Commonwealth v. Humberto H., a juvenile (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-193-13)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC‑11297 COMMONWEALTH vs. HUMBERTO H., a juvenile. Suffolk. September 9, 2013. ‑ November 26, 2013. Present: Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Gants, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ. Controlled Substances. Probable Cause. Juvenile Court, Delinquent child. Supreme Judicial Court, Jurisdiction. Evidence, Juvenile delinquency, Intent. Intent. Practice, Criminal, Juvenile delinquency proceeding, Complaint, Dismissal, Arraignment, Judicial discretion. Complaint received and sworn to in the Suffolk County Division of the Juvenile Court Department on January 24, 2011. A motion to dismiss was heard by Leslie E. Harris, J. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. Donna Jalbert Patalano, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. Emily A. Cardy, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for the juvenile. Robert E. McDonnell, Deana K. El-Mallawany, & Nathaniel P. Bruhn, for American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief. GANTS, J. A Juvenile Court judge allowed the juvenile’s motion to dismiss a delinquency complaint charging one count of possession of a class D substance (marijuana) with intent to distribute after concluding that the complaint was not supported by probable cause that the juvenile intended to distribute the marijuana in his possession. The judge declared that, where a complaint is to be dismissed, he believed it “offensive to arraign a child . . . just to put it on the child’s record,” but concluded that he was obliged to arraign the juvenile before dismissing the complaint. The Commonwealth appealed the dismissal of the complaint. We affirm the judge’s dismissal of the delinquency complaint, concluding that the information in the complaint application fell short of probable cause to believe that the juvenile intended to distribute the marijuana in his possession. We also declare that a Juvenile Court judge, in his or her discretion, may allow a motion to dismiss before the arraignment of a juvenile where the judge concludes that prearraignment dismissal is in both the best interests of the child and the interests of justice., Background. We describe the facts as set forth in the police incident report filed in support of the application for the complaint. On January 24, 2011, a Boston school police officer and the dean of discipline (dean) of a Boston high school were posted at the back door of the high school’s cafeteria, monitoring students who […]
Beatty’s Case (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-140-13)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 12‑P‑1586 Appeals Court FRANCIS BEATTY’S CASE (and four companion cases[1]). No. 12‑P‑1586. Suffolk. May 10, 2013. ‑ November 26, 2013. Present: Cohen, Graham, & Fecteau, JJ. Workers’ Compensation Act, Reimbursement of insurer, Cost of living allowance. Limitations, Statute of. Practice, Civil, Statute of limitations. Statute, Construction. Administrative Law, Regulations. Regulation. Appeal from a decision of the Industrial Accident Reviewing Board. Kirk G. Hanson, Assistant Attorney General, for Workers’ Compensation Trust Fund. John J. Canniff for the employer. GRAHAM, J. At issue is whether a two-year limitations period, established by a regulation of the Department of Industrial Accidents (department), see 452 Code Mass. Regs. § 3.03(3) (1999), should be applied to bar certain claims of Harvard University (Harvard), a self-insurer, for reimbursement of cost of living adjustments (COLA) from the Workers’ Compensation Trust Fund (Fund), pursuant to G. L. c. 152, § 34B, as amended by St. 1991, c. 398, § 61. The Fund appeals from a decision of the department’s reviewing board (board), declining to enforce the regulation. We reverse the board’s decision. Background. General Laws c. 152, § 34B, provides that any person receiving workers’ compensation benefits under G. L. c. 152, § 31 or § 34A, also receive an additional benefit in an amount intended to protect the employee from the effects of inflation. See Sliski’s Case, 424 Mass. 126, 135 (1997). The statute requires that insurers pay these COLA supplemental benefits (COLA benefits) concurrently with the employee’s base benefits. Relevant here, insurers paying COLA benefits to employees whose injuries occurred on or before October 1, 1986, are entitled to be reimbursed for those amounts from the Fund, so long as the insured employer participates in the assessment provisions that supply the revenues for the Fund, pursuant to c. 152, § 65. On July 22, 2010, Harvard filed claims seeking reimbursement from the Fund for COLA benefits it paid to five employees, Francis Beatty, Maria Carvalho, Adolphus Gordon, Helena Raposo, and Francis Yebba, from July 1, 2005, through June 30, 2010. The Fund denied Harvard’s claims for reimbursement for COLA benefits Harvard paid from July 1, 2005, through July 21, 2008, as those payments were made more than two years before Harvard filed its claims for reimbursement. A department regulation, 452 Code Mass. Regs. § 3.03(3) (regulation), provided for reimbursement only for petitions made within two […]
Commonwealth v. Joyce (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-141-13)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 12‑P‑1380 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. SHAWN P. JOYCE. No. 12‑P‑1380. Essex. September 17, 2013. ‑ November 26, 2013. Present: Kafker, Trainor, & Maldonado, JJ. Arrest. Resisting Arrest. Evidence, Intent. Intent. Wilful, Wanton, or Reckless Conduct. Fire Fighter. Complaint received and sworn to in the Newburyport Division of the District Court Department on April 13, 2011. The case was heard by Michael A. Uhlarik, J. Leslie B. Salter for the defendant. Paul C. Wagoner, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. KAFKER, J. After shouting obscenities at the fire chief and police officers responding to a fire at his home, ignoring their orders, and wrestling with them inside the burning building, the defendant, Shawn P. Joyce, was convicted of wilfully interfering with a fire fighter in the performance of his duty, see G. L. c. 268, § 32A, and resisting arrest, see G. L. c. 268, § 32B. He argues on appeal that there was insufficient evidence for the judge to find him guilty of either offense. We affirm. Background. The evidence at the bench trial was as follows. At about 8:00 P.M. on April 12, 2011, neighbors discovered a fire at 69 Pearson Drive in the Byfield section of Newbury, where the defendant lived with his mother, his dog, and several “feral” cats. The blaze already had engulfed at least one side of the home, and flames were rising fifty feet high. After telephoning 911, two neighbors, one of whom was a nurse, ran to the house, calling out to determine whether the defendant and his mother were safe. These neighbors found the defendant and his mother outside the house and witnessed him cursing and pounding the trunk of his car. When the neighbors managed to attract the defendant’s attention, he shouted threats and profanity at them and chased them off the property. Shortly thereafter, Newbury police Officer Stephen Smith arrived at the burning home.[1] As Smith walked up the driveway, the defendant briskly approached him and began swearing at him and blaming him for a number of misfortunes, including the likely death of family pets in the fire. Observing that the defendant was out of control, Smith ordered him to stay back. The defendant responded by continuing to shout obscenities and by walking back toward the house. Despite the […]
Diamond Group, Inc. v. Selective Distribution International, Inc. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-139-13)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 12‑P‑864 Appeals Court Diamond Group, Inc. vs. Selective Distribution International, Inc. No. 12‑P‑864. Middlesex. January 8, 2013. ‑ November 25, 2013. Present: Graham, Grainger, & Sikora, JJ. Jurisdiction, Personal, Long‑arm statute, Forum non conveniens. Constitutional Law. Due Process of Law. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on October 19, 2009. A motion to dismiss was heard by Daniel M. Wrenn, J. Scott P. Fink for the plaintiff. Leonard M. Singer for the defendant. SIKORA, J. This appeal presents a question of the jurisdiction of the Massachusetts courts over a business corporation located exclusively in New York State. The plaintiff, Diamond Group, Inc. (Diamond), is a wholesale distributor of perfume products; its sole business location lies in Newton, Massachusetts. The defendant, Selective Distribution International, Inc. (Selective), is a distributor of fragrances, cosmetics, and beauty aids and accessories to retailers; its sole location lies in Jericho (Long Island), New York. Diamond brought suit against Selective in Superior Court for nonpayment for goods sold and delivered. It alleged that, over a period of twenty-one months, it had sold perfume products to Selective of a value of $ 995,692.35, but that Selective had failed to pay a balance due of $ 529,689.70. Diamond pleaded claims of breach of contract, quantum meruit entitlement, and unfair or deceptive conduct within the meaning of G. L. c. 93A, §§ 2 and 11. If proven, the wrongful nonpayment for more than half a million dollars worth of perfume would constitute conduct in fragrante delicto. However, this appeal does not require a decision of that ultimate question. It requires instead the determination whether the Massachusetts courts have jurisdiction to entertain the claim. In response to Diamond’s complaint, Selective moved under Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction or, alternatively, forum non conveniens. After supplementation of the allegations of the verified complaint by affidavits and appended exhibits by both parties, and after submission of extensive memoranda of law, a judge of the Superior Court concluded that Massachusetts courts lacked personal jurisdiction over Selective and entered judgment of dismissal. For the following reasons, we now reverse. Background. These undisputed facts emerge from the verified complaint, the parties’ affidavits, and their attached exhibits. Each of the corporate parties in this case is primarily a one-man […]
Categories: News Tags: 1113913, Diamond, Distribution, Group, Inc., International, Lawyers, Selective, Weekly
Commonwealth v. Bradley (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-190-13)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC‑11457 COMMONWEALTH vs. ZACHARY D. BRADLEY. Berkshire. October 7, 2013. ‑ November 21, 2013. Present: Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ. “School Zone” Statute. Statute, Emergency law, Retroactive application, Amendment. Due Process, Retroactive application of statute. Complaints received and sworn to in the Northern Berkshire Division of the District Court Department on December 30, 2010. A question of law was reported to the Appeals Court by Paul M. Vrabel, J. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. Stephen N. Pagnotta for the defendant. John P. Bosse, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. GANTS, J. On November 8, 2010, Williamstown police officers executed a search warrant at the defendant’s dormitory room and seized a quantity of marijuana. The dormitory room was approximately 700 feet from the Williams College Children’s Center, an accredited preschool facility. The defendant was charged by criminal complaint in the District Court with possession of a class D substance (marijuana) with intent to distribute, in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32C (a), committing this violation within 1,000 feet of a preschool facility, in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32J, commonly known as a “school zone” violation. On August 2, 2012, the Governor signed into law St. 2012, c. 192, entitled “An Act relative to sentencing and improving law enforcement tools” (Crime Bill), which contained an emergency preamble that made it effective on enactment. Section 30 of the Crime Bill amended G. L. c. 94C, § 32J, by reducing the radius of the school zone from 1,000 feet to 300 feet. The defendant moved to dismiss the school zone violation, claiming that § 30 of the Crime Bill applies to all cases alleging a school zone violation that had not been adjudicated before August 2, 2012, and that his alleged violation occurred outside the amended school zone. The judge reported without decision the following question to the Appeals Court: “Whether [St. 2012, c. 192, § 30], which reduces the radius of the Drug-Free School Zone from 1,000 feet to 300 feet, should be applied retroactively to an offense that occurred prior to the effective date of the amendment, but for which the Defendant had been charged but not adjudicated on the effective date of the amendment?” We allowed the defendant’s application for direct appellate […]
Commonwealth v. Pagan (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-191-13)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC‑11456 COMMONWEALTH vs. NOEL PAGAN. November 21, 2013. “School Zone” Statute. Statute, Emergency law, Retroactive application, Amendment. Due Process, Retroactive application of statute. On August 19, 2009, Marlborough police officers executed a search warrant at the defendant’s residence and discovered a quantity of cocaine and drug-dealing paraphernalia. The defendant’s residence was located approximately 700 feet from an accredited preschool facility. The next day, the defendant was charged by criminal complaint in the District Court with possession of a class B substance (cocaine) with intent to distribute, in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32A (a); and committing this violation of § 32A (a) within 1,000 feet of a preschool facility, in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32J, commonly known as a “school zone” violation. On August 2, 2012, the Governor signed into law St. 2012, c. 192, entitled “An Act relative to sentencing and improving law enforcement tools” (Crime Bill), which contained an emergency preamble that made it effective immediately on enactment. Section 30 of the Crime Bill amended G. L. c. 94C, § 32J, by reducing the radius of the school zone from 1,000 feet to 300 feet. On September 13, 2012, the defendant moved to dismiss the school zone violation, claiming that § 30 of the Crime Bill applies to all cases alleging a school zone violation that had not been adjudicated before August 2, 2012, and that his alleged violation occurred outside the amended school zone.[1] The judge initially allowed the defendant’s motion to dismiss but reconsidered his decision on motion of the Commonwealth and issued a new order denying the motion to dismiss. The judge later reported the following question to the Appeals Court: “Are violations of G. L. c. 94C[, § 32J,] that occur prior to August 2, 2012, the effective date of the Crime Bill, governed by the element of the cause in effect at the time of the offense or at the time of trial”? We allowed the defendant’s application for direct appellate review. The reported question is effectively the same as that asked in the case of Commonwealth v. Bradley, ante (2013), which we paired for oral argument with this case, and our answer is the same. Section 30 of St. 2012, c. 192, applies to all cases alleging a school zone violation for which a guilty plea had not been […]
Commonwealth v. Lee (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-192-13)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC‑11443 COMMONWEALTH vs. JOSEPH A. LEE. November 21, 2013. Motor Vehicle, Operation, License to operate, Operating under the influence. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, Records, Revocation of license to operate. Due Process of Law, Suspension of driver’s license. Following a jury-waived trial, the defendant was convicted of operating a motor vehicle after his license had been suspended for operating while under the influence of alcohol (OUI) pursuant to G. L. c. 90, § 23, third par. The trial judge sentenced him to sixty days in a house of correction and stayed the sentence pending his direct appeal. His appeal then proceeded in the Appeals Court, where he raised two issues: (1) that the admission of certain documents from the registry of motor vehicles (registry) without live testimony from a registry employee violated his right under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution to confront witnesses against him; and (2) that the Commonwealth failed to prove that he had violated G. L. c. 90, § 23, third par., which governs operating a motor vehicle after suspension of a license on the basis of an OUI, and that the judge therefore erred in imposing a sixty-day sentence. Instead, in the defendant’s view, the judge should have sentenced him pursuant to G. L. c. 90, § 23, first par., which governs operating a motor vehicle after suspension of a license (where the suspension is not based on an OUI) and which provides for a lesser sentence.[1] The Appeals Court affirmed the conviction. See Commonwealth v. Lee, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 1109 (2013). The case is now before this court on further appellate review. Background. The defendant’s license was suspended in June, 2009, for a period of two years following two OUI offenses — an OUI offense that occurred in Massachusetts in 2007, and an OUI offense that occurred in New Hampshire in 2008. In September, 2009, the defendant was operating a motor vehicle in Chelmsford and was stopped by a State police officer. He was thereafter charged in a complaint with violating G. L. c. 90, § 23. More specifically, the complaint stated that the defendant had operated a motor vehicle after his license had been suspended “pursuant to a violation of G. L. c. 90, §§ 24(1)(a), 24D, 24E, 24G, 24L or 24N, or of G. L. c. 90B, §§ 8(a), first par., 8A or 8B,” in violation of G. L. c. 90, § 23, […]
Categories: News Tags: 1019213, Commonwealth, Lawyers, Weekly
Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 29481 v. Sex Offender Registry Board (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-138-13)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 11‑P‑1700 Appeals Court JOHN DOE, SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD NO. 29481 vs. SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD. No. 11‑P‑1700. Suffolk. September 12, 2013. ‑ November 21, 2013. Present: Green, Grainger, & Fecteau, JJ. Sex Offender. Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act. Administrative Law, Hearing. Evidence, Bias. Due Process of Law, Administrative hearing. Constitutional Law, Impartial tribunal. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on January 22, 2009. The case was heard by Frank M. Gaziano, J., on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, and a motion to vacate the denial of the motion for judgment on the pleadings was heard by Peter M. Lauriat, J. Xiomara M. Hernandez for the plaintiff. Thomas M. Doyle for the defendant. FECTEAU, J. The plaintiff appeals from a Superior Court judgment that affirmed the denial of his request for expert funds and affirmed the final decision of the Sex Offender Registry Board (board) which, after a de novo hearing, ordered the plaintiff to register as a level three (high risk) offender. On appeal, the plaintiff essentially argues that (1) the hearing examiner’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence, (2) a remand for a new hearing is necessary due to the bias of the hearing examiner, and (3) a remand is also required because it was an abuse of discretion to deny his motion for funds to obtain expert evidence to explain that he poses a lower risk of recidivism because of mental illness and his age (fifty-eight at the time of the hearing). Due to the bias of the hearing examiner, the decision of the board must be vacated and the plaintiff must be afforded a new classification hearing. 1. Background. On December 17, 1997, the plaintiff pleaded guilty to two counts of rape of a child, two counts of indecent assault and battery on a child under age fourteen, and two counts of incest, and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of eight to twelve years in State prison. In addition, he was placed on probation for a period of twelve years to be served concurrently with his direct sentence. These offenses were all committed against his daughter over the course of several months, until she was thirteen years of age. The plaintiff does not challenge […]
Associated Industries of Massachusetts Mutual Insurance Company v. Hough (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-137-13)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 12‑P‑1927 Appeals Court ASSOCIATED INDUSTRIES OF MASSACHUSETTS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY vs. SHAWN HOUGH. No. 12‑P‑1927. Middlesex. September 10, 2013. ‑ November 19, 2013. Present: Rapoza, C.J., Wolohojian, & Milkey, JJ. Workers’ Compensation Act, Attorney’s fees. Practice, Civil, Attorney’s fees. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on July 21, 2008. A motion for attorney’s fees and costs was heard by S. Jane Haggerty, J. Teresa Brooks Benoit for the defendant. Holly B. Anderson for the plaintiff. MILKEY, J. Pursuant to G. L. c. 152, § 11D(3), an insurer brought an action in Superior Court against Shawn Hough, seeking to recoup excess workers’ compensation benefits it had paid to him. Hough successfully defended against that action, and the sole question raised by this appeal is whether he is thereby entitled to attorney’s fees. Because we agree with the Superior Court judge that the answer is “no,” we affirm. Background. Hough was employed by Athol Table, LLC. Based on a 2002 workplace incident, Hough sought workers’ compensation benefits. By decision dated September 29, 2006, an administrative judge of the Department of Industrial Accidents (DIA) ultimately ruled in favor of the employer’s insurer, Associated Industries of Massachusetts Mutual Insurance Company (insurer). Although the administrative judge determined that Hough suffered from a permanent disability, she concluded that he failed to demonstrate that his disability was causally related to the 2002 incident. Hough initially pursued, but then abandoned, an appeal. Accordingly, the correctness of the administrative judge’s decision is not before us. Subsequent to the administrative judge’s decision, the insurer filed an action in Superior Court pursuant to G. L. c. 152, § 11D(3), seeking to recoup the partial incapacity benefits that it had been ordered to pay by an earlier conference order. After trial, a Superior Court judge allowed Hough’s motion for a required finding based on his inability to pay. The insurer does not challenge that ruling; in fact, the insurer acknowledged Hough’s inability to pay after the close of evidence. Having successfully defended against the recoupment action, Hough argued that he was entitled to attorney’s fees. Unable to identify a statute that expressly authorizes fee shifting in this specific context, Hough relied “by analogy” on various fee-shifting provisions set forth in G. L. c. 152, the workers’ compensation act (act). Discerning no statutory basis […]
Categories: News Tags: 1113713, Associated, Company, Hough, Industries, Insurance, Lawyers, massachusetts, Mutual, Weekly
Commonwealth v. Berrios (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-136-13)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 11‑P‑1426 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. ANGEL D. BERRIOS, JR. No. 11‑P‑1426. Essex. April 10, 2013. ‑ November 19, 2013. Present: Trainor, Graham, & Wolohojian, JJ. Sex Offender. Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act. Parole. Practice, Criminal, Complaint, Admission to sufficient facts to warrant finding, Continuance without a finding, Sentence, Parole. District Court, Jurisdiction. Complaints received and sworn to in the Lawrence Division of the District Court Department on January 16, 2007, and May 2, 2008. A motion to revise and revoke sentence, following an admission to sufficient facts and a continuance without a finding, was heard by Thomas M. Brennan, J.; a motion for release from unlawful restraint was also heard by him; and a motion to terminate probation was heard by Michael J. Brooks, J. A motion to vacate a stay of sentence was allowed in this court by Katzmann, J., and a motion for reconsideration was considered by Cohen, J. Nicole M. Procida for the defendant. Catherine Langevin Semel, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. TRAINOR, J. The defendant appeals from the denial of his motion for release from unlawful restraint, which challenged, as illegal, the imposition of community parole supervision for life (CPSL). This case presents two issues for our review and determination: first, whether the defendant waived his right to challenge the sufficiency of the criminal complaints by admitting to sufficient facts; second, whether CPSL could legally be imposed on the defendant for failing to register where he received a continuance without a finding (CWOF) rather than a conviction. We affirm. Factual and procedural background. The defendant, a level two sex offender as a result of having previously been adjudicated delinquent for rape of a child with force, was required to report annually to the Lawrence police department for verification of his required personal information. On December 19, 2006, the Lawrence police department mailed the defendant a letter mandating that he report to the station on January 10, 2007, in order to complete his verification. The defendant did not appear on that day; nor did he return any of the department’s telephone calls over the following week. On January 19, the defendant was arrested for failing to register. After this initial complaint was issued, the district attorney’s office learned that the […]