Commonwealth v. Amran (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-073-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11686 COMMONWEALTH vs. ASIM AMRAN. Worcester. February 6, 2015. – April 30, 2015. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, & Hines, JJ. Homicide. Evidence, Photograph, Inflammatory evidence. Jury and Jurors. Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Mistrial, Instructions to jury, Assistance of counsel, Jury and jurors, Deliberation of jury, Voir dire. Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court Department on November 20, 2009. The case was tried before Janet Kenton-Walker, J. Leslie W. O’Brien for the defendant. Stephen J. Carley, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. SPINA, J. The defendant was convicted of killing his wife with deliberate premeditation. On appeal he alleges error in (1) the admission of photographs prejudicially depicting the victim’s body in an advanced state of decomposition, and lacking any relevance to any issue at trial; (2) the failure to grant a mistrial after the medical examiner testified that the victim’s death was a homicide, when the defense was that it was a suicide; (3) the admission of the defendant’s statement to police with no redactions of (i) inadmissible accusations by police, (ii) assertions that police had inculpatory evidence that was not presented to the jury, and (iii) hearsay; and (4) the failure to conduct a voir dire of jurors after at least one juror had been exposed to prejudicial extraneous material. We affirm the conviction and decline to exercise our powers under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 1. Background. The jury could have found the following facts. We reserve additional details for discussion of particular issues. The defendant and the victim were married in Pakistan in 2003 or 2004. The marriage was arranged by the defendant’s family. Shortly after the marriage, the defendant, an American citizen, returned to the United States with the victim. She spoke no English and did not drive. She was entirely dependent on the defendant’s family for companionship and transportation. The couple had a son with whom the victim was very close. The couple came under stress after the defendant lost a lucrative job. They began arguing and discussed separating. In 2008, their financial circumstances forced them to move to an apartment owned by the defendant’s parents in Fitchburg. That year the defendant obtained employment as a staff nurse at a nursing home in Tewksbury. One of his responsibilities included […]
Britton v. Board of Bar Examiners (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-074-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11703 RANDY A. BRITTON vs. BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS. April 30, 2015. Board of Bar Examiners. Attorney at Law, Admission to practice. On May 12, 2006, Randy A. Britton applied for admission to the Massachusetts bar, and he took and passed the written bar examination in July of that year. Based on information in his application, including his responses to questions concerning his employment history and involvement in litigation, and the pendency of his application for admission to the Connecticut bar, the Board of Bar Examiners (board) interviewed Britton and then stayed further investigation pending a final determination on the Connecticut application. After Britton withdrew that application, the board resumed its investigation, appointed special counsel to assist in the investigation, and thereafter conducted a hearing to inquire whether Britton “is of good moral character and sufficient acquirements and qualifications” to warrant his admission to the bar. G. L. c. 221, § 37. See S.J.C. Rule 3:01, § 5.1, as appearing in 411 Mass. 1321 (1992). Britton was the sole witness at the hearing. The board determined that he was not qualified for admission and recommended that the petition be dismissed. S.J.C. Rule 3:01, § 5.3, as appearing in 411 Mass. 1321 (1992). Britton petitioned the county court for a hearing on his application, raising a variety of constitutional, statutory, and other challenges to the board’s decision. After a hearing, a single justice issued a very thorough memorandum in which he carefully addressed and rejected each of Britton’s challenges. The single justice thus denied Britton’s application and dismissed his petition. We affirm for essentially the same reasons stated by the single justice. 1. Facts. In his application, Britton disclosed that he had been “wrongfully terminated” by two employers, and that he had brought multiple lawsuits involving separate incidents against former employers, attorneys, police officers, and a media outlet alleging, among other things, wrongful termination, violation of civil rights, defamation, breach of contract, malicious prosecution, and abuse of process. In addition, he reported that his application for admission to the Connecticut bar had been pending since 2004. The board’s investigation revealed additional involvement with the legal system and other matters, which he had failed to disclose in his application. a. Failures to disclose. In support of his application, Britton submitted three letters of recommendation. One of those letters was from an attorney […]
Goudreault v. Nine (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-041-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 14-P-359 Appeals Court BARBARA GOUDREAULT vs. ERIK NINE. No. 14-P-359. Essex. December 8, 2014. – April 30, 2015. Present: Grainger, Agnes, & Sullivan, JJ. Medical Malpractice, Tribunal, Expert opinion. Negligence, Medical malpractice, Doctor, Expert opinion, Causation. Doctor. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on October 30, 2012. A motion to dismiss was heard by Richard E. Welch, III, J. Barrie E. Duchesneau for the plaintiff. Allyson N. Hammerstedt for the defendant. AGNES, J. The plaintiff, Barbara Goudreault, filed a medical malpractice suit alleging that on February 7, 2011, the defendant radiologist Erik Nine, M.D., failed to properly interpret her mammogram results and recommend necessary follow-up tests, delaying her breast cancer diagnosis and worsening her prognosis. In accordance with G. L. c. 231, § 60B, the matter was referred to a medical malpractice tribunal, with the only issue being that of causation. After a hearing, the tribunal concluded that there was insufficient evidence “to raise a legitimate question of liability appropriate for judicial inquiry.” G. L. c. 231, § 60B, inserted by St. 1975, c. 362, § 5.[1] For the reasons that follow, we reverse. Background. We first set out the evidence before the tribunal, in the light most favorable to Goudreault. See Cooper v. Cooper-Ciccarelli, 77 Mass. App. Ct. 86, 91 (2010). a. Course of diagnosis and treatment. On July 26, 2010, Goudreault went to Anna Jaques Hospital for a routine bilateral screening mammogram, which was found to be abnormal. The reporting doctor (not the defendant) concluded, relevantly here, that “[i]n the left lower outer breast there [was] a [one-centimeter] ovoid well-defined nodule which [was] new compared to the prior studies,” adjacent to which was, in the left upper outer breast, a “small cluster [of] microcalcifications . . . associated with a small well defined density.” The doctor recommended a bilateral breast ultrasound, spot compression mammograms and true lateral mammograms of both breasts, and magnification mammograms of the left upper outer breast. The doctor’s report assessed Goudreault in “category 0″ — “need[s] additional imaging evaluation.” Complying with the recommendation, four days later, on July 30, 2010, Goudreault returned for the diagnostic mammograms and ultrasound. The same doctor (again, not the defendant) reported the findings, which included that “[t]he microcalcifications in the left upper outer breast are two in number and are both rounded. This is not worrisome appearance but they […]
Starks v. Commonwealth (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-072-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11735 TREVELL STARKS vs. COMMONWEALTH. April 29, 2015. Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. Practice, Criminal, Sentence, Appellate Division. Trevell Starks (petitioner) appeals from a judgment of a single justice of this court denying relief on his petition filed pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3. We affirm. The petition concerns the sentences imposed on the petitioner on June 5, 2012, in the Superior Court following his convictions of assault and battery on a police officer (two counts), resisting arrest, disturbing the peace, and disorderly conduct. He was sentenced to two consecutive terms of two and one-half years each in a house of correction on the convictions of assault and battery on a police officer. He received a consecutive suspended sentence of two and one-half years in a house of correction on the resisting arrest conviction, and terms of probation on the remaining convictions. More than twenty months later, on February 28, 2014, the petitioner filed a motion with the Appellate Division of the Superior Court requesting that the Appellate Division accept an appeal of his house of correction sentences. See G. L. c. 278, §§ 28A-28C. He claimed that failure to accept the appeal would violate his rights under art. 1 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Appellate Division denied the petitioner’s motion. His petition under G. L. c. 211, § 3, followed.[1] General Laws c. 278, § 28A, limits the jurisdiction of the Appellate Division to the “review of sentences to the state prison imposed by final judgments in criminal cases . . . and [to] the review of sentences to the reformatory for women for terms of more than five years imposed by final judgments in such criminal cases.” The petitioner contends that G. L. c. 278, § 28A, violates equal protection guarantees because it permits both men and women to appeal State prison sentences to the Appellate Division and, on its face, permits women to appeal sentences to a reformatory for women for terms exceeding five years, but has no comparable provision for men sentenced to a house of correction for more than five years. We rejected a similar argument in Commonwealth v. Alfonso, 449 Mass. 738 (2007), and, for essentially the same reasons, reject the petitioner’s argument here. The historic distinction “between felony sentences to the reformatory for women […]
Resolute Management Inc., et al. v. Transatlantic Reinsurance Company, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-040-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 14-P-573 Appeals Court RESOLUTE MANAGEMENT INC. & another[1] vs. TRANSATLANTIC REINSURANCE COMPANY & another.[2] No. 14-P-573. Suffolk. November 13, 2014. – April 29, 2015. Present: Green, Wolohojian, & Blake, JJ. Practice, Civil, Motion to dismiss. Consumer Protection Act, Businessman’s claim. Contract, Reinsurance agreement, Interference with contractual relations. Conflict of Laws. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on April 30, 2013. A motion to dismiss was heard by Thomas P. Billings, J. Bryce L. Friedman, of New York (Kevin O’Connor with him) for the plaintiffs. John N. Thomas, of New York (Ben T. Clements with him) for the defendants. GREEN, J. The plaintiffs appeal from a judgment of dismissal entered in Superior Court following the allowance of the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974).[3] The complaint asserted claims of tortious interference with contractual relations and violation of G. L. c. 93A. We conclude that the judge correctly dismissed the claims of Resolute Management Inc. (Resolute) for tortious interference with contractual relations as Resolute is not a party to the contracts at issue. However, we conclude that the allegations of the complaint do not establish as a matter of law that the plaintiffs cannot maintain a cause of action under G. L. c. 93A, or whether New York or Massachusetts law should apply to the claims of National Indemnity Company (National) for tortious interference with contractual relations. We accordingly reverse so much of the judgment as dismisses the plaintiffs’ c. 93A claims and National’s claims for tortious interference with contractual relations. Background. We summarize the facts alleged in the plaintiffs’ complaint which, for purposes of our review of the defendants’ motion to dismiss, we accept as true, construing all reasonable inferences from those facts in the plaintiffs’ favor. See Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636 (2008). National, a Nebraska corporation with a principal place of business in Nebraska, is an eligible surplus lines insurer and reinsurer in the Commonwealth whose business includes issuing reinsurance contracts and contracting to manage asbestos-related personal injury claims for Massachusetts-based insurers. National’s business, in part, is to enter contracts with other insurers’ clients, pursuant to which it (or Resolute, as National’s agent) resolves claims against those other insurers and collects reinsurance. In 2001, National entered into an […]
Categories: News Tags: 1104015, Company, Inc., Lawyers, Management, Reinsurance, Resolute, Transatlantic, Weekly
In the Matter of Simkin (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-071-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11750 IN THE MATTER OF JAY EDWARD SIMKIN. April 29, 2015. Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. Board of Bar Overseers. Practice, Civil, Standing. Jay Edward Simkin filed a petition in the county court alleging that certain attorneys had committed breaches of the rules of professional conduct in connection with proceedings involving the revocation and reinstatement of his license to carry firearms. He requested that this court enter findings to that effect, which, he claimed, would lead to bar counsel’s reconsideration of her decision not to pursue his complaints against the attorneys. The record indicates that the Board of Bar Overseers (board) reviewed bar counsel’s decision not to take further action. A single justice denied Simkin’s petition without a hearing, reasoning that an “individual who files a complaint with the board lacks standing to challenge in a court action the board’s decision not to prosecute the complaint.” Simpkin appeals.[1] The single justice properly denied relief because, regardless of the mechanism employed, a private individual cannot prosecute a judicial action for attorney discipline. “There simply is no such private right of action.” Matter of a Request for an Investigation of an Attorney, 449 Mass. 1013, 1014 (2007) (complainant may not “commence a judicial action challenging bar counsel’s decision and seek a judicial order compelling bar counsel to act in a certain way”). That is essentially what Simkin seeks to accomplish here. He filed complaints with the board, as was his right; bar counsel investigated but declined to pursue them; and, after review, the board determined not to proceed. Simkin has no further standing in the matter. See id. See also Ellis, petitioner, 460 Mass. 1020, 1021 (2011). Judgment affirmed. The case was submitted on the papers filed, accompanied by a memorandum of law. Jay Edward Simkin, pro se. [1] Simkin filed a memorandum and appendix pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:21, as amended, 434 Mass. 1301 (2001). That rule does not apply here because Simkin’s petition does not challenge an “interlocutory ruling in the trial court.” Id. It is evident from his submission and from the papers in the county court, however, that he has no standing to maintain the action. Full-text Opinions
Forlizzi, et al. v. Commonwealth (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-070-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11746 DAVID FORLIZZI & another[1] vs. COMMONWEALTH. April 28, 2015. Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. Practice, Criminal, Interlocutory appeal. David Forlizzi and Fred Battista appeal from a judgment of a single justice of this court denying their petition pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3. The petition sought relief from the orders of a Superior Court judge denying their motions to dismiss indictments and from the judge’s decision not to conduct an evidentiary hearing on their motions. The single justice denied the petition. We affirm. Background. Forlizzi has been indicted on charges of obstruction of justice, in violation of G. L. c. 268, § 13B; three counts of corruption of a witness, in violation of G. L. c. 268A, § 2 (c); three counts of subornation of perjury, in violation of G. L. c. 268, § 2; and multiple counts of conspiracy to violate those same laws, G. L. c. 274, § 7. He also has been indicted as a habitual offender, in violation of G. L. c. 279, § 25. Battista faces similar charges. These indictments arise out of the petitioners’ alleged misconduct in connection with a prior trial involving alleged insurance fraud. In the Superior Court, Forlizzi (joined by Battista) moved to dismiss the indictments, alleging that, during the investigation leading to the indictments, the Commonwealth had engaged in prosecutorial misconduct. They claimed that the Commonwealth caused the grand jury to subpoena the bank records of trial counsel in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.8 (f), 426 Mass. 1397 (1998), and that the Attorney General improperly obtained counsels’ tax records though the insurance fraud bureau. A Superior Court judge denied the motion, concluding that the proscription of rule 3.8 (f) does not apply to third-party record holders such as banking institutions, but that the mechanism used by the prosecutors to obtain the attorneys’ tax records constituted overreaching. The judge determined, however, that dismissal of the indictments as a sanction was not warranted in the circumstances. Forlizzi thereafter filed a second motion to dismiss, which also was denied. The judge reasoned that Forlizzi “has not demonstrated that the Commonwealth engaged in conduct designed to interfere with [his] . . . right [under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution] to counsel of choice, nor has he persuaded the [c]ourt that an evidentiary hearing would likely produce evidence to establish his claim.” […]
Commonwealth v. Canning (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-069-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11773 COMMONWEALTH vs. JOSIAH H. CANNING. Barnstable. January 8, 2015. – April 27, 2015. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Marijuana. Medicine. Controlled Substances. Search and Seizure, Warrant, Affidavit, Probable cause. Probable Cause. Practice, Criminal, Warrant, Affidavit, Motion to suppress. License. Complaint received and sworn to in the Orleans Division of the District Court Department on May 30, 2013. A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Brian R. Merrick, J. An application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory appeal was allowed by Gants, J., in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk, and the case was reported by him to the Appeals Court. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. Elizabeth A. Sweeney, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. Richard F. Comenzo for the defendant. The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: John M. Collins for Massachusetts Chiefs of Police Association, Inc. Paul R. Rudof, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for Daniel J. Chao & another. Steven S. Epstein & Marvin Cable for National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Law. BOTSFORD, J. We consider here for the first time the Commonwealth’s new medical marijuana law, “An Act for the humanitarian medical use of marijuana,” St. 2012, c. 369 (act), which the voters approved in November, 2012.[1] The central question presented is whether, with the act in effect, police may obtain a search warrant to search a property where they suspect an individual is cultivating marijuana by establishing probable cause that cultivation is taking place or are required to establish probable cause to believe that the individual was not registered, or licensed, to do so. In accord with cases relating to other types of license regimes, we conclude that, if police seek a warrant to search such a property for evidence of illegal marijuana possession or cultivation, they must offer information sufficient to provide probable cause to believe the individual is not properly registered under the act to possess or cultivate the suspected substance. In this case, a judge in the District Court allowed the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized by police during a search of the defendant’s property conducted pursuant to a warrant in May of 2013, after the act went into effect. We agree with the […]
Sebago, et al. v. Boston Cab Dispatch, Inc., et al. (and a consolidated case) (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-068-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11757 BERNARD SEBAGO & others[1] vs. BOSTON CAB DISPATCH, INC., & others[2] (and a consolidated case[3]). Suffolk. January 8, 2015. – April 21, 2015. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, & Hines, JJ. Taxicab. Independent Contractor Act. Massachusetts Wage Act. Minimum Wage. Tips. Labor, Wages, Minimum wage, Overtime compensation. Civil actions commenced in the Superior Court Department on March 6 and September 14, 2012. After consolidation, the case was heard by Linda E. Giles, J., on motions for summary judgment, and the case was reported by her to the Appeals Court. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. Shannon Liss-Riordan (Adelaide Pagano with her) for Bernard Sebago. Andrew Good (Philip G. Cormier with him) for Edward J. Tutunjian. Albert A. DeNapoli (Emily C. Shanahan with him) for USA Taxi Association, Inc. Nathan L. Kaitz, for John Byda, was present but did not argue. The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: Norman M. Leon, of Illinois, & Matthew Iverson for International Franchise Association. Nicole Horberg Decter & Don Siegel for Massachusetts AFL-CIO. Stevan Johnson, pro se. Helen G. Litsas, Special Assistant Corporation Counsel, for city of Boston. CORDY, J. In this case, we must determine whether licensed taxicab drivers in the city of Boston (city) may be classified properly as independent contractors, see G. L. c. 149, § 148B (independent contractor statute), in accordance with Boston Police Department Rule 403, Hackney Carriage Rules and Flat Rate Handbook (2008) (Rule 403). Rule 403 is a comprehensive set of regulations for the Boston taxicab industry, promulgated by the city’s police commissioner (commissioner) pursuant to an express delegation of authority by the Legislature. St. 1930, c. 392, as amended by St. 1931, c. 408, § 7, and St. 1934, c. 280. The plaintiffs in these consolidated cases, Bernard Sebago, Pierre Duchemin, Ahmed Farah, and Yves Bien-Aime, are licensed taxicab drivers in the city. They contend that they were employees of the defendants but were misclassified as independent contractors, thereby depriving them of minimum wages, overtime pay, tips, and the protections afforded by the Wage Act, G. L. c. 149, § 148. The defendants include taxicab owners, radio associations, and a taxicab garage. They argue that their relationships with the plaintiffs must be considered in the context of Rule 403, which explicitly permits drivers to […]
Commonwealth v. Pacheco (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-039-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 13-P-1821 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. MICHAEL PACHECO. No. 13-P-1821. Bristol. December 4, 2014. – April 17, 2015. Present: Cohen, Fecteau, & Massing, JJ. Constitutional Law, Waiver of constitutional rights by juvenile, Admissions and confessions. Practice, Criminal, Motion to suppress, Admissions and confessions, Waiver. Waiver. Complaint received and sworn to in the Bristol County Division of the Juvenile Court Department on September 28, 2012. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on November 1, 2012. A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Lawrence Moniz, J., in the Bristol County Division of the Juvenile Court Department. An application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory appeal was allowed by Barbara A. Lenk, J., in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk, and the appeal was reported by her to the Appeals Court. Tara L. Blackman, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. Joseph Maggiacomo, III, for the juvenile. MASSING, J. Following the execution of a search warrant, resulting in the discovery of a handgun and several bags of heroin in the defendant youthful offender’s bedroom, the Taunton police arrested the juvenile and took him to the police station to question him about his suspected involvement in a shooting that took place on the railroad tracks near his home. Because he was sixteen years old, the police arranged for the juvenile’s guardian to be present during questioning. A Juvenile Court judge found that the juvenile validly waived his Miranda rights at the outset of questioning, but that the police failed to honor his mid-interview request to consult with his guardian. Accordingly, the judge denied the juvenile’s motion to suppress statements made during the first part of the interview, but allowed the motion with respect to statements made after his request to consult. We affirm. Background. The facts found by the judge at the hearing on the motion to suppress, as amplified by uncontested evidence presented at the hearing and by the contents of the videotaped interview,[1] are as follows. On September 22, 2012, at approximately 8:30 P.M., two Taunton police officers went to the apartment where the juvenile lived with his guardian, Crystal Courtney,[2] to execute a search warrant for a firearm as part of an investigation into a shooting. After discovering a handgun and several […]