Commonwealth v. Tarjick (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-050-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 13-P-932 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. AARON M. TARJICK. No. 13-P-932. Hampshire. December 3, 2014. – May 18, 2015. Present: Kantrowitz, Green, & Meade, JJ. Practice, Criminal, Motion to suppress, Warrant. Constitutional Law, Search and seizure. Search and Seizure, Warrant, Plain view. Evidence, Digital image, Photograph, Prior misconduct. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on September 22 and December 17, 2010. A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Mary-Lou Rup, J., and the cases were tried before C. Jeffrey Kinder, J. Elaine Fronhofer for the defendant. Joseph A. Pieropan, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. KANTROWITZ, J. This matter involves the interplay between twenty-first century technology and twentieth century search and seizure principles. We hold that the police, while executing a search warrant for nude images of the defendant’s thirteenyear old stepdaughter on a video camera, cellular telephone (cell phone), and computer, were justified in seizing three memory cards from digital cameras that they came across.[1] The defendant challenges the propriety of the order denying his motion to suppress the contents of a memory card removed from one of the digital cameras. He also challenges the admission at trial of enlarged photographs of one young female victim at various ages, the Commonwealth’s references to the defendant’s status as a prisoner, and the playing of two recordings of telephone calls that he made from jail. We affirm. Background.[2] Carla was the defendant’s stepdaughter. She lived with her biological mother and the defendant, who were living together and were married when Carla was about seven or eight years old. Carla testified that in 2006, the defendant began sexually abusing and raping her. At one point, she indicated that the defendant took at least one sexually explicit photograph of her using his cell phone and made sexually explicit video recordings of her with a video camera. The police suspected that the defendant transferred or copied the images to the family computer because Carla told authorities that her mother had said that the defendant was viewing sexually explicit images of young girls on the computer. After Carla disclosed the abuse, she went to live with her biological father. The second victim, Nina, was Carla’s ten year old friend from school. The defendant sexually abused Nina on multiple occasions when she visited. […]
Bridgeman v. District Attorney for the Suffolk District, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-082-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11764 KEVIN BRIDGEMAN & others[1] vs. DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR THE SUFFOLK DISTRICT & another.[2] Suffolk. January 8, 2015. – May 18, 2015. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Controlled Substances. Constitutional Law, Plea, Conduct of government agents, Judicial review, Sentence, Delay in commencement of prosecution. Due Process of Law, Plea, Sentence, Delay in commencement of prosecution, Intervention in civil action. Committee for Public Counsel Services. Attorney at Law, Attorney as witness. Practice, Criminal, Plea, Postconviction relief, New trial, Sentence, Delay in commencement of prosecution, Conduct of government agents, Cross-examination by prosecutor. Evidence, Guilty plea, Certificate of drug analysis, Disclosure of evidence, Cross-examination. Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. Practice, Civil, Intervention. Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk on January 9, 2014. The case was reported by Botsford, J. Matthew R. Segal (Daniel N. Marx with him) for the petitioners. Benjamin H. Keehn, Committee for Public Counsel Services (Nancy J. Caplan, Committee for Public Counsel Services, with him) for the intervener. Vincent J. DeMore, Assistant District Attorney, for District Attorney for the Suffolk District. Quentin Weld, Assistant District Attorney, for District Attorney for the Essex District. Jean-Jacques Cabou, of Arizona; Joanna Perini-Abbott, of Oregon; & Daniel Gelb & Elizabeth A. Lunt, for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief. Richard Marshall, of New York, & Aaron M. Katz, C. Thomas Brown, Mark Vaughn, & Barbara J. Dougan, for Families Against Mandatory Minimums & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief. SPINA, J. The present case is the latest in a series of cases concerning the egregious misconduct of Annie Dookhan, a chemist who was employed in the forensic drug laboratory of the William A. Hinton State Laboratory Institute (Hinton drug lab) from 2003 until 2012.[3] Kevin Bridgeman, Yasir Creach, and Miguel Cuevas (collectively, the petitioners) are three individuals who pleaded guilty to various drug offenses in cases where Dookhan signed the certificates of drug analysis (drug certificates) on the line labeled “Assistant Analyst.” On January 9, 2014, prior to this court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Scott, 467 Mass. 336 (2014), the petitioners filed a petition in the county court pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, asking the court for two forms of relief. […]
Commonwealth v. Tavares (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-080-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11508 COMMONWEALTH vs. SANDRO TAVARES. Suffolk. January 9, 2015. – May 14, 2015. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, & Duffly, JJ. Homicide. Joint Enterprise. Evidence, Joint venturer, Intent, Argument by prosecutor, Firearm. Intent. Malice. Jury and Jurors. Practice, Criminal, Instructions to jury, Question by jury, New trial, Argument by prosecutor, Capital case. Firearms. License. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on October 27, 2009. The cases were tried before Elizabeth B. Donovan, J. Dennis Shedd for the defendant. Sarah Montgomery Lewis, Assistant District Attorney (John P. Pappas, Assistant District Attorney, with her) for the Commonwealth. BOTSFORD, J. In October, 2011, a jury in the Superior Court convicted the defendant of murder in the first degree based on deliberate premeditation in connection with the fatal shooting of Manuel Monteiro and Jovany Eason.[1] The defendant did not fire the gun that killed the victims, but was convicted on a theory of joint venture with the shooter, who took the gun from the defendant’s hand and began shooting. On appeal, the defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of murder in the first degree based on a joint venture theory, that the judge erred in not instructing the jury on involuntary manslaughter and in misstating the law of joint venture in her response to a jury question, and that the prosecutor made improper statements in his closing argument.[2] We conclude that the judge’s mistaken response to the jury question regarding the law of joint venture created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. Therefore, we vacate the defendant’s conviction on the murder charges and remand for a new trial on those indictments.[3] Background. Because the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence presented, we summarize the facts the jury could have found in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. See Commonwealth v. Earle, 458 Mass. 341, 342 (2010). We reserve certain facts for further discussion in connection with other issues raised. Around 1 A.M. on August 2, 2009, an argument erupted at a bar and restaurant (bar) in the Dorchester section of Boston that was a popular gathering spot for members of the Cape Verdean community. The argument led to a physical fight in the restroom of the bar, and later to the fatal […]
DaRosa, et al. v. City of New Bedford (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-081-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11759 JOHN DaROSA & others[1] vs. CITY OF NEW BEDFORD; MONSANTO COMPANY & others,[2] third-party defendants. Bristol. January 8, 2015. – May 15, 2015. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Public Records. Municipal Corporations, Public record. Attorney at Law, Work product, Attorney-client relationship. Privileged Communication. Practice, Civil, Discovery. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on October 24, 2008. A motion to strike privilege and work product objections to certain documents and to compel their production, filed on May 15, 2014, was heard by Richard T. Moses, J. An application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory appeal was allowed by Judd J. Carhart, J., in the Appeals Court, and the case was reported by him to that court. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. Shephard S. Johnson, Jr., for city of New Bedford. Mary K. Ryan (Cynthia M. Guizzetti with her) for AVX Corporation. John J. Gushue, for ABC Disposal Service, Inc., was present but did not argue. Mark P. Dolan & Stanley F. Pupecki, for Tutor Perini Corporation, submitted a brief. Michael R. Perry & Aaron D. Rosenberg, for NSTAR Electric Company & another, submitted a brief. John J. Davis & John M. Wilusz, for Massachusetts Municipal Association, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. Martha Coakley, Attorney General, & Judy Zeprun Kalman, for the Commonwealth, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. Brandon H. Moss, for Massachusetts Municipal Lawyers Association, Inc., amicus curiae, joined in a brief. GANTS, C.J. In General Elec. Co. v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 429 Mass. 798, 801 (1999) (General Electric), we held that “materials privileged as work product . . . are not protected from disclosure under the public records statute unless those materials fall within the scope of an express statutory exemption.” We noted that there is not an express statutory exemption for work product and rejected the claim that work product is protected from disclosure by an implied exemption. See id. at 801-806. In General Electric, the parties were not yet in litigation, so the work product was sought under the public records act rather than in discovery. And in General Electric we did not reach the issue whether the work product would be protected from disclosure under the “policy deliberation” […]
Bowers v. P. Wile’s, Inc. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-049-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 14-P-313 Appeals Court LINDA S. BOWERS vs. P. WILE’S, INC.[1] No. 14-P-313. Middlesex. December 10, 2014. – May 15, 2015. Present: Kantrowitz, Green, & Sullivan, JJ. Negligence, Retailer. Notice. Practice, Civil, Summary judgment. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on February 24, 2012. The case was heard by Paul D. Wilson, J., on a motion for summary judgment, and a motion to vacate judgment was heard by him. David McCormack for the plaintiff. Joseph T. Black for the defendant. GREEN, J. In Sheehan v. Roche Bros. Supermarkets, Inc., 448 Mass. 780, 788 (2007) (Sheehan), the Supreme Judicial Court adopted the so-called “mode of operation” approach to premises liability. Under that approach, a plaintiff injured as the result of a dangerous condition on an owner’s property is relieved of the need to prove that the owner had actual or constructive notice of the condition if he instead establishes that the dangerous condition was “related to the owner’s self-service mode of operation.” Id. at 786. In the present case, a judge of the Superior Court allowed the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, based on his view that the mode of operation approach applies only where the dangerous condition results from breakage or spillage of items offered for sale.[2] We discern no such limitation in the mode of operation approach described by the Supreme Judicial Court in Sheehan, supra, or in the rationale supporting it. We also conclude that the summary judgment record does not foreclose the prospect that the plaintiff could succeed, at trial, in proving that the defendant failed to use reasonable measures to prevent injuries that could result from the foreseeable dangerous condition. See Kourouvacilis v. General Motors Corp., 410 Mass. 706, 714 (1991). We accordingly reverse the judgment and the order denying the plaintiff’s motion to vacate the judgment, and remand the matter to the Superior Court for further proceedings. Background. We review the entry of summary judgment de novo, construing all facts in favor of the nonmoving party. Augat, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 410 Mass. 117, 120 (1991). We summarize the undisputed facts, construed in that manner, as they appear in the summary judgment record. On the afternoon of December 28, 2011, the plaintiff rode with her father to the defendant’s store on […]
Maryland Casualty Company, et al. v. NSTAR Electric Company, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-079-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11741 MARYLAND CASUALTY COMPANY[1] & another[2] vs. NSTAR ELECTRIC COMPANY & another.[3] Middlesex. January 5, 2015. – May 14, 2015. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Department of Public Utilities. Public Utilities, Electric company, Rate structure, Negligence. Negligence, Public utilities, Limitation of liability. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on March 27, 2008. The case was heard by Dennis J. Curran, J., on motions for summary judgment, and entry of a stipulated final judgment was ordered by him. The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. Matthew M. O’Leary (Andrew J. Fay with him) for the plaintiffs. Andrea Peraner-Sweet (Barbara L. Drury with her) for the defendants. LENK, J. This case raises the question whether a tariff filed with and approved by the Department of Public Utilities (DPU) may limit a public utility from liability to nonresidential customers for special, indirect, or consequential damages resulting from the utility’s gross negligence. We hold that a properly approved tariff may so limit a public utility’s liability. 1. Background. On December 8, 2006, two employees of NSTAR Electric and Gas were performing a switching procedure to restore electrical equipment that had been taken out of service. During the procedure, an explosion occurred, igniting a fire in the basement of a building at One Broadway in Cambridge. Smoke filled the basement and flowed into the stairwells leading up to the other floors of the building. The fire and smoke resulted in extensive damage to the building, requiring its closure for approximately six weeks. Construction and repairs continued for a lengthy period of time thereafter. At the time of the fire, the building was owned by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). MIT leased space in the building to Cambridge Incubator, Inc. (Cambridge Incubator),[4] Sedo.com, LLC (Sedo), and Allodia Corporation (Allodia). Cambridge Incubator and Sedo purchased insurance coverage from Maryland Casualty Corporation (Maryland Casualty); Allodia purchased insurance coverage from Assurance Company of America (Assurance). In the wake of the fire, Maryland Casualty paid claims by Cambridge Incubator and Sedo, and Assurance paid claims by Allodia. Maryland Casualty and Assurance then brought this complaint against NSTAR Electric Company and NSTAR Electric & Gas Company (collectively, NSTAR), seeking to recover for […]
Goduti v. City of Worcester (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-048-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 14-P-597 Appeals Court PHILIP L. GODUTI, trustee,[1] vs. CITY OF WORCESTER. No. 14-P-597. Suffolk. January 12, 2015. – May 13, 2015. Present: Fecteau, Wolohojian, & Massing, JJ. Moot Question. Practice, Civil, Moot case, Summary judgment. Real Property, Foreclosure of tax title, Record title. Mortgage, Foreclosure. Municipal Corporations, Tax title property. Taxation, Real estate tax: tax taking. Civil action commenced in the Land Court Department on September 29, 2011. The case was heard by Keith C. Long, J., on motions for summary judgment. Michael J. Markoff for the plaintiff. Karen A. Meyer, Assistant City Solicitor, for the defendant. FECTEAU, J. Philip L. Goduti appeals from the allowance of summary judgment against him by a judge of the Land Court in his declaratory judgment action regarding the legality of the city of Worcester’s (city) tax assessment for the years 2006 through 2011 on a property located at 2 Gambier Avenue, Worcester (property). He first contends that the city was not authorized, under G. L. c. 59, § 11, to assess taxes to his mortgagor, who failed to pay the taxes, but was required, instead, to assess taxes during those years only to him, the purported record owner of the property following his foreclosure by entry pursuant to G. L. c. 244, § 1. Second, Goduti argues that the judge incorrectly determined, especially at the summary judgment stage, that he had waived his foreclosure. While we need not reach his arguments because this case has become moot, we reject his contentions nevertheless. 1. Background. The property in question was first acquired by Sandra and James Dunn, husband and wife, in 1973. In 1989, Goduti became a mortgagee of the property behind two others.[2] While remaining current on the first two mortgages, the Dunns fell behind on their mortgage payments to Goduti. Utilizing the foreclosure by entry procedure of G. L. c. 244, § 1, Goduti recorded a certificate of entry in the registry of deeds on October 9, 1996, thereby signaling his intent to foreclose. During the three‑year period after Goduti filed his certificate of entry, after which foreclosure would be completed and his title would ripen, he accepted regular payments from the Dunns; Goduti disputes that those payments were applied to the mortgage, claiming that they were for use or occupation of the property. When the Dunns divorced in 2004, the […]
Commonwealth v. Vaughn (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-078-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-08400 COMMONWEALTH vs. JEFFREY VAUGHN. Suffolk. January 9, 2015. – May 12, 2015. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, & Duffly, JJ. Homicide. Practice, Criminal, Affidavit, Disclosure of evidence, Conduct of prosecutor, Assistance of counsel, Failure to object, Jury and jurors, Capital case. Evidence, Exculpatory, Disclosure of evidence, Testimony before grand jury, Police report, Impeachment of credibility, Hearsay. Jury and Jurors. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on March 19, 1998. The cases were tried before James D. McDaniel, Jr., J., and a supplemental motion for a new trial, filed on December 17, 2009, was heard by Thomas E. Connolly, J. Eileen D. Agnes for the defendant. Teresa K. Anderson, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. SPINA, J. In June of 1999, a Superior Court jury convicted the defendant, Jeffrey Vaughn, of murder in the first degree for the shooting of Robert Mason in a schoolyard in the Dorchester section of Boston on the night of November 29, 1997.[1] The defendant now brings this direct appeal as well as an appeal of the denial of his motion for a new trial. Represented by new counsel on appeal, he claims the judge considering his motion for a new trial improperly denied it without an evidentiary hearing, that the Commonwealth failed to disclose exculpatory evidence timely, that the prosecutor knowingly solicited false testimony, and that his trial counsel was ineffective. The defendant also requests that we exercise our power pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to order a new trial or direct the entry of a verdict of a lesser degree of guilt. We affirm the conviction and the order denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial, and decline to exercise our power under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 1. Facts and background. We recite the facts the jury could have found, reserving further details for discussion of the specific issues raised. On the morning of November 30, 1997, police responded to a report of a dead body in a schoolyard in the Dorchester section of Boston. There, they found the victim, later identified as Robert Mason. The victim had been shot five times, twice in the head and once in the chest and each arm, by a .40 caliber firearm. Later that day, John Hyppolite, the victim’s close friend, was arrested […]
Commonwealth v. Rarick (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-047-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557- 1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 13-P-1883 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. KEITH R. RARICK. No. 13-P-1883. Berkshire. January 29, 2015. – May 8, 2015. Present: Kafker, Grainger, & Agnes, JJ. Motor Vehicle, Operating under the influence. Practice, Criminal, Required finding. Intoxication. Evidence, Intoxication. Complaint received and sworn to in the Northern Berkshire Division of the District Court Department on January 4, 2013. The case was tried before Rita S. Koenigs, J. John O. Mitchell for the defendant. Megan L. Rose, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. AGNES, J. The defendant, Keith R. Rarick, was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, second or subsequent offense, in violation 2 of G. L. c. 90, § 24(1)(a)(1).1 On appeal, the defendant contends that during the trial of the underlying offense, at the close of the Commonwealth’s case, his motion for a required finding of not guilty should have been allowed because the evidence that he was under the influence of alcohol was not sufficient to warrant a finding by the jury that this element had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Because we conclude that the evidence was sufficient both at the close of the Commonwealth’s case and at the close of the evidence, we affirm. Background. a. The Commonwealth’s case. While on patrol at approximately 3:04 A.M. in the early morning of January 1, 2013, special police Officer David Sherman of the Williamstown police department was traveling northbound on Route 7 in a marked cruiser when he passed the defendant’s vehicle headed southbound in the opposite direction. Based on his mounted directional radar system, which he had calibrated earlier that day, Officer Sherman determined that the defendant’s vehicle was traveling fifty-eight miles per hour in a clearly marked forty- 1 After the jury returned a verdict of guilty of the underlying offense of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, the defendant pleaded guilty to the second offense portion of the complaint in accordance with the procedure set forth in G. L. c. 278, § 11A. The judge sentenced the defendant to a two-year term of probation, with conditions that included attendance at a fourteen-day, residential alcohol treatment program, and fines and fees totaling over $ 1,400. 3 five mile per hour speed zone.2 Officer Sherman activated his cruiser’s blue lights and pulled the vehicle over without incident […]
Commonwealth v. Norman (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-046-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 13-P-1978 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. KENNETH I. NORMAN. No. 13-P-1978. Worcester. January 8, 2015. – May 8, 2015. Present: Grainger, Brown, & Milkey, JJ. Motor Vehicle, Operating under the influence, License to operate. License. Notice. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, Records. Practice, Criminal, Required finding. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on November 14, 2012. The cases were tried before David Ricciardone, J. Nelson P. Lovins for the defendant. Ellyn H. Lazar-Moore, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. MILKEY, J. Following jury and jury-waived trials in Superior Court, the defendant was convicted of operating under the influence of intoxicating liquor (OUI) while under a license 2 suspension for a prior OUI. 1 G. L. c. 90, § 23. On appeal, the defendant argues primarily that the evidence was insufficient to support that conviction. He makes no challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence that he committed an OUI, that at the time he did so his license was suspended, and that the suspension at issue was for a prior OUI. Instead, he targets the sufficiency only of the evidence that he was notified of the suspension. See Commonwealth v. Oyewole, 470 Mass. 1015, 1016 (2014) (to make out a violation of G. L. c. 90, § 23, the Commonwealth must prove, inter alia, that the defendant “was notified that his license had been suspended or revoked”). We conclude that the evidence was sufficient and therefore affirm the convictions. Background. Given the limited nature of the defendant’s appeal, we lay out only the evidence related to whether the defendant had notice of his license suspension. The longtime branch manager of the Worcester office of the Registry of Motor Vehicles (RMV) testified that the RMV had a system in place to provide drivers formal notice that their licenses had been suspended. Under that system, once an OUI conviction is entered 1 The defendant was also convicted of OUI, fifth or subsequent offense. G. L. c. 90, § 24(1)(a)(1). As discussed infra at note 6, he initially challenged that conviction but has since abandoned that claim. He has not challenged his additional conviction of operating negligently so as to endanger. G. L. c. 90, § 24(2)(a). 3 into the relevant database, a suspension notice is automatically generated, and employees in the RMV mailroom then place the notice in an envelope and deliver it […]