Commonwealth v. Kolenovic (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-101-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-08047 COMMONWEALTH vs. ENEZ KOLENOVIC. Hampshire. December 4, 2014. – June 23, 2015. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Homicide. Constitutional Law, Assistance of counsel. Practice, Criminal, Capital case, New trial, Assistance of counsel. Intoxication. Mental Impairment. Evidence, Intoxication. Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court Department on September 24, 1996. The case was tried before Mary-Lou Rup, J., and a motion for a new trial, filed on March 18, 2003, was heard by her. Thomas H. Townsend, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. Michael R. Schneider for the defendant. HINES, J. On February 2, 1999, a jury convicted the defendant, Enez Kolenovic, of murder in the first degree on the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty.[1] The defendant’s conviction stems from the stabbing death of David Walker (victim) during the early morning hours of September 16, 1996, following an altercation between the two in a bar. While the defendant’s appeal to this court was pending, he filed a motion for a new trial arguing ineffective assistance of counsel and error in the jury instructions. We remanded the motion to the Superior Court.[2] The judge, who had been the trial judge, granted the defendant’s motion for a new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel. The Commonwealth appealed. We conclude that the judge erred and reverse the order allowing the motion for a new trial. 1. Background. a. Facts presented at trial. From the evidence presented at trial, the jury could have found the following facts. In the early morning hours of September 16, 1996, the defendant was riding in the back seat of his friend’s vehicle after a day spent consuming alcohol. His friend, John J. McCrystal, was driving; the defendant and another friend, Melissa Radigan, were seated in the back seat, and the victim was sitting directly in front of the defendant in the front passenger seat. The defendant and the victim had had an altercation earlier in the evening. The group was on the way to the defendant’s house to continue drinking when the defendant reached forward and slit the victim’s throat. McCrystal stopped the vehicle, and the defendant got out, opened the front passenger door, and pulled the victim to the ground. The defendant stabbed the victim multiple times while he […]
Sarkisian v. Concept Restaurants, Inc. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-100-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11786 ANGELA SARKISIAN vs. CONCEPT RESTAURANTS, INC.[1] Worcester. March 5, 2015. – June 23, 2015. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Negligence, One owning or controlling real estate. Notice. Practice, Civil, Summary judgment. Civil action commenced in the Worcester Division of the District Court Department on July 6, 2010. The case was heard on a motion for summary judgment by Steven E. Thomas, J. After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. Karen L. Stern for the plaintiff. Richard L. Neumeier for the defendant. Charlotte E. Glinka, Michael C. Najjar, & Thomas R. Murphy, for Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. John F. Brosnan, for Massachusetts Defense Lawyers Association, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. CORDY, J. In this case we decide whether the “mode of operation” approach to premises liability, adopted by this court in Sheehan v. Roche Bros. Supermkts., Inc., 448 Mass. 780, 788 (2007), applies to slip-and-fall incidents occurring outside of the context of self-service establishments. Traditionally, a plaintiff asserting premises liability has been required to show that the owner of the premises had actual or constructive notice of an unsafe condition that gave rise to an injury for which compensation is sought. See id. at 782-783. Under the mode of operation approach, however, the plaintiff satisfies the notice requirement by showing that the injury was attributable to a reasonably foreseeable unsafe condition related to the owner’s chosen mode of operation. See id. at 786. The plaintiff, Angela Sarkisian, broke her leg after slipping and falling on a wet dance floor at a nightclub owned by the defendant, Concept Restaurants, Inc. A judge in the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant based on the plaintiff’s inability to show that the defendant had actual or constructive notice of the unsafe condition that caused her injury. We conclude that, on the facts presented by this case, the mode of operation approach applies and summary judgment granted to the defendant must be reversed.[2] 1. Background. We recite the material facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the party who opposed the motion for summary judgment. Augat, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 410 Mass. 117, 120 (1991). The defendant […]
Adoption of Zak (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-065-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 13-P-780 Appeals Court ADOPTION OF ZAK (and two companion cases[1]). No. 13-P-780. Norfolk. December 10, 2014. – June 19, 2015. Present: Katzmann, Hanlon, & Maldonado, JJ. Adoption, Parent’s consent, Dispensing with parent’s consent, Visitation rights. Parent and Child, Adoption, Dispensing with parent’s consent to adoption. Minor, Adoption, Visitation rights. Practice, Civil, Adoption. Petitions filed in the Norfolk County Division of the Juvenile Court Department on May 19, 2010, and September 9, 2011. The cases were heard by Dana Gershengorn, J. Sherrie Krasner for the father. Deborah Sirotkin Butler for the mother. Kari B. Kipf-Horstmann, Assistant Attorney General, for Department of Children and Families. Ann Belmelli O’Connor for Zak. Yvette L. Kruger for Carol & another. MALDONADO, J. The mother and father separately appeal from Juvenile Court decrees terminating their parental rights. In addition, the judge ordered posttermination and postadoption visitation for both parents.[2] The father and mother contend that the termination of their parental rights lacked evidentiary support. They also argue that the judge erred in denying placement of the children either with the mother’s aunt or father’s mother. Finally, the mother, but not the father, challenges the terms of posttermination and postadoption visitation. She asserts that the children’s best interests favors more than the three yearly visits the judge ordered. Carol and Nick cross-appeal. They contest the judge’s orders for posttermination and postadoption visitation, arguing that there should be no postadoption visitation, and assert that the judge erred in failing to consider the effect on the children of domestic violence as it relates to those visits. Having in mind the trial judge’s careful and thorough findings of fact and rulings of law, we conclude that the judge did not abuse her discretion in terminating the mother and father’s parental rights, or in refusing to place the children either with their maternal great-aunt or paternal grandmother; we therefore affirm those portions of the decrees. However, we vacate the posttermination and postadoption visitation orders and remand for further consideration and specific findings regarding whether posttermination and postadoption visitation is in the children’s best interests, given the domestic violence that they have witnessed. 1. Termination of parental rights. The mother and father assert that the termination of their parental rights was based upon a single 2006 incident of […]
Commonwealth v. Figueroa (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-099-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11755 COMMONWEALTH vs. VICTOR FIGUEROA. June 17, 2015. Mayhem. Assault and Battery by Means of a Dangerous Weapon. Practice, Criminal, Duplicative convictions, Lesser included offense. Following a jury trial, the defendant, Victor Figueroa, was convicted of mayhem, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 14, and assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon causing serious bodily injury, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 15A (c) (i).[1] The Appeals Court affirmed the convictions, rejecting, among other things, the defendant’s argument that the convictions are duplicative. See Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 85 Mass. App. Ct. 1127 (2014). The case is now before this court on further appellate review of that limited issue. See 469 Mass. 1110 (2014). Background. We limit our discussion of the facts to those relevant to the duplicative convictions issue, which are as follows. Prior to the attack that led to the convictions, the defendant had been, essentially, stalking the victim. On the morning of March 17, 2005, the victim was riding a bus to work. The defendant was also on the bus, as was the victim’s coworker Silvia Gomez. At their usual stop, the victim and Gomez got off the bus by the front door. The defendant called to the victim and she told him that she had nothing to say to him. The defendant then pulled the victim by her jacket and punched her in the mouth with his hand, striking her twice. The victim became dizzy, felt her face and neck burning, and saw a knife in the defendant’s hand. While the defendant was striking the victim, she tried to run, but the defendant was holding her jacket and arm. Gomez pulled the victim away and they ran toward their office. The victim was subsequently placed in an ambulance and taken to the hospital. As a result of the attack, the victim sustained injuries to her face, neck, ear, and right arm, and has scarring on her face and neck. A police officer who arrived shortly after the attack testified that the victim had at least three lacerations on her face and neck area. At trial, the judge instructed the jury that the mayhem charge related to the injuries to the victim’s face and the assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon causing serious bodily injury charge related to the […]
Commonwealth v. Moniz (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-064-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 11-P-954 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. ROBERT MONIZ. No. 11-P-954. Middlesex. February 12, 2015. – June 17, 2015. Present: Cohen, Green, & Massing, JJ. Rape. Assault with Intent to Rape. Practice, Criminal, Motion to suppress, Assistance of counsel, Admissions and confessions. Constitutional Law, Assistance of counsel, Admissions and confessions. Evidence, Admissions and confessions. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on September 2, 2004. The case was heard by Elizabeth M. Fahey, J., and a motion for a new trial, filed on January 14, 2014, was considered by her. James A. Reidy for the defendant. Jamie Charles, Assistant District Attorney (Kevin L. Ryle, Assistant District Attorney, with him) for the Commonwealth. MASSING, J. The defendant, convicted of eight counts of sex offenses committed against his adopted son when the boy was between the ages of fourteen and eighteen years old, appeals from the three convictions based on his conduct after the victim turned sixteen, one for rape in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 22(b), and two for assault with intent to rape in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 24, claiming insufficiency of the evidence.[1] He also appeals from the denial of his motion for new trial alleging that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress the defendant’s postindictment admissions to a person he asserts was acting in a law enforcement capacity. We affirm. Background. The victim was born in August, 1978. The defendant met the victim after he entered into a romantic relationship with the victim’s mother. In 1988, the victim’s family began living with the defendant in Enfield, New Hampshire. In April, 1989, the defendant married the victim’s mother and adopted the victim. The first sexual incident occurred when the defendant arranged to sleep alone with the victim in a cabin the defendant had built in the middle of the woods, approximately two hundred yards from the house in Enfield. The defendant touched the victim’s genitals over his clothing for a couple of minutes before they went to bed. The victim asked the defendant what he was doing, and the defendant told him, “[T]his is what all good friends do.” The defendant would “do the same thing” at the print shop that the defendant and the victim’s mother owned, where the victim sometimes worked. The defendant took the […]
Commonwealth v. Elliott (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-063-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 11-P-1277 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. JOSEPH ELLIOTT. No. 11-P-1277. Essex. January 7, 2015. – June 17, 2015. Present: Kafker, Meade, & Maldonado, JJ. Rape. Indecent Assault and Battery. Practice, Criminal, Trial of indictments together, Severance, Argument by prosecutor, Defendant’s decision not to testify, Instructions to jury, Presumptions and burden of proof, New trial, Interpreter. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on April 30, 2008. The cases were tried before Maureen B. Hogan, J., and a motion for a new trial was heard by her. James Vander Salm for the defendant. David F. O’Sullivan, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. KAFKER, J. The defendant, Joseph Elliott, was indicted on seven charges of rape and indecent assault and battery that occurred within a one week time span against identical twin sisters, Karen and Mary.[1],[2] After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of two counts of rape and two counts of indecent assault and battery against Karen and acquitted of the remaining counts. The defendant appeals from the judgments and from the trial judge’s order denying his motion for new trial pursuant to Mass.R.Crim.P. 30(b), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001). In his direct appeal, the defendant contends that the trial judge abused her discretion in denying his motion for severance, and that the prosecutor’s closing argument violated his constitutional rights to due process and to remain silent. The defendant also claims that the judge abused her discretion in denying his motion for a new trial. The issue presented in that motion was his claimed hearing impairment and whether the judge provided adequate accommodations to address the defendant’s hearing difficulties. We affirm. 1. Background. The relevant evidence in this case comes primarily from the testimony of Karen and Mary. The sisters testified that the defendant, a longtime family friend, committed a series of sexual assaults against them in a span of eight days in 2007, when the sisters were nineteen years old. We briefly summarize their testimony, and reserve certain facts for our discussion of the issues raised. The defendant first met Karen and Mary at church when the sisters were children. Over the years, the defendant became a longtime friend of the family, and grew particularly close to the sisters’ mother. The defendant often visited the […]
Preferred Mutual Insurance Company v. Vermont Mutual Insurance Company, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-062-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 13-P-1890 Appeals Court PREFERRED MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY vs. VERMONT MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY & others.[1] No. 13-P-1890. Middlesex. October 7, 2014. – June 17, 2015. Present: Cohen, Wolohojian, & Blake, JJ. Insurance, Coverage, Insurer’s obligation to defend, Defense of proceedings against insured, Homeowner’s insurance, Business exclusion, Excess Liability Insurance. Contract, Insurance. Practice, Civil, Summary judgment. Indemnity. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on March 30, 2012. The case was heard by Dennis J. Curran, J., on motions for summary judgment, and the entry of separate and final judgment was ordered by him. Peter C. Kober for Vermont Mutual Insurance Company. Robert A. Curley, Jr., for the plaintiff. COHEN, J. This insurance dispute arises from an accident in which Richard Dubois was injured while working at a residence in Medford. The residence was owned by Francis and Eileen Munyon, who lived there with their adult son, Joseph.[2] In October, 2009, the Munyons undertook to renovate their second-floor bathroom and hired Dubois’s employer as the plumbing contractor. On Dubois’s first day on the job, he removed old copper piping and other debris from the bathroom and attempted to throw it into the backyard from a second-floor deck. Unbeknownst to Dubois, on the previous day, Joseph had unfastened the porch railing in order to push the old cast iron bathtub into the backyard; but when he finished, he left the railing in an upright position so it appeared to be securely in place. While leaning against the unsecured railing, Dubois fell to the ground and was injured. Dubois and his wife later filed suit against Joseph and his parents, alleging that they were liable for Dubois’s personal injuries and his wife’s loss of consortium. At the time of the accident, Francis and Eileen were the named insureds under a homeowner’s policy issued by the defendant, Vermont Mutual Insurance Company (Vermont). In addition, by virtue of his status as a resident relative, Joseph, too, was an insured under the Vermont policy. Independently, Joseph was the named insured under a commercial lines policy issued by the plaintiff, Preferred Mutual Insurance Company (Preferred), in connection with Joseph’s business as a self-employed licensed electrician. Both Vermont and Preferred were notified of the Duboises’ claims. Vermont assumed the defense of Francis and Eileen, but refused to […]
Commonwealth v. Kostka (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-098-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11766 COMMONWEALTH vs. CHRISTOPHER KOSTKA. Suffolk. February 3, 2015. – June 17, 2015. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ. Contempt. Practice, Criminal, Contempt. Constitutional Law, Search and seizure. Deoxyribonucleic Acid Search and Seizure, Buccal swab, Probable cause. Probable Cause. Evidence, Buccal swab, Relevancy and materiality, Third-party culprit. Adjudication of contempt in the Superior Court Department by Jeffrey A. Locke, J., on April 9, 2013. After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. John H. Cunha, Jr. (Charles Allan Hope with him) for the defendant. Teresa K. Anderson, Assistant District Attorney (Ursula A. Knight, Assistant District Attorney, with her) for the Commonwealth. William Trach, Laura Carey, P.R. Goldstone, & Chauncey B. Wood, for Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. DUFFLY, J. The Commonwealth seeks to compel Christopher Kostka[1] to provide a saliva sample from which it may obtain Christopher’s deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA). The Commonwealth filed a motion in the Superior Court to compel the taking of a saliva sample, arguing that a DNA sample is necessary in order to determine whether Christopher is the identical or fraternal twin of his brother, Timothy Kostka, who has been indicted on charges of murder in the first degree and armed home invasion.[2] Christopher is not a suspect in that case. A judge of the Superior Court allowed the Commonwealth’s motion and ordered Christopher to provide a buccal swab;[3] Christopher refused to comply, and a judgment of contempt was entered against him. After the Appeals Court affirmed the judgment, Commonwealth v. Kostka, 86 Mass. App. Ct. 69, 72-73 (2014), we granted Christopher’s application for further appellate review. We conclude that the Commonwealth has not made the requisite showing, see Commonwealth v. Draheim, 447 Mass. 113 (2006), to support the compelled production of a DNA sample from an uncharged third party in a criminal proceeding and, accordingly, that the judgment of contempt must be reversed.[4] Background. In support of its motion, the Commonwealth submitted affidavits from Boston police criminalist Joseph Ross[5] and Boston police Detective Philip J. Bliss. We summarize the factual assertions contained in those affidavits, which the Commonwealth intends to establish at trial. On April 16, 2012, at approximately 10 A.M., the victim, Barbara Coyne, […]
Opinion of the Justices to the House of Representatives (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-097-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11883 OPINION OF THE JUSTICES TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. General Court. Constitutional Law, General Court, Appropriation of money, Taxation. Statute, Appropriation of money, Amendment. Taxation. On June 15, 2015, the Justices submitted the following response to questions propounded to them by the House of Representatives. To the Honorable the House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts: The undersigned Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court respectfully submit this response to the questions set forth in an order adopted by the House of Representatives on May 22, 2015, and transmitted to us on that date. The order poses five questions concerning the State budget legislation for fiscal year 2016. All of the questions involve Part II, c. 1, § 3, art. 7, of the Massachusetts Constitution, which we will refer to as the origination article.[1] They ask, among other things, whether certain provisions in the House budget bill rendered it a “money bill” within the meaning of the origination article, and whether the Senate improperly “originated” a money bill in violation of this article. As explained below, we are of the view that the House bill was a money bill, and that the Senate did not improperly originate a money bill.[2] Bills and amendments at issue. We begin by summarizing the history of the various bills and amendments that give rise to the questions, and by describing generally the provisions that are at issue, reserving for later a more detailed analysis of the legal effect of those provisions. On March 4, 2015, acting pursuant to art. 63, § 2, of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution, as amended by art. 107 of the Amendments, and pursuant to G. L. c. 29, § 7H, the Governor filed with the House his recommended budget for fiscal year 2016, which, as is customary, was designated House No. 1. Among its many provisions was section 27, entitled “Delay FAS 109 Deduction,”[3] which provided: “Subsection (2) of section 95 of chapter 173 of the acts of 2008 is hereby amended by striking out the figure ’2016′, inserted by section 189 of chapter 165 of the acts of 2014, and inserting in place thereof the following figure:- 2017.” The Governor’s submission described section 27 as follows: “This section delays until tax year 2017 the start of the deduction allowed to certain publicly-traded companies to offset increases in their net deferred tax […]
Conway v. CLC Bio, LLC (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-061-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 14-P-350 Appeals Court DANIEL CONWAY vs. CLC BIO, LLC. No. 14-P-350. Middlesex. December 10, 2014. – June 12, 2015. Present: Kantrowitz, Green, & Sullivan, JJ. Arbitration, Judicial review, Award, Authority of arbitrator. Massachusetts Wage Act. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on February 17, 2012. A motion to vacate an arbitration award was heard by Douglas H. Wilkins, J., and judgment was entered by him. David B. Summer for the plaintiff. Michelle Y. Bush for the defendant. SULLIVAN, J. The plaintiff, Daniel Conway (Conway), appeals from the denial of his motion to vacate an arbitration award, see G. L. c. 251, § 12, concerning a claim for unpaid wages under The Wage Act. See G. L. c. 149, §§ 148, 150 as amended by St. 2009. We affirm, and in so doing, reiterate the standard of review applicable to complaints to vacate a commercial arbitration award. Background. To place our discussion in context, we set forth the facts found by and rationale of the arbitrator. Conway was employed by the defendant, CLC Bio, LLC (CLC), a bioinformatics company, from October, 2007, until his termination in January, 2012. Conway’s employment at CLC was governed by an employment contract that provided for his base salary and potential bonus payments or commissions.[1] The contract also contained an arbitration clause that mandated arbitration of “any dispute or controversy arising out of or relating in any way to [Conway’s] employment with and/ or termination from [CLC].”[2] Conway’s employment at CLC was terminated on January 12, 2012. On January 18, 2012, CLC sent Conway a letter offering to pay severance and outstanding bonus payments to Conway in exchange for a release of claims. Conway failed to respond, but CLC tendered $ 30,325 in bonus payments to Conway on March 1, 2012, payments which included a $ 10,990 Individual Sales Bonus (ISB). In the interim, on February 17, 2012, Conway filed a complaint against CLC in a Superior Court, alleging breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and violations of the Wage Act stemming from claims for severance pay, unpaid vacation time, and future and late-paid commissions. CLC moved to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration provision in Conway’s employment contract. See G. L. c. 251, § 1, as appearing in St. 1991, […]