Commonwealth v. Mattei (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-157-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 14-P-1004 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. ALEXANDER MATTEI. No. 14-P-1004. Essex. May 10, 2016. – October 27, 2016. Present: Cypher, Blake, & Henry, JJ. Assault with Intent to Rape. Assault and Battery. Deoxyribonucleic Acid. Evidence, Expert opinion, Cross-examination. Witness, Expert, Cross-examination. Practice, Criminal, Instructions to jury, Argument by prosecutor, Confrontation of witnesses. Constitutional Law, Confrontation of witnesses. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on May 22, 2002. Following review by the Supreme Judicial Court, 455 Mass. 840 (2010), the cases were tried before Timothy Q. Feeley, J. Karl R.D. Suchecki for the defendant. Catherine L. Semel, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. CYPHER, J. The defendant, Alexander Mattei, appeals from his convictions of assault with intent to rape and assault and battery. On appeal, the defendant challenges: (1) the admission of testimony of a substitute DNA analyst; (2) the judge’s ruling curtailing cumulative cross-examination regarding what effect information regarding the criminal histories of other workers at the victim’s residence might have had on the police investigation; (3) the judge’s failure to give a Bowden[1] instruction; and (4) statements by the prosecutor in closing argument. We affirm. Background. In April, 2002, the defendant and three other inmates were on work release from the Lawrence Correctional Alternative Center on the day of the incident. They were working at a housing complex for the elderly and disabled, which is run by the Andover Housing Authority. The victim, a resident of the housing complex, was attacked in her apartment and “sustained numerous trauma about her face.” She was taken by ambulance to the hospital for treatment. From there the victim was transferred to New England Medical Center, where she was treated by eye specialists. The substitute analyst. The defendant claims that admission of the deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) opinion testimony of crime laboratory analyst Brian Cunningham violated his confrontation rights because Cunningham: (1) did not conduct the DNA testing in this case; (2) was not employed by the crime lab at the time the testing was conducted by analyst Stacey Edward; and (3) reached a conclusion that “conflicted in significant part” with the conclusion of the analyst (Edward) who conducted the DNA testing concerning two key pieces of evidence (mixed sample DNA recovered from the defendant’s sweatpants and the […]
Commonwealth v. Paquette (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-169-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12028 COMMONWEALTH vs. RAYMOND ZACHARY PAQUETTE. Hampshire. April 4, 2016. – October 27, 2016. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, Hines, JJ.[1] Misleading a Police Officer. Practice, Criminal, Instructions to jury. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on June 24, 2014. The cases were tried before C. Jeffrey Kinder, J. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. Thomas D. Frothingham for the defendant. Steven E. Gagne, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. Yale Yechiel N. Robinson, pro se, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. LENK, J. This case considers whether any lie to police during a criminal investigation “misleads” police in violation of G. L. c. 268, § 13B, the witness intimidation statute. The statute prohibits, as relevant here, “willfully . . . mislead[ing] . . . [a] police officer.” The defendant was convicted by a Superior Court jury on two indictments charging violations of that prohibition, at two separate interviews with police, during their investigation of a fight at a party he hosted in May, 2014. On direct appellate review, the defendant argues primarily that the jury were not instructed correctly regarding the elements of § 13B, and that his motions for required findings of not guilty should have been allowed. We conclude that the instruction regarding the “mislead[ing]” element of § 13B was incorrect. We further conclude that, if the jury had been instructed correctly, the evidence would have been sufficient to allow the jury to find the defendant guilty of violating § 13B at the first interview, but not at the second interview. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment and remand the matter to the Superior Court for entry of a required finding of not guilty on the second indictment, alleging that the defendant misled police at the second interview.[2] The defendant may be retried on the first indictment, concerning statements he made to police during the first interview. Background. We recite the facts the jury could have found, reserving certain details for later discussion. On the night of May 3, 2014, the defendant and his sister hosted a party at their father’s house in Westhampton. Two of the guests, Patrick Bousquet and Tyler Spath, became involved in an argument in the kitchen after a remark by Spath that Bousquet perceived as an insult to his girl friend. […]
Commonwealth v. LeBlanc (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-170-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12066 COMMONWEALTH vs. RANDY A. LeBLANC. Franklin. September 8, 2016. – October 28, 2016. Present: Gants, C.J., Botsford, Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ. Motor Vehicle, Leaving scene of accident. Statute, Construction. Complaint received and sworn to in the Orange Division of the District Court Department on May 3, 2013. The case was heard by David S. Ross, J. After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. Leslie H. Powers for the defendant. Thomas H. Townsend, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. BUDD, J. Following a jury-waived trial in the Orange Division of the District Court Department in March, 2014, the defendant, Randy A. LeBlanc, was found guilty of knowingly causing damage to another automobile in a private driveway and leaving without identifying himself to the owner under G. L. c. 90, § 24 (2) (a).[1] He appealed, and the Appeals Court affirmed the conviction in a memorandum and order issued pursuant to its rule 1:28. Commonwealth v. LeBlanc, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 1112 (2015). We granted further appellate review to determine whether the prohibition set forth in § 24 (2) (a) against leaving the scene after causing property damage without providing identification includes as an element of the crime that the accident causing the damage occurred on a public way.[2] We conclude that it does not and affirm the defendant’s conviction. Background. The trial evidence would permit the following facts to be found. In February, 2013, a friend of the defendant telephoned him to ask for a ride to a nearby convenience store. The defendant arrived in his pickup truck at the home where the friend was staying and pulled into the driveway where the homeowner’s Chevrolet Cavalier automobile was already parked. The friend entered the truck and the two men left. Upon their return, the defendant backed his truck into the driveway. When the friend got out of the truck, he noticed that the Cavalier’s hood was “pushed up” and that it had been pushed back into a trailer. The friend waved his arms to signal to the defendant, but the defendant “just left.” The defendant later admitted to the friend and to an investigating police officer that he had accidentally hit the Cavalier. Discussion. 1. […]
Commonwealth v. Lawson (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-171-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11996 COMMONWEALTH vs. RICHARD LAWSON. Suffolk. March 7, 2016. – October 28, 2016. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ.[1] Insanity. Mental Health. Evidence, Sanity, Inference, Presumptions and burden of proof, Argument by prosecutor. Practice, Criminal, Presumptions and burden of proof, Required finding, Argument by prosecutor. Complaint received and sworn to in the Central Division of the Boston Municipal Court Department on March 12, 2014. The case was heard by Michael J. Coyne, J. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. Christopher DeMayo for the defendant. John P. Zanini, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. GANTS, C.J. The defendant, after being told by Boston police officers that he had an outstanding warrant, resisted arrest and assaulted the officers. At a jury-waived trial in the Boston Municipal Court, the defendant offered a defense of lack of criminal responsibility, and called a forensic psychologist who described the defendant’s lengthy mental health history and opined that the defendant was not criminally responsible at the time of the offense. The Commonwealth did not present expert evidence on the issue of criminal responsibility in rebuttal but rather relied on the circumstances surrounding the offense and cross-examination of the defendant’s expert to establish criminal responsibility. The judge denied the defendant’s motion for required findings of not guilty by reason of lack of criminal responsibility and found the defendant guilty on all charges. On appeal, the defendant contends that the judge must have relied on the so-called “presumption of sanity” because, without this presumption, the evidence did not support a finding of criminal responsibility beyond a reasonable doubt. We conclude that the “presumption of sanity” is not truly a presumption but rather an inference that the defendant is probably criminally responsible because most people are criminally responsible for their acts. Where a defendant proffers a defense of lack of criminal responsibility and there is some evidence that supports it, this inference, standing alone, cannot support a finding that a defendant is criminally responsible beyond a reasonable doubt. Although the Commonwealth may not rely on “the presumption of sanity” to establish criminal responsibility, the Commonwealth need not offer expert testimony in every case and may rely instead on the circumstances of the offense and all […]
Cristo v. Evangelidis (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-158-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 15-P-91 Appeals Court JUDE CRISTO vs. LEWIS EVANGELIDIS.[1] No. 15-P-91. Worcester. November 2, 2015. – October 28, 2016. Present: Agnes, Sullivan, & Blake, JJ. Civil Rights, Immunity of public official, Termination of employment. Employment, Retaliation, Termination. Constitutional Law, Freedom of speech and press, Public employment. Public Employment, Termination. Practice, Civil, Summary judgment, Civil rights. Sheriff. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on September 6, 2011. A motion for summary judgment was heard by David Ricciardone, J. Andrew J. Abdella for the defendant. Timothy M. Burke for the plaintiff. AGNES, J. The question before us is whether the defendant, Lewis Evangelidis, sheriff of Worcester County, was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on count three of the plaintiff Jude Cristo’s complaint, charging Evangelidis with a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.[2] In particular, Cristo alleges that Evangelidis retaliated against him by terminating him from employment in the Worcester County sheriff’s office (sheriff’s office or department) on January 7, 2011, for exercising his rights under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution in early 2010, the year before Evangelidis took office. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that Evangelidis’s motion for summary judgment, based on the defense of qualified immunity, should have been allowed because on the record before us, Cristo’s speech, while related to matters of public concern, was undertaken in his capacity as an employee of the sheriff’s office, and not as a private citizen.[3] See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006). Background. We view the summary judgment record in the light most favorable to Cristo, the nonmoving party. Cristo was hired in June, 1999, as the assistant personnel director of the sheriff’s office. Cristo was promoted to human resources director of the sheriff’s office in February, 2006, by Guy Glodis, Evangelidis’s predecessor. Shortly thereafter, Cristo was also appointed by Glodis to be the payroll director, and given other human resource duties. When, during the summer of 2009, Glodis decided not to seek reelection as sheriff, Shawn P. Jenkins assumed the role of acting sheriff. In early 2010, Cristo expressed concerns to Jenkins, and to deputy superintendent Paul Legendre, that assistant deputy superintendent Scott Bove, a candidate for the sheriff’s position, was not performing his human resource duties and […]
Commonwealth v. Gomes (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-168-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11427 COMMONWEALTH vs. JOSEPH GOMES. Suffolk. April 8, 2016. – October 26, 2016. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Botsford, Duffly, & Hines, JJ.[1] Homicide. Armed Assault with Intent to Murder. Assault and Battery by Means of a Dangerous Weapon. Joint Enterprise. Intent. Evidence, Joint venturer, Intent, Relevancy and materiality, Spontaneous utterance, Identification, Hearsay, Motive. Jury and Jurors. Identification. Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Jury and jurors, Question by jury, Instructions to jury, Request for jury instructions. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on May 2, 2007. The cases were tried before Raymond J. Brassard, J. David Keighley for the defendant. Teresa K. Anderson, Assistant District Attorney (Julie Sunkle Higgins, Assistant District Attorney, & Gretchen Lundgren with her) for the Commonwealth. BOTSFORD, J. In December, 2010, a Superior Court jury convicted the defendant, Joseph Gomes, of murder in the first degree and of various related offenses involving the use of a dangerous weapon. The charges arose from a drive-by shooting incident that took place in Boston on February 13, 2007, leaving Fausto Sanchez dead and several other young men wounded. In this direct appeal from his convictions, the defendant argues that the judge erred by (1) denying his motion for a required finding of not guilty; (2) admitting in evidence certain items, including drugs, cash, and guns, that were seized from an apartment building owned by his parents; (3) permitting jurors to pose questions to witnesses, three of which were prejudicial; (4) admitting or excluding certain testimonial evidence; and (5) declining to instruct the jury on the theory of transferred intent. The defendant also requests relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E. We affirm the defendant’s convictions and decline to grant relief pursuant to § 33E. Background. a. Facts. We summarize the trial evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Whitaker, 460 Mass. 409, 410 (2011). In February, 2007, several members of the Gomes and DaSilva families lived in the same apartment building on Langdon Street in the Roxbury section of Boston. The defendant’s parents owned the building and lived in an apartment on the second floor; the defendant’s sister, brother-in-law, and nephew, Anthony DaSilva, lived in the first-floor apartment. Anthony and the defendant’s original codefendant, Emmanuel DaSilva, are cousins.[2] […]
Commonwealth v. Rosario (and a companion case) (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-156-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 15-P-752 Appeals Court 15-P-753 COMMONWEALTH vs. CARLOS ROSARIO (and a companion case[1]). Nos. 15-P-752 & 15-P-753. Essex. May 17, 2016. – October 26, 2016. Present: Cypher, Blake, & Henry, JJ. Controlled Substances. Practice, Criminal, Identification of defendant in courtroom, Required finding, Disclosure of evidence. Constitutional Law, Identification. Due Process of Law, Identification. Evidence, Identification, Chain of custody, Disclosure of evidence, Cross-examination. “School Zone” Statute. Complaints received and sworn to in the Lawrence Division of the District Court Department on May 16, 2014. The cases were tried before Mark A. Sullivan, J. Daniel K. Sherwood for Carlos Rosario. Stephen E. Meltzer for Lylibeth Rosario. Quentin Weld, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. CYPHER, J. In this consolidated appeal, the defendants, Carlos Rosario and Lylibeth Rosario, appeal from their convictions for distribution of heroin in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32(a), and a drug violation near a school or park in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32J. In addition, Carlos[2] was charged with possession of heroin in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 34. The defendants filed a motion in limine to exclude any in-court identification of the defendants, which was denied. They argue that the trial judge committed error by admitting the confidential informant’s in-court identification in the absence of any pretrial identification procedure. They also argue that the chain of custody was inadequate to connect the drug evidence presented at trial to this case and, therefore, the evidence was insufficient to prove the drug charges beyond a reasonable doubt. Lylibeth also argues that she was not given pretrial notice of a map offered by the Commonwealth and admitted in evidence that supported the school zone charge. We affirm both defendants’ convictions. Background. On May 15, 2014, the Lawrence police department’s drug enforcement unit (unit) was conducting supervised controlled buys with the assistance of a paid confidential informant named William Demers. Detective Carmen Purpora searched Demers and the female who accompanied him for money and contraband before each controlled buy and then gave Demers marked currency to complete the drug transactions. Detective Purpora and Demers agreed that Demers would take off his hat and place it by his side to signal that a drug transaction had taken place. That morning, Demers and the unit […]
Beninati, et al. v. Borghi, et al. (and a companion case) (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-155-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 15-P-953 Appeals Court ELIZABETH BENINATI & another[1] vs. STEVEN BORGHI & others[2] (and a consolidated case[3]). No. 15-P-953. Suffolk. May 16, 2016. – October 24, 2016. Present: Agnes, Massing, & Kinder, JJ. Contract, Construction of contract, Modification. Consumer Protection Act, Availability of remedy. Practice, Civil, Attorney’s fees. Damages, Attorney’s fees. Civil actions commenced in the Superior Court Department on May 24, 2012, and May 14, 2013. After consolidation, the case was heard by Janet L. Sanders, J.; a motion for attorney’s fees and costs was heard by her; and entry of final judgment was ordered by her. John W. Moran (Michael T. Grant with him) for Elizabeth Beninati. Charles R. Bennett, Jr., for Steven Borghi. Max D. Stern for Harold Dixon & others. Michael S. Marino, for Joseph Masotta & others, was present but did not argue. MASSING, J. The plaintiffs, Elizabeth Beninati and Joseph Masotta, together with defendants Steven Borghi and Linda Borghi, owned and operated a chain of fitness clubs licensing the “Work Out World” (WOW) trade name (collectively, WOW New England).[4] While actively involved in the management of WOW New England, Steven, working with an outside partner, defendant Harold Dixon, and using WOW New England’s inside information and resources, formed Blast Fitness Group, LLC (Blast), and opened a chain of similar clubs in the same geographic area, some using the WOW name, others using the name “Blast Fitness.” (We refer to the defendant clubs that Dixon and Steven controlled as the Blast clubs or, together with Blast, as the Blast defendants). After a jury-waived trial on two consolidated complaints,[5] a Superior Court judge found the Borghis and Dixon liable to Elizabeth, Masotta, and the other WOW New England owners for breach of fiduciary duty on the plaintiffs’ derivative claims and awarded approximately $ 4 million in damages. The judge held as a matter of law, however, that Dixon and the Blast defendants could not be liable for unfair competition under G. L. c. 93A because their misconduct involved only aiding and abetting Steven in the breach of his fiduciary duties. The judge also upheld corporate votes of the WOW New England companies removing the Borghis from management, and awarded attorney’s fees to Elizabeth under G. L. c. 156C, § 57, but not Masotta. On Elizabeth and Masotta’s appeal from the judge’s […]
Commonwealth v. Perez (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-154-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 15-P-1672 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. SANTOS PEREZ.[1] No. 15-P-1672. Bristol. September 8, 2016. – October 21, 2016. Present: Green, Wolohojian, & Massing, JJ. Controlled Substances. Constitutional Law, Search and seizure, Probable cause. Search and Seizure, Probable cause, Warrant, Affidavit. Practice, Criminal, Motion to suppress, Warrant, Affidavit. Probable Cause. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on November 29, 2012. A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Raymond P. Veary, Jr., J. An application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory appeal was heard by Geraldine S. Hines, J., in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk, and the appeal was reported by her to the Appeals Court. Tara L. Blackman, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. Alexandra H. Deal for the defendant. MASSING, J. The Commonwealth appeals from the allowance of the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized from an apartment in the execution of a search warrant. The motion judge determined that the affidavit supporting the search warrant application, which relied in part on information provided by a confidential informant, did not satisfy the probable cause standard under the Aguilar–Spinelli test.[2] Reviewing the affidavit in its entirety, we conclude that the application did establish probable cause to search for heroin in the subject apartment. Accordingly, we reverse the order allowing the motion to suppress. Background. The defendant was indicted on charges of trafficking in 200 grams or more of heroin, in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32E(c)(4), and of manufacturing, distributing, dispensing, or possessing with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense heroin, G. L. c. 94C, § 32(a). It appears[3] that New Bedford police officers discovered a substantial quantity of heroin when they executed the warrant permitting them to search “172 Hathaway Street, apartment 3 east” for controlled substances, “to include specifically [h]eroin,” as well as instrumentalities used in, records of, and proceeds from the sale of controlled substances. The affidavit in support of the search warrant application, prepared by Lorenzo Gonzalez, III, a New Bedford police officer with four years of experience, assigned as a detective in a unit specializing in narcotics investigations, states that the New Bedford police began an investigation of the defendant when they received a confidential informant’s tip that “a male by the name of Luis Reyes,[4] with a […]
LaChance v. Commissioner of Correction (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-167-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12016 EDMUND LaCHANCE vs. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION & others.[1] Essex. March 10, 2016. – October 21, 2016. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ.[2] Civil Rights, Attorney’s fees. Practice, Civil, Attorney’s fees. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on June 20, 2006. Following review by this court, 463 Mass. 767 (2012), a motion for attorney’s fees was heard by Robert A. Cornetta, J., and a motion for reconsideration was considered by him. The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. William D. Saltzman for the defendants. James R. Pingeon for the plaintiff. GANTS, C.J. This appeal concerns an award of attorney’s fees under the Federal Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), in a civil rights action brought by a Massachusetts prison inmate, Edmund LaChance. LaChance claimed that the defendants violated his constitutional due process rights by holding him in essentially solitary confinement in a special management unit (SMU) for ten months, without a hearing, while waiting to transfer or reclassify him. That litigation eventually resulted in our decision in LaChance v. Commissioner of Correction, 463 Mass. 767 (2012) (LaChance I), where we announced “for the first time that segregated confinement on awaiting action status for longer than ninety days gives rise to a liberty interest entitling an inmate to notice and a hearing,” and a written posthearing decision. Id. at 778. See id. at 776-777. On remand, a Superior Court judge entered declaratory judgment in favor of LaChance and awarded him $ 28,578.69 in attorney’s fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). The defendants are challenging that award in this appeal. The principal issue before us is whether LaChance qualified for an award of fees as a “prevailing party” under § 1988(b), even though he had already been discharged in 2006 from the SMU detention that was the subject of his suit, long before he won any relief in his favor. The defendants argue that, in these circumstances, LaChance was not a prevailing party because the declaratory judgment he ultimately won was moot, and did not directly benefit him or materially alter his relationship with the defendants, at the time it was entered. We conclude, however, […]
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