Commonwealth v. Blanchard (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-036-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12041 COMMONWEALTH vs. MICHAEL BLANCHARD. February 27, 2017. Practice, Criminal, Jury and jurors, Deliberation of jury, Instructions to jury, Voir dire, Mistrial, Confrontation of witnesses, Required finding. Constitutional Law, Jury, Confrontation of witnesses. Jury and Jurors. Evidence, Expert opinion, Cross-examination. Witness, Cross-examination. Firearms. License. In the early morning hours of March 16, 2010, the defendant, by his own admission, fired multiple shots into the window of the apartment where Stephen Erving, Jr., was asleep, and killed him. The Commonwealth charged the defendant with murder in the first degree, armed assault with the intent to murder, and carrying a firearm without a license. At trial, there was an issue whether the defendant’s actions were consistent with manslaughter where he argued that he fired the shots to scare, not kill, Erving, who purportedly had threatened the defendant and his family. The jury ultimately convicted the defendant of murder in the second degree and carrying a firearm without a license. He appealed from the convictions to the Appeals Court. Before the Appeals Court, the defendant argued (among other claims) that the trial judge improperly denied his motion for a mistrial on the ground that during the jury’s deliberations, the jurors were exposed to the contents of a binder belonging to the judge that contained copies of various motions, photographs, and transcripts, and included materials that had been excluded as evidence at trial.[1] The defendant’s position was that the extraneous materials were a factor in the jury’s decision to convict him of murder in the second degree, and that he was therefore prejudiced by the jurors’ unauthorized exposure to them. The Appeals Court upheld the judge’s denial of the defendant’s motion for a mistrial, rejected his other claims of error, and affirmed the convictions. Commonwealth v. Blanchard, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 637 (2016). We granted the defendant’s application for further appellate review, and affirm the convictions. The principal issue before us is whether the jury’s exposure to the judge’s binder during deliberations should have resulted in a mistrial. Where a jury have been exposed to extraneous materials, we have differentiated between cases in which the exposure comes to light before a seated jury have completed deliberations, and cases where the exposure is discovered after jurors have already had been discharged.[2] Compare Commonwealth v. Mejia, 461 Mass. […]
Commonwealth v. Oberle (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-037-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12149 COMMONWEALTH vs. WILLIAM OBERLE. Norfolk. December 8, 2016. – February 28, 2017. Present: Gants, C.J., Botsford, Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ. Assault and Battery. Kidnapping. Jury and Jurors. Practice, Criminal, Jury and jurors, Challenge to jurors. Evidence, Prior misconduct. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on September 17, 2014. The cases were tried before Raymond J. Brassard, J. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. Merritt Schnipper for the defendant. Michael McGee, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. BOTSFORD, J. The defendant, William Oberle, appeals from three assault and battery convictions, G. L. c. 265, § 13A (a), and a kidnapping conviction, G. L. c. 265, § 26, arising out of an incident of domestic violence. The defendant argues that the trial judge erred in denying his peremptory challenge of a female juror and in admitting prior bad act evidence. We reject both arguments and affirm the judgments of conviction of assault and battery. The defendant also argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his kidnapping conviction. We are unpersuaded, and affirm that conviction. Background. a. Facts. Because the defendant challenges, in part, the sufficiency of the trial evidence, we summarize it in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 611, 676-677 (1979). The defendant and the victim began a romantic relationship in the summer of 2013. The defendant made the victim feel uncomfortable and insecure, and prevented her from looking at or speaking with others in public. In February, 2014, the victim went to a hospital emergency room with bruising to her ears, face, neck, and arm after the defendant had beaten and strangled her. As he wrapped his hands around her neck during that incident, the defendant told the victim he was going to kill her. The couple soon reconciled and moved together to the home of the defendant’s daughter in Dedham. They occupied a bedroom in the basement of the house, which had a private back door and a shared exit through the first-floor kitchen.[1] Although their relationship briefly stabilized following the move, the defendant’s physical abuse of the victim resumed, and the defendant struck the victim’s face on multiple occasions. The victim struggled with alcohol […]
Commonwealth v. Unitt (and six companion cases) (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-017-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 16-P-29 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. PETER J. UNITT, THIRD (and six companion cases[1]). No. 16-P-29. Middlesex. December 7, 2016. – February 28, 2017. Present: Cypher, Maldonado, & Blake, JJ. Bail. Forfeiture Proceeding. Practice, Criminal, Restitution. Restitution. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on September 23, 2010. A bail forfeiture proceeding was had before Sandra L. Hamlin, J. Dennis M. Toomey for Peter J. Unitt, III. James E. McCall for Lee Peck Unitt. Melissa Weisgold Johnsen, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. BLAKE, J. The married defendants, Peter J. Unitt, III (Peter), and Lee Peck Unitt (Lee), jointly operated a law office in Woburn prior to their arraignment on numerous crimes related to the theft and embezzlement of their clients’ funds.[2] Their adult children, Jade Unitt (Jade) and Peter Unitt, IV (Peter, IV), posted bail on their behalf.[3] Neither defendant defaulted, and each subsequently was convicted of a subset of the charged crimes. This appeal presents the question whether, where no default occurred, a judge of the Superior Court had the authority to order that the bail posted on the defendants’ behalf be forfeited and applied toward the restitution they owed. Because we conclude that under the circumstances presented by this case, the judge did not have such authority, we reverse the order of forfeiture. Background. On October 18, 2010, both Peter and Lee were arraigned on multiple indictments in the Superior Court, at which time bail was set at $ 50,000 cash for each defendant. On December 9, 2010, Jade, the defendants’ adult daughter, posted bail on behalf of Lee and was named as surety on the recognizance. On February 16, 2011, Peter, IV, the defendants’ adult son, posted bail on behalf of Peter and was named as surety on the recognizance. Both recognizance forms, which are identical, warn the surety of the risk of forfeiting the money posted for bail if the defendant defaults, but list no other potential risks of forfeiture. Between their arraignments in 2010, and their convictions in 2013, each of the defendants appeared for court as required under the recognizances, thereby satisfying the conditions of their bail. In April of 2013, a jury convicted Lee of four counts of larceny and one count of embezzlement. Thereafter, the judge adjudicated her […]
Commonwealth v. Long (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-035-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11253 COMMONWEALTH vs. DERYCK LONG. Norfolk. October 11, 2016. – February 24, 2017. Present: Gants, C.J., Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ. Homicide. Constitutional Law, Assistance of counsel. Evidence, Exculpatory, Wiretap, Result of illegal search. Cellular Telephone. Electronic Surveillance. Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Assistance of counsel. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on March 9, 2006. Pretrial motions to suppress evidence were heard by Janet L. Sanders, J.; the cases were tried before Kenneth J. Fishman, J., and a motion for a new trial, filed on August 4, 2014, was heard by him. Robert F. Shaw, Jr., for the defendant. Pamela Alford, Assistant District Attorney (Craig F. Kowalski, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the Commonwealth. GAZIANO, J. A Superior Court jury found the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree, on a theory of deliberate premeditation, in the shooting death of Jamal Vaughn (victim) on January 9, 2016, in Quincy. Before us is the defendant’s appeal from his convictions and from the denial of his motion for a new trial. He claims that his trial counsel’s uninformed decision not to introduce cell site location information (CSLI) to contradict the testimony of a key prosecution witness constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, and that it was error for a motion judge to deny his pretrial motion to suppress the testimony of the same witness because the Commonwealth had obtained his testimony as a result of an illegal wiretap that this court previously had ordered suppressed. See Commonwealth v. Long, 454 Mass. 542 (2009). We conclude that the defendant was not deprived of the effective assistance of trial counsel, and that there was no error in the motion judge’s determination that the witness’s testimony was sufficiently attenuated from the suppressed wiretap evidence to dissipate the taint of illegality. Accordingly, we affirm the conviction and the denial of the motion for a new trial, and decline to exercise our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to disturb the verdict. Facts. We recite the facts that the jury could have found, reserving certain facts for our analysis of the particular issues. From late 2005 to early 2006, the defendant would frequently stay with his girl friend, Janet Ojo, at her house on Franklin Street in Quincy. […]
Fazio v. Fazio (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-016-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 16-P-106 Appeals Court JOHANNE FAZIO vs. KEITH FAZIO. No. 16-P-106. Plymouth. November 7, 2016. – February 24, 2017. Present: Cypher, Massing, & Sacks, JJ. Federal Servicemembers Civil Relief Act. Practice, Civil, Stay of proceedings. Parent and Child, Child support. Divorce and Separation, Child support, Division of property. Complaint for divorce filed in the Plymouth Division of the Probate and Family Court Department on November 17, 2006. The case was heard by Catherine P. Sabaitis, J. David P. Sorrenti for the husband. Leonard F. Zandrow, Jr., for the wife. MASSING, J. In this appeal from an amended judgment of divorce nisi, Keith Fazio (husband), a major in the Army National Guard who repeatedly saw active duty over the course of the divorce proceedings, contends that the Probate and Family Court judge violated the Federal Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 501 et seq. (2006) (SCRA),[1] by issuing certain temporary orders in his absence. He also claims that the judge abused her discretion by disproportionately allocating marital assets to Johanne Fazio (wife). Although we conclude that the husband’s request for a stay did not satisfy the SCRA requirements, the temporary orders nonetheless failed to comply with the applicable provisions of the Massachusetts child support guidelines (guidelines), and we remand the case for further proceedings regarding the subject matter of these orders. We discern no abuse of discretion in the allocation of the marital estate. Background. The husband and the wife married in 1992, had three daughters together, and permanently separated in late 2006, when this divorce action was filed. The husband was a commissioned officer of the Army National Guard, eventually rising to the rank of major. He was deployed to active duty six times between 2003 and 2012. Recognizing that the husband’s military service was “selfless and honorable,” the judge found that his frequent long-term deployments were “a major factor in the deterioration of the family and the marriage.” The wife was the primary caretaker of the children, who all lived with her since the separation. She also was their sole caregiver when the husband was on active duty status. Although both parties contributed to the purchase and the maintenance of the marital home, the wife assumed financial responsibility for the home after the separation. The judge found […]
Coren-Hall v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-015-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 16-P-300 Appeals Court ALEXIS D. COREN-HALL[1] vs. MASSACHUSETTS BAY TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY. No. 16-P-300. Suffolk. December 13, 2016. – February 23, 2017. Present: Milkey, Massing, & Sacks, JJ. Practice, Civil, Presentment of claim under Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, Interlocutory appeal, Summary judgment. Massachusetts Tort Claims Act. Notice, Claim under Massachusetts Tort Claims Act. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority, General manager. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on May 16, 2012. The case was heard by Peter M. Lauriat, J., on a motion for summary judgment, and a motion for reconsideration was considered by him. Amy Bratskeir (Jonathan P. Feltner also present) for the defendant. Albert E. Grady for the plaintiff. SACKS, J. The defendant, Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA), appeals from a Superior Court order denying its renewed motion for summary judgment on plaintiff Alexis D. Coren-Hall’s tort claim under the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, G. L. c. 258. The MBTA’s motion asserted that Coren-Hall had failed to make presentment of her claim to the MBTA’s “executive officer,” as required by G. L. c. 258, § 4. The judge denied the motion on the ground that, although Coren-Hall had not made presentment to the MBTA’s executive officer, the executive officer nevertheless had “actual notice” of the claim. We conclude that the MBTA’s motion should have been allowed.[2] Background. Coren-Hall alleged that on May 10, 2010, she was injured when a negligently driven MBTA bus struck a vehicle that she was in the process of entering. After she filed suit on May 16, 2012, the MBTA’s answer asserted, as an affirmative defense, that she had failed to make proper presentment of her claim as required by G. L. c. 258, § 4. In July, 2015, the MBTA filed a renewed motion for summary judgment on that basis.[3] Under G. L. c. 258, § 4, a tort claim against a public employer must be presented to its “executive officer,” defined in G. L. c. 258, § 1, inserted by St. 1978, c. 512, § 15, as its “nominal chief executive officer or board,”[4] within two years after the cause of action arose. The MBTA’s motion asserted that, although Coren-Hall had timely mailed notice of her claim to the MBTA “Claims Department,” she had never sent such notice to the executive officer. The judge denied the MBTA’s motion, and this appeal followed.[5] Discussion. The parties’ […]
Categories: News Tags: 1101517, Authority, CorenHall, Lawyers, massachusetts, Transportation, Weekly
Fortunato v. Akebia Therapeutics, Inc., et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 12-012-17)
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS SUFFOLK, ss. SUPERIOR COURT. 1584CV02665-BLS2 ____________________ ANTHONY FORTUNATO, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. AKEBIA THERAPEUTICS, INC., and Others1 ____________________ MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ALLOWING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS Anthony Fortunato asserts claims on behalf of himself and a putative class of investors in Akebia Therapeutics, Inc. The amended complaint alleges that Akebia’s final registration statement and prospectus for its initial public offering were misleading because they did not disclose interim results from an ongoing clinical drug trial. Fortunato claims that as a result Akebia, senior executives and directors who signed the offering materials, and the investment banks that acted as underwriters for the IPO all violated the federal Securities Act of 1933. Defendants move to dismiss this action on the grounds that: (1) the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over Securities Act class actions; (2) Fortunato’s claims sound in fraud and he has failed to state the factual basis for his claims with sufficient particularity; and (3) if particularity is not required, Fortunato has failed to allege facts that plausibly suggest he and the putative class are entitled to relief. The Court concludes that the first two arguments are without merit. State courts have concurrent jurisdiction to hear Securities Act class actions; the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 did not take that power away. And Fortunato need not meet the heightened pleading standard that applies to fraud claims because he alleges only negligent misrepresentations and expressly disclaims any claim of intentional or reckless fraud. But the Court will ALLOW the motion to dismiss because the facts alleged by Fortunato do not plausibly suggest that he is entitled to any relief under the 1 John P. Buler, Jason A. Amello, Muneer A. Satter, Campbell Murray, M.D., Jack Nielsen, Anupam Dalal, M.D., Giovanni Ferrara, Kim Dueholmd, Ph.D, Duane Nash, M.D., Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC, Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC, UBS Securities LLC, and Nomura Securities, International. – 2 – Securities Act. Fortunato claims that the offering materials issued by Akebia for its March 2014 IPO were misleading because they failed to disclose preliminary information from Akebia’s ongoing Phase 2b clinical trial of its first potential pharmaceutical product suggesting that patients receiving the test drug were more likely to experience serious adverse events than patients who received a placebo. But the complaint and the materials it cites make clear that this Phase 2b study was a double-blind, placebo controlled, randomized trial. They also indicate that this trial was not completed, and thus the study results were not unblinded to reveal which patients received the trial drug and which received a placebo, until six months or more after the IPO. Fortunato alleges no facts […]
Commonwealth v. Mendez (and 11 companion cases) (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-034-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11869 SJC-11870 COMMONWEALTH vs. CHARLES MENDEZ (and eleven companion cases[1]). Bristol. October 11, 2016. – February 22, 2017. Present: Gants, C.J., Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ. Homicide. Firearms. Robbery. Assault and Battery by Means of a Dangerous Weapon. Felony-Murder Rule. Constitutional Law, Search and seizure, Reasonable suspicion. Search and Seizure, Reasonable suspicion. Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Motion to suppress, Trial of indictments together, Argument by prosecutor, Instructions to jury. Witness, Credibility. Jury and Jurors. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on January 7, 2011, and February 11, 2011. Pretrial motions to suppress were heard by Renee P. Dupuis, J., and a motion for joinder was also heard by her; and the cases were tried before D. Lloyd Macdonald, J. Cathryn A. Neaves for Charles Mendez. Jennifer H. O’Brien for Tacuma Massie. Yul-mi Cho, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. BUDD, J. On the evening of November 18, 2010, Edward Platts was shot and killed while sitting in his motor vehicle at a housing complex in Fall River. The defendants, Charles Mendez and Tacuma Massie, were each indicted on charges of (1) murder in the first degree[2]; (2) carrying a firearm without a license; (3) carrying a loaded firearm without a license; and (4) armed robbery. They additionally were charged with assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon and armed robbery on separate indictments in connection with a separate incident involving a different individual. The motion judge denied the defendants’ motions to suppress evidence seized in connection with their warrantless stop. At the conclusion of a joint jury trial in September, 2013, the defendants were convicted of all charges. Each defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. Both assert the following errors: the denial of his motion to suppress; the joinder at trial of the indictments for two separate incidents; and portions of the prosecutor’s closing argument. Massie further argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of the armed robbery and felony-murder. Each defendant separately asserts additional errors pursuant to Commonwealth v. Moffett, 383 Mass. 201, 208 (1981). We affirm the defendants’ convictions and decline to exercise our extraordinary power under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. Background. We summarize the facts in the light most favorable to […]
Koines, et al. v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Cohasset, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-014-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 16-P-678 Appeals Court ALEXANDER C. KOINES & another[1] vs. ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS OF COHASSET & others.[2] No. 16-P-678. February 21, 2017. Zoning, Nonconforming use or structure, Lot size, Exemption, Judicial review. Real Property, Merger. The plaintiffs appeal from a judgment of the Land Court that affirmed a decision of the defendant zoning board of appeals of Cohasset (board) based on a conclusion that the board correctly interpreted the Cohasset zoning by-law to afford grandfather protection to a lot owned by the defendants John and Martha Shaw. We affirm. At issue in the case is section 8.3.2(c) of the by-law, the language of which is set out in the margin.[3] The Shaws’ lot, containing approximately 21,850 square feet, is located in an R-C district in which the minimum lot size is 60,000 square feet. The current minimum lot size results from an increase enacted by amendment to the by-law in 1985, at a time when the Shaws’ lot was held in common ownership with several parcels of adjacent land. The lot accordingly plainly meets the literal linguistic requirements of the second portion of section 8.3.2(c) as applicable to lots in the R-C district. The plaintiffs nonetheless contend that the board erroneously interpreted the by-law to afford grandfather protection to the lot by virtue of the common law doctrine of merger. Under that doctrine, a lot held in separate ownership at the time an increase in area renders it nonconforming and thereby entitled to grandfather protection under the fourth paragraph of G. L. c. 40A, § 6, loses grandfather protection if it thereafter comes into common ownership with adjoining land. See Preston v. Board of Appeals of Hull, 51 Mass. App. Ct. 236, 243 (2001). As the plaintiffs observe, this court reached its conclusion in Preston despite the fact that the lot at issue met the literal linguistic requirements set forth in the statute, resting its conclusion on the fact that the Legislature, though presumptively aware of the preexisting and well-established merger doctrine at the time it enacted § 6, did not evince a clear intent to alter the common law. See id. at 240, 243. The present case stands differently since we are presented with an enactment of the Cohasset town meeting, construed by the local zoning board of appeals […]
Commonwealth v. Tradition (North America) Inc. v. Jampel, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-013-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 15-P-1543 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. TRADITION (NORTH AMERICA) INC.; RONALD JAMPEL & others,[1] third-party defendants. No. 15-P-1543. Suffolk. October 5, 2016. – February 21, 2017. Present: Meade, Milkey, & Kinder, JJ. Bonds, Tax-exempt. Contribution. Contract, Performance and breach, Implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, Indemnity, Bidding for contract, Misrepresentation, Unjust enrichment, Interference with contractual relations, Settlement agreement, Release from liability. Indemnity. Massachusetts False Claims Act. Consumer Protection Act, Unfair or deceptive act. Deceit. Fraud. Conspiracy. Unjust Enrichment. Unlawful Interference. Release. Limitations, Statute of. Practice, Civil, Enforcement of liability on bond, Joinder of claims, Damages. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on November 5, 2010. Motions to dismiss a third-party complaint against certain third-party defendants were heard by Frances A. McIntyre, J., and a separate motion to dismiss the third-party complaint against another defendant was considered by Paul D. Wilson, J. John E. Roberts (Michael R. Hackett also present) for Tradition (North America) Inc. Joseph J. Bial, of the District of Columbia, for FSA Capital Management Services, LLC. Douglas L. Wald, of the District of Columbia (Kevin P. Martin also present) for Trinity Plus Funding Company LLC. Julia McLetchie for Steven E. Goldberg. Jeremy M. Sternberg, for Ronald Jampel, was present but did not argue. KINDER, J. The Commonwealth brought this enforcement action against the defendant, Tradition (North America) Inc. (Tradition), a broker for transactions involving municipal bond derivatives, claiming that Tradition engaged in bid rigging and other deceptive practices that harmed the Commonwealth in violation of the Consumer Protection Act, G. L. c. 93A, § 2, and the False Claims Act, G. L. c. 12, § 5B. Tradition denied the allegations, asserting that it, too, was a victim of the alleged bid-rigging scheme. Tradition filed third-party claims against individuals and corporations with whom it had consulted in the allegedly fraudulent transactions, including Ronald Jampel, Steven E. Goldberg, Trinity Plus Funding Company LLC (Trinity), and FSA Capital Management Services, LLC (FSA) (collectively, the third-party defendants). The third-party complaint sought contribution from the third-party defendants pursuant to G. L. c. 231B, § 1(a), for any liability Tradition might have to the Commonwealth (contribution claims). It also alleged various other claims, including breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, common-law indemnification, unfair and deceptive trade practices, fraud […]