Commonwealth v. Cooper (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-067-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 16-P-697 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. ROBERT F. COOPER. No. 16-P-697. Middlesex. March 8, 2017. – May 25, 2017. Present: Green, Wolohojian, & Sullivan, JJ. Controlled Substances. “School Zone” Statute. Words, “Accredited.” Complaint received and sworn to in the Cambridge Division of the District Court Department on March 29, 2012. The case was tried before Michelle B. Hogan, J. Kathleen A. Kelly for the defendant. Jason R. Chandler, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. GREEN, J. Among the challenges to his conviction of distribution of a class E substance in a school zone, in violation of G. L. c. 94C, §§ 32D(a) and 32J, the defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to establish that the pills seized at the time of his arrest were a class E substance (gabapentin), or that the school furnishing the basis for his school zone violation was an “accredited private preschool” within the meaning of § 32J. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to establish that the pills were a class E substance and, discerning no merit in his other claims of error as to that charge, affirm his conviction on the charge of distribution of a class E substance. However, we reject the Commonwealth’s contention that evidence that the preschool in question was licensed sufficed to establish that it was “accredited” within the meaning of the statute, and accordingly the defendant’s conviction of the school zone violation is reversed, the verdict is set aside, and judgment shall enter for the defendant on that charge. Background. We summarize the facts the jury could have found, reserving other details for discussion of the issues. On the morning of March 16, 2012, undercover Cambridge police Officer Janie Munro entered a fast food restaurant and made eye contact with the defendant; shortly thereafter, the two left the restaurant together. Munro told the defendant that she was looking to buy drugs, and the defendant asked if she was familiar with “Johnnies,” or Neurontins. The defendant explained that the pills were really called gabapentin, and that he had a prescription for that medication, with five refills remaining. During their conversation, the defendant displayed a prescription pill bottle from his backpack, though Munro was not able to read the label. As they ended their conversation, Munro and […]
Commonwealth v. McGrath (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-085-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11909 COMMONWEALTH vs. George McGrath. May 25, 2017. Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. Practice, Criminal, Capital case. George McGrath purports to appeal from the decision of a single justice of this court, pursuant to the gatekeeper provision of G. L. c. 278, § 33E, denying leave to appeal from the denial of his motion for a new trial on charges of murder in the first degree and assault with intent to rob.[1] “A defendant who is denied leave to appeal from a single justice acting as a gatekeeper . . . has no right to appeal from the single justice’s ruling denying leave. The single justice’s ruling is ‘final and unreviewable.’” Commonwealth v. Companiono, 472 Mass. 1004, 1005 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Gunter, 456 Mass. 1017, 1017 (2010), S.C., 459 Mass. 480, cert. denied, 565 U.S. 868 (2011). We see no reason to depart from this longstanding rule. See Commonwealth v. Robinson, 477 Mass. (2017). Appeal dismissed. The case was submitted on briefs. Kathleen M. McCarthy for the defendant. Teresa K. Anderson, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. [1] McGrath’s convictions were affirmed on direct appeal after plenary review. Commonwealth v. McGrath, 358 Mass. 314 (1970). In addition, we reversed the allowance of McGrath’s previous motion for a new trial. Commonwealth v. McGrath, 437 Mass. 46, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 980 (2002). Full-text Opinions
In the Matter of a Grand Jury Investigation (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-086-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12249 IN THE MATTER OF A GRAND JURY INVESTIGATION. May 25, 2017. Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. Moot Question. The petitioner, R.C., appealed from a judgment of the county court denying his petition for relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3. R.C. has been indicted for possessing and distributing child pornography. In his petition, he sought relief from an order of a Superior Court judge authorizing computers and digital storage devices (digital material) seized from his home to be searched for child pornography. R.C., who is an attorney, argued that the digital material may contain privileged data provided to him by his clients and that the Superior Court judge’s order did not adequately protect any such privileged data because it does not conform to the protocol set forth in Preventive Med. Assocs. v. Commonwealth, 465 Mass. 810 (2013). After the single justice denied relief, R.C. moved to stay the Superior Court order pending this appeal. We denied that motion, thereby allowing the search to proceed. The Commonwealth has moved to dismiss this appeal as moot. It represents that the search has taken place pursuant to the protocol set forth in the Superior Court order, that files allegedly containing child pornography were transmitted to R.C.’s counsel, and that R.C. does not claim that any of those files are protected by the attorney-client privilege. R.C. has not disputed these representations or filed any response to the motion within the time set forth in Mass. R. A. P. 15 (a), 365 Mass. 859 (1974). R.C.’s challenge to the Superior Court order has become moot, as that order has been fully carried out. See Lenardis v. Commonwealth, 452 Mass. 1001, 1001 (2008). No effective relief can be provided. Moreover, we see no reason to believe that the issue is capable of repetition, yet evading review, and R.C. has offered none. Appeal dismissed. The case was submitted on the papers filed, accompanied by a memorandum of law. Andrew W. Piltser Cowan for the petitioner. Varsha Kukafka & Anne S. Yas, Assistant District Attorneys, for the Commonwealth. Full-text Opinions
In the Matter of an Application for a Criminal Complaint (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-088-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReportersjc.state.ma.us SJC-12062 IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION FOR A CRIMINAL COMPLAINT. May 25, 2017. Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. Practice, Criminal, Complaint, Standing. Police Officer. The petitioner appeals from a judgment of the county court denying her petition for relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3. We affirm the judgment. The petitioner, who was a Boston police officer, filed an application for a criminal complaint in the West Roxbury Division of the Boston Municipal Court (BMC), alleging that the respondent, her supervisor, committed an assault and battery against her. The respondent was the commander of the police station falling within that court’s jurisdiction. After a hearing, a clerk-magistrate denied the application for lack of probable cause. G. L. c. 218, § 35A. The petitioner moved for reconsideration and change of venue. The application was transferred to the Charlestown Division of the BMC for rehearing by a clerk-magistrate, although it appears that the application was not docketed until almost one year later. The petitioner requested that the matter be transferred out of Suffolk County to Bristol County. That request was denied. The respondent also requested a new hearing and change of venue on the ground that he had a business relationship with all the divisions of the BMC. As a result, the application was transferred to the Dedham Division of the District Court Department, nearly three years after the application was transferred to the Charlestown Division of the BMC.[1] A clerk-magistrate of that court denied the application, finding no probable cause. The petitioner then filed her G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition, seeking both a rehearing on her application and a broader ruling requiring that applications for criminal complaints made against police officers be automatically transferred to a judge outside the police officer’s jurisdiction, rather than being heard by a clerk-magistrate in the first instance. The single justice denied relief without a hearing. We review the single justice’s denial of relief only to determine whether there was an abuse of discretion or an error of law. Marides v. Rossi, 446 Mass. 1007, 1007 (2006), citing Restucci v. Appeals Court, 442 Mass. 1031, 1032 (2004). The petitioner has not demonstrated any error or abuse of discretion as to either of her claims. First, the single justice properly denied the petitioner’s request for a rehearing of her application […]
Commonwealth v. Robinson (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-087-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11907 COMMONWEALTH vs. PAUL ROBINSON. May 25, 2017. Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. Practice, Criminal, Capital case. Along with a codefendant, Paul Robinson was convicted of two counts of murder in the first degree and two counts of assault with intent to rob in 1969. After plenary review, this court affirmed the convictions. Commonwealth v. McGrath, 358 Mass. 314 (1970), S.C., 408 Mass. 245 (1990) and 437 Mass. 1002, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 980 (2002). Robinson has since filed several motions for a new trial, all of which have been denied. After the denial of his most recent (seventh) such motion, Robinson sought leave to appeal pursuant to the gatekeeper provision of G. L. c. 278, § 33E. A single justice of this court concluded that the motion failed to present a “new and substantial question” and therefore denied such leave. Robinson filed a notice of appeal to the full court from the single justice’s ruling, and the Commonwealth moved to dismiss. Robinson asserted in opposition that his appeal ought to be permitted to proceed despite the longstanding rule that the decision of the gatekeeper is “final and unreviewable.” E.g., Commonwealth v. Vinnie, 475 Mass. 1011, 1011 (2016), and cases cited. We gave Robinson an opportunity to explain the basis for his position in a preliminary statement of no more than five pages. Robinson has responded with an eleven-page statement of issues, in which he argues essentially that the gatekeeper process leads to arbitrary results and, more particularly, that his appeal was not allowed to proceed whereas other defendants’ appeals were.[1] This is merely a recasting of the equal protection challenge we rejected in Napolitano v. Attorney Gen., 432 Mass. 240, 241-242 (2000). We reject it again here. Robinson received plenary review of his convictions under § 33E on direct appeal, and he has offered no reason to suppose that his seventh motion for a new trial raised any new and substantial issue that was not or could not have been presented in any of the previous six. There is no hint of arbitrariness in this case. He also has not offered any reason to believe that the “single justice erred by denying [his] gatekeeper petition on procedural grounds.” Commonwealth v. Nassar, 454 Mass. 1008, 1009 n.2 (2009). Finally, we reject Robinson’s argument […]
Deputy Chief Counsel for the Public Defender Division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services, et al. v. Acting First Justice of the Lowell Division of the District Court Department (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-084-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12121 DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL FOR THE PUBLIC DEFENDER DIVISION OF THE COMMITTEE FOR PUBLIC COUNSEL SERVICES & another[1] vs. ACTING FIRST JUSTICE OF THE LOWELL DIVISION OF THE DISTRICT COURT DEPARTMENT. Suffolk. November 9, 2016. – May 24, 2017. Present: Gants, C.J., Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ. Committee for Public Counsel Services. District Court, Drug court session. Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk on February 23, 2016. The case was reported by Duffly, J. Paul R. Rudof, Committee for Public Counsel Services (Ryan M. Schiff, Committee for Public Counsel Services, also present) for the plaintiffs. Bethany L. Stevens for the defendant. HINES, J. This matter is before us on a reservation and report, by a single justice of this court, of a petition for relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3. The petition, brought by the Deputy Chief Counsel for the Public Defender Division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services and the Deputy Chief Counsel for the Private Counsel Division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services (collectively CPCS), sought an order affirming CPCS’s independent authority under G. L. c. 211D to select and supervise attorneys for indigent defendants in the pilot program it had launched in the drug court session of the Lowell Division of the District Court Department (drug court). The issue arose after the Acting First Justice of the Lowell District Court (Justice), citing the need for a “team” approach to cases in the drug Court, removed CPCS attorneys from drug court cases to which they had been assigned and excluded CPCS attorneys from assignment to any new case in the drug court. The single justice, in her reservation and report, observed that “the matter raises some important legal questions that ought to be decided by the full court, concerning specialty courts in general and adult drug courts in particular, and the respective roles and responsibilities of judges, [CPCS], and individual defense attorneys.” The issue highlights the tension that may arise between an attorney’s duty to zealously advocate for the rights of the drug court defendant and a drug court model that favors a collaborative and nonadversarial approach to supervision of the drug court defendant. We recognize that the success of drug court outcomes depends in large part […]
Commonwealth v. Lopez (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-065-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 15-P-1183 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. AUGUSTO LOPEZ. No. 15-P-1183. Middlesex. March 6, 2017. – May 24, 2017. Present: Carhart, Massing, & Lemire, JJ.[1] Rape. Child Abuse. Enticement of Minor. Evidence, First complaint, Relevancy and materiality, Credibility of witness. Witness, Credibility. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on May 17, 2012. The cases were tried before Kenneth W. Salinger, J. Jane Larmon White, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for the defendant. Jessica Langsam, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. MASSING, J. The defendant was convicted of two counts of rape and abuse of a child under sixteen years of age, aggravated by an age difference of ten years or more, see G. L. c. 265, § 23A(b), two counts of rape of a child by force, G. L. c. 265, § 22A, and one count of enticement of a child, G. L. c. 265, § 26C. The charges arose from a single incident involving a twelve year old girl. The only evidence of the crime was the testimony of the child, who was fifteen years old at the time of trial. At issue is the judge’s decision to admit the testimony of the child’s “therapeutic mentor” that the child lacked the ability to engage in “imagination play.” We conclude that the testimony was improperly admitted to prove that the child was incapable of telling lies and that its use for this purpose was prejudicial, warranting a new trial. Background. a. The crime. When the child was twelve years old she lived next door to the defendant, whom she called “Pachoo.” The defendant lived with Chrissy, who was a friend of the child’s mother, and Chrissy’s three children, two of whom were younger than the child. The defendant was Chrissy’s boy friend and was fifty-five years old at the time. According to the child, one night she went next door to babysit for Chrissy’s two younger children while Chrissy went out to play bingo. The child had just finished using the upstairs bathroom when the defendant called her into Chrissy’s bedroom. The defendant pushed her onto the bed, took off her pants and underwear, got on top of her, and “sticked his dick in [her] vagina.” At some point he stopped, and the child put her underwear and pants back on. Then the defendant […]
Blanchard, et al. v. Steward Carney Hospital, Inc., et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-082-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12141 LYNNE BLANCHARD & others[1] vs. STEWARD CARNEY HOSPITAL, INC., & others.[2] Suffolk. November 7, 2016. – May 23, 2017. Present: Gants, C.J., Botsford, Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ.[3] “Anti-SLAPP” Statute. Constitutional Law, Right to petition government. Practice, Civil, Motion to dismiss. Words, “Based on.” Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on May 24, 2013. Special motions to dismiss were heard by Linda E. Giles, J. After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. Jeffrey A. Dretler (Joseph W. Ambash also present) for the defendants. Dahlia C. Rudavsky (Ellen J. Messing also present) for the plaintiffs. Donald J. Siegel & Paige W. McKissock, for Massachusetts AFL-CIO, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. LENK, J. In the spring of 2011, following reports of abuse at the adolescent psychiatric unit (unit) of Steward Carney Hospital, Inc., then president of the hospital, William Walczak, fired all of the registered nurses and mental health counsellors who worked in the unit. Walczak subsequently issued statements, both to the hospital’s employees and to the Boston Globe Newspaper Co. (Boston Globe), arguably to the effect that the nurses had been fired based in part on their culpability for the incidents that took place at the unit. The plaintiffs, nine of the nurses who had been fired, then filed suit against the defendants for, among other things, defamation. The hospital defendants[4] responded by filing a special motion to dismiss the defamation claim pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 59H, the “anti-SLAPP” statute. A Superior Court judge denied the motion, concluding that the hospital defendants had failed to meet their threshold burden of showing that the claim was based solely on their petitioning activity. The hospital defendants filed an interlocutory appeal in the Appeals Court as of right. See Fabre v. Walton, 436 Mass. 517, 521–522 (2002). The Appeals Court then reversed the motion judge’s decision in part. See Blanchard v. Steward Carney Hosp., Inc., 89 Mass. App. Ct. 97, 98 (2016). We granted the parties’ applications for further appellate review. We conclude that a portion of the plaintiff nurses’ defamation claim is based solely on the hospital defendants’ petitioning activity. The hospital defendants as special movants thus having satisfied in […]
477 Harrison Ave., LLC v. JACE Boston, LLC, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-083-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12150 477 HARRISON AVE., LLC vs. JACE BOSTON, LLC, & another.[1] Suffolk. January 5, 2017. – May 23, 2017. Present: Gants, C.J., Botsford, Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ.[2] “Anti-SLAPP” Statute. Constitutional Law, Right to petition government. Practice, Civil, Motion to dismiss. Abuse of Process. Consumer Protection Act, Unfair or deceptive act. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on March 23, 2015. A special motion to dismiss was heard by Dennis J. Curran, J. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. Mark S. Furman (Emily C. Shanahan also present) for the defendants. Andrew E. Goloboy (Ronald W. Dunbar, Jr., also present) for the plaintiff. LENK, J. This case involves the application of G. L. c. 231, § 59H, the “anti-SLAPP” statute, to a dispute between adjoining building owners. In 2011, the plaintiff purchased a parcel of property located at 477 Harrison Avenue in Boston with the goal of redeveloping it. The defendants own an abutting parcel.[3] Over the course of the next several years, the defendants opposed the plaintiff’s redevelopment plans in various legal and administrative arenas. The plaintiff eventually filed a complaint against the defendants, raising claims of abuse of process and a violation of G. L. c. 93A, § 11. The defendants responded by filing a special motion to dismiss pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 59H. A Superior Court judge denied the motion, the defendants appealed, and we allowed their application for direct appellate review. We consider first whether the defendants have met their threshold burden under the anti-SLAPP statute of showing that each claim is solely based on the defendants’ petitioning activity. See Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Products Corp., 427 Mass. 156, 167 (1998) (Duracraft). We conclude that they have done so as to the abuse of process claim, but not as to the G. L. c. 93A claim. The judge correctly denied the special motion to dismiss the latter claim. The defendants having met their threshold burden as to the abuse of process claim, however, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show that the petitioning activity on which that claim is based lacks a reasonable basis in law or fact and has caused it actual injury, i.e., is not a valid exercise of the right to petition. On the record before […]
Hyannis Anglers Club, Inc., et al. v. Harris Warren Commercial Kitchens, LLC (and a consolidated case) (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-063-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 16-P-34 Appeals Court HYANNIS ANGLERS CLUB, INC., & others[1] vs. HARRIS WARREN COMMERCIAL KITCHENS, LLC[2] (and a consolidated case[3]). No. 16-P-34. Barnstable. October 14, 2016. – May 23, 2017. Present: Vuono, Massing, & Sacks, JJ. Consumer Protection Act, Unfair or deceptive act, Attorney’s fees, Damages. Fraud. Deceit. Damages, Consumer protection case, Deceit. Civil actions commenced in the Superior Court Department on September 6, 2011, and April 29, 2013. After consolidation, the case was tried before Christopher J. Muse, J., and a motion for attorney’s fees and costs was heard by him. Stephen Soule & Clyde K. Hanyen, Jr., for Hyannis Anglers Club, Inc., & another. John J. Lang for Harris Warren Commercial Kitchens, LLC. VUONO, J. Shortly after 5:00 A.M. on August 27, 2010, a fire erupted in the kitchen of a restaurant in Hyannis owned by Oceans Harbors, LLC (Harbors). The blaze originated in a “Pitco Frialator” (fryer),[4] a cooking appliance, which, some twelve hours earlier, had purportedly been repaired by a technician employed by Harris Warren Commercial Kitchens, LLC (Harris), a firm engaged in repairing commercial kitchen equipment. The restaurant operated on the first floor of a two-story building owned by Hyannis Anglers Club, Inc. (Anglers Club). The Anglers Club, Harbors, and their insurer, Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London (Underwriters), brought this action against Harris seeking damages for the losses caused by the fire and for violations of G. L. c. 93A, §§ 2 and 11.[5] Following a trial in the Superior Court, a jury found that Harris was negligent, and the plaintiffs were awarded $ 686,496.44, exclusive of costs and statutory interest.[6] Thereafter, the trial judge, who had reserved for himself the plaintiffs’ claim under c. 93A, entered findings, rulings, and an order in which he concluded that Harris had violated c. 93A when its employee, for whom Harris was vicariously liable, disabled a safety switch on the fryer, concealed this fact from Harbors, and falsified the associated work documentation in violation of the Attorney General’s rules and regulations regarding repairs and services, 940 Code Mass. Regs. § 3.08(1)(e) (1993). The judge ruled that this deceptive conduct “caused the fire that damaged plaintiffs’ businesses and property.” However, the judge declined to find, as the plaintiffs alleged, that Harris had wilfully or knowingly violated c. 93A, a ruling that foreclosed an award of […]