Spinazola v. Mass. Environmental Associates, Inc., et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 12-078-17)
1 COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS SUFFOLK, ss. SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL ACTION NO. 0684CV00949BLS1 ROSEMARY SPINAZOLA, as Executrix of the Estate of Clarence Spinazola and as Co-Trustee of the Clarence Spinazola 1994 Revocable Trust vs. MASS. ENVIRONMENTAL ASSOCIATES, INC. and PATRICK J. HANNON MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER ON MOTION TO SUBSTITUTE ASSIGNEE, KING ROOT CAPITAL, LLC, AS PLAINTIFF AND REQUEST FOR EXECUTION This case was filed on March 6, 2006. On March 8, 2007, a Final Judgment by Default Upon Assessment of Damages by the Court entered in favor of the plaintiff, Rosemary Spinazola, as Executrix of the Estate of Clarence Spinazola and as Co-Trustee of the Clarence Spinazola 1994 Revocable Trust (the Judgment)1, in the amount of $ 982,316, with interest from the date of filing. On August 20, 2007, the defendants filed a “Motion to Vacate Judgment by Default for Failure to Produce Discovery and for Failure to Comply with Court Orders.” On September 18, 2007, that motion was denied. Then, nearly ten years later, the motion now before the court was filed. It is styled: “Motion to Substitute Assignee, King Root Capital, LLC, as Plaintiff and Request for Execution” (the Motion). In that motion, King Root Capital, LLC (King Root) alleges that: (1) Spinazola assigned her interest in the Judgment to ABCD Holdings, LLC (ABCD Holdings or, simply, ABCD); (2) ABCD, thereafter, assigned its interest to King Root; (3) after accounting for payments by the defendants and the further accrual of post- 1 It is not clear to the court whether the judgment is in favor of Rosemary Spinazola, individually, or the Estate or a Trust. The court will simply use the term “plaintiff.” 2 judgment interest, as of October 18, 2016 the Judgment balance is $ 2,055,540.59, with interest accruing from that date; and (4) the court should “substitute it as the plaintiff in this case and issue an execution in its name [in that amount].” The defendants appeared by counsel and opposed the motion. The principal grounds for their opposition was that the sole member of ABCD is attorney George A. McLaughlin, III, whose brother is the sole member of King Root. McLaughlin represented defendant Hannon for a number of years, and, in particular, in connection with the negotiation and execution of a Settlement Agreement between the plaintiff and Hannon pursuant to which the Judgment would be satisfied in full by payment to plaintiff of $ 400,000 according to a payment schedule (the Agreement).2 The defendants also alleged that McLaughlin diverted funds available to pay the balance of the $ 400,000 due under the Settlement Agreement to other entities.3 Based on these allegations, the defendants assert that the assignments “are void against public policy, fatally infected […]
Categories: News Tags: 1207817, Associates, Environmental, Inc., Lawyers, Mass., Spinazola, Weekly
Commonwealth v. Hebb (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-116-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12158 COMMONWEALTH vs. WILLIAM J. HEBB. Suffolk. February 7, 2017. – June 30, 2017. Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ. Motor Vehicle, Operating under the influence. Constitutional Law, Double jeopardy. Practice, Criminal, Double jeopardy, Verdict. Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk on July 19, 2016. The case was reported by Spina, J. Christopher DeMayo for the defendant. Donna-Marie Haran, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. Timothy St. Lawrence, pro se, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. HINES, J. In this case, we decide whether double jeopardy principles preclude the Commonwealth from retrying the defendant on a complaint charging a violation of G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (a) (1), on the theory of operation of a motor vehicle with a percentage of alcohol in his blood of .08 or greater (per se violation), after a jury acquitted him on the theory of operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor (impaired ability violation). The Commonwealth prosecuted the one-count complaint on both theories, and after the jury returned a verdict on the impaired ability violation only, the judge declared a mistrial on the per se violation. A new complaint issued charging only a per se violation of G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (a) (1). Claiming that retrial violated his double jeopardy rights where the complaint issued after an acquittal on the impaired ability violation, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. The judge denied the motion. The defendant sought relief in the county court pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3. The case is before us on a reservation and report from a single justice of this court. We conclude that double jeopardy principles do not preclude retrial where the Commonwealth prosecuted the case on both theories and the jury reached a verdict on only one of those theories. Background. We set forth the facts the jury could have found. On May 16, 2013, the defendant was struck by a vehicle while he was operating his motorcycle on a public way.[1] At the scene of the collision, the defendant admitted to having had several alcoholic beverages and was uncooperative with the paramedics. After the defendant complained of pain, he was transported to the Milford Hospital emergency department. The treating physician […]
Commonwealth v. Mora (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-115-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12170 COMMONWEALTH vs. STEVEN MORA. Suffolk. February 6, 2017. – June 29, 2017. Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ. Firearms. Motor Vehicle, Firearms. Search and Seizure, Motor vehicle, Warrant, Probable cause. Practice, Criminal, Interlocutory appeal, Judicial discretion, Motion to suppress, Warrant, Grand jury proceedings, Indictment, Sentence. Probable Cause. Evidence, Grand jury proceedings. Grand Jury. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on October 22, 2014. A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by James R. Lemire, J. An application for leave to file an interlocutory appeal was allowed by Botsford, J., in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk, and the appeal was reported by her. Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk on June 20, 2016. The case was reported by Botsford, J. Richard J. Shea for the defendant. Ellyn H. Lazar-Moore, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. BUDD, J. This case is here on the reservation and report of two related matters involving the defendant, Steven Mora, who was indicted on various charges in connection with the possession of an unlicensed firearm. Two of those charges included sentence enhancement as an armed career criminal pursuant to G. L. c. 269, § 10G (b). We conclude that the search warrant that yielded the gun, a magazine, and ammunition lacked probable cause and that the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence to the grand jury to support the armed career criminal enhancements. Background. a. The search. We summarize the facts provided in the affidavit that a Worcester police officer filed in support of an application for a warrant to search a safe found in a motor vehicle driven by the defendant. See Commonwealth v. O’Day, 440 Mass. 296, 297 (2003) (“our inquiry as to the sufficiency of the search warrant application always begins and ends with the ‘four corners of the affidavit’” [citation omitted]). One summer evening in 2014, that police officer was conducting surveillance and observed a man engaged in what appeared to be hand-to-hand drug transactions in the parking lot of a convenience store. This lot was known to be a location where “numerous drug arrests” had occurred. Approximately thirty minutes into the surveillance, the defendant drove […]
Commonwealth v. Sanborn (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-114-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12202 COMMONWEALTH vs. RICHARD R. SANBORN. Worcester. January 6, 2017. – June 29, 2017. Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, & Cypher, JJ. Abuse Prevention. Constitutional Law, Investigatory stop. Due Process of Law, Abuse prevention. Practice, Civil, Service. Threshold Police Inquiry. Complaint received and sworn to in the Fitchburg Division of the District Court Department on May 18, 2015. A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Christopher P. LoConto, J., and a question of law was reported by him to the Appeals Court. The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. Ellyn H. Lazar-Moore, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. Merritt Schnipper (Robert M. Cassesso, Jr., also present) for the defendant. LOWY, J. The question before us was reported by a judge in the District Court: “Whether G. L. c. 209A authorizes the police to effectuate a motor vehicle stop to serve a civil abuse prevention order?” We answer the question in the negative. We conclude that G. L. c. 209A requires law enforcement to take reasonable measures to serve abuse prevention orders. In order for the service of the orders to be reasonable, the manner of service must comply with the terms of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. Background. At a hearing regarding a motion to suppress evidence obtained during a motor vehicle stop, the motion judge found the following facts. On May 16, 2015, a Lunenberg police sergeant was parked outside a local bar. In the course of randomly checking the registration status and owner information of vehicles parked outside the bar, he inquired about a license plate number registered to Richard Sanborn, the defendant. The sergeant recalled that a civil abuse restraining order issued pursuant to G. L. c. 209A had not yet been served on the defendant. Another officer from the Lunenberg police department delivered the restraining order to the sergeant. Subsequently the defendant left the bar, entered his vehicle, and drove away.[1] The sergeant followed the defendant and eventually stopped his vehicle. Based on the sergeant’s observations of the defendant after the stop, the defendant was placed under arrest for operating while under the influence of liquor. […]
Zagranski v. Commonwealth (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-112-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12171 RICHARD ZAGRANSKI vs. COMMONWEALTH. June 27, 2017. Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. Practice, Criminal, Capital case. The petitioner, Richard Zagranski, was convicted of murder in the first degree in 1989. We affirmed the conviction. See Commonwealth v. Zagranski, 408 Mass. 278 (1990). In 2012, Zagranski filed a motion for postconviction relief claiming that he received ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel and seeking, among other things, an order granting him a new trial, an order vacating his conviction, or an order reducing the degree of the offense. He set forth several bases for the ineffective assistance claim including, as is relevant here, that his counsel had a conflict of interest that impaired counsel’s ability to provide effective representation.[1] The postconviction motion was denied. Zagranski then filed, in the county court, a petition for leave to appeal pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, in which he continued to press the conflict of interest argument. A single justice denied the petition, in August, 2013, as well as Zagranski’s subsequent motion for reconsideration.[2] In February, 2016, Zagranski filed a “Petition for Extraordinary Relief Pursuant to [G. L. c.] 211, § 3,” in the county court in which he claimed that the transcript of the hearing at which the trial judge considered the conflict of interest issue was not a part of the record that was before this court when it considered his direct appeal. In Zagranski’s view, the court was thus not able to fulfil its duty pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to review “the whole case” because the court did not have a complete record of the trial court proceedings. A single justice denied the petition on the bases that Zagranski has an adequate alternative remedy — to seek postconviction relief in the trial court — and that his petition did not, in any event, raise a “new and substantial” issue that would entitle him to review pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E. Zagranski has appealed from the single justice’s denial of his petition; the Commonwealth has moved to dismiss the appeal. A decision of a single justice denying leave to appeal under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, is final and unreviewable, and Zagranski cannot circumvent that by seeking relief pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3. See Cook v. Commonwealth, 451 […]
Commonwealth v. Littles (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-113-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12238 COMMONWEALTH vs. CASANDRA B. LITTLES. Essex. March 9, 2017. – June 28, 2017. Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ. Larceny. Fraud. Practice, Criminal, Instructions to jury, Harmless error. Due Process of Law, Inference. Constitutional Law, Harmless error. Error, Harmless. Evidence, Fraud, Prima facie evidence, Inference. Complaint received and sworn to in the Lawrence Division of the District Court Department on January 21, 2014. The case was tried before Michael A. Uhlarik, J. The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. Philip A. Mallard, Assistant District Attorney (Lindsay M. Nasson, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the Commonwealth. Joseph K. Kenyon, Jr., for the defendant. LOWY, J. The case before us challenges the constitutionality of a jury instruction for the crime of drawing or uttering a fraudulent check. The challenged instruction informed the jury that they could infer that the defendant had both (1) knowledge of insufficient funds and (2) fraudulent intent if they found that the defendant “failed to make good on th[e] check within two days after she was notified that the bank had refused payment because of insufficient funds.” The instruction stems from G. L. c. 266, § 37, which designates the failure to make the required payment on the bad check within two days of notice as “prima facie evidence” of the defendant’s intent and knowledge. We conclude that the statute’s designation of prima facie evidence and the corresponding instruction are constitutionally infirm because a defendant’s failure to pay a check within two days of being notified of its dishonor is, without more, insufficient to warrant a jury in finding the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, we conclude that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in this case, and therefore we affirm the defendant’s convictions. Background. The jury could have found the following facts. Between July 26 and 28, 2013, the defendant deposited four checks, totaling $ 15,000, into certain bank accounts she held at TD Bank via automated teller machines (ATMs). The funds were credited to the respective accounts electronically on the day of the transaction, before the checks were finally negotiated. Each check was drawn from a single Citizens Bank account […]
Commonwealth v. Lys (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-082-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 16-P-0039 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. CHRIST O. LYS. No. 16-P-39. Middlesex. December 8, 2016. – June 28, 2017. Present: Green, Agnes, & Desmond, JJ. Controlled Substances. Practice, Criminal, New trial, Plea, Affidavit, Assistance of counsel. Constitutional Law, Plea, Assistance of counsel. Due Process of Law, Plea, Assistance of counsel. Alien. Complaint received and sworn to in the Marlborough Division of the District Court Department on January 13, 2012. A motion for a new trial was heard by Robert G. Harbour, J. Patrick Long for the defendant. KerryAnne Kilcoyne, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. AGNES, J. The defendant, Christ Lys, appeals from a decision by a judge of the District Court, following a non-evidentiary hearing, to deny his motion for a new trial.[1] The defendant maintains that his attorney was ineffective because he did not inform the defendant that he would be deported as a consequence of pleading guilty. The judge reasoned that although adequate advice from plea counsel was lacking, thus satisfying the first prong of the familiar two-part test for ineffective assistance of counsel, see Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89 (1974) (Saferian), the defendant was not entitled to relief because he failed to establish that he was prejudiced by the shortcomings of his attorney. Although we affirm, we take this opportunity to clarify what framework a judge should apply when faced with a defendant’s affidavit that is not accompanied by an affidavit of his trial counsel. Background. On January 13, 2012, the defendant was charged in a twenty-eight count complaint with three counts of distribution of a class D substance (marijuana) in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32C(a); four counts of distribution of a drug within one thousand feet of a school, in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32J; two counts of possession of a class B substance (cocaine), in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 34; two counts of distribution of a class B substance (cocaine), in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32A (c); two counts of conspiracy to violate controlled substances laws, in violation of G. L. c. 274, § 7; and fifteen counts of attempting to distribute cocaine and marijuana, in violation of G. L. c. 274, § 6. On October 30, 2012, the defendant pleaded guilty to three counts of marijuana distribution, two counts of cocaine distribution, two […]
Categories: News Tags: 1108217, Commonwealth, Lawyers, Weekly
Adoption of Ilian (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-083-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 16-P-1517 Appeals Court ADOPTION OF ILIAN.[1] No. 16-P-1517. Bristol. May 3, 2017. – June 28, 2017. Present: Kinder, Henry, & Desmond, JJ. Adoption, Dispensing with parent’s consent. Minor, Adoption. Parent and Child, Dispensing with parent’s consent to adoption. Practice, Civil, Findings by judge. Department of Children & Families. Petition filed in the Bristol County Division of the Juvenile Court Department on August 23, 2013. The case was heard by Siobhan E. Foley, J. Matthew P. Landry, Assistant Attorney General, for the Department of Children and Families. Abigail H. Salois, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for the father. Diane Messere Magee for the child. KINDER, J. Following trial, a Juvenile Court judge found that Ilian’s parents were unfit to parent him and that termination of their parental rights was in Ilian’s best interests, and she accordingly issued decrees terminating their parental rights. See G. L. c. 119, § 26; G. L. c. 210, § 3. The judge approved a plan put forward by the Department of Children and Families (DCF) for Ilian’s adoption by the foster family with whom he had been living for eighteen months. On appeal, the father claims error in the termination of his parental rights in light of his plan for a paternal cousin (cousin) to serve as Ilian’s caregiver. The father contends that the judge failed to conduct an “even-handed assessment” of the two plans. We agree that the judge’s assessment of the father’s plan should have been more explicit. More detailed findings regarding the cousin’s credibility as a witness and suitability as a caregiver would have clearly demonstrated the required even-handed assessment. Nevertheless, for the reasons that follow, we conclude that the judge adequately considered the father’s alternative plan and properly concluded such placement was not in Ilian’s best interests.[2] Accordingly, we affirm. Background. We summarize the relevant facts, which have ample support in the record. Ilian was born in May, 2011, and was almost five years old at the close of the trial. DCF’s first involvement with Ilian’s family was in September, 2012, when DCF received a report pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 51A (51A report), for neglect, alleging that Ilian was present when the father shot a sixteen year old boy. Ultimately, DCF’s investigation did not support the claim that Ilian was present at […]
Padmanabhan v. Board of Registration in Medicine, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-111-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12119 BHARANIDHARAN PADMANABHAN vs. BOARD OF REGISTRATION IN MEDICINE & another.[1] June 27, 2017. Board of Registration in Medicine. Administrative Law, Decision. The petitioner, Bharanidharan Padmanabhan, appeals from a judgment of a single justice of the county court dismissing his petition for relief in the nature of certiorari pursuant to G. L. c. 249, § 4. On May 18, 2017, we issued an order affirming the single justice’s judgment and indicated that this opinion would follow. In 2010, Padmanabhan, a medical doctor, was terminated from his position at Cambridge Health Alliance, a termination that he alleges was based on false claims that he harmed patients and in retaliation for certain actions that he took, including reporting purported insurance fraud. Subsequent to his termination, the Board of Registration in Medicine (board) commenced disciplinary proceedings against him, and referred the matter to the Division of Administrative Law Appeals (DALA).[2] Following an evidentiary hearing that spanned eight days, the DALA magistrate issued his recommended decision in August, 2015. The board subsequently remanded the case to the magistrate, in January, 2016, asking the magistrate to elaborate on certain parts of his decision and, among other things, to include credibility determinations and clarify certain inconsistencies in the decision. In March, 2016, the magistrate issued an order indicating that he was preparing a revised recommended decision for the board in response to the remand order. Shortly thereafter, Padmanabhan filed a “Renewed Complaint in the Nature of a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari” in the county court. In the petition he argued that his due process rights had been violated in various ways during the course of the board proceedings. He also argued that the recommended decision issued by the magistrate in August, 2015, became final in February, 2016, pursuant to 801 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.01(11)(c)(3) (1998), and that his petition thus did not stem from, or seek relief from, an interlocutory ruling but rather what was, in effect, a final decision of the board. The board moved to dismiss the petition on the basis that the proceedings before it had not yet concluded and that it had not yet issued a final decision. The single justice dismissed the petition without a hearing.[3] In his appeal, Padmanabhan continues to argue that the magistrate’s recommended decision became the board’s final decision pursuant to 801 […]
Categories: News Tags: 1011117, Board, Lawyers, Medicine, Padmanabhan, Registration, Weekly
George, et al. v. National Water Main Cleaning Company, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-110-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12191 ROBERT GEORGE & others[1] vs. NATIONAL WATER MAIN CLEANING COMPANY & others.[2] Suffolk. February 14, 2017. – June 26, 2017. Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ. Supreme Judicial Court, Certification of questions of law. Massachusetts Wage Act. Labor, Wages, Failure to pay wages, Damages. Damages, Interest. Interest. Judgment, Interest. Practice, Civil, Interest, Judgment, Damages. Certification of a question of law to the Supreme Judicial Court by the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Adam J. Shafran (Jonathon D. Friedmann also present) for the plaintiffs. Richard L. Alfred (Dawn Reddy Solowey & Anne S. Bider also present) for the defendants. John Pagliaro & Martin J. Newhouse, for New England Legal Foundation, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. Annette Gonthier Kiely, Kathy Jo Cook, Thomas R. Murphy, & Timothy J. Wilton, for Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. GANTS, C.J. Several employees of National Water Main Cleaning Company filed a class action suit against the company and its parent company, Carylon Corporation, in the Superior Court, alleging, among other claims, nonpayment of wages in violation of the Massachusetts Wage Act, G. L. c. 149, §§ 148, 150 (Wage Act). After the case was removed to the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, the judge granted final approval of a class settlement agreement that resolved all outstanding issues except one question of law. To resolve that question, the judge certified to this court the following question pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 1:03, as appearing in 382 Mass. 700 (1981): “Is statutory interest pursuant to [G. L. c. 231, § 6B or 6C,] available under Massachusetts law when liquidated (treble) damages are awarded pursuant to [G. L. c. 149, § 150]?” In answer to the question, we declare that, under Massachusetts law, statutory prejudgment interest pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 6H, shall be added by the clerk of court to the amount of lost wages and other benefits awarded as damages pursuant to G. L. c. 149, § 150, but shall not be added to the additional amount of the award arising from the trebling of those damages as liquidated damages.[3] Interpretation of the certified question. Before we answer the certified question, which the judge issued at the joint request of the parties, we must first ascertain its […]