Josh J., a juvenile v. Commonwealth (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-017-18)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12286 JOSH J., a juvenile vs. COMMONWEALTH. Suffolk. October 5, 2017. – January 31, 2018. Present: Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. Bail. Delinquent Child. Due Process of Law, Pretrial detainees. Moot Question. Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk on January 11, 2017. The case was reported by Lowy, J. Eliza Lockhart-Jenks, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for the juvenile. Marina Moriarty, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. LOWY, J. This case, here on a reservation and report by a single justice of the county court in response to the juvenile’s petition under G. L. c. 211, § 3, requires us to consider the proper application of G. L. c. 276, § 58, and G. L. c. 276, § 58B, specifically with regard to the number of days an individual may be held without bail after a bail revocation hearing. We conclude that where an individual has been released on bail pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 58, and there is probable cause to believe the individual committed a crime while released on bail, the Commonwealth may seek to revoke bail under either § 58 or § 58B. The judge must then determine whether the Commonwealth satisfied the requirements of the particular statute, either § 58 or § 58B, under which it sought to revoke bail. Background and prior proceedings. On May 6, 2016, a delinquency complaint issued charging the juvenile with breaking and entering in the daytime with intent to commit a felony and larceny over $ 250. A judge in the Juvenile Court set the juvenile’s bail at $ 1,000. The judge also advised the juvenile, pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 58, that the juvenile’s bail could be revoked if he committed a new crime while on release. The juvenile posted bail and was released. In August, 2016, two delinquency complaints issued against the juvenile for several new crimes he allegedly committed while on release on the pending charges, including two counts of assault and battery on a pregnant victim and one count of malicious destruction of property valued over $ 250. In November, 2016, based on the new charges, the Commonwealth sought to revoke the juvenile’s bail pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 58. A Juvenile Court judge allowed the Commonwealth’s motion, revoked the juvenile’s bail, and set a date for a […]
Mui v. Massachusetts Port Authority (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-016-18)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12296 TZE-KIT MUI vs. MASSACHUSETTS PORT AUTHORITY. Suffolk. November 6, 2017. – January 29, 2018. Present: Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Budd, & Cypher, JJ. Massachusetts Wage Act. Massachusetts Port Authority. Public Employment, Sick leave benefits. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on October 17, 2014. The case was heard by Robert B. Gordon, J., on motions for judgment on the pleadings. The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. Laurie F. Rubin for the defendant. Kevin C. Merritt for the plaintiff. David J. Fried, for Massachusetts Employment Lawyers Association, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. BUDD, J. The plaintiff, Tze-Kit Mui, sued his former employer, Massachusetts Port Authority (Massport or agency), alleging that Massport failed to timely compensate him for his accrued, unused sick time under the Wage Act, G. L. c. 149, §§ 148, 150 (Wage Act or act). A Superior Court judge allowed Mui’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. Massport appealed, and we transferred the case here on our own initiative. Because we conclude that payment for accrued, unused sick time (sick pay) does not count as “wages” under the act, we vacate the judgment and remand the matter to the Superior Court.[1] Background. In 2013, Massport initiated disciplinary proceedings against Mui, a longtime employee.[2] One week later, he applied for retirement. Massport’s employees’ retirement system set Mui’s retirement date retroactively, despite the fact that the disciplinary proceedings had not been resolved. Several weeks later, Massport discharged Mui for cause.[3] The termination was subsequently overturned pursuant to a grievance procedure.[4] Under Massport’s sick pay policy, eligible employees receive payment for a percentage of the value of their accrued, unused sick time upon separation from the agency.[5] Employees who are discharged for cause are not eligible for sick pay. Prior to the completion of the grievance process, Massport’s position was that because the agency initiated disciplinary proceedings against Mui by suspending him prior to his application for retirement, and then terminated him (an action that was later reversed), he was not entitled to any sick pay. Once the arbitrator ruled that Massport could not terminate Mui because he had already retired, the agency paid the value of Mui’s accrued sick time pursuant to its policy. Because of the grievance […]
Brockton Housing Authority v. Mello (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-010-18)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 16-P-1708 Appeals Court BROCKTON HOUSING AUTHORITY vs. KEITH G. MELLO. No. 16-P-1708. Plymouth. November 6, 2017. – January 26, 2018. Present: Sullivan, Blake, & Singh, JJ. Housing Authority. Landlord and Tenant, Termination of tenancy. Controlled Substances. Words, “Keeping.” Civil action commenced in the Southeast Division of the Housing Court Department on January 25, 2016. The case was heard by Anne Kenney Chaplin, J. Laura F. Camara for the defendant. Caitlin P. Milone for the plaintiff. SULLIVAN, J. Three months into Keith G. Mello’s occupancy of a one-bedroom apartment at the Caffrey Towers development (premises or apartment), the Brockton Housing Authority (BHA) filed an action pursuant to G. L. c. 139, § 19, to void his tenancy. Following a trial, a judge of the Southeastern Housing Court ruled that Mello “engaged in conduct, and allowed his guests to engage in conduct, which constitutes the keeping of controlled substances in the premises.” She entered a judgment voiding the lease and permanently enjoining Mello from entering any portion of Caffrey Towers, a Federally subsidized housing development for the elderly and the disabled. See New Bedford Hous. Authy. v. Olan, 435 Mass. 364, 369 (2001) (Olan). Mello appeals from the final judgment.[1] We affirm. Background. We summarize the facts as found by the judge. Dennis Sheedy, a BHA asset manager, observed Mello’s guests arriving at Caffrey Towers in an impaired state, and unwilling (or unable) to cooperate with security. On December 1, 2015, Anthony Giardini, a Brockton police officer who served as the community liaison to the BHA conducted an investigation into complaints in or about the premises. As he approached Mello’s apartment, he heard loud voices coming from inside and smelled the odor of “some sort of substance.”[2] After entering the apartment, Officer Giardini saw three people, including Mello, sitting in a room. There was smoke that smelled like marijuana and crack cocaine. He observed drug paraphernalia in plain view, including a flat mirror “lined horizontally,” lying on a room partition, a debit card, and the remains of what could be a filter for a crack pipe. He also saw two daggers, one of which was next to the mirror within reach of Mello, who was in “an intoxicated state.” Officer Giardini concluded that those present in the apartment had been smoking […]
Jones, et al. v. Massachusetts Department of Children & Families (Lawyers Weekly No. 09-001-18)
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS SUFFOLK, ss SUPERIOR COURT 1784CV00586 THERESE JONES and MAXWELL JONES BY HIS MOTHER AND NEXT FRIEND, THERESE JONES v. MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS This case arises out of the decision of defendant Massachusetts Department of Children and Families (“DCF”) to take emergency custody of minor plaintiff Maxwell Jones (“Maxwell”). This decision followed a statutorily mandated investigation in which DCF learned that plaintiff Therese Jones (“Ms. Jones”) had left her three-year old son sleeping alone in a Marriott hotel room while she drank with friends at the hotel bar. Plaintiffs’ Complaint concedes that Ms. Jones left the infant Maxwell alone in her hotel room when she “ran into a few work friends and had a few drinks,” but insists that she “checked in on her son every ten to fifteen minutes.” Plaintiffs have brought negligence claims against DCF, asserted under the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, G.L. c. 258 (the “MTCA”). Plaintiffs contend that Ms. Jones “ha[d] never been arrested, had no criminal record, and had no previous contact or investigation with DCF,” facts that DCF purportedly “failed to investigate.” In these circumstances, plaintiffs charge, the decision to take Maxwell into emergency custody and remove him from the care of his mother was “wrongful.” DCF has now moved to dismiss the Complaint, both for failure to state a claim pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). DCF maintains that the Complaint sets forth no facts plausibly suggesting negligence on the part of DCF. DCF alternatively argues that even otherwise viable negligence claims of the type asserted by the plaintiffs in this case must be dismissed, because they fall within the MTCA’s “discretionary function” exemption, G.L. c. 258, _ 10(b). DISCUSSION At the outset, the Court expresses doubt that the plaintiffs have stated viable claims for negligence, as the facts pleaded in the Complaint do no more than attach conclusory labels – viz., a “failure to investigate” and a “wrongful” decision to assume custody of the minor child – to the conduct of the defendant. Beyond such labels, the Complaint sets forth no facts permitting a plausible inference that DCF’s investigative actions and decisions were improper in any respect. Plaintiffs stress that Ms. Jones “checked in on her son every ten to fifteen minutes,” but do not dispute that Ms. Jones left the child unattended in a strange hotel room for substantial periods of time while she consumed alcohol in a bar. DCF […]
Categories: News Tags: 0900118, Children, department, Families, Jones, Lawyers, massachusetts, Weekly
Adoption of Garret (and two companion cases) (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-009-18)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 17-P-79 Appeals Court ADOPTION OF GARRET (and two companion cases[1]). No. 17-P-79. Hampden. October 4, 2017. – January 22, 2018. Present: Agnes, Sacks, & Lemire, JJ. Adoption, Care and protection, Dispensing with parent’s consent, Visitation rights. Parent and Child, Adoption, Care and protection of minor, Dispensing with parent’s consent to adoption, Custody. Minor, Care and protection, Custody, Visitation rights. Petitions filed in the Hampden County Division of the Juvenile Court Department on August 2, 2012. The cases were heard by Lois M. Eaton, J. Katrina McCusker Rusteika for the mother. Madeline Weaver Blanchette for Garret & another. Briana Rose Cummings for Susan. Jeremy Bayless for Department of Children and Families. William B. Tobey, for the father, was present but did not argue. AGNES, J. This termination of parental rights case involves a blended family consisting of seven individuals: the mother, the father, and their child, Susan; Garret and Elizabeth, the father’s children from a prior relationship; and Peter and Michael, the mother’s children from her prior marriage. On August 2, 2012, the Department of Children and Families (DCF) filed two petitions pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 24, in the Juvenile Court alleging that all five children were in need of care and protection. A judge granted DCF temporary custody of Elizabeth that same day. DCF was subsequently granted temporary custody of the remaining four children on August 21, 2012. Both the mother and the father waived their rights to a temporary custody hearing on September 10, 2012. The care and protection petitions were later consolidated. The termination trial occurred over the course of eleven days in 2014; twenty-three witnesses testified and over fifty exhibits were introduced in evidence. The judge subsequently made 913 written findings of fact and seventy-one conclusions of law, including conclusions regarding the fourteen factors enumerated in G. L. c. 210, § 3(c), with respect to each parent.[2] As relevant to this appeal, the judge found that the mother and the father were unfit to parent Susan and their other respective children both at the time of trial and into the future.[3] All of the children were adjudicated in need of care and protection and were committed to the care of DCF pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 26. Pursuant to G. L. c. 210, § 3, the judge terminated […]
Trustees of the Cambridge Point Condominium Trust v. Cambridge Point, LLC, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-014-18)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12327 Trustees of the Cambridge Point Condominium Trust vs. Cambridge Point, LLC, & others.[1] Middlesex. October 5, 2017. – January 19, 2018. Present: Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. Condominiums, By-laws, Management, Common area. Real Property, Condominium. Public Policy. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on April 3, 2014. A motion for partial summary judgment was heard by Rosalind H. Miller, J.; a motion for reconsideration was considered by her; and motions to dismiss were heard by Peter B. Krupp, J. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. Edmund A. Allcock for the plaintiffs. John F. Gleavy for CDI Commercial Development, Inc., & another. David Aleksic, for Frank Fodera & another, was present but did not argue. David T. Keenan, for Anahid Mardiros, was present but did not argue. Henry A. Goodman & Ellen A. Shapiro, for Community Associations Institute, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. Cailin M. Burke, Julie B. Heinzelman, Diane R. Rubin, Thomas O. Moriarty, & Kimberly A. Bielan, for Real Estate Bar Association for Massachusetts, Inc., & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief. GANTS, C.J. In this action, a condominium trust’s board of trustees has filed suit against the developers of the condominium for damages arising from various design and construction defects in the condominium’s common areas and facilities. The condominium bylaws, however, provide that the trustees cannot bring any litigation involving the common areas and facilities against anyone other than a unit owner unless they first obtain the consent of at least eighty per cent of the unit owners. The issue on appeal is whether this bylaw provision is void, either because it violates the Condominium Act (act), G. L. c. 183A, or because it contravenes public policy. We conclude that it is void because it contravenes public policy.[2] Background. In 2007, Cambridge Point, LLC, as the declarant of a predominantly residential forty-two-unit condominium in Cambridge, filed in the Middlesex South District registry of deeds a master deed, a declaration of trust, and the bylaws of the Cambridge Point Condominium Trust (trust). The trust’s board of trustees (trustees) is responsible for administering the affairs of the trust. Among the powers and duties committed to the trustees is the authority under § 1(o) of […]
Grand Manor Condominium Association, et al. v. City of Lowell (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-015-18)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12294 GRAND MANOR CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION & others[1] vs. CITY OF LOWELL. Middlesex. October 5, 2017. – January 19, 2018. Present: Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. Hazardous Materials. Massachusetts Oil and Hazardous Material Release Prevention Act. Real Property, Environmental damage. Limitations, Statute of. Practice, Civil, Statute of limitations. Damages, Hazardous waste contamination. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on October 10, 2012. The case was tried before Kathe M. Tuttman, J. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. Alan B. Rubenstein (Stacie A. Kosinski also present) for the plaintiff. C. Michael Carlson, Assistant City Solicitor (Rachel M. Brown, Assistant City Solicitor, also present) for city of Lowell. KAFKER, J. The owners of condominium units at Grand Manor and the Grand Manor Condominium Association (collectively, plaintiffs) filed suit against the city of Lowell (city) on October 10, 2012, for the release of hazardous materials at the Grand Manor condominium site. The plaintiffs brought claims for response costs under G. L. c. 21E, § 4A, and for damage to the plaintiffs’ property under G. L. c. 21E, § 5 (a) (iii).[2] A jury found that the plaintiffs’ claim under § 5 (a) (iii) was barred by the applicable statute of limitations, G. L. c. 21E, § 11A (4). The plaintiffs appealed, and we granted their application for direct appellate review. On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that (1) the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the plaintiffs knew that the property damage was permanent; and (2) the trial judge erred in instructing the jury that the plaintiffs had the burden of persuasion to show that they filed suit within the statute of limitations. The city contends that the plaintiffs needed to know only that there was environmental damage and that the defendant was the source of the damage, not that the damage was permanent, for the limitations period to begin to run. The city also contends that the jury were properly instructed. We conclude that a plaintiff must be on notice that he or she has a claim under § 5 (a) (iii) before that claim may be time barred, and that such notice is separate from a plaintiff’s notice that environmental contamination has occurred. A plaintiff has notice of a claim under § 5 (a) (iii) once the plaintiff learns whether or not […]
Categories: News Tags: 1001518, Association, City, Condominium, Grand, Lawyers, Lowell, Manor, Weekly
Commonwealth v. Cole C., a juvenile (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-008-18)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 16-P-1645 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. COLE C., a juvenile.[1] No. 16-P-1645. Suffolk. November 8, 2017. – January 19, 2018. Present: Milkey, Blake, & Singh, JJ. Juvenile Court, Jurisdiction. Jurisdiction, Juvenile Court. Youthful Offender Act. Practice, Criminal, Indictment, Transfer hearing. Statute, Construction. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on July 5, 2016. After transfer to the Suffolk County Division of the Juvenile Court Department, a motion to dismiss was heard by Peter M. Coyne, J. Colby M. Tilley, Assistant District Attorney (Michael V. Glennon, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the Commonwealth. Melissa Allen Celli for the defendant. MILKEY, J. A grand jury indicted the defendant as a youthful offender after he had turned eighteen years old. Relying on Commonwealth v. Mogelinski, 466 Mass. 627 (2013) (Mogelinski I), a Juvenile Court judge dismissed the indictments for want of jurisdiction. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and order that the indictments be reinstated. Background. The relevant facts are undisputed. On April 20, 2016, Boston police arrested the defendant on a variety of charges related to an armed home invasion that occurred that day. He was seventeen years old at that time. After his arrest, the police took him to a Department of Youth Services (DYS) facility. The following day, a twelve-count delinquency complaint was issued, and a second delinquency complaint that included two additional charges was issued a day later. The defendant was arraigned on April 25, 2016, and two days after that (one week after the alleged incident), he turned eighteen. On July 5, 2016, a grand jury indicted the defendant as a youthful offender on five charges: armed home invasion, armed robbery, assault with a dangerous weapon, unlawful possession of a firearm, and intimidation of a witness. The indictments were filed with the Juvenile Court on July 11, 2016, and the case was continued to July 26, 2016, for arraignment. However, a Juvenile Court judge refused to arraign the defendant on the youthful offender indictments on the grounds that — because the defendant had turned eighteen prior to the issuance of the indictments — the court lacked jurisdiction over them. The judge also denied alternative relief that the Commonwealth requested, the holding of a transfer hearing pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 72A, in […]
James B. Nutter & Company v. Estate of Murphy, et al. (and two consolidated cases) (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-013-18)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12325 JAMES B. NUTTER & COMPANY vs. ESTATE OF BARBARA A. MURPHY & others[1] (and two consolidated cases[2]). Suffolk. October 2, 2017. – January 18, 2018. Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. Mortgage, Foreclosure. Real Property, Mortgage. Civil actions commenced in the Land Court Department on October 27, 2015; January 28, 2016; and February 11, 2016, respectively. A motion for partial judgment on the pleadings was heard by Robert B. Foster, J., and the cases were reported by him to the Appeals Court. The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the cases from the Appeals Court. Daniel Bahls (Uri Strauss also present) for Brett Jamieson. Effie Gikas Tchobanian for the plaintiff. Elaine Benkoski, for Estate of Barbara A. Murphy & others, was present but did not argue. GANTS, C.J. In 2007 and 2008, three elderly homeowners obtained loans from James B. Nutter & Company (Nutter), secured by reverse mortgages on their homes. A few years later, two of the borrowers died; the third took ill and could no longer live in her home. Alleging default, Nutter now seeks to foreclose on the mortgages. Rather than proceed directly to foreclosure, however, Nutter brought separate actions in the Land Court against each borrower or the executors of their estate,[3] seeking in each case a declaratory judgment allowing it to foreclose pursuant to the statutory power of sale. Each of the reverse mortgages adhered to Nutter’s standard form, which states in paragraph 20 that, in the event of default, “[l]ender may invoke the power of sale and any other remedies permitted by applicable law.” The issue we must resolve is whether this language in the reverse mortgage incorporates the statutory power of sale as set forth in G. L. c. 183, § 21, and allows Nutter to foreclose on the mortgaged property in accordance with the requirements in § 21. We hold that it does. Background. 1. Reverse mortgages. For many retirees, one of the most reliable potential sources of income in later life is the accrued equity in their homes. See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Issue Brief: The costs and risks of using a reverse mortgage to delay collecting Social Security, at 8 (2017). In order to secure cash for their living expenses, many […]
Kennedy, et al. v. Commonwealth, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-007-18)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 16-P-1464 Appeals Court RUTH KENNEDY & others[1] vs. COMMONWEALTH & others.[2] No. 16-P-1464. Hampshire. September 19, 2017. – January 18, 2018. Present: Vuono, Blake, & Singh, JJ. School and School Committee, Regional school district, Standing to challenge validity of statute. Contract, Regional school district, Promissory estoppel. Constitutional Law, Standing, Home Rule Amendment, Special law. Municipal Corporations, Home rule. Statute, Special law. Practice, Civil, Standing, Declaratory proceeding, Motion to dismiss. Declaratory Relief. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on October 31, 2014. Motions to dismiss were heard by Bertha D. Josephson, J. James B. Lampke (Russell J. Dupere also present) for the plaintiffs. Layla G. Taylor for town of Worthington. Kerry David Strayer, Assistant Attorney General (Juliana deHaan Rice, Assistant Attorney General, also present) for the Commonwealth & another. VUONO, J. This appeal arises from the town of Worthington’s (Worthington’s) withdrawal from the Gateway regional school district (school district) pursuant to special legislation. The school district was established in 1957 and consisted of seven member towns in Hampden and Hampshire Counties until May 7, 2014, when the Legislature adopted “An Act Relative to the Withdrawal of the Town of Worthington From the Gateway Regional School District.” St. 2014, c. 97 (act). The act enabled Worthington to withdraw from the school district without the consent of the other member towns. The school district, the town of Huntington (Huntington), Ruth Kennedy (a resident of the member town of Russell), and Derrick Mason (a resident of the member town of Russell), brought an action in Superior Court against Worthington, the Commonwealth, the Department of Elementary and Secondary Education (department), and the town of Russell, challenging the act. The defendants filed motions to dismiss pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) & (6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), which a judge allowed. Primarily for the reasons set forth in the judge’s well-reasoned memorandum of decision, we affirm. Background. Between 1957 and 1968, the towns of Russell, Worthington, Huntington, Middlefield, Montgomery, Chester, and Blandford entered into an agreement for the creation and the operation of the school district. See G. L. c. 71, §§ 14-14B, 15. Among other things, the agreement provides for the location of schools, the apportionment and payment of costs by member towns, and the employment of teachers. The agreement also outlines the procedures through which […]