Posts tagged "1104216"

Landry v. Massachusetts Port Authority, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-042-16)

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030;   15-P-253                                        Appeals Court   DONALD R. LANDRY  vs.  MASSACHUSETTS PORT AUTHORITY & another.[1] No. 15-P-253. Hampden.     November 12, 2015. – April 12, 2016.   Present:  Cohen, Grainger, & Wolohojian, JJ. Massachusetts Port Authority.  Municipal Corporations, Liability for tort.  Practice, Civil, Summary judgment, Interlocutory appeal, Execution.  Negligence, Use of way.  Way, Public:  defect.  Notice, Action alleging injury caused by defect in public way.       Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on June 25, 2012.   The case was heard by C. Jeffrey Kinder, J., on motions for summary judgment.     Tara E. Lynch for the defendants. Enrico M. De Maio for the plaintiff.      COHEN, J.  The plaintiff, Donald R. Landry, brought this negligence action pursuant to the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, G. L. c. 258, seeking damages from the defendants, the Massachusetts Port Authority (Massport) and the city of Worcester (city), for injuries he sustained at the Worcester Regional Airport (airport) when a motorized sliding gate pinned him to a metal bar protruding from the gate post.  The defendants jointly moved for summary judgment, claiming that Landry was injured by reason of a defect in a way and, hence, his exclusive remedy was an action under G. L. c. 84, §§ 15, 18, and 19.[2]  See Botello v. Massachusetts Port Authy., 47 Mass. App. Ct. 788, 789 & n.3 (1999).  Because it was undisputed that Landry had not given notice within thirty days of his injury, as required by c. 84, § 18,[3] the defendants argued that they were entitled to judgment as matter of law.  The city also argued that it was entitled to summary judgment for the independent reason that it was not responsible for “the way at issue.” A judge of the Superior Court denied summary judgment, concluding that the defendants had failed to establish that the site of the accident was a “way,”[4] and that there remained a genuine issue of material fact as to the city’s responsibility for the maintenance and operation of the gate.  The defendants then jointly filed a notice of appeal from this interlocutory order, claiming entitlement to immediate review under the doctrine of present execution.  Although we conclude that the appeal is not properly before us and must be dismissed, we exercise our discretion to consider the defendants’ substantive arguments, which we find to be without merit. Background.  Viewing the evidence in the summary […]


Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - April 12, 2016 at 4:47 pm

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