Callahan v. Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liability Policies and Bonds (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-122-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 15-P-475 Appeals Court ELEANOR CALLAHAN vs. BOARD OF APPEAL ON MOTOR VEHICLE LIABILITY POLICIES AND BONDS & another.[1] No. 15-P-475. Suffolk. February 1, 2016. – September 12, 2016. Present: Cohen, Carhart, & Kinder, JJ. Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liability Policies and Bonds. Motor Vehicle, Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liability Policies and Bonds, Operating under the influence, License to operate, Homicide. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, Revocation of license to operate. License. Administrative Law, Decision. Civil actions commenced in the Superior Court Department on March 31, 2011, and January 21, 2014. After consolidation, the case was heard by Edward P. Leibensperger, J., on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, and a motion to dismiss was also heard by him. Martin P. Desmery for the plaintiff. Robert L. Quinan, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for the defendants. COHEN, J. The plaintiff sought judicial review of a decision of the Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liability Policies and Bonds (board) denying her application for reinstatement of her driver’s license. On cross motions for judgment on the pleadings, a judge of the Superior Court ruled in favor of the board, and the plaintiff appealed to this court. The plaintiff argues that the board erred in determining that her 1989 conviction of “driving while ability is impaired,” in violation of the New York State Vehicle Traffic Law (VTL), is “substantially similar” to a Massachusetts conviction of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor (OUI), thereby subjecting her to lifetime revocation of her driver’s license as a result of her subsequent conviction of motor vehicle homicide while OUI. The plaintiff also argues that the board lacked the authority to reconsider an earlier decision granting her a restricted, hardship license. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. Background. The relevant facts are drawn from the administrative record and are not disputed. On October 30, 1988, the plaintiff was charged in Lewisboro, New York, with driving while intoxicated per se, pursuant to VTL § 1192.2; driving while intoxicated, pursuant to VTL § 1192.3; and driving left of the pavement marking, pursuant to VTL § 1126a. These charges were resolved on January 23, 1989, when the plaintiff pleaded guilty to the lesser charge of “driving while ability is […]
Burke v. Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liability Policies and Bonds, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-121-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 15-P-117 Appeals Court JOSEPH L. BURKE vs. BOARD OF APPEAL ON MOTOR VEHICLE LIABILITY POLICIES AND BONDS & another.[1] No. 15-P-117. Suffolk. March 16, 2016. – September 12, 2016. Present: Cohen, Katzmann, & Blake, JJ. Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liability Policies and Bonds. Motor Vehicle, Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liability Policies and Bonds, Operating under the influence, License to operate, Homicide. License. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, Revocation of license to operate. Administrative Law, Agency’s interpretation of statute. Statute, Construction, Retroactive application. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on December 9, 2013. The case was heard by Edward P. Leibensperger, J., on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, and a motion for reconsideration was considered by him. Brian K. Wells for the plaintiff. David R. Marks, Assistant Attorney General, for the defendants. KATZMANN, J. In this appeal, we are again asked to consider whether a lifetime suspension is appropriate for a driver who, after having committed an operating under the influence (OUI) offense, causes a fatality in the course of a second OUI offense. Plaintiff Joseph Burke appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court upholding a decision of the defendant Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liability Policies and Bonds (Board) that affirmed the denial by the Registrar of Motor Vehicles (registrar) of Burke’s application for reinstatement of his driver’s license pursuant to G. L. c. 90, § 24(1)(c)(4), as amended through St. 1982, c. 373, § 4, as well as the registrar’s permanent revocation of that license, on the basis that Burke’s second drunk driving offense resulted in a fatality.[2] We affirm. Background. On February 27, 2000, Burke, was arrested for OUI after a motor vehicle accident in Rehoboth. On May 1, 2000, Burke admitted to sufficient facts for a finding of guilty of OUI in connection with the February incident but received the benefit of a continuance without a finding of guilty (CWOF) for one year until May 1, 2001, during which time he was placed on probation. The terms of his probation included a 180-day loss of license and an assignment to an alcohol education program. On August 6, 2000, while still on probation with his license suspended as a result of the incident the previous February, Burke drove a […]
Zoning Board of Appeals of Hanover v. Housing Appeals Committee, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-110-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 15-P-893 Appeals Court ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS OF HANOVER vs. HOUSING APPEALS COMMITTEE & another.[1] No. 15-P-893. Plymouth. May 9, 2016. – August 29, 2016. Present: Agnes, Massing, & Kinder, JJ. Housing. Zoning, Housing appeals committee, Comprehensive permit, Low and moderate income housing. Administrative Law, Agency’s interpretation of regulation, Regulations. Municipal Corporations, Fees. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on March 11, 2014. The case was heard by William F. Sullivan, J., on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Jonathan D. Witten (Barbara M. Huggins with him) for the plaintiff. Paul N. Barbadoro for Hanover Woods, LLC. Bryan F. Bertram, Assistant Attorney General, for Housing Appeals Committee. MASSING, J. Defendant Hanover Woods, LLC (developer), filed an application with the plaintiff zoning board of appeals of Hanover (board) for a comprehensive permit to build a 152-unit mixed-income housing project. Considering the board’s filing fee to be unreasonable, however, the developer paid only what it unilaterally determined to be a reasonable filing fee. Deeming the application incomplete, the board did not accept it for filing. By the time the developer paid the remainder of the fee, six weeks later, the town had qualified for a safe harbor under the Comprehensive Permit Act, G. L. c. 40B, §§ 20-23 (act), effectively giving the board unreviewable discretion to deny the developer’s permit. Nonetheless, the defendant Housing Appeals Committee (HAC) ultimately ordered the board to issue a comprehensive permit to the developer for a 200-unit project. The board appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court affirming the HAC’s order. Because we conclude that the HAC erred in determining that the developer’s application was complete on the date of its incomplete submission, rather than on the date the filing fee was paid in full, we reverse. Background. On October 22, 2009, the developer filed an application for a comprehensive permit for a project to be called Woodland Village, consisting of 152 units to be offered for sale, as well as parking spaces and other site improvements on a twenty-four acre parcel of land in Hanover (town). Thirty-eight of the units, or twenty-five percent, were designated to be affordable units. Under the board’s fee schedule, the filing fee for a project of that size was $ 250 per housing unit, or $ 38,000. […]
Tusino v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Douglas, et al. (and a companion case) (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-107-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 15-P-1400 Appeals Court 14-P-1193 LOUIS C. TUSINO vs. ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS OF DOUGLAS & another[1] (and a companion case[2]). Nos. 15-P-1400 & 14-P-1193. Worcester. June 3, 2016. – August 25, 2016. Present: Vuono, Wolohojian, & Blake, JJ. Jurisdiction, Zoning. District Court, Jurisdiction, Appellate Division. Zoning, Appeal. Appeals Court, Jurisdiction. Practice, Civil, Zoning appeal, Appellate Division: appeal, Action in nature of mandamus, Moot case. Mandamus. Moot Question. Civil action commenced in the Uxbridge Division of the District Court Department on December 8, 2014. The case was heard by David B. Locke, J., on a motion for summary judgment. Civil action commenced in the Land Court Department on August 21, 2009. The case was heard by Robert B. Foster, J., on a motion for summary judgment. Gerald E. Shugrue for Louis C. Tusino. Henry J. Lane for Joseph Bylinski. Michael J. Kennefick for building commissioner of the town of Douglas, & another. WOLOHOJIAN, J. These two cases arise out of the construction of a house on a nonconforming lot in Douglas. The dispositive issue on appeal is whether we have jurisdiction over a direct appeal from a decision of the Uxbridge District Court in a zoning appeal under G. L. c. 40A, § 17. Concluding that we do not, we dismiss Tusino v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Douglas, 2015-P-1400 (zoning appeal). Because our disposition of this case renders moot Bylinski v. Guaranteed Builders, Inc., 14-P-1193 (mandamus appeal), we dismiss it as well. On July 8, 2008, Tusino obtained a building permit to build a house on a lot he owns in Douglas. Construction began in February, 2009, and Bylinski, who owns the adjacent property, immediately thereafter asked the building commissioner to revoke the permit. The commissioner denied that request, and Bylinski appealed to the zoning board (board). The appeal was constructively allowed, and the building permit was revoked. On appeal, the Superior Court affirmed the revocation of the permit. Tusino did not further appeal, and the Superior Court’s decision became final. Tusino thereafter applied to the board for a variance. This too was denied. He appealed the denial to the Land Court, which entered summary judgment against him. On February 21, 2014, in a memorandum and order issued pursuant to our rule 1:28, we affirmed the […]
311 West Broadway LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeal of Boston, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-106-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 15-P-1227 Appeals Court 311 WEST BROADWAY LLC vs. ZONING BOARD OF APPEAL OF BOSTON & others.[1] No. 15-P-1227. Suffolk. May 13, 2016. – August 23, 2016. Present: Katzmann, Carhart, & Sullivan, JJ. Zoning, Variance, Appeal, Jurisdiction. Jurisdiction, Superior Court, Zoning. Superior Court, Jurisdiction. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on June 13, 2013. A motion to dismiss was heard by Brian A. Davis, J., and a motion to file an amended complaint was also heard by him. Edward J. Lonergan for 311 West Broadway LLC. Kate Moran Carter for Bromfield Development LLC. Adam Cederbaum for zoning board of appeal of Boston. KATZMANN, J. The plaintiff, 311 West Broadway, LLC (311 West Broadway), appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court dismissing its pending appeal pursuant to the Boston zoning enabling act, St. 1956, c. 665, § 11, as amended through St. 1993, c. 461, § 5 (zoning act), from a decision of the defendant zoning board of appeal of Boston (board) in favor of the defendant Bromfield Development, LLC (Bromfield), in the wake of a new decision issued by the board after an assented-to, judicially-ordered remand. The Superior Court had gained jurisdiction when an appeal was filed from the initial decision of the board, the parties agreed after the filing of that appeal to a judicial remand, the order of remand created no scheduling deadlines for the parties, and the parties provided status reports to a judge regarding the proceedings before the board and the further Superior Court litigation that they contemplated following the board’s new decision. 311 West Broadway did not file an appeal from the new decision of the board, and the question is whether the court was deprived of jurisdiction because a new appeal was required. We conclude that, in the circumstances here, a new appeal was not required and the court was not divested of jurisdiction. We reverse. Background.[2] 311 West Broadway owns property at 311-313 West Broadway in the South Boston section of Boston that abuts property owned by Bromfield at 315-319 West Broadway. Starting in 2012, Bromfield sought approval to change the occupancy of its property from a fitness center and private club to a fitness center, offices, and residential units, and to build a new four-story vertical addition over its […]
Three Registered Voters v. Board of Selectmen of Lynnfield, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-101-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 15-P-936 Appeals Court THREE REGISTERED VOTERS vs. BOARD OF SELECTMEN OF LYNNFIELD & another.[1] No. 15-P-936. Essex. March 9, 2016. – August 12, 2016. Present: Cypher, Cohen, & Neyman, JJ. Open Meeting Law. Municipal Corporations, Open meetings. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on January 5, 2015. A motion to dismiss was heard by Robert A. Cornetta, J. Michael C. Walsh (David E. Miller with him) for the plaintiffs. Thomas A. Mullen for the defendants. CYPHER, J. The plaintiffs, three registered voters (voters)[2] in the town of Lynnfield (town), appeal from the dismissal in the Superior Court of their complaint alleging that the board of selectmen of Lynnfield (board)[3] violated the open meeting law, G. L. c. 30A, §§ 18-25, in the selection process for appointing several municipal officials. The voters argue that the board violated the open meeting law by (1) failing to give proper notice of the meeting at which the new town administrator was appointed; (2) failing to properly process their complaint; and (3) failing to interview and to deliberate on applicants for the town administrator position in an open meeting. We affirm the dismissal of the complaint. This case appears to be the first under G. L. c. 30A, §§ 18-25, to reach an appellate court. This new statute, inserted by St. 2009, c. 28, § 18,[4] was a significant revision of the former open meeting law, G. L. c. 39, §§ 23A-23C, which was repealed by St. 2009, c. 28, § 20. Therefore, we briefly summarize provisions of the new law as relevant to the present case. The open meeting law continues to “manifest[] . . . a general policy that all meetings of a governmental body should be open to the public unless exempted by . . . statute.” Attorney Gen. v. School Comm. of Taunton, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 226, 229 (1979). Section 20(a) of the open meeting law declares that “all meetings of a public body shall be open to the public,” and § 20(b) states that a public body “shall post notice of every meeting at least 48 hours prior to such meeting.” G. L. c. 30A, § 20, as appearing in St. 2014, c. 485. Section 19(a) of the new law established a division of open government in the office of the Attorney General and provided her authority pursuant to § 25(a) to “promulgate rules and regulations to carry out enforcement of […]
Clay v. Massachusetts Parole Board (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-123-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12032 FREDERICK CLAY vs. MASSACHUSETTS PAROLE BOARD. Suffolk. April 7, 2016. – August 12, 2016. Present: Gants, C.J., Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ.[1] Parole. Constitutional Law, Parole, Ex post facto law. Imprisonment, Parole. Practice, Criminal, Parole. Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk on November 20, 2015. The case was reported by Botsford, J. Jeffrey Harris for the petitioner. Jennifer K. Zalnasky, Assistant Attorney General, for the respondent. Barbara Kaban, for Youth Advocacy Division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief. CORDY, J. In 1981, the petitioner, Frederick Clay, was convicted of murder in the first degree. The victim was a Boston taxicab driver. When the crime was committed in 1979, Clay was a juvenile. He was sentenced to serve the statutorily mandated term of life in prison without the possibility of parole, see G. L. c. 265, § 2, which conviction and sentence we affirmed on appeal.[2] See Commonwealth v. Watson, 388 Mass. 536, 548 (1983), S.C., 393 Mass. 297 (1984). More than thirty years later, we determined that G. L. c. 265, § 2, which mandated Clay’s sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole, was invalid as applied to those, like Clay, who were juveniles when they committed murder in the first degree. See Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 655, 667 (2013), S.C., 471 Mass. 12 (2015), adopting Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012) (Eighth Amendment to United States Constitution and art. 26 of Massachusetts Declaration of Rights forbid sentencing schemes mandating life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders).[3] The result was that any juvenile offender who had been convicted of murder in the first degree, including Clay, became eligible for parole within sixty days before the expiration of fifteen years of his or her life sentence. See Diatchenko, supra at 666, 673; Commonwealth v. Brown, 466 Mass. 676, 689 (2013) (under doctrine of severability, statute read “as if omitting the exception for parole eligibility for murder in the first degree when applying the statute to juveniles”). See also G. L. c. 127, § 133A. Clay, having already served more than fifteen years of his sentence, became immediately eligible to be considered for parole […]
West Beit Olam Cemetery Corporation v. Board of Assessors of Wayland (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-080-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 15-P-128 Appeals Court WEST BEIT OLAM CEMETERY CORPORATION vs. BOARD OF ASSESSORS OF WAYLAND. No. 15-P-128. Suffolk. April 8, 2016. – July 7, 2016. Present: Kafker, C.J., Wolohojian, & Maldonado, JJ. Cemetery. Taxation, Real estate tax: exemption, cemetery. Appeal from a decision of the Appellate Tax Board. Sander A. Rikleen for the taxpayer. Mark J. Lanza for board of assessors of Wayland. KAFKER, C.J. This is an appeal from a decision of the Appellate Tax Board (board) by West Beit Olam Cemetery Corporation (West Beit Olam), a nonprofit corporation organized in accordance with G. L. c. 114.[1] West Beit Olam is the record owner of lot 1A, located at 59 Old Sudbury Road in Wayland (town). In 2012, pursuant to G. L. c. 59, § 5, Twelfth (Clause Twelfth), West Beit Olam applied to the town’s board of assessors (assessors) for a tax abatement for lot 1A.[2] The assessors denied the application, and West Beit Olam appealed to the board. After an evidentiary hearing, the board determined that a portion of lot 1A, known as parcel A, was exempt under Clause Twelfth, but the rest of the property was taxable. West Beit Olam appeals, claiming that all of lot 1A is exempt from taxation exempt under Clause Twelfth. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the board’s decision. In particular, we conclude that the board properly denied a tax exemption for the large part of lot 1A and a building located on it that were contractually restricted to residential use for seven years, including the tax year in question. Background. We summarize the facts as the board found them, noting that they are essentially undisputed by the parties. In 1998, the Jewish Cemetery Association of Massachusetts, Inc. (JCAM), a nonprofit cemetery corporation, purchased property in the town and created the Beit Olam Cemetery. As part of that purchase, JCAM also secured a right of first refusal on an adjoining parcel, lot 1A, which is the focus of this appeal. Lot 1A is contiguous to the Beit Olam Cemetery’s western border and is improved with a single-family residence. To accommodate the future expansion of the Beit Olam Cemetery, JCAM created West Beit Olam in 2007 for the purpose of acquiring lot 1A. On July 26, 2007, West Beit Olam purchased lot […]
Picard v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Westminster, et al. (Lwyers Weekly No. 10-085-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11991 MAURICE PICARD, personal representative,[1] vs. ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS OF WESTMINSTER & another.[2] Worcester. February 9, 2016. – June 17, 2016. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Zoning, Person aggrieved. Practice, Civil, Standing. Easement. Real Property, Easement, Beach. Beach. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on August 23, 2011. The case was heard by Robert B. Gordon, J. After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. Thomas M. Bovenzi for 3333, Inc. Peter A. CampoBasso for the plaintiff. CORDY, J. Is a claimed injury to a private easement right sufficient to confer standing to challenge a zoning determination made by a zoning board of appeals? In the circumstances of this case, we conclude that it is not. Maurice Picard, as the personal representative of his wife’s estate, commenced this action in the Superior Court after the zoning board of appeals of Westminster (zoning board) upheld the building commissioner’s determination that property abutting his, owned by the defendant, 3333, Inc., enjoyed grandfathered status under the Westminster zoning by-law. After a bench trial, a judge in the Superior Court dismissed Picard’s complaint for lack of standing. The Appeals Court, in an unpublished decision pursuant to its rule 1:28, reversed the judgment as to standing and concluded that the property in question did not enjoy grandfathered status under the Westminster zoning by-law. Picard v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Westminster, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 1125 (2015). We granted further appellate review, limited to the standing issue. We affirm the judgment of the Superior Court. Background. The trial judge found the following facts, which we occasionally supplement with undisputed facts from the record. See Wendy’s Old Fashioned Hamburgers of N.Y., Inc. v. Board of Appeal of Billerica, 454 Mass. 374, 383 (2009) (on appellate review, judge’s factual findings will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous or unless there is no evidence to support them). Picard is the owner and occupant of certain property on Laurie Lane in Westminster (town). Picard’s property is identified as lots 34 and 43 on a plan referred to by the judge as the “Laurie Lane Plan.” The deed that conveyed the property to Picard’s late spouse also contained within it […]
DiMasi v. State Board of Retirement, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-056-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11971 SALVATORE F. DiMASI vs. STATE BOARD OF RETIREMENT & others.[1] Suffolk. February 9, 2016. – April 21, 2016. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Public Employment, Forfeiture of retirement benefits. Retirement. State Board of Retirement. Contribution. Words, “Final conviction.” Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk on June 16, 2014. The case was reported by Cordy, J. Thomas R. Kiley for the plaintiff. David R. Marks, Assistant Attorney General, for the defendants. SPINA, J. After the plaintiff, Salvatore F. DiMasi, was convicted of several violations of Federal law, the State Board of Retirement (board) unanimously approved the forfeiture of his retirement allowance in accordance with G. L. c. 32, § 15 (4), and a judge in the Boston Municipal Court Department affirmed the board’s decision. DiMasi filed a complaint for relief in the nature of certiorari pursuant to G. L. c. 249, § 4, in the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County. A single justice reserved and reported the case for determination by the full court. DiMasi contends that a “final conviction” of a criminal offense for purposes of § 15 (4) occurs at the conclusion of the appellate process, not when a sentence is imposed. He further contends that the board improperly has withheld his accumulated total deductions since September, 2011. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that, in the context of pension forfeiture, a “final conviction” occurs when an individual is sentenced. We further conclude that DiMasi is entitled to the return of his accumulated total deductions, together with interest on such deductions from September, 2011, until such time as payment is made. 1. Statutory framework. The provisions of G. L. c. 32, § 15, “pertain to dereliction of duty by a member of the contributory retirement system for public employees (member).” See State Bd. of Retirement v. Bulger, 446 Mass. 169, 170 (2006) (Bulger). General Laws c. 32, § 15 (4), states as follows: “In no event shall any member after final conviction of a criminal offense involving violation of the laws applicable to his office or position, be entitled to receive a retirement allowance under the provisions of [§§ 1-28], inclusive, nor shall any beneficiary be entitled to receive any benefits […]