Seales v. Boston Housing Authority (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-178-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReportersjc.state.ma.us 14-P-1551 Appeals Court TINA SEALES vs. BOSTON HOUSING AUTHORITY. No. 14-P-1551. Suffolk. October 6, 2015. – November 16, 2015. Present: Cohen, Meade, & Agnes, JJ. Boston Housing Authority. Housing Authority. Municipal Corporations, Housing authority. Practice, Civil, Action in nature of certiorari. Administrative Law, Hearing, Substantial evidence, Judicial review. Evidence, Hearsay. Controlled Substances. Civil action commenced in the Boston Division of the Housing Court Department on January 23, 2014. The case was heard by Jeffrey M. Winik, J., on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Angela Marcolina for the defendant. Alex Mitchell-Munevar for the plaintiff. MEADE, J. Tina Seales is a participant in the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) Housing Choice Voucher Program, commonly referred to as “Section 8.” The program is administered by the Boston Housing Authority (BHA) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (2012), and related HUD regulations. In August of 2013, Seales received notice that the BHA proposed to terminate her participation in the program due to serious or repeated violation of her lease. Seales appealed the proposed termination. Following an informal hearing, a hearing officer, by a decision dated January 2, 2014, upheld the termination of Seales’s Section 8 housing subsidy. Thereafter, Seales successfully sought relief in the nature of certiorari under G. L. c. 249, § 4, in the Housing Court. On appeal from that judgment, the BHA claims that the judge erred in determining that the hearing officer improperly found that criminal or illegal activity occurred on the rental premises that constituted a serious violation of Seales’s Section 8 lease. We reverse. Background. Seales resided at 25 Drayton Avenue in the Dorchester section of Boston. She was a participant in the BHA’s Section 8 program and had been receiving Section 8 housing benefits for approximately fifteen years. Seales lived with her three children, then ages sixteen, seventeen, and nineteen. In August of 2013, Seales received notice that the BHA proposed to terminate her participation in the program due to a family member having engaged in drug-related activity and serious or repeated violation of her lease.[1] The BHA based its allegations on a Boston police incident report, a leased housing recertification questionnaire, family obligations, and the lease itself. 1. The incident report. According to the Boston police incident report, on July 9, 2013, police Officers Femino, […]
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Boston v. Rogers, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-161-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 15-P-839 Appeals Court ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF BOSTON vs. JON ROGERS & others.[1] No. 15-P-839. Norfolk. July 22, 2015. – October 14, 2015. Present: Vuono, Carhart, & Blake, JJ. Religion. Church. Jurisdiction, Ecclesiastical controversy. Real Property, Trespass. Trespass. Practice, Civil, Motion to dismiss, Jury trial, Standing, Continuance, Injunctive relief. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on March 10, 2015. A motion to continue was heard by Edward P. Leibensperger, J., and the case was heard by him. Mary Elizabeth Carmody for the defendants. William J. Dailey, Jr., for the plaintiff. CARHART, J. This case arises from the suppression of St. Frances X. Cabrini Church in Scituate (church).[2] The defendants are former parishioners of the church who have maintained an around-the-clock, seven-days-per-week vigil since the decree of suppression entered in October, 2004. In February, 2015, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Boston (RCAB) notified the defendants that they must end their vigil and leave the church or face legal action. The defendants refused to leave and the RCAB instituted this action for declaratory and injunctive relief. Following a bench trial before a judge in the Superior Court, judgment entered against the defendants declaring them to be trespassers and permanently enjoining them from entering on church property. This appeal followed.[3] On appeal, the defendants argue that the judge made several erroneous pretrial rulings, including denying their motion to dismiss and declining their demand for a jury trial. They further contend that facts found by the judge in support of the trespass claim were clearly erroneous. We affirm. Background facts. We outline the relevant facts, reserving discussion of some facts for the issues raised. The RCAB is a corporation sole organized under c. 506 of the Acts of 1897. It is the record owner of the property located at 27-31 Hood Road, Scituate, on which the church stands. In May, 2004, the Archbishop of Boston, Cardinal Seán O’Malley, announced that the church would be closed as part of the RCAB’s ongoing “reconfiguration process.” He issued a decree suppressing the church on October 5, 2004, which became effective on October 29, 2004. Under the Universal Law of the Roman Catholic Church (canon law), the suppression of the church meant that the church no longer was part of a designated Roman Catholic parish. In July, […]
Doe, et al. v. Boston Medical Center Corporation (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-133-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 13-P-1998 Appeals Court JANE DOE & another[1] vs. BOSTON MEDICAL CENTER CORPORATION. No. 13-P-1998. Suffolk. May 6, 2015. – September 9, 2015. Present: Rubin, Brown, & Maldonado, JJ. Practice, Civil, Summary judgment. Negligence, Hospital, Duty to prevent harm, Foreseeability of harm. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on March 2, 2011. The case was heard by Heidi E. Brieger, J., on a motion for summary judgment. Matthew W. Perkins for the plaintiffs. Joseph A. King (Kevin M. Sullivan with him) for the defendant. BROWN, J. The plaintiffs, Jane and John Doe, filed an amended complaint for negligent supervision and loss of consortium, arising out of an assault on Jane by Boston Medical Center Corporation (hospital) interpreter Thomas Consoli. A Superior Court judge entered summary judgment in favor of the hospital. The plaintiffs appeal. We reverse. 1. Background. We summarize the relevant facts from the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Foster v. Group Health Inc., 444 Mass. 668, 672 (2005). The facts as written are undisputed. In 2004, after obtaining a Criminal Offender Record Information (CORI) report from the Criminal History Systems Board, indicating no prior criminal convictions, the hospital hired Consoli as an interpreter. Shortly after being hired Consoli was oriented and informed of the hospital’s policies. One such policy was that as an interpreter, Consoli was never to touch or be alone with any patients. This policy was self-regulated by Consoli, that is, the only person to insure that Consoli was never alone with a patient was himself. On March 31, 2008, Jane, a Spanish-speaking immigrant from Guatemala who understands minimal English and has no formal education, was admitted to the hospital in connection with the impending labor and delivery of her first child. She was directed to a room and changed into a hospital gown. At or shortly after 3:05 P.M. Consoli entered Jane’s hospital room and translated between Jane and Jane’s doctor and nurse. After speaking with Jane, Consoli and the medical team went out of the room, leaving her door open. Consoli told the nurse that he was going to another assignment in triage, but when she departed, he remained outside Jane’s room. Soon after, Consoli reentered Jane’s room, alone, and asked Jane where she felt pain. He told her that he […]
Pugsley v. Police Department of Boston, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-133-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11740 SEAN PUGSLEY vs. POLICE DEPARTMENT OF BOSTON & others.[1] Suffolk. January 6, 2015. – July 31, 2015. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Boston. Municipal Corporations, Police. Police, Hiring. Anti-Discrimination Law, Sex, Bona fide occupational qualification. Employment, Discrimination. Practice, Civil, Standing. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on June 2, 2011. The case was heard by Carol S. Ball, J., on motions for summary judgment, and entry of final judgment was ordered by Frances A. McIntyre, J. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. Joseph L. Sulman (David Isaac Brody with him) for the plaintiff. Nicole I. Taub for police department of Boston. Nicholas A. Ogden, Assistant Attorney General (Ronald F. Kehoe, Assistant Attorney General, with him) for Human Resources Division & another. The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: Jamie Ann Sabino & Leah Kaine for The Women’s Bar Association of Massachusetts. Ralph C. Martin & Lisa A. Sinclair for Northeastern University. Simone R. Liebman & Constance M. McGrane for Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination. CORDY, J. The plaintiff, Sean Pugsley, brought a claim of sex discrimination against defendants Boston police department (department) and the Commonwealth’s Human Resources Division (division) alleging a violation of G. L. c. 151B and of the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, G. L. c. 12, § 11I. The plaintiff’s claim arises from the department’s preferential treatment of females in hiring candidates for the December, 2010, police academy class. Summary judgment was entered for the defendants on the discrimination claim, G. L. c. 151B.[2] For the reasons stated herein, we vacate the judgment of the Superior Court and remand the case for entry of a judgment of dismissal for lack of standing. 1. Background. Under G. L. c. 31 and the division’s personnel administration rules (rules), the department appoints entry-level police officers from a “main certification” list generated by the division at the department’s request. The division creates this list by ranking candidates on an eligibility list according to their scores on the most recent civil service examination (examination). The eligibility list is then augmented by candidates for “reemployment,”[3] and candidates who possess statutory preferences, including veterans’ preferences. The candidates for reemployment are required to be placed first on the main certification list, followed by those with statutory preferences,[4] […]
Monell, et al. v. Boston Pads, LLC, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-090-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11661 NESTO MONELL & others[1] vs. BOSTON PADS, LLC, & others.[2] Suffolk. December 2, 2014. – June 3, 2015. Present: Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Independent Contractor Act. Broker. License. Real Property, License to sell. Labor, Wages. Massachusetts Wage Act. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on October 17, 2011. A motion for partial summary judgment was heard by Robert C. Cosgrove, J., and entry of final judgment was ordered by Edward P. Leibensperger, J. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. Hillary Schwab (Brant Casavant with her) for the plaintiffs. Stephen M. Perry (Robert S. Kutner with him) for the defendants. Ian O. Russell & Nicole Horberg Decter, for Massachusetts Employment Lawyers Association & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief. Philip S. Lapatin & Nathaniel F. Hulme, for Massachusetts Association of Realtors & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief. HINES, J. We granted the plaintiffs’ application for direct appellate review to determine whether the independent contractor statute, G. L. c. 149, § 148B, which makes it a violation of the statute to fail “to properly classify an individual as an employee,” applies to real estate salespersons licensed under, and affiliated with and working for a licensed brokerage firm pursuant to G. L. c. 112, § 87RR. A Superior Court judge concluded that the independent contractor statute did not apply in these circumstances to the salespersons in this industry. We affirm. 1. Background. We summarize the material undisputed facts. The defendants Jacob Realty, LLC (Jacob Realty); NextGen Realty, Inc. (NextGen); and RentMyUnit.Com, Inc., doing business as Boardwalk Properties (Boardwalk Properties) (collectively, business entities), are licensed Massachusetts real estate brokerage firms that are in the business of renting and selling real estate in Massachusetts.[3] The defendants Demetrios Salpoglou and Yuan Huang are members of Jacob Realty and shareholders of NextGen and Boardwalk Properties, and are involved in the operations of these business entities. Salpoglou serves as the broker of record for the business entities. The plaintiffs Nesto Monell, Jonathan Gibson, Rachael Butcher, and Lindsey Burnes were licensed real estate salespersons who worked for Jacob Realty under its real estate broker’s license. The plaintiff Ann McGovern was a licensed real estate salesperson who worked for NextGen under its real estate broker’s license. The plaintiff Benjamin Smith […]
Sebago, et al. v. Boston Cab Dispatch, Inc., et al. (and a consolidated case) (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-068-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11757 BERNARD SEBAGO & others[1] vs. BOSTON CAB DISPATCH, INC., & others[2] (and a consolidated case[3]). Suffolk. January 8, 2015. – April 21, 2015. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, & Hines, JJ. Taxicab. Independent Contractor Act. Massachusetts Wage Act. Minimum Wage. Tips. Labor, Wages, Minimum wage, Overtime compensation. Civil actions commenced in the Superior Court Department on March 6 and September 14, 2012. After consolidation, the case was heard by Linda E. Giles, J., on motions for summary judgment, and the case was reported by her to the Appeals Court. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. Shannon Liss-Riordan (Adelaide Pagano with her) for Bernard Sebago. Andrew Good (Philip G. Cormier with him) for Edward J. Tutunjian. Albert A. DeNapoli (Emily C. Shanahan with him) for USA Taxi Association, Inc. Nathan L. Kaitz, for John Byda, was present but did not argue. The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: Norman M. Leon, of Illinois, & Matthew Iverson for International Franchise Association. Nicole Horberg Decter & Don Siegel for Massachusetts AFL-CIO. Stevan Johnson, pro se. Helen G. Litsas, Special Assistant Corporation Counsel, for city of Boston. CORDY, J. In this case, we must determine whether licensed taxicab drivers in the city of Boston (city) may be classified properly as independent contractors, see G. L. c. 149, § 148B (independent contractor statute), in accordance with Boston Police Department Rule 403, Hackney Carriage Rules and Flat Rate Handbook (2008) (Rule 403). Rule 403 is a comprehensive set of regulations for the Boston taxicab industry, promulgated by the city’s police commissioner (commissioner) pursuant to an express delegation of authority by the Legislature. St. 1930, c. 392, as amended by St. 1931, c. 408, § 7, and St. 1934, c. 280. The plaintiffs in these consolidated cases, Bernard Sebago, Pierre Duchemin, Ahmed Farah, and Yves Bien-Aime, are licensed taxicab drivers in the city. They contend that they were employees of the defendants but were misclassified as independent contractors, thereby depriving them of minimum wages, overtime pay, tips, and the protections afforded by the Wage Act, G. L. c. 149, § 148. The defendants include taxicab owners, radio associations, and a taxicab garage. They argue that their relationships with the plaintiffs must be considered in the context of Rule 403, which explicitly permits drivers to […]
Kelley, et al. v. Boston Fire Department, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-150-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 13-P-1701 Appeals Court JOSEPH KELLEY & others[1] vs. BOSTON FIRE DEPARTMENT & another.[2] No. 13-P-1701. November 18, 2014. Fire Fighter, Appointment. Municipal Corporations, Fire department. Boston. Civil Service, Appointment. Practice, Civil, Review of interlocutory action. Four fire lieutenants employed by the city of Boston (city) fire department filed an appeal with the Civil Service Commission (commission) pursuant to G. L. c. 31, § 2(b) and (c), claiming to be aggrieved by the practice of appointing out-of-grade acting captains without following the provisions of the civil service laws. The commission found that the city violated G. L. c. 31, § 31, by appointing acting captains on an emergency basis without initially notifying the Division of Human Resources (HRD), and without obtaining the consent of HRD to extend the emergency appointments after the initial thirty days. The commission ordered the city to cease appointing acting captains in this manner, and the city ended the practice effective July 1, 2009.[3] However, the commission ultimately dismissed the plaintiffs’ appeal, concluding that compliance with § 31 procedures was “ministerial,” and that the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate that the appointments did not meet the statutory criteria set forth in G. L. c. 31, § 31.[4] The lieutenants appealed the commission’s decision pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, § 14. A judge of the Superior Court vacated the commission’s decision, concluding as a matter of law that the statutory notice and consent requirements were not ministerial, and that the burden of proving that the § 31 criteria were met rested with the city, not the plaintiffs. The matter was remanded to the commission for a new evidentiary hearing to allow the plaintiffs to offer proof of the specific appointments made in violation of § 31 that “they should have received because of their position on the promotion list.” The city has appealed. No appeal was filed by the commission. “As a general rule, an aggrieved litigant cannnot as a matter of right pursue an immediate appeal from an interlocutory order unless a statute or rule authorizes it.” Elles v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Quincy, 450 Mass. 671, 673-674 (2008). This general rule applies with equal force to appeals by litigants who appear before administrative agencies. “[A]n order of remand to an administrative agency is interlocutory and may not be appealed from by the parties to the underlying action.” Chief Justice for Admin. & Mgmt. of […]
Cape Cod Shellfish & Seafood Company, Inc., et al. v. City of Boston, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-148-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 11-P-1474 Appeals Court CAPE COD SHELLFISH & SEAFOOD COMPANY, INC., & others[1] vs. CITY OF BOSTON & another.[2] No. 11-P-1474. Suffolk. October 9, 2013. – November 12, 2014. Present: Cypher, Katzmann, & Maldonado, JJ. Taxation, Exemption, Leased property, Abatement, Real estate tax: exemption, abatement. Contract, Lease of real estate. Landlord and Tenant, Taxation, Tenancy at sufferance, Lease as contract. Real Property, Lease. Massachusetts Port Authority. Boston. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on November 9, 2004. After review by this court, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 1127 (2009), the case was heard by Elizabeth M. Fahey, J., on a motion for summary judgment. Marshall F. Newman for the plaintiffs. Adam Cederbaum, Assistant Corporation Counsel, for city of Boston. MALDONADO, J. The plaintiffs appeal from a Superior Court judgment in favor of the city of Boston (city) in its effort to tax the plaintiffs as lessees of property owned by the Massachusetts Port Authority (Massport), on Boston’s Fish Pier. Although, pursuant to G. L. c. 91 App., § 1-17 (§ 17), as appearing in St. 1978, c. 332, § 2, Massport and its lessees are not required to pay real estate taxes on Massport properties, an exception to the exemption applies to business lessees of property in the area known as the Commonwealth Flats. In an earlier decision pursuant to our rule 1:28, we determined that the plaintiffs are liable for taxes for their respective lease terms under that exception.[3] At issue now is whether the plaintiffs, all of whom remained on the property after the end of their lease terms, continue to be liable as lessees for the taxes assessed during the holdover period. Background. We recount the undisputed facts from the motion judge’s May 20, 2011, memorandum of decision and order on the city’s motion for summary judgment, supplemented also by the record on appeal as noted. The plaintiffs, Cape Cod Shellfish & Seafood Company, Inc.; John Mantia & Sons Co., Inc.; Atlantic Coast Seafood, Inc.; New England Marketers, Inc.; and Great Eastern Seafood, Inc., operated wholesale fish and seafood businesses on the Boston Fish Pier, which is owned by Massport and situated in the Commonwealth Flats area of South Boston. The plaintiffs originally occupied the property pursuant to written leases with Massport. The relevant leases of the plaintiffs covered the […]
Figgs v. Boston Housing Authority (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-141-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11532 TRENEA FIGGS vs. BOSTON HOUSING AUTHORITY. Suffolk. April 8, 2014. – August 18, 2014. Present: Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ.[1] Boston Housing Authority. Housing Authority. Municipal Corporations, Housing authority. Practice, Civil, Action in nature of certiorari. Administrative Law, Hearing, Substantial evidence. Evidence, Hearsay. Civil action commenced in the Boston Division of the Housing Court Department on August 24, 2012. The case was heard by Jeffrey M. Winik, J. The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. Michael J. Louis & Angela Marcolina for the defendant. Jeremy T. Robin for the plaintff. The following submitted briefs for amicus curiae: Jeffrey C. Turk for Greater Boston Real Estate Board & another. James M. McCreight, Alex Munevar, & Quinten Steenhuis for Massachusetts Coalition for the Homeless & others. Esme Caramello, Deena Greenberg, & Melanie Zuch for Charles Hamilton Houston Institute & another. SPINA, J. Trenea Figgs is a participant in the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) Housing Choice Voucher Program, commonly referred to as “Section 8,” administered by the Boston Housing Authority (BHA) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (2012) and implementing HUD regulations.[2] On November 22, 2011, the BHA notified Figgs of its intent to terminate her participation in the Section 8 program due to allegations of serious or repeated violations of her lease. Several weeks earlier, Boston police officers had executed a search warrant for Figgs’s apartment in connection with a criminal investigation of her brother, Damon Nunes, and had discovered, among other things, two plastic bags of marijuana, a .380 caliber Ruger pistol, and five rounds of ammunition. Figgs appealed the proposed termination. Following an informal hearing on February 22, 2012, a hearing officer, by decision dated August 6, 2012, upheld the termination of Figgs’s Section 8 housing subsidy. On August 24, 2012, Figgs filed a verified complaint in the Housing Court for injunctive and declaratory relief. She sought to enjoin the BHA from terminating her Section 8 housing subsidy on the ground that the informal hearing failed to satisfy her procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and she sought a declaration that the bases for her termination were insufficient. In response, the BHA filed a […]
Lu v. City of Boston, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-127-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11611 FREIDRICH LU vs. CITY OF BOSTON & others.[1] July 17, 2014. Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. Declaratory Relief. Practice, Civil, Pendency of prior action. The plaintiff, Freidrich Lu, filed a complaint in the county court pursuant to G. L. c. 231A, § 1, essentially seeking a judgment declaring that the Trustees of the Boston Public Library (trustees) are not a subsidiary corporation, division or unit of the city of Boston (city), that the trustees and the city “are two separate, independent legal entities,” and that members of the city of Boston Law Department (law department) may not provide legal representation to the trustees or library employees. A single justice of this court denied Lu’s motion for summary judgment, dismissed the complaint, and denied postjudgment relief. Lu appeals. We affirm. Background. This declaratory judgment action has its genesis in a civil rights action that Lu commenced in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts against the defendant trustees and a library employee, defendant George Hulme. In general, Lu alleged that, in violation of his civil rights, he was denied entrance to the Boston Public Library. A judge of that court denied Lu’s motion seeking disqualification of the law department as counsel for the trustees and Hulme, and concluded that “[t]he [t]rustees constitute a municipal entity that oversees the Library as a department of the [c]ity of Boston,” and that the law department may represent the trustees and Hulme. Lu then commenced this action in the county court, seeking a contrary determination. Discussion. The complaint in this case essentially deals with the same controversy that exists between the parties in the Federal litigation. As such, it does not present a proper occasion for declaratory relief. Jacoby v. Babcock Artificial Kidney Ctr., Inc., 364 Mass. 561, 562 (1974). The single justice correctly concluded that: “For all practical purposes, the only ‘actual controversy’ the plaintiff claims is his challenge to the [Federal] judge’s denial of his motion to disqualify counsel, which he seeks to undermine by obtaining a contrary legal determination from this court regarding the relationship between the [t]rustees and the [c]ity of Boston. This is not an appropriate ground to bring a declaratory judgment claim. If the plaintiff wishes to appeal [the Federal District Court judge’s] denial of his motion to disqualify […]