Cantell, et al. v. Commissioner of Correction, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-166-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12015 ROBERT CANTELL & others[1] vs. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION & others.[2] Suffolk. March 10, 2016. – October 21, 2016. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ.[3] Commissioner of Correction. Administrative Law, Regulations. Imprisonment, Segregated confinement. Due Process of Law, Prison classification proceedings, Prison regulation. Moot Question. Practice, Civil, Moot case, Dismissal of appeal, Class action. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on January 20, 2012. Motions to dismiss and for class certification were heard by Elizabeth M. Fahey, J. After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. Bonita Tenneriello for the plaintiffs. Sheryl F. Grant for the defendants. The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: Amy Fettig & Jamelia N. Morgan, of the District of Columbia, Phillip Kassell, Matthew R. Segal, & Jessie J. Rossman for American Civil Liberties Union & others. Ruth A. Bourquin, Deborah Harris, Margaret E. Monsell, & Jamie A. Sabino for Massachusetts Law Reform Institute & others. Adam Sanders, pro se. BOTSFORD, J. The named plaintiffs in this putative class action are inmates serving criminal sentences in various Massachusetts prison facilities. For varying lengths of time, each of them has been placed in a “special management unit” (SMU) in nondisciplinary administrative segregation. In January, 2012, the plaintiffs commenced this action against the Commissioner of Correction (commissioner) and the superintendents of the correctional institutions in which the plaintiffs were housed (collectively, defendants). The plaintiffs allege that their placements in the SMUs, essentially in conditions of solitary confinement, violate their State and Federal constitutional rights to due process as well as regulations of the Department of Correction (department), and they seek to represent a class of similarly situated prisoners confined in SMUs. In early 2013, following the release of this court’s decision in LaChance v. Commissioner of Correction, 463 Mass. 767 (2012) (LaChance I), a judge in the Superior Court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification and allowed the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ amended complaint. The plaintiffs appealed to the Appeals Court.[4] A divided panel of that court dismissed the appeal as moot because by then it was undisputed that no named plaintiffs remained in SMUs. Cantell v. Commissioner of Correction, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 629 […]
Categories: News Tags: 1016616, Cantell, Commissioner, Correction, Lawyers, Weekly
Brown v. Office of the Commissioner of Probation (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-161-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11987 HELEN BROWN vs. OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER OF PROBATION. Suffolk. March 7, 2016. – October 11, 2016. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ.[1] Governmental Immunity. Commonwealth, Claim against. Judgment, Interest. Interest. Damages, Interest, Punitive, Attorney’s fees. Practice, Civil, Interest, Costs, Attorney’s fees. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on August 13, 2007. Following review by the Appeals Court, 84 Mass. App. Ct. 1109 (2013), a motion for postjudgment interest was considered by Paul E. Troy, J., and judgment was entered by him. After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. Jonathan J. Margolis (Beth R. Myers with him) for the plaintiff. Sally A. VanderWeele, Assistant Attorney General, for the Office of the Commissioner of Probation. Jamie Goodwin, for Massachusetts Employment Lawyers Association & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief. LENK, J. In this case, we consider whether sovereign immunity bars a plaintiff who is awarded punitive damages, costs, and attorney’s fees as part of a judgment under G. L. c. 151B, § 9, from recovering postjudgment interest on those awards from a public employer. The trial judge denied a request by the plaintiff, Helen Brown, for such interest, concluding that sovereign immunity has not been waived with respect to such interest, and judgment was entered accordingly. A divided panel of the Appeals Court affirmed the judgment, see Brown v. Office of the Commissioner of Probation, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 729, 735 (2015), and we allowed the plaintiff’s application for further appellate review. Because we conclude that G. L. c. 151B, § 9, does not waive sovereign immunity from liability for postjudgment interest, either expressly or by necessary implication, we affirm.[2] Background. We recite only those facts necessary for understanding in context the question of law at issue here. The plaintiff and a colleague sued the defendant, the office of the Commissioner of Probation, for sex discrimination, race discrimination, and retaliation, pursuant to the procedure set forth in G. L. c. 151B, § 9. On February 9, 2011, a Superior Court jury found for the plaintiff on her retaliation claim,[3] and awarded $ 6,000 in compensatory damages and $ 500,000 in punitive damages. The award of punitive damages was reduced to $ 108,000 by an order of remittitur. […]
Deal, et al. v. Commissioner of Correction, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-135-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12053 TIMOTHY DEAL & others[1] vs. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION & another.[2] Suffolk. May 3, 2016. – August 25, 2016. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ.[3] Commissioner of Correction. Constitutional Law, Sentence, Parole. Due Process of Law, Sentence, Parole, Prison classification proceedings. Imprisonment, Reclassification of prisoner. Parole. Youthful Offender Act. Practice, Criminal, Sentence, Parole. Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk on July 14, 2015. The case was reported by Botsford, J. Barbara Kaban (Benjamin H. Keehn, Committee for Public Counsel Services, & James W. Rosseel with her) for the petitioners. Charles Anderson, Jr., for the respondents. David J. Apfel & Eileen L. Morrison, for American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief. CORDY, J. This case is before us on the reservation and report of the single justice. The petitioners, Timothy Deal, Siegfried Golston, and Jeffrey Roberio, are juvenile homicide offenders[4] who are serving mandatory indeterminate life sentences and who have a constitutional right to a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 655, 674 (2013) (Diatchenko I), quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010). This right also extends to juveniles convicted of murder in the second degree. See Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 471 Mass. 12, 32 (2015) (Diatchenko II). This case concerns the manner in which juvenile homicide offenders are classified and placed in Department of Correction (department) facilities. The issue before us is whether the department’s practice of using “discretionary override codes” to block qualifying juvenile homicide offenders from placement in a minimum security facility unless and until the individual has received a positive parole vote violates (1) G. L. c. 119, § 72B, as amended by St. 2014, c. 189, § 2; or (2) their right to a meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, arts. 12 and 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, or both Constitutions. We conclude that the department’s current classification practice violates G. L. c. 119, § 72B, as amended by St. 2014, c. 189, § 2, because the department’s failure to consider a juvenile homicide offender’s suitability […]
Categories: News Tags: 1013516, Commissioner, Correction, Deal, Lawyers, Weekly
The First Marblehead Corporation, et al. v. Commissioner of Revenue (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-122-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11609 THE FIRST MARBLEHEAD CORPORATION & another[1] vs. COMMISSIONER OF REVENUE. Suffolk. May 3, 2016. – August 12, 2016. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ.[2] Financial Institution. Taxation, Excise, Apportionment of tax burden. Constitutional Law, Taxation, Commerce clause, Interstate commerce. Interstate Commerce. Appeal from a decision of the Appellate Tax Board. The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. Donald-Bruce Abrams (John S. Brown with him) for the taxpayer. Brett M. Goldberg, Assistant Attorney General (Daniel J. Hammond, Assistant Attorney General, with him) for Commissioner of Revenue. The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: Margaret Winterkorn Meyers, of New York, David W.T. Daniels, of the District of Columbia, & Emily M. Kelley, for Michael S. Knoll & another. Helen Hecht, Bruce Fort, Sheldon Laskin, & Lila Disque, of the District of Columbia, for Multistate Tax Commission. BOTSFORD, J. In The First Marblehead Corp. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 470 Mass. 497, 498 (2015) (First Marblehead), this court affirmed a decision of the Appellate Tax Board (board) concerning the tax liability of the taxpayer GATE Holdings Inc. (Gate), under the Commonwealth’s financial institution excise tax (FIET). Gate was a wholly owned subsidiary of The First Marblehead Corporation (FMC),[3] id. at 497-498, and “played an integral role in the FMC student loan securitization process[,]” as the holder of beneficial interests in all the separate trusts that effectively owned the securitized student loans. Id. at 499. Gate had no employees, no office space, and no tangible assets; it was essentially a holding company. Id. Gate’s taxable property consisted of its interests in the securitized student loans held in the trusts. Id. In its decision, the board determined, and this court agreed, that all of Gate’s interests in the securitized loans were properly assigned to Massachusetts under the FIET’s apportionment rules set forth in G. L. c. 63, § 2A, resulting in a greater tax liability than Gate had calculated. Id. at 498. Gate filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. On October 13, 2015, the Court granted Gate’s petition, vacated this court’s rescript in the case, and remanded the case for further consideration in light of Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. […]
Categories: News Tags: 1012216, Commissioner, Corporation, First, Lawyers, Marblehead, Revenue, Weekly
Bank of America, N.A. v. Commissioner of Revenue (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-096-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11995 BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., trustee,[1] vs. COMMISSIONER OF REVENUE. Suffolk. March 7, 2016. – July 11, 2016. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Trust, Taxation. Taxation, Trust, Income tax. Fiduciary. Domicil. Words, “Inhabitant.” Appeal from a decision of the Appellate Tax Board. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. Kevin P. Martin (Joshua M. Daniels with him) for the taxpayer. Kirk G. Hanson, Assistant Attorney General, for Commissioner of Revenue. Phoebe A. Papageorgiou, of the District of Columbia, & Brad S. Papalardo, for Massachusetts Bankers Association & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief. BOTSFORD, J. In this case, we consider whether Bank of America, N.A. (bank), in its capacity as a corporate trustee of several inter vivos trusts, qualifies as an “inhabitant” and accordingly is subject to the fiduciary income tax under G. L. c. 62, § 10, even though the bank is not domiciled in Massachusetts. Considering the bank’s appeal from a decision of the Appellate Tax Board (board) in which the board determined that the bank did qualify as an inhabitant, we affirm the board’s decision on the record of this case, but on somewhat different grounds.[2] Background.[3] The bank is a national banking association authorized to act as a fiduciary. At all relevant times, the bank’s commercial domicil was in North Carolina, with its principal place of business in Charlotte, North Carolina. This case concerns appeals by the bank from the denials, by the Commissioner of Revenue (commissioner), of applications for abatement of fiduciary income taxes paid by thirty-four inter vivos trusts. The taxes were paid by the bank in its capacity as trustee or co-trustee of each of the thirty-four trusts;[4] the taxes paid related to the tax year ended December 31, 2007 (tax year at issue). In 2011, the bank took the position that these thirty-four and similar inter vivos trusts of which the bank served as trustee or co-trustee did not qualify as “resident inter vivos trusts,” as described in 830 Code Mass. Regs. § 62.10.1(1) (b) (2016),[5] and therefore were not subject to fiduciary income tax under G. L. c. 62, § 10 (§ 10). Accordingly, the bank filed with the commissioner 2,987 applications for abatement of the tax and […]
National Grid USA Service Company, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-065-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 14-P-1861 Appeals Court NATIONAL GRID USA SERVICE COMPANY, INC. vs. COMMISSIONER OF REVENUE. No. 14-P-1861. Suffolk. December 11, 2015. – June 8, 2016. Present: Cypher, Carhart, & Blake, JJ. Taxation, Abatement, Corporate excise. Public Utilities. Appeal from a decision of the Appellate Tax Board. John S. Brown (Donald-Bruce Abrams with him) for the taxpayer. Brett M. Goldberg for Commissioner of Revenue. CYPHER, J. National Grid USA Service Company, Inc. (NGUSA) appeals from a decision of the Appellate Tax Board (board) denying its motion for summary judgment and allowing a motion to dismiss brought by the Commissioner of Revenue (commissioner) concerning the effect of a closing agreement between National Grid Holdings, Inc. (NGHI)[1] and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) on interest deductions under G. L. c. 63, § 30(4). The board rejected National Grid’s position that the closing agreement, which allowed a Federal deduction for a portion of the disputed interest payments, is binding on deductions allowed for State tax purpose. Background. For background we refer to our decision in National Grid Holdings, Inc. v. Commissioner of Rev., 89 Mass. App. Ct. (2016) (National Grid Holdings, Inc.). Briefly, that case dealt with the question whether certain deferred subscription arrangements (DSAs), among various entities related to National Grid plc, the parent company located in the United Kingdom, constituted true indebtedness, whereby payments made pursuant to the DSAs could be deducted as interest in calculating Massachusetts corporate excise tax. The commissioner disallowed the deductions for the 2002 tax year and National Grid appealed to the board. This separate action arose when the board, in hearing the first appeal, declined to admit the closing agreement in evidence. Relevant here, we add the following undisputed facts from the board’s September 19, 2014, findings of fact and report. National Grid’s tax returns for the 2002 tax year were audited by both the commissioner and the IRS. On May 1, 2007, National Grid entered into a closing agreement with the IRS, pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7121 of the Internal Revenue Code (code), in connection with National Grid’s Federal tax return.[2] As part of that agreement, the IRS allowed a Federal deduction for a portion of the amount claimed by National Grid as interest on the DSAs. As to National Grid’s 2002 Massachusetts tax return, the commissioner determined that the DSAs were […]
National Grid Holdings, Inc., et al. v. Commissioner of Revenue (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-064-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 14-P-1662 Appeals Court NATIONAL GRID HOLDINGS, INC., & others[1] vs. COMMISSIONER OF REVENUE. No. 14-P-1662. Suffolk. December 11, 2015. – June 8, 2016. Present: Cypher, Carhart, & Blake, JJ. Taxation, Abatement, Corporate excise, Accounting principle. Public Utilities. Debt. Corporation, Stock. Evidence, Settlement offer. Appeal from a decision of the Appellate Tax Board. John S. Brown (Donald-Bruce Abrams with him) for the taxpayers. Brett M. Goldberg for Commissioner of Revenue. CYPHER, J. The plaintiffs, National Grid Holdings, Inc. (NGHI), National Grid USA (NGUSA), and National Grid USA Service Company, Inc. (NG Service) (collectively, taxpayers), appeal from a decision of the Appellate Tax Board (board) in favor of the defendant, Commissioner of Revenue (commissioner), on the taxpayers’ claims for an abatement of corporate excise for the tax year ended March 31, 2002. Primarily at issue is whether certain financing transactions, referred to as deferred subscription arrangements (DSAs), among various subsidiaries of National Grid plc (NGPLC), constituted true indebtedness so that the interest paid thereon qualified for the deduction allowed under the Massachusetts taxation of corporations statute, G. L. c. 63, § 30(4). NGPLC is a British electric and gas utility company that owns numerous entities in the United States (U.S.), the United Kingdom (U.K.), and beyond (collectively, National Grid). The DSAs were financing arrangements designed by National Grid to take advantage of the differences in the U.S. and U.K. tax codes.[2] National Grid attempted to cast the transactions as indebtedness under U.S. State and Federal tax laws, thereby reducing National Grid’s tax liability in the U.S., and as equity, under U.K. law, thereby reducing its taxable income in the U.K. Of overriding concern was the avoidance of any appearance of indebtedness in the U.K., where a debenture between a U.K. entity and its foreign subsidiary is strictly prohibited by statute, under threat of criminal sanctions.[3] To that end, National Grid drafted the DSAs as agreements among various related entities to sell and repurchase shares of stock, maintaining in these proceedings that the mandatory nature of the stock repurchase constituted debt under Massachusetts corporate tax law. “We will not modify or reverse a decision of the board if the decision is based on both substantial evidence and the correct application of the law.” Boston Professional Hockey Assn. v. Commissioner of Rev., 443 Mass. 276, 285 (2005). […]
Goe v. Commissioner of Probation (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-035-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11841 GEORGE GOE[1] vs. COMMISSIONER OF PROBATION & another.[2] Suffolk. November 2, 2015. – March 14, 2016. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Practice, Criminal, Probation. Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision. Global Positioning System Device. Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk on January 29, 2015. The case was reported by Cordy, J. Beth L. Eisenberg, Committee for Public Counsel Services (Lily Lockhart, Committee for Public Counsel Services, & Spencer Lord with her) for the petitioner. Steven R. Strom, of Connecticut, for the intervener. Sarah M. Joss, Special Assistant Attorney General, for Commissioner of Probation. U. Gwyn Williams, Laura Carey, & Charles Stones, for Citizens for Juvenile Justice & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief. GANTS, C.J. This case comes to us on a reservation and report from the single justice asking the following questions: “(1) Whether the Massachusetts courts are the appropriate forum for challenging additional probation conditions imposed on a probationer transferred to Massachusetts pursuant to the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision; and, if so, what is the proper mechanism for mounting such a challenge? “(2) Whether a transferee probationer is entitled to actual notice of mandatory [global positioning system (GPS)] monitoring pursuant to G. L. c. 265, § 47[,] from the sentencing judge, or whether such notice is implied or waived by a petitioner’s voluntary transfer to Massachusetts[?] “(3) Whether mandatory GPS monitoring for crimes committed as a minor constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, where the minor was convicted as an adult in another jurisdiction? “(4) Whether the Commissioner of Probation’s Policy on the Issuance of Travel Permits is ultra vires; and, if not, whether the application of that policy to the petitioner violated his right to interstate travel?” In answer to the first question, we conclude that, where a probationer whose supervision is transferred to Massachusetts under the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision (compact) contends that a special condition of probation that was added by Massachusetts is not mandated by Massachusetts law or is unconstitutional, this determination is appropriately made by a Massachusetts court, and the appropriate mechanism to obtain such a determination is through a complaint for declaratory relief. We also conclude that […]
Frawley v. Police Commissioner of Cambridge (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-028-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11903 JOSEPH F. FRAWLEY, JR. vs. POLICE COMMISSIONER OF CAMBRIDGE. Middlesex. November 5, 2015. – March 4, 2016. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Firearms. Police, Firearms, Retirement. Public Employment, Police. Declaratory Relief. Practice, Civil, Summary judgment, Injunctive relief, Relief in the nature of certiorari. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on November 13, 2012. The case was heard by Douglas H. Wilkins, J., on motions for summary judgment. The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. Samuel A. Aylesworth, Assistant City Solicitor, for the defendant. James F. Lamond (Dennis M. Coyne with him) for the plaintiff. SPINA, J. When Joseph F. Frawley, Jr., retired on March 4, 2004, from his position as a sergeant with the Cambridge police department (department), the police commissioner for the city of Cambridge (city) issued him a “retired officer identification card” (ID card) that had no expiration date. On December 22, 2011, Frawley applied for the issuance of a replacement ID card because the one in his possession had broken. The successor police commissioner (commissioner) denied the application, stating that Frawley “ha[d] not met the standard set by the Department.” On November 28, 2012, Frawley filed an amended complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief in the Superior Court. He sought a declaration that the commissioner had breached his duty under 501 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 13.00 (2008) (regulations), which set forth the standards for identification cards for retired law enforcement officers, by refusing to issue Frawley a replacement ID card. The ID card, together with a so-called “Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act Training and Certification Card” (training certification card), allows the holder to carry a concealed firearm in accordance with the provisions of the Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act of 2004 (LEOSA), Pub. L. No. 108-277, 118 Stat. 865 (2004), codified insofar as relevant here at 18 U.S.C. § 926C (2012). See 501 Code Mass. Regs. § 13.04(2)(a). After determining that Frawley had standing to seek declaratory relief, a judge allowed Frawley’s motion for summary judgment, declaring that he was entitled to receive a replacement ID card because he had retired “in good standing.” Id. at §§ 13.02, 13.03. The commissioner appealed, and we transferred the case to […]
Regency Transportation, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-004-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11873 REGENCY TRANSPORTATION, INC. vs. COMMISSIONER OF REVENUE. Suffolk. November 5, 2015. – January 6, 2016. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Taxation, Sales and use tax, Abatement. Constitutional Law, Taxation, Commerce clause, Interstate commerce. Interstate Commerce. Appeal from a decision of the Appellate Tax Board. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. Matthew A. Morris (Richard L. Jones with him) for the taxpayer. Marikae G. Toye (Joseph J. Tierney with her) for the Commissioner of Revenue. Elizabeth J. Atkinson, of Virginia, & Andrew J. Fay & Patrick E. McDonough, for Massachusetts Motor Transportation Association & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief. CORDY, J. Regency Transportation, Inc. (Regency), appeals from a decision of the Appellate Tax Board affirming in part the denial of an abatement of the motor vehicle use tax assessed against it under G. L. c. 64I, § 2. We granted Regency’s application for direct appellate review to decide whether an unapportioned use tax imposed on Regency’s interstate fleet of vehicles violates the commerce clause of the United States Constitution. For the reasons discussed herein, we conclude it does not.[1] 1. Background. The essential facts are not disputed. Regency is a Massachusetts S corporation that operates a freight business with terminals in Massachusetts and New Jersey. Regency is licensed by the Interstate Commerce Commission as an interstate carrier to operate a fleet of tractors and trailers. The Regency fleet carries and delivers goods throughout the eastern United States. Throughout the tax periods at issue, Regency maintained its corporate headquarters in Massachusetts, as well as four warehouses and a combined maintenance facility and terminal location which it used for repairing and storing vehicles in its fleet. Regency also operated five warehouses in New Jersey and two combined maintenance facility and terminal locations there. Regency performed thirty-five per cent of the maintenance and repair work on its fleet at its Massachusetts locations and thirty-five per cent of the work at its New Jersey locations, with the remainder being performed by third parties. All vehicles in the Regency fleet entered into Massachusetts at some point during the tax periods at issue, and during these same periods Regency employed between sixty-three and eighty-three per cent of its workforce in the Commonwealth. […]
Categories: News Tags: 1000416, Commissioner, Inc., Lawyers, Regency, Revenue, Transportation, Weekly