Mount Vernon Fire Insurance Company v. Visionaid, Inc. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-108-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12142 MOUNT VERNON FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY vs. VISIONAID, INC.[1] Suffolk. December 5, 2016. – June 22, 2017. Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, & Cypher, JJ. Insurance, Insurer’s obligation to defend. Certification of questions of law to the Supreme Judicial Court by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. Kenneth R. Berman (Heather B. Repicky also present) for the defendant. James J. Duane, III (Scarlett M. Rajbanshi also present) for the plaintiff. The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: Marshall Gilinsky for United Policyholders. Laura Foggan, of the District of Columbia, & Rosanna Sattler for American Insurance Association & others. Michael F. Aylward for American International Group, Inc., & another. GAZIANO, J. In this case we are called upon to answer three certified questions from the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit involving the scope of an insurer’s duty to defend, and whether that duty extends to a counterclaim brought by the insured. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that where an insurance policy provides that the insurer has the “duty to defend any claim” initiated against the insured, the insurer’s duty to defend does not require it to prosecute affirmative counterclaims on behalf of its insured.[2] Facts and prior proceedings. We recite the facts based on the United States District Court judge’s memorandum of decision, the decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, and the undisputed documents in the record. Visionaid, Inc. (Visionaid),[3] is a manufacturer of lens cleaning and eye safety products. It purchased an employment practices liability insurance policy from Mount Vernon Fire Insurance Company (Mount Vernon), which covered, among other things, wrongful termination claims brought against Visionaid from May, 2011, through May, 2012. As relevant here, the policy imposed two duties on Mount Vernon with respect to any wrongful termination claim brought against Visionaid. The policy provided that Mount Vernon had “the right and duty to defend any Claim to which this insurance applies,” and that it was obligated to “pay one hundred percent (100%) of the Defense Costs for the [covered] Claim” up to the policy limit. Under the terms of the policy, “Claim” was defined as “any proceeding initiated against [Visionaid] . . . seeking to hold [Visionaid] responsible for […]
The Gillette Company v. Provost, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 12-071-17)
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS SUFFOLK, ss. SUPERIOR COURT. 1584CV00149-BLS2 ____________________ THE GILLETTE COMPANY v. CRAIG PROVOST, JOHN GRIFFIN, WILLIAM TUCKER, DOUGLAS KOHRING, and SHAVELOGIC, INC. ____________________ MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REPORT SUMMARY JUDGMENT DECISION PURSUANT TO RULE 64 In prior rulings, the Court dismissed or granted partial summary judgment against all of The Gillette Company’s claims. Most recently the Court decided that the remaining Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Gillette’s claims that four of its former employees helped ShaveLogic, Inc., develop a new disposable cartridge shaving razor using Gillette’s confidential information. The only remaining claims to be decided are ShaveLogic’s counterclaims that Gillette intentionally interfered with prospective business relations and violated c. 93A, by threatening to bring and then filing baseless legal claims in an attempt to keep ShaveLogic from entering the market for so-called wet-shaving products. When the Court granted partial summary judgment in Defendants’ favor on Gillette’s “confidential information” claims, it did not enter separate and final judgment under Mass. R. Civ. P. 54(b) because doing so would be inconsistent with the appellate courts’ strong policy against piecemeal appeals.1 Gillette therefore has no right to appeal the Court’s interlocutory decision granting partial summary judgment in Defendants’ favor on what had been Gillette’s remaining claims.2 Gillette has now asked the Court to report its summary judgment decision for interlocutory appellate review under Mass. R. Civ. P. 64(a). The Court will DENY this request for the reasons discussed below. 1 See Long v. Wichett, 50 Mass. App. Ct. 380, 388-404 (2000) (separate judgment held inconsistent with “bedrock policy against premature and piecemeal appeals”). 2 See Morrissey v. New England Deaconess Ass’n—Abundant Life Communities, Inc., 458 Mass. 580, 594 (2010) (in absence of separate and final judgment, “no appeal can be taken from a trial judge’s partial ‘judgment’ on a claim prior to entry of a final judgment disposing of all claims against all parties to the action”). – 2 – Rule 64(a) authorizes a trial court to report an interlocutory order to the appeals court for immediate review. However, “[s]uch a report should be reserved for novel and difficult issues, the appellate decision of which may expedite resolution of the case.” Morrison v. Lennett, 415 Mass. 857, 859 (1993). “Interlocutory matters should be reported only where it appears that they present serious questions likely to be material in the ultimate decision, and that subsequent proceedings in the trial court will be substantially facilitated by so doing.” Globe Newspaper Co. v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth. Ret. Bd., 412 Mass. 770, 772 (1992), quoting John Gilbert Jr. Co. v. C.M. Fauci Co., 309 Mass. 271, 273 (1941). Gillette argues that the summary judgment decision in this case turned […]
Bay Colony Property Development Company, et al. v. Headlands Realty Corporation, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 12-069-17)
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS SUFFOLK, ss. SUPERIOR COURT. 1784CV00936-BLS2 ____________________ BAY COLONY PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT COMPANY and WILLIAM E. LOCKE, JR. v. HEADLANDS REALTY CORPORATION; PROLOGIS LOGISTICS SERVICES INC.; AMB PROPERTY II, L.P.; AMB PROPERTY CORPORATION; and PROLOGIS, INC. ____________________ MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ CROSS-MOTION TO STRIKE Bay Colony Property Development Company and William E. Locke, Jr., claim that Defendants hired them to plan, coordinate, and supervise the development of two different properties in Pennsylvania. They allege that Defendants promised to pay Bay Colony two percent of the development costs (the “Base Fee”) plus ten percent of the profits (the “Incentive Fee”) for its work on one site, and promised to pay the same percentage amounts to Locke for his work on the other site. Plaintiffs allege they have not been paid and are owed part of the Base Fees and all of the Incentive Fees for the two projects. Plaintiffs assert claims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and declaratory judgment as to enforceability of the alleged contracts. Defendants have moved to dismiss on the ground that all claims are time barred. They argue that the statutory limitations period began to run on October 29, 2010, when AMB Property Corporation (“AMB”) sent a letter disputing whether it had any binding contract with Bay Colony. If that were correct, then all claims would be time barred—whether the Massachusetts six-year limitations period or the Pennsylvania four-year limitations period controlled—because this action was not filed in Middlesex Superior Court until November 14, 2016, more than six years later. The Court concludes that it may consider the October 2010 letter in deciding the motion to dismiss, but that it must DENY the motion because that letter did not put Plaintiffs on notice of any actual or anticipated breach of contract. 1. Considering the 2010 Letter. Plaintiffs ask the Court to strike or at least disregard the October 29, 2010, letter that is attached to Defendants’ motion to dismiss. They argue that the Court may not consider this letter without converting – 2 – the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment because Plaintiffs did not attach the letter to, reference the letter in, or rely on the letter in drafting the complaint. The Court disagrees. The authenticity of this letter and the fact that it was sent to Plaintiffs are not in dispute, as Plaintiffs acknowledged at oral argument. It is therefore permissible and appropriate for the Court to consider the letter in deciding Defendants’ motion to dismiss. When deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court may consider “documents the authenticity of which is not disputed by the parties” without converting the motion […]
Chamberland v. Arbella Mutual Insurance Company (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-077-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 16-P-861 Appeals Court HEATHER CHAMBERLAND vs. ARBELLA MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY. No. 16-P-861. Bristol. February 1, 2017. – June 9, 2017. Present: Carhart, Massing, & Henry, JJ.[1] Insurance, Underinsured motorist, Arbitration. Contract, Insurance, Arbitration. Waiver. Collateral Estoppel. Judgment, Preclusive effect. Arbitration. Practice, Civil, Summary judgment, Waiver. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on March 4, 2015. The case was heard by Robert J. Kane, J., on motions for summary judgment. Peter E. Heppner (Andrew Hart Lynch also present) for the defendant. Ronald J. Resmini for the plaintiff. HENRY, J. This case highlights the intricacies of the framework for underinsured motorist claims in Massachusetts, which provides that the insured and the insurer must either agree on the resolution of the claim or arbitrate. The plaintiff, Heather Chamberland, pursued a lengthy civil action against the other driver involved in the underlying accident and obtained a large judgment and eventually a settlement in the amount of that driver’s policy limits. Her underinsurance carrier, Arbella Mutual Insurance Company, was not a party to that action, though it consented to the settlement. Chamberland then sought underinsured motorist coverage from Arbella, which invoked arbitration. On cross motions for summary judgment, a Superior Court judge held that Arbella’s invocation of arbitration was untimely, and thus Arbella had waived its right to arbitrate. The motion judge further held that, as a result of the damages award that Chamberland had secured against the other driver at trial, Arbella was collaterally estopped from contesting issues of liability and damages in connection with Chamberland’s underinsurance claim. Arbella appealed. We reverse because, notwithstanding the significant amount of time that passed before Arbella’s demand for arbitration, Arbella did not act inconsistently with its statutory and policy-based right to arbitrate. As such, there is no basis for a finding of waiver of that right. Background. The following undisputed facts are drawn from the summary judgment record. On July 16, 2007, Chamberland was injured in an accident while operating a motor vehicle insured under a policy issued by Arbella. The other vehicle involved in the accident was operated by Dylon Maiorano and insured under a policy issued by Liberty Mutual Insurance Company. Arbella was notified of the accident, and by October 3, 2007, confirmed in writing that Chamberland’s underinsurance (part […]
Chamberland v. Arbella Mutual Insurance Company (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-077-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 16-P-861 Appeals Court HEATHER CHAMBERLAND vs. ARBELLA MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY. No. 16-P-861. Bristol. February 1, 2017. – June 9, 2017. Present: Carhart, Massing, & Henry, JJ.[1] Insurance, Underinsured motorist, Arbitration. Contract, Insurance, Arbitration. Waiver. Collateral Estoppel. Judgment, Preclusive effect. Arbitration. Practice, Civil, Summary judgment, Waiver. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on March 4, 2015. The case was heard by Robert J. Kane, J., on motions for summary judgment. Peter E. Heppner (Andrew Hart Lynch also present) for the defendant. Ronald J. Resmini for the plaintiff. HENRY, J. This case highlights the intricacies of the framework for underinsured motorist claims in Massachusetts, which provides that the insured and the insurer must either agree on the resolution of the claim or arbitrate. The plaintiff, Heather Chamberland, pursued a lengthy civil action against the other driver involved in the underlying accident and obtained a large judgment and eventually a settlement in the amount of that driver’s policy limits. Her underinsurance carrier, Arbella Mutual Insurance Company, was not a party to that action, though it consented to the settlement. Chamberland then sought underinsured motorist coverage from Arbella, which invoked arbitration. On cross motions for summary judgment, a Superior Court judge held that Arbella’s invocation of arbitration was untimely, and thus Arbella had waived its right to arbitrate. The motion judge further held that, as a result of the damages award that Chamberland had secured against the other driver at trial, Arbella was collaterally estopped from contesting issues of liability and damages in connection with Chamberland’s underinsurance claim. Arbella appealed. We reverse because, notwithstanding the significant amount of time that passed before Arbella’s demand for arbitration, Arbella did not act inconsistently with its statutory and policy-based right to arbitrate. As such, there is no basis for a finding of waiver of that right. Background. The following undisputed facts are drawn from the summary judgment record. On July 16, 2007, Chamberland was injured in an accident while operating a motor vehicle insured under a policy issued by Arbella. The other vehicle involved in the accident was operated by Dylon Maiorano and insured under a policy issued by Liberty Mutual Insurance Company. Arbella was notified of the accident, and by October 3, 2007, confirmed in writing that Chamberland’s underinsurance (part […]
Rockland Trust Company v. Langone (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-098-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12129 ROCKLAND TRUST COMPANY vs. ROBERT J. LANGONE. Suffolk. February 7, 2017. – June 1, 2017. Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ. Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. Practice, Civil, Counterclaim and cross-claim, Motion to dismiss. District Court, Jurisdiction, One-trial system. Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk on January 6, 2016. The case was considered by Spina, J. Jason W. Morgan for the plaintiff. Dana Alan Curhan for the defendant. LOWY, J. The question before us is whether, pursuant to G. L. c. 218, §§ 19 and 19A, a District Court judge may grant a plaintiff’s motion to dismiss a compulsory counterclaim under Mass R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (10), as appearing in 450 Mass. 1403 (2008), because the counterclaim is reasonably likely to result in the recovery of more than $ 25,000. We conclude that the judge may not. Background. The dispute between the parties stems from two promissory notes executed in 1984 and 1987 to Rockland Trust Company (Rockland) from the Aunyx Corporation, of which the defendant, Robert Langone, was a former officer and principal owner. Alleging that Langone was a guarantor for the notes, Rockland sued Langone in the District Court in 2003, after Aunyx defaulted. Langone filed counterclaims asserting damages of $ 6,500. Initially, Rockland prevailed, but, for reasons not relevant here, the judgment was later vacated in 2014. Subsequently, Langone brought an additional counterclaim, asserting damages of $ 110,000. Citing rule 12 (b) (10), and G. L. c. 218, §§ 19 and 19A (b), Rockland moved to dismiss the counterclaim[1] arguing that the District Court could not proceed with a counterclaim in excess of $ 25,000.[2] The judge denied the motion, concluding that she had discretion to retain the case. Rockland appealed to a single justice of the county court under G. L. c. 211, § 3, who denied its petition without a hearing. Rockland appealed to the full court. “Because the issue raised relates to the efficient administration of justice in the trial courts, we have elected to decide the case under our power of general superintendence, G. L. c. 211, § 3, second par.” Sperounes v. Farese, 449 Mass. 800, 802 (2007). We affirm the single justice’s denial of Rockland’s […]
Williamson-Green v. Interstate Fire and Casualty Company (Lawyers Weekly No. 12-062-17)
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS SUFFOLK, ss. SUPERIOR COURT. 1684CV03141-BLS2 ____________________ MICHELLE WILLIAMSON-GREEN, as Administratrix of the Estate of James W. Williamson IV v. INTERSTATE FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY ____________________ MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS James W. Williamson IV died from injuries sustained while he was inspecting a roof from a bucket lift that tipped over. His estate brought a wrongful death action against both the lift manufacturer and the company that had had rented out the lift, Equipment 4 Rent, Inc. (“E4R”). The jury found that the manufacturer and E4R were both negligent and awarded compensatory damages of $ 4.3 million. It also found that “E4R’s conduct was grossly negligent, willful, wanton, or reckless” and awarded additional punitive damages of $ 5.9 million, as allowed under G.L. c. 229, § 2. Interstate Fire and Casualty Company had insured E4R. It paid E4R’s share of the compensatory damages but refused to pay any part of the punitive damage award. In this action Plaintiff claims that Interstate failed to settle the claims against E4R after its liability had become reasonably clear. She asserts one claim on behalf of Mr. Williamson’s estate and four claims as E4R’s assignee. The assigned claims allege that E4R’s damages include “being exposed to an uncovered punitive damages award that would have been avoided had Interstate settled the Underlying Action.” Interstate has moved for judgment on the pleadings on the assigned claims. It argues that requiring an insurer to pay any part of a punitive damages award, even as consequential damages arising from the insurer’s failure to settle a meritorious claim, would be against public policy. The Court must DENY Interstate’s motion because Massachusetts law does not insulate an insurer from liability for damages incurred because its insured caused bodily injury, engaged in reckless or grossly negligent misconduct, or did both. The limitation on insurers’ liability sought by Interstate would be inconsistent with G.L. c. 175, § 47, cl. Sixth (b), which “codifies the entire public policy” of Massachusetts regarding the insurability of losses – 2 – resulting from reckless misconduct. Andover Newton Theological Sch., Inc. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 409 Mass. 350, 353 n.2 (1991).1 1. Insurers’ Liability for Failing to Settle Claims. Once an insured’s liability for a particular claim has become reasonably clear, the insurer has a duty under Massachusetts law to make a fair offer to settle the claim and to do so promptly. This duty is imposed on all insurers by statute. See G.L. c. 176D, § 3(9)(f); Hopkins v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 434 Mass. 556, 566-567 (2001). In many cases it is also an implicit part of the insurer’s contractual obligations. When an insurance policy […]
Categories: News Tags: 1206217, Casualty, Company, Fire, Interstate, Lawyers, Weekly, WilliamsonGreen
The Gillette Company v. Provost, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No 12-040-17)
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS SUFFOLK, ss. SUPERIOR COURT. 1584CV00149-BLS2 ____________________ THE GILLETTE COMPANY v. CRAIG PROVOST, JOHN GRIFFIN, WILLIAM TUCKER, DOUGLAS KOHRING, and SHAVELOGIC, INC. ____________________ MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT The Gillette Company alleges that four former employees helped ShaveLogic, Inc., develop a new disposable cartridge shaving razor using Gillette’s confidential information. Gillette claims that in so doing Defendants violated G.L. c. 93A, the individual defendants breached non-disclosure agreements with Gillette, and all five Defendants engaged in a civil conspiracy. It also claims that ShaveLogic’s patents and patent applications should be subjected to a constructive trust in favor of Gillette. Gillette does not claim that any of the individual defendants breached a covenant not to compete with Gillette. The parties previously stipulated to the dismissal with prejudice of Gillette’s trade secret claims.1 ShaveLogic claims, in turn, that Gillette intentionally interfered with prospective business relations and violated c. 93A, by threatening to bring and then filing baseless legal claims in an attempt to keep ShaveLogic from entering the market for so-called wet-shaving products. The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment on all remaining claims and counterclaims. The Court concludes that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment in their favor on Gillette’s remaining claims because Gillette cannot prove that Defendants misused any of Gillette’s confidential information or that the individual defendants breached any non-disclosure agreement. The Court 1 The Court (Salinger, J.) previously ordered the dismissal with prejudice of Gillette’s claims against three other defendants. It dismissed Gillette’s claims that ShaveLogic’s general counsel breached fiduciary duties that he owed as a former Gillette patent counsel and that ShaveLogic’s CEO, its president, and the other individual defendants aided and abetted that alleged breach of fiduciary duty and conspired to bring it about. – 2 – also concludes that Gillette is not entitled to summary judgment on ShaveLogic’s counterclaims because a reasonable fact finder could conclude that Gillette had deliberately brought baseless claims in an attempt to bully ShaveLogic out of the market. The Court will schedule a final pre-trial conference to discuss trial of ShaveLogic’s counterclaims. 1. Gillette’s Claims. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment in their favor on Gillette’s remaining claims because the undisputed material facts show that Gillette has “no reasonable expectation of proving” at least one element of each of its claims. See Boazava v. Safety Ins. Co., 462 Mass. 346, 350 (2012). “A nonmoving party’s failure to establish an essential element of her claim ‘renders all other facts immaterial’ and mandates summary judgment in favor of the moving party.” Roman v. Trustees of Tufts College, 461 Mass. 707, 711 (2012), quoting Kourouvacilis v. General Motors Corp., 410 Mass. 706, 711 (1991). 1.1. Unfair Competition—G.L. c. […]
The Gillette Company v. Provost, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 12-040-17)
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS SUFFOLK, ss. SUPERIOR COURT. 1584CV00149-BLS2 ____________________ THE GILLETTE COMPANY v. CRAIG PROVOST, JOHN GRIFFIN, WILLIAM TUCKER, DOUGLAS KOHRING, and SHAVELOGIC, INC. ____________________ MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT The Gillette Company alleges that four former employees helped ShaveLogic, Inc., develop a new disposable cartridge shaving razor using Gillette’s confidential information. Gillette claims that in so doing Defendants violated G.L. c. 93A, the individual defendants breached non-disclosure agreements with Gillette, and all five Defendants engaged in a civil conspiracy. It also claims that ShaveLogic’s patents and patent applications should be subjected to a constructive trust in favor of Gillette. Gillette does not claim that any of the individual defendants breached a covenant not to compete with Gillette. The parties previously stipulated to the dismissal with prejudice of Gillette’s trade secret claims.1 ShaveLogic claims, in turn, that Gillette intentionally interfered with prospective business relations and violated c. 93A, by threatening to bring and then filing baseless legal claims in an attempt to keep ShaveLogic from entering the market for so-called wet-shaving products. The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment on all remaining claims and counterclaims. The Court concludes that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment in their favor on Gillette’s remaining claims because Gillette cannot prove that Defendants misused any of Gillette’s confidential information or that the individual defendants breached any non-disclosure agreement. The Court 1 The Court (Salinger, J.) previously ordered the dismissal with prejudice of Gillette’s claims against three other defendants. It dismissed Gillette’s claims that ShaveLogic’s general counsel breached fiduciary duties that he owed as a former Gillette patent counsel and that ShaveLogic’s CEO, its president, and the other individual defendants aided and abetted that alleged breach of fiduciary duty and conspired to bring it about. – 2 – also concludes that Gillette is not entitled to summary judgment on ShaveLogic’s counterclaims because a reasonable fact finder could conclude that Gillette had deliberately brought baseless claims in an attempt to bully ShaveLogic out of the market. The Court will schedule a final pre-trial conference to discuss trial of ShaveLogic’s counterclaims. 1. Gillette’s Claims. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment in their favor on Gillette’s remaining claims because the undisputed material facts show that Gillette has “no reasonable expectation of proving” at least one element of each of its claims. See Boazava v. Safety Ins. Co., 462 Mass. 346, 350 (2012). “A nonmoving party’s failure to establish an essential element of her claim ‘renders all other facts immaterial’ and mandates summary judgment in favor of the moving party.” Roman v. Trustees of Tufts College, 461 Mass. 707, 711 (2012), quoting Kourouvacilis v. General Motors Corp., 410 Mass. 706, 711 (1991). 1.1. Unfair Competition—G.L. c. […]
Wright, et al. v. Balise Motor Sales Company, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 12-042-17)
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS SUFFOLK, ss. SUPERIOR COURT. 1684CV03477-BLS2 ____________________ DEREK WRIGHT and NATHANIEL TOWSE, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated v. BALISE MOTOR SALES COMPANY and Others1 ____________________ MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS AND MOTION FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT Derek Wright previously sold cars at Balise Hyundai in Hyannis, Massachusetts, for Cape Hy, Inc. Nathaniel Towse sold cars in West Springfield, Massachusetts for Balise Motor Sales Company. Wright and Towse claim that they are owed unpaid overtime, Sunday premium pay, and minimum wages. They assert a variety of statutory claims as well as common law claims for breach of contract and unjust enrichment or quantum meruit. They seek to assert the same claims on behalf of a putative class of similarly situated salespeople. Defendants have moved to dismiss the four common law claims and to compel a more definite statement as to the scope of the putative class. The Court will allow the partial motion to dismiss but deny the motion for a more definite statement. The Court concludes that Defendants are entitled to dismissal of the common law claims because the facts alleged in the complaint do not plausibly suggest that Defendants entered into an implied contract to pay hourly wages of any kind. Instead, the complaint indicates that the parties understood that all salespeople would be paid commissions only. The existence of an implied contract to pay commissions bars Plaintiffs’ claims for unjust enrichment or quantum meruit. 1. Motion to Dismiss. To survive a motion to dismiss under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint must allege facts that, if true, would “plausibly suggest[] … an entitlement to relief.” Lopez v. Commonwealth, 463 Mass. 696, 701 (2012), quoting Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636 (2008), and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007). For the purpose of deciding the pending motion 1 Cape Hy, Inc.; James E. Balise, Jr.; William Peffer; Steven M. Mitus; and Allen Thomalla. – 2 – to dismiss, the Court must assume that the factual allegations in the complaint and any reasonable inferences that may be drawn in Plaintiffs’ favor from the facts alleged are true. See Golchin v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 460 Mass. 222, 223 (2011). In so doing, however, it must “look beyond the conclusory allegations in the complaint and focus on whether the factual allegations plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.” Maling v. Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP, 473 Mass. 336, 339 (2015), quoting Curtis v. Herb Chambers I-95, Inc., 458 Mass. 674, 676 (2011). 1.1. Implied Contract Claim. In Count VI, Plaintiffs claim that Defendants breach an implied contract with Plaintiffs by failing […]