Smith, et al. v. Unidine Corporation (Lawyers Weekly No. 12-097-17)
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS SUFFOLK, ss. SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL ACTION Nos. 2015-2667 and 2015-3417 consolidated with No. 2016-3297 1 DONALD SMITH and MATTHEW ALES vs. UNIDINE CORPORATION MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT In this action under the Massachusetts Wage Act, G.L. c. 149, §§ 148, 150 (the “Act”), the employer, Unidine Corporation, and plaintiffs, former employees, cross move for summary judgment. The principal issue presented is whether the former employees are entitled to recover for the non-payment of commissions and a bonus. The employer says they are not because of the terms and conditions of the governing agreement for calculating and paying commissions and bonuses. The former employees assert that they should be paid the commissions as a matter of law under the Act.2 The resolution of the motion turns on both the terms and conditions of the written agreement regarding commissions and bonuses as well as the terms of the Act. The Act requires 1 These actions are consolidated into the lead case, Civil Action No. 2016-3297 BLS1. The plaintiff in No. 2016-3297 is Correna Lukas. Unidine and Lukas do not move for summary judgment in the lead case. 2 Plaintiffs also assert claims for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and “quantum meruit/unjust enrichment.” All claims are for nonpayment of commissions or bonus. 1 the timely payment of wages. Wages include commissions “when the amount of such commissions . . . has been definitely determined and has become due and payable . . . .” Id. The terms of the written agreement determine what has been “definitely determined” and what is “due and payable.” BACKGROUND The following facts, drawn from the parties’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, are undisputed. Unidine is in the business of providing dining management services to institutional clients such as hospitals, senior living facilities, universities, etc. Unidine employs Directors of Business Development (“DBDs”) to sell the services of Unidine and to develop and maintain relationships with client customers as the contracts with the client customers are performed. Plaintiffs, Donald Smith and Matthew Ales, were employed by Unidine as DBDs.3 DBDs earn a base salary and are eligible to participate in Unidine’s 2014 Sales Commission and Bonus Plan (the “Plan”) subject to its terms and conditions. DBDs, including Smith and Ales, acknowledge and sign the Plan each year. All of plaintiffs’ claims arise under the 2014 Plan. The Plan applies to contracts with client customers executed in 2014. Smith began work at Unidine on April 14, 2014, as an at-will employee, in the position of DBD. He was paid a base salary of $ 125,000 per year, and a signing bonus of $ 25,000. Smith was terminated […]
Commonwealth of Massachusetts ex rel. Kelly, et al. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 12-098-17)
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS SUFFOLK, ss SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL ACTION 2016-03107-BLS1 COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, EX REL., ALLISON KELLY AND FRANK GARCIA vs. NOVARTIS PHARMACEUTICALS CORPORATION & Others1 1 Novartis Corporation and Genentech, Inc. 2 The District Court’s order actually dismissed the state claims with prejudice, notwithstanding its declination of jurisdiction over them. The First Circuit reversed that part of the District Court’s decision. It observed that while the District Court could have dismissed the state claims based on the same reasoning applied to the federal claims had it retainedjurisdiction, once it declined jurisdiction, it was required to dismiss the state claims MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS RELATORS’ FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT Allison Kelly and Frank Garcia (Relators) brought qui tam actions against Genentech, Inc. (Genentech) and Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation (Novartis) in federal district court in Massachuesetts under the Federal False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et seq., the Massachusetts False Claims Act (MFCA), G. L. c. 12, § 5B(a)(1)-(10), and several other analogous state statutes. The federal claims asserted in their complaints were dismissed by the District Court for failure to plead the alleged fraud with the specificity required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). See U.S. ex rel. Garcia v. Novartis Pharm. Corp.,91 F. Supp. 3d 87 (D. Mass. 2015). The dismissal was affirmed by the First Circuit Court of Appeals. See U.S. ex. rel. Kelly v. Novartis Pharm. Corp.,827 F. 3d 5 (1stCir. 2016) (Kelly). While the Relators’ FCA claims were dismissed with prejudice, their state claims were dismissed without prejudice because the District Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them.2 The Relators then filed 2 without prejudice. Kelly, 827 F. 3d at 16. 3 Novartis Corporation is also a named defendant, but the Relators did not serve that company with a summons and complaint or the Amended Complaint, so the case is dismissed as to it. 4 Because the court concludes that the Relators have not complied with Rule 9(b), it will not consider the defendants’ arguments that the Amended Complaint should also be dismissed because the“public disclosure” bar applies or because the Relators failed to file the Amended Complaint under seal. thequi tam action against Genentech and Novartis now before the Superior Court alleging claims underthe MFCA.3 As with their previous federal complaints, the Relators allege that the defendants, who jointly marketed the asthma medication Xolair, providedillegal kickbacks to certain Massachusetts doctors, which caused the doctors to prescribe Xolair to Massachusetts Medicaid patients and submit false reimbursement claims for the drug to Medicaid. The defendants now move to dismiss the Relator’s First Amended Complaint (Amended Complaint) contending, among other grounds, that the Relators have again failed […]
Categories: News Tags: 1209817, Commonwealth, Corporation, kelly, Lawyers, massachusetts, Novartis, Pharmaceuticals, rel., Weekly
Cave Corporation v. Conservation Commission of Attleboro (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-088-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 16-P-944 Appeals Court CAVE CORPORATION vs. CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF ATTLEBORO. No. 16-P-944. Plymouth. April 6, 2017. – July 14, 2017. Present: Green, Blake, & Lemire, JJ. Municipal Corporations, Conservation commission, By-laws and ordinances. Wetlands Protection Act. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on January 9, 2015. The case was heard by Richard J. Chin, J., on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, and a motion for clarification or reconsideration was considered by him. Matthew Watsky for the plaintiff. Rebekah Lacey for the defendant. GREEN, J. When a municipal conservation commission fails to act timely on a notice of intent for work affecting wetlands, the applicant is entitled to seek relief from the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP). G. L. c. 131, § 40. If, on the applicant’s request for relief, the DEP thereafter issues a superseding order of conditions authorizing the work described in the notice of intent, the superseding order controls the work under the Wetlands Protection Act (act), G. L. c. 131, § 40, notwithstanding any more restrictive provisions of an otherwise applicable municipal wetlands ordinance or by-law. See Oyster Creek Preservation, Inc. v. Conservation Commn. of Harwich, 449 Mass. 859, 865 (2007). Cave Corporation (Cave), the plaintiff in the present case, contends that such a superseding order operated to divest the conservation commission of Attleboro (commission) of all authority to regulate activity on the land subject to the superseding order, even if the same land is also the subject of a separate notice of intent on which the commission acted timely.[1] A judge of the Superior Court disagreed, and we affirm. Background. The Attleboro city council adopted the Attleboro wetlands protection ordinance (ordinance) on October 2, 2001, and the commission, acting pursuant to authority delegated by the ordinance, promulgated rules and regulations thereafter. Section 18-1.1 of the ordinance recites as its purpose: “to protect the wetlands, water resources, and adjoining land areas in Attleboro by controlling activities deemed by the Conservation Commission likely to have a significant or cumulative effect upon resource area values, including but not limited to the following: public or private water supply, groundwater, flood control, erosion and sedimentation control, storm damage prevention including coastal storm flowage, water quality, water pollution control, fisheries, wildlife habitat, rare species habitat including rare plant species, agriculture, […]
Categories: News Tags: 1108817, Attleboro, Cave, Commission, Conservation, Corporation, Lawyers, Weekly
Bay Colony Property Development Company, et al. v. Headlands Realty Corporation, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 12-069-17)
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS SUFFOLK, ss. SUPERIOR COURT. 1784CV00936-BLS2 ____________________ BAY COLONY PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT COMPANY and WILLIAM E. LOCKE, JR. v. HEADLANDS REALTY CORPORATION; PROLOGIS LOGISTICS SERVICES INC.; AMB PROPERTY II, L.P.; AMB PROPERTY CORPORATION; and PROLOGIS, INC. ____________________ MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ CROSS-MOTION TO STRIKE Bay Colony Property Development Company and William E. Locke, Jr., claim that Defendants hired them to plan, coordinate, and supervise the development of two different properties in Pennsylvania. They allege that Defendants promised to pay Bay Colony two percent of the development costs (the “Base Fee”) plus ten percent of the profits (the “Incentive Fee”) for its work on one site, and promised to pay the same percentage amounts to Locke for his work on the other site. Plaintiffs allege they have not been paid and are owed part of the Base Fees and all of the Incentive Fees for the two projects. Plaintiffs assert claims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and declaratory judgment as to enforceability of the alleged contracts. Defendants have moved to dismiss on the ground that all claims are time barred. They argue that the statutory limitations period began to run on October 29, 2010, when AMB Property Corporation (“AMB”) sent a letter disputing whether it had any binding contract with Bay Colony. If that were correct, then all claims would be time barred—whether the Massachusetts six-year limitations period or the Pennsylvania four-year limitations period controlled—because this action was not filed in Middlesex Superior Court until November 14, 2016, more than six years later. The Court concludes that it may consider the October 2010 letter in deciding the motion to dismiss, but that it must DENY the motion because that letter did not put Plaintiffs on notice of any actual or anticipated breach of contract. 1. Considering the 2010 Letter. Plaintiffs ask the Court to strike or at least disregard the October 29, 2010, letter that is attached to Defendants’ motion to dismiss. They argue that the Court may not consider this letter without converting – 2 – the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment because Plaintiffs did not attach the letter to, reference the letter in, or rely on the letter in drafting the complaint. The Court disagrees. The authenticity of this letter and the fact that it was sent to Plaintiffs are not in dispute, as Plaintiffs acknowledged at oral argument. It is therefore permissible and appropriate for the Court to consider the letter in deciding Defendants’ motion to dismiss. When deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court may consider “documents the authenticity of which is not disputed by the parties” without converting the motion […]
Massasoit Industrial Corporation v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-031-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 16-P-459 Appeals Court MASSASOIT INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION vs. MASSACHUSETTS COMMISSION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION & another.[1] No. 16-P-459. Plymouth. December 7, 2016. – March 23, 2017. Present: Cypher, Maldonado, & Blake, JJ. Handicapped Persons. Anti-Discrimination Law, Handicap, Age, Employment, Termination of employment. Employment, Discrimination, Termination. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination. Emotional Distress. Damages, Emotional distress. Words, “Handicap.” Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on July 2, 2014. The case was heard by Thomas F. McGuire, Jr., J., on motions for judgment on the pleadings. Susanne Hafer for the plaintiff. Wendy A. Cassidy for Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination. Christopher Maffucci, for the intervener, was present but did not argue. BLAKE, J. The plaintiff, Massasoit Industrial Corporation (Massasoit), appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court denying its challenge to the decision and final order of the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD). The MCAD decision affirmed a hearing officer’s order, arising from her finding that Massasoit had terminated the employment of William J. Glynn in violation of the handicap and age discrimination provisions of G. L. c. 151B. We affirm. Background. In 1986, Massasoit hired Glynn as a part-time custodian in its outside maintenance department. At the time, Glynn was fifty-four years old. For the ten years prior to his termination, he performed general custodial work at the registry of motor vehicles (RMV) in Brockton to the satisfaction of his supervisors. He had a spotless personnel record with Massasoit, and had never called in sick or missed work due to illness. On March 30, 2007, Glynn left work early because he was not feeling well. Glynn’s son took him to the hospital, where he stayed for three days to treat pneumonia. Glynn asked his daughter-in-law to notify his coworker of his absence from work due to his illness, which she did on the next day Glynn was scheduled to work. The coworker assured her that he would notify their supervisor. On April 6, 2007, less than one week after being discharged from the hospital, Glynn was readmitted with chest pains and diagnosed with a heart attack. The daughter-in-law again notified the coworker of Glynn’s situation, and he assured her that he would notify their supervisor. He also visited Glynn and assured him that the supervisor had been notified. From April 5, 2007, through […]
Categories: News Tags: 1103117, Against, Commission, Corporation, Discrimination, Industrial, Lawyers, massachusetts, Massasoit, Weekly
G4S Technology LLC v. Massachusetts Technology Park Corporation (Lawyers Weekly No. 12-007-17)
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS SUFFOLK, ss SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL ACTION 2014-02998-BLS2 G4S TECHNOLOGY LLC, Plaintiff, vs. MASSACHUSETTS TECHNOLOGY PARK CORPORATION, Defendant. MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT This is a contract-based dispute arising from a state and federally-funded project to design and construct a fiber optic network in western Massachusetts. Plaintiff G4S Technology LLC (G4S), the design-builder on the project, instituted the lawsuit claiming that the defendant Massachusetts Technology Park Corporation (MTPC) wrongfully denied a $ 10.1 Million “Request for Adjustment” claim and improperly withheld an additional $ 4.1 Million based on unfounded claims of late delivery and poor quality of work. MTPC counterclaimed, alleging fraud and violation of Chapter 93A.[1] In an earlier decision, this Court allowed MTPC’s motion for summary judgment as to G4S’s claims, relying on appellate case law which held that an intentional breach by one of the parties to a contract prevented it from recovering on its own contract-based claims so long as that breach was not de minimis. See Memorandum of Decision and Order dated March 29, 2016 (the March 2016 Decision). Now before the Court are two motions. The first is G4S’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on so much of MTPC’s counterclaim that asserts a 93A violation. [2] Among other arguments, G4S contends that MTPC is not engaged in “trade or commerce” and thus may not proceed under G.L.c. 93A §11. The second motion is brought by MTPC and seeks judgment in its favor on both the Chapter 93A claim and the common law claim of fraud. In opposing that motion, G4S argues that it is entitled to judgment its favor because MTPC cannot demonstrate that it has suffered any damages, particularly in light of the fact that it has already been successful in obtaining this Court’s ruling that G4S cannot assert its own claims. This Court concludes that G4S’ Motion must be Allowed, MTPC’s motion must be Denied and that both the 93A and the fraud counts must be dismissed. BACKGROUND MTPC is a state development agency established and organized under Chapter 40J. As stated in the enabling legislation, its purpose is to “foster the expansion of industrial and commercial activity and employment opportunities in the commonwealth.” G.L.c. 40J §1A. One of MTPC’s divisions, Massachusetts Broadband Institute (MBI), is charged with expanding the broadband infrastructure in Massachusetts. G.L.c. 40J §6B(b). In 2010, consistent with these purposes, MTPC received $ 45.4 million in federal funding together with additional money from the state to build MassBroadband 123 (the Project). The federal funds were stimulus money allocated through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. The Project involved the creation of […]
Categories: News Tags: 1200717, Corporation, Lawyers, massachusetts, Park, Technology, Weekly
Murby, et al. v. Children’s Hospital Corporation (Lawyers Weekly No. 12-166-16)
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS SUFFOLK, ss. SUPERIOR COURT. 1684CV01213-BLS2 ____________________ GUSTAVE H. MURBY, and Others1 v. CHILDREN’S HOSPITAL CORPORATION, doing business as Boston Children’s Hospital, and Others2 ____________________ MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ALLOWING FURTHER MOTION BY CHILDREN’S HOSPITAL CORPORATION TO DISMISS THIS ACTION Plaintiffs brought suit in an effort to stop Boston Children’s Hospital from erecting a new clinical building on the site of the Prouty Garden, which they and many others value as a quiet sanctuary for Hospital patients and their families. In their amended complaint Plaintiffs allege that the Hospital illegally began site preparation and other construction work required for its proposed Boston Children’s Clinical Building (the “BCCB”) without first obtaining approval from the Department of Public Health (“DPH”) under the determination of need (“DoN”) law, G.L. c. 111, §§ 25B-25G. Plaintiffs also allege that the Hospital’s DoN application for the BCCB project improperly excluded the costs of certain renovation projects that the Hospital has already started or completed at its main campus in the Longwood medical area of Boston, and of a planned expansion of the Hospital’s Waltham campus. The Court previously ordered that all claims against defendants Suffolk Construction Company, Inc., Turner Construction Company, and the Commissioner of the Massachusetts Department of Public Health be dismissed without prejudice because they are not proper or necessary parties. The Hospital now moves to dismiss the rest of the case on the grounds that it became moot when DPH approved the Hospital’s DoN application. The Court will ALLOW that motion, and dismiss this case without prejudice, because it agrees that the claims asserted in this action are now moot. It will also declare the rights of the 1 Anne C. Gamble, Walter J. Gamble, M.D., Stephen Gellis, M.D., Loring Conant, Jr., M.D., Louise Conant, Brian Greenberg, Peggy Greenberg, Karen d’Amato, Neil Dinkin, Christine Barensfeld, and John W. Hagerman. 2 Suffolk Construction Company, Inc., Turner Construction Company, and Commissioner of the Massachusetts Department of Public Health. – 2 – parties with respect to one of the legal issues raised in the amended complaint. The Court takes judicial notice of the two DPH letter decisions that are attached to the Hospital’s memorandum of law: the October 27, 2016, letter decision in which DPH approved the Hospital’s DoN application, and the June 3, 2016, letter decision in which DPH rejected claims that certain ongoing or now completed renovations at the Longwood campus were part of the BCCB project and thus required DoN approval.3 The amended complaint asserts three general categories of claims, all of which are now either moot, must be pursued as part of the c. 30A appeal from the final decision by DPH, or raise a pure question of law that can […]
Categories: News Tags: 1216616, Children's, Corporation, Hospital, Lawyers, Murby, Weekly
OBP Corporation v. Welch Allyn, Inc. (Lawyers Weekly No. 12-156-16)
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS SUFFOLK, ss. SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL ACTION NO. 2016-01496-BLS1 OBP CORPORATION d/b/a OBP MEDICAL vs. WELCH ALLYN, INC. MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER ON WELCH ALLYN, INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT Defendant, Welch Allyn, Inc., allegedly misappropriated confidential business information belonging to plaintiff OBP Corporation. The confidential business information was a list of OBP’s customer names, along with confidential sales information. Welch Allyn obtained the confidential information from Owens & Minor, Inc., OBP’s primary distributor. Welch Allyn allegedly used the confidential business information to craft a marketing plan intended to steal OBP’s customers and to eliminate OBP as a competitor in the market for a selfilluminating, disposable vaginal speculum. Welch Allyn now moves to dismiss OBP’s First Amended Complaint (Amended Complaint) pursuant to Mass. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). For the reasons that follow, the motion is DENIED. BACKGROUND The following comes from the allegations, taken as true, in OBP’s Amended Complaint. OBP sells a variety of medical examination instruments to hospitals and physician offices, including a self-illuminating disposable vaginal speculum. It generates its customers through direct marketing and sales efforts, and sells its products by entering into pricing agreements directly with individual customers and with group purchasing organizations (GPOs) acting on behalf of hospital systems and/or physician’s offices. The individual customer agreements identify OBP’s customers and the prices OBP negotiated directly with them. Similarly, the GPO agreements identify the prices OBP negotiated with the GPOs and include provisions indicating that the terms of the agreement are confidential. Since June 2011, OBP has used Owens & Minor to fulfill orders from OBP’s customers. In connection with this service, Owens & Minor stocks its distribution centers with OBP products. Owens & Minor orders products directly from OBP at an agreed upon unit price based on demand from OBP’s customers. When Owens & Minor fulfills customer orders, it charges customers according to the terms set forth in OBP’s pricing agreements with the customers. OBP reimburses Owens & Minor through “rebates” for any difference between that price and the fixed price Owens & Minor pays to OBP. As part of this process, OBP provides copies of the relevant pricing agreements to Owens & Minor. In return for its fulfillment services, OBP pays Owens & Minor an administrative fee. Owens & Minor operates pursuant to a Code of Honor, made publicly available on its website, in which it states that the customer and sales information of suppliers like OBP will not be disclosed to third parties and will only be used for purposes of effectuating the parties’ business relationship. The Code of Honor specifically provides that: [a]ll Company records and information related to the Company, its customers, suppliers and teammates is […]
Rass Corporation v. The Travelers Companies, Inc., et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-163-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 15-P-358 Appeals Court RASS CORPORATION vs. THE TRAVELERS COMPANIES, INC., & another.[1] No. 15-P-358. Suffolk. February 24, 2016. – November 10, 2016. Present: Katzmann, Maldonado, & Blake, JJ.[2] Insurance, Coverage, Insurer’s obligation to defend, Notice, Settlement of claim, Unfair act or practice. Notice, Insurance claim. Commercial Disparagement. Trade Secret. Libel and Slander. Consumer Protection Act, Insurance, Unfair act or practice, Offer of settlement, Damages, Attorney’s fees. Damages, Libel, Wrongful use of trade secret, Consumer protection case, Attorney’s fees. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on June 7, 2010. Motions for summary judgment were heard by Janet L. Sanders, J., and the case was heard by her. Anil Madan for the plaintiff. Michael F. Aylward for the defendants. BLAKE, J. At issue in the present case is whether the defendant insurance companies, The Travelers Companies, Inc., and Travelers Property Casualty Company of America (collectively Travelers), breached their duties to defend, indemnify, and settle in good faith, as to their insured, the plaintiff, Rass Corporation (Rass). The underlying action, arising out of Rass’s decision to cut the underlying plaintiff out of its food marketing and distribution business, alleged that Rass’s principal had committed trade libel, defamation, and misappropriation of trade secrets. After a three-month delay in notice, Travelers agreed to defend the case from that point forward under a reservation of rights that disclaimed coverage of the trade secrets claim, and subject to Traveler’s limit on defense counsel’s hourly rate. Rass ultimately settled the case on its own, refusing the insurer’s offer to contribute a nominal amount conditioned on a waiver of Rass’s right to seek indemnification. Thereafter, Rass commenced the present action against Travelers, seeking indemnity for the settlement and the reasonable attorney’s fees left unpaid by Travelers, and alleging violations of G. L. c. 93A. Following a bench trial in the Superior Court, the judge allocated $ 140,000 of the settlement to Travelers for indemnification of the covered claims and found that Travelers owed an additional $ 25,000 in reasonable attorney’s fees. The judge also found that Travelers had committed violations of G. L. c. 93A based on its commission of unfair claim settlement practices. In a summary judgment ruling issued prior to trial, the judge rejected Rass’s claim for attorney’s fees incurred prior to its notice of the […]