Posts tagged "Correction"

Carey, et al. v. Commissioner of Correction (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-067-18)

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us   SJC-12369   MICHAEL CAREY & others[1]  vs.  COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION.       Suffolk.     January 8, 2018. – April 19, 2018.   Present:  Gants, C.J., Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ.     Commissioner of Correction.  Regulation.  Administrative Law, Agency’s interpretation of regulation, Administrative Procedure Act.  State Administrative Procedure Act.       Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on January 2, 2014.   The case was heard by Joseph F. Leighton, Jr., J., on motions for summary judgment.   The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court.     Leonard M. Singer for the plaintiffs. William D. Saltzman for the defendant.     BUDD, J.  In 2013, the Department of Correction (department) announced that visitors to correctional facilities would be subject to search by drug-detecting dogs.  The plaintiffs, who are visitors to correctional facilities who are not attorneys, allege that this canine search policy (policy) violated the department’s existing regulations and that the department failed to follow requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), G. L. c. 30A, §§ 1 et seq., in implementing this new policy.  The defendant Commissioner of Correction (commissioner) contends that the policy is consistent with the department’s existing regulations and is exempt from the APA. We conclude that although the policy is not inconsistent with the department’s existing regulations, it is not exempt from the APA.  Given the policy’s substantial impact on institutional security, however, entry of judgment shall be stayed for 180 days to permit the department to take action consistent with this opinion, during which time the department may continue to enforce the policy. Background.  In early 2013, the department announced that it would begin subjecting prison visitors to search by drug-detecting dogs.[2]  The plaintiffs commenced this action to prevent the department from implementing the new policy.  The plaintiffs sought a judgment declaring that the policy was not authorized by the department’s existing regulations, as well as a preliminary injunction to enjoin the department from implementing the policy without its being promulgated pursuant to the APA.[3]  A judge in the Superior Court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, concluding that the wording of the regulation governing visits by members of the general public was broad enough to allow for canine searches. The policy was thereafter implemented.  The dogs performing the searches are not aggressive and […]

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Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - April 19, 2018 at 5:18 pm

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Deal, et al. v. Commissioner of Correction (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-180-17)

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us   SJC-12246   TIMOTHY DEAL & another[1]  vs.  COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION.       Suffolk.     April 3, 2017. – November 9, 2017.   Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Lowy, Budd, & Cypher, JJ.[2]     Commissioner of Correction.  Due Process of Law, Prison classification proceedings.  Imprisonment, Reclassification of prisoner.  Youthful Offender Act.       Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk on October 26, 2016.   The case was reported by Botsford, J.     Barbara Kaban for the petitioner. Benjamin H. Keehn, Committee for Public Counsel Services (Dulcineia Goncalves, Committee for Public Counsel Services, also present) for the intervener. Charles W. Anderson, Jr., for the respondent. James R. Pingeon, for Prisoners’ Legal Services of Massachusetts, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.          BUDD, J.  The Department of Correction (department) has adopted procedures to determine, on a periodic basis, the security classification of every inmate, including juvenile homicide offenders.[3]  Approximately one year ago we examined the department’s then procedure used to classify juvenile homicide offenders, and concluded that, as pertaining to that cohort, the procedure violated G. L. c. 119, § 72B, as amended by St. 2014, c. 189, § 2, which prohibits the department from categorically barring juvenile homicide offenders from being placed in minimum security facilities.  See Deal v. Commissioner of Correction, 475 Mass. 307, 312 (2016) (Deal I).  The department has since developed a modified process for classifying juvenile homicide offenders, which the petitioner and intervener in this case (collectively, petitioners) — juvenile homicide offenders who also were petitioners in Deal I — continue to challenge. Applying our holding in Deal I to these updated procedures, we conclude that the department still falls short of the requirements of § 72B.  Given that the department continues to block the majority of objectively qualifying juvenile homicide offenders from placement in a minimum security facility, its written explanations for doing so do not go far enough to ensure that the classification procedure is actually individualized and that no juvenile homicide offender is categorically barred from classification to a minimum security facility.  We also conclude that the department must make a recording of the initial classification hearing and make that recording (or a transcription of that recording) available at any subsequent stage of review so that the final classification decision may include the same level […]

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Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - November 10, 2017 at 4:03 am

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Rosado v. Commissioner of Correction, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-062-17)

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us   16-P-680                                        Appeals Court   CHRISTIAN ROSADO  vs.  COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION & another.[1]     No. 16-P-680.   Middlesex.     February 7, 2017. – May 22, 2017.   Present:  Green, Meade, & Agnes, JJ.     Imprisonment, Safe environment.  Constitutional Law, Imprisonment.  Administrative Law, Judicial review.  Practice, Civil, Relief in the nature of certiorari, Motion to dismiss.  Due Process of Law, Prison regulation.  Libel and Slander.       Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on May 11, 2015.   A motion to dismiss was considered by Kenneth J. Fishman, J.     Christian Rosado, pro se. Katherine W. Briggs for the defendants.     GREEN, J.  The pro se plaintiff, an inmate in the custody of the Department of Correction, appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court, dismissing his complaint against the defendants, the Commissioner of Correction and the chief of the office of investigative services (investigative services chief).  In his complaint, the plaintiff asserted various claims stemming from the defendants’ designation of him as a member of the “Latin Kings,” a “security threat group” (STG).  The plaintiff denies that he is a member of the Latin Kings, and that his false designation as such subjects him to various harms entitling him to relief.  We agree with the judge that the plaintiff’s claim for certiorari relief, pursuant to G. L. c. 249, § 4, does not lie because the designation was a discretionary administrative decision rather than an adjudicatory or quasi adjudicatory one, and that his due process claim fails because his designation as a member of an STG does not infringe upon a protected liberty interest.[2]  We accordingly affirm the judgment of dismissal. Background.  “We review the allowance of a motion to dismiss de novo, accepting as true all factual allegations in the complaint and favorable inferences drawn therefrom.  Curtis v. Herb Chambers I-95, Inc., 458 Mass. 674, 676 (2011), and cases cited.  We may also consider exhibits attached to the complaint and items appearing in the record.  Melia v. Zenhire, Inc., 462 Mass. 164, 165-166 (2012), citing Schaer v. Brandeis Univ., 432 Mass. 474, 477 (2000).”  Lipsitt v. Plaud, 466 Mass. 240, 241 (2013). As we observed in the introduction, the plaintiff is an inmate in the custody of the Department of Correction.[3]  In November, 2014, a search of his cell uncovered pictures of a number of […]

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Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - May 22, 2017 at 5:36 pm

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LaChance v. Commissioner of Correction (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-167-16)

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us   SJC-12016   EDMUND LaCHANCE  vs.  COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION & others.[1]       Essex.     March 10, 2016. – October 21, 2016.   Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ.[2]     Civil Rights, Attorney’s fees.  Practice, Civil, Attorney’s fees.       Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on June 20, 2006.   Following review by this court, 463 Mass. 767 (2012), a motion for attorney’s fees was heard by Robert A. Cornetta, J., and a motion for reconsideration was considered by him.   The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court.     William D. Saltzman for the defendants. James R. Pingeon for the plaintiff.   GANTS, C.J.  This appeal concerns an award of attorney’s fees under the Federal Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), in a civil rights action brought by a Massachusetts prison inmate, Edmund LaChance.  LaChance claimed that the defendants violated his constitutional due process rights by holding him in essentially solitary confinement in a special management unit (SMU) for ten months, without a hearing, while waiting to transfer or reclassify him.  That litigation eventually resulted in our decision in LaChance v. Commissioner of Correction, 463 Mass. 767 (2012) (LaChance I), where we announced “for the first time that segregated confinement on awaiting action status for longer than ninety days gives rise to a liberty interest entitling an inmate to notice and a hearing,” and a written posthearing decision.  Id. at 778.  See id. at 776-777.  On remand, a Superior Court judge entered declaratory judgment in favor of LaChance and awarded him $ 28,578.69 in attorney’s fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).  The defendants are challenging that award in this appeal. The principal issue before us is whether LaChance qualified for an award of fees as a “prevailing party” under § 1988(b), even though he had already been discharged in 2006 from the SMU detention that was the subject of his suit, long before he won any relief in his favor.  The defendants argue that, in these circumstances, LaChance was not a prevailing party because the declaratory judgment he ultimately won was moot, and did not directly benefit him or materially alter his relationship with the defendants, at the time it was entered.  We conclude, however, […]

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Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - October 21, 2016 at 8:32 pm

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Cantell, et al. v. Commissioner of Correction, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-166-16)

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us   SJC-12015   ROBERT CANTELL & others[1]  vs.  COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION & others.[2]       Suffolk.     March 10, 2016. – October 21, 2016.   Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ.[3]     Commissioner of Correction.  Administrative Law, Regulations.  Imprisonment, Segregated confinement.  Due Process of Law, Prison classification proceedings, Prison regulation.  Moot Question.  Practice, Civil, Moot case, Dismissal of appeal, Class action.       Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on January 20, 2012.   Motions to dismiss and for class certification were heard by Elizabeth M. Fahey, J.   After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review.     Bonita Tenneriello for the plaintiffs. Sheryl F. Grant for the defendants. The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: Amy Fettig & Jamelia N. Morgan, of the District of Columbia, Phillip Kassell, Matthew R. Segal, & Jessie J. Rossman for American Civil Liberties Union & others. Ruth A. Bourquin, Deborah Harris, Margaret E. Monsell, & Jamie A. Sabino for Massachusetts Law Reform Institute & others. Adam Sanders, pro se.     BOTSFORD, J.  The named plaintiffs in this putative class action are inmates serving criminal sentences in various Massachusetts prison facilities.  For varying lengths of time, each of them has been placed in a “special management unit” (SMU) in nondisciplinary administrative segregation.  In January, 2012, the plaintiffs commenced this action against the Commissioner of Correction (commissioner) and the superintendents of the correctional institutions in which the plaintiffs were housed (collectively, defendants).  The plaintiffs allege that their placements in the SMUs, essentially in conditions of solitary confinement, violate their State and Federal constitutional rights to due process as well as regulations of the Department of Correction (department), and they seek to represent a class of similarly situated prisoners confined in SMUs.  In early 2013, following the release of this court’s decision in LaChance v. Commissioner of Correction, 463 Mass. 767 (2012) (LaChance I), a judge in the Superior Court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification and allowed the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ amended complaint. The plaintiffs appealed to the Appeals Court.[4]  A divided panel of that court dismissed the appeal as moot because by then it was undisputed that no named plaintiffs remained in SMUs.  Cantell v. Commissioner of Correction, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 629 […]

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Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - October 21, 2016 at 4:57 pm

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Deal, et al. v. Commissioner of Correction, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-135-16)

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us   SJC-12053   TIMOTHY DEAL & others[1]  vs.  COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION & another.[2]     Suffolk.     May 3, 2016. – August 25, 2016.   Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ.[3]     Commissioner of Correction.  Constitutional Law, Sentence, Parole.  Due Process of Law, Sentence, Parole, Prison classification proceedings.  Imprisonment, Reclassification of prisoner.  Parole.  Youthful Offender Act.  Practice, Criminal, Sentence, Parole.     Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk on July 14, 2015.   The case was reported by Botsford, J.     Barbara Kaban (Benjamin H. Keehn, Committee for Public Counsel Services, & James W. Rosseel with her) for the petitioners. Charles Anderson, Jr., for the respondents. David J. Apfel & Eileen L. Morrison, for American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief.     CORDY, J.  This case is before us on the reservation and report of the single justice.  The petitioners, Timothy Deal, Siegfried Golston, and Jeffrey Roberio, are juvenile homicide offenders[4] who are serving mandatory indeterminate life sentences and who have a constitutional right to a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”  Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 655, 674 (2013) (Diatchenko I), quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010).   This right also extends to juveniles convicted of murder in the second degree.  See Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 471 Mass. 12, 32 (2015) (Diatchenko II).  This case concerns the manner in which juvenile homicide offenders are classified and placed in Department of Correction (department) facilities. The issue before us is whether the department’s practice of using “discretionary override codes” to block qualifying juvenile homicide offenders from placement in a minimum security facility unless and until the individual has received a positive parole vote violates (1) G. L. c. 119, § 72B, as amended by St. 2014, c. 189, § 2; or (2) their right to a meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, arts. 12 and 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, or both Constitutions. We conclude that the department’s current classification practice violates G. L. c. 119, § 72B, as amended by St. 2014, c. 189, § 2, because the department’s failure to consider a juvenile homicide offender’s suitability […]

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Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - August 25, 2016 at 2:40 pm

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Marchand v. Department of Correction, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-121-16)

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us   SJC-11949   MARK MARCHAND  vs.  DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION & another.[1]       August 11, 2016.     Correction Officer.  Public Employment, Assault pay benefits.     On January 21, 2008, while working for the defendant Department of Correction (department), the plaintiff, Mark Marchand, sustained a knee injury when he intervened to protect a fellow employee from an assault by an inmate.  As a result of the injury, Marchand began to receive workers’ compensation benefits, pursuant to G. L. c. 152, as well as assault pay, pursuant to G. L. c. 30, § 58.  On November 19, 2010, after a hearing, the department’s acting commissioner determined that Marchand was medically unfit for duty and separated him from employment as of that date.  Although Marchand continued to receive workers’ compensation benefits until July 4, 2013, the department stopped paying assault pay as of the date of Marchand’s separation from employment.[2]   Marchand then commenced this action against the department and the Commonwealth’s Executive Office of Health and Human Services, Division of Human Resources, seeking a declaration that he was entitled to continue receiving assault pay for so long as he was receiving workers’ compensation benefits — that is, until July 4, 2013.  A judge in the Superior Court agreed.  He allowed Marchand’s cross motion for summary judgment; denied the defendants’ motion; and ordered that judgment enter declaring that Marchand was entitled to assault pay retroactive to November 19, 2010, and continuing through July 4, 2013.  The Appeals Court affirmed the judgment, in a memorandum and order issued pursuant to its rule 1:28.  See Marchand v. Department of Correction, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 1127 (2015).  We allowed the defendants’ application for further appellate review.   The single question before us is whether a Commonwealth employee entitled to receive assault pay pursuant to G. L. c. 30, § 58, fourth par., is entitled to continue receiving such pay even after he separates from employment so long as he is entitled to workers’ compensation benefits pursuant to G. L. c. 152, or whether his right to assault pay ceases with his separation from employment.  The Appeals Court has previously interpreted the relevant provisions of G. L. c. 30, § 58, to mean the former.  See Moog v. Commonwealth, 42 Mass. App. Ct. 925, 927 (1997).  We conclude, however, that the latter is the better interpretation — in short, that assault pay is contingent on continued employment.   […]

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Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - August 11, 2016 at 5:56 pm

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Ainooson v. Department of Correction (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-063-16)

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us   SJC-11780   JUSTICE E. AINOOSON  vs.  DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION.     May 5, 2016.     Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts.       Justice E. Ainooson appeals from a judgment of the county court denying, without a hearing, his petition for relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3.  We affirm.   In 2013, Ainooson commenced an action in the Superior Court against a number of individual defendants.  After receiving additional time to effect service, Ainooson filed a motion to waive service or to deem the defendants served.  That motion was allowed.  However, the judge vacated her allowance of the motion after the defendants filed a motion for reconsideration.  A different Superior Court judge subsequently ordered Ainooson to make service by regular mail at his own expense, with no further extensions to be allowed.  Ainooson’s G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition challenged these rulings.  After Ainooson filed his petition, but before the single justice ruled on it, a judgment entered in the Superior Court dismissing the complaint.  Ainooson timely filed a notice of appeal in the Superior Court.   Ainooson’s petition sought relief from one or more interlocutory rulings of the trial court.  When he filed his petition, his case in the Superior Court was still pending.  As noted above, however, the case thereafter went to final judgment.  Passing the question whether Ainooson was obligated in these circumstances to file a memorandum and appendix pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:21, as amended, 434 Mass. 1301 (2001), it is clear on the record before us that he had adequate alternative remedies, namely, a petition to a single justice of the Appeals Court pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 118, first par., at the time of the Superior Court rulings, see Greco v. Plymouth Sav. Bank, 423 Mass. 1019, 1019-1020 (1996), and a direct appeal to the Appeals Court from the final judgment of the Superior Court.  Indeed, the record indicates that he is pursuing one of those remedies.[1]  Accordingly, the single justice neither erred nor abused his discretion by denying extraordinary relief.  ”Our general superintendence power under G. L. c. 211, § 3, is extraordinary and to be exercised sparingly, not as a substitute for the normal appellate process or merely to provide an additional layer of appellate review after the normal process has run its course.”  E.g., Fennick v. Kittredge, 460 Mass. 1012 (2011), […]

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Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - May 5, 2016 at 10:54 pm

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LaChance v. Commissioner of Correction, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-160-15)

NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557- 1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 14-P-1648 Appeals Court EDMUND D. LaCHANCE, JR. vs. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION & others.1 No. 14-P-1648. Suffolk. May 13, 2015. – October 13, 2015. Present: Trainor, Agnes, & Blake, JJ. Imprisonment, Department disciplinary unit, Enforcement of discipline, Grievances. Administrative Law, Prison disciplinary proceeding, Agency’s authority, Regulations, Rulemaking. Practice, Civil, Review of administrative action, Summary judgment. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on July 29, 2011. The case was heard by Marita A. Hopkins, J., on motions for summary judgment, and motions for reconsideration were considered by her. David J. Rentsch for the defendants. Edmund D. LaChance, Jr., pro se. TRAINOR, J. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the judge allowed the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on 1 Various officials of the Department of Correction. 2 count IV of the complaint and the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the remaining counts. In granting summary judgment on count IV, the judge “declare[d] that [North Central Correctional Institution’s (NCCI)] policy of terminating inmates from the Garden Program as a result of guilty findings violates the prohibition against imposing more than one sanction per offense contained in 103 Code Mass. Regs. § 430.25 [2006].”2 The defendants appeal from the allowance of summary judgment on count IV. We review the allowance of a motion for summary judgment de novo. Alicea v. Commonwealth, 466 Mass. 228, 234 (2013). The material facts are not in dispute. The plaintiff, an inmate in NCCI during all relevant times, was a participant in NCCI’s garden program, which is a leisure program, in the spring of 2011. The plaintiff was charged with and pleaded guilty to at least three different disciplinary offenses that occurred on different days between April 6 and May 13, 2011. The plaintiff 2 The judge also declared “that the defendants have not otherwise violated the plaintiff’s rights or the Department of Corrections Regulations.” The judge further concluded that whether the plaintiff could participate in the garden program was moot because the “growing season ha[d] long passed.” The judge nevertheless reached the merits because the issue whether a prisoner can be terminated from the garden program after a guilty finding falls within an exception to the mootness doctrine as it is “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” Karchmar v. Worcester, 364 Mass. 124, 136 (1973), quoting from Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commn., 219 U.S. […]

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Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - October 13, 2015 at 7:54 pm

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Ivey, et al. v. Commissioner of Correction, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-110-15)

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us   14-P-1262                                       Appeals Court   EUGENE M. IVEY & another[1]  vs.  COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION & others.[2] No. 14-P-1262. Suffolk.     May 4, 2015. – August 13, 2015.   Present:  Grainger, Hanlon, & Carhart, JJ.     Imprisonment, Department disciplinary unit, Enforcement of discipline.  Administrative Law, Regulations.  Due Process of Law, Prison disciplinary proceedings.  Practice, Civil, Declaratory proceeding.     Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on January 9, 2012.   The case was heard by Bonnie H. MacLeod, J., on motions for summary judgment.     Bonita Tenneriello for the plaintiffs. C. Raye Poole for the defendants.     CARHART, J.  Plaintiffs Eugene M. Ivey and Francis Lang appeal from a summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the plaintiffs’ complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief.  The defendants are officials of the Department of Correction (hereinafter, collectively, the DOC).  The plaintiffs, who are prisoners at the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Cedar Junction (MCI-Cedar Junction), sought a declaration that an informal DOC policy regarding segregation in the departmental disciplinary unit (DDU) violates the DOC inmate discipline regulations (103 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 430.00, hereinafter, regulations), and an order enjoining the DOC from enforcing the policy.  Because we conclude that the informal policy was canceled as a matter of law by amendments to the regulations, we vacate the judgment. Background.  The summary judgment record reflects the following undisputed facts.  The DDU is located on the grounds of MCI-Cedar Junction.  All inmates entering the DDU are provided a “DDU Inmate Orientation Manual” (DDU manual), which is updated annually.[3]  Once inmates arrive in the DDU, they become subject to a policy (the policy) in the DDU manual: “The DDU Administrator/designee shall initially review the status of each inmate placed in the DDU within 30 days of placement.  Thereafter, each inmate’s status shall be reviewed every 30 days.  An inmate will lose credit for time served in DDU and loss of all pending and previously earned privileges (i.e., TV, radio, visits, and telephone) if he is found guilty of:   one Category 1 disciplinary report one Category 2 disciplinary report one Category 3 AND one Category 4 disciplinary report two Category 3 disciplinary reports or two Category 4 disciplinary reports   “The loss of credit will occur for the review period in which the report was written.”   The policy previously had been codified at 103 […]

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Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - August 14, 2015 at 7:19 am

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