Cantell, et al. v. Commissioner of Correction, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-078-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 13-P-1858 Appeals Court ROBERT CANTELL & others[1] vs. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION & others.[2] No. 13-P-1858. Suffolk. December 12, 2014. – July 22, 2015. Present: Rubin, Milkey, & Carhart, JJ. Moot Question. Practice, Civil, Moot case, Dismissal of appeal, Class action. Commissioner of Correction. Administrative Law, Regulations. Imprisonment, Segregated confinement. Due Process of Law, Prison classification proceedings. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on January 20, 2012. Motions to dismiss and for class certification were heard by Elizabeth M. Fahey, J. Bonita Tenneriello for the plaintiffs. Sheryl F. Grant for the defendants. MILKEY, J. The plaintiffs are inmates at various State prison facilities who for a time had been held in segregated confinement in so-called “special management units” (SMUs).[3] They brought this action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the Commissioner and other officials of the Department of Correction (collectively, the DOC). The plaintiffs’ amended complaint alleged that they, and other inmates similarly situated, cannot be segregated in SMUs without being afforded certain substantive and procedural protections. Their claims were identical to ones raised by the inmate in LaChance v. Commissioner of Correction, 463 Mass. 767, 774-777 (2012).[4] Thus, for example, like that inmate, the plaintiffs claimed inter alia that the conditions they faced in the SMUs were as onerous as those faced in so-called “departmental segregation units” (DSUs),[5] and that therefore the DOC was bound to extend to them the benefit of existing regulations governing confinement in the DSUs. Once the Supreme Judicial Court issued its opinion in LaChance, a Superior Court judge dismissed this action without prejudice to the plaintiffs’ filing a new complaint alleging “that [the] DOC is failing to properly comply with LaChance.”[6] For the reasons set forth below, we dismiss this appeal from the judgment as moot. Framing the mootness question. As an initial matter, we note that it is uncontested that the plaintiffs are no longer held in segregated confinement in SMUs.[7] Accordingly, to the extent that their case seeks to assert their own rights, it is moot. See Littles v. Commissioner of Correction, 444 Mass. 871, 872 n.3 (2005). However, a moot case nevertheless can be heard if it presents an issue “of public importance, capable of repetition, yet evading review.” Superintendent of Worcester State Hosp. v. Hagberg, 374 Mass. 271, 274 (1978).[8] As […]
Categories: News Tags: 1107815, Cantell, Commissioner, Correction, Lawyers, Weekly
Department of Correction v. Massachusetts Correction Officers Federated Union, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-104-13)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 12‑P‑1789 Appeals Court DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION vs. MASSACHUSETTS CORRECTION OFFICERS FEDERATED UNION & another.[1] No. 12‑P‑1789. August 16, 2013. Commissioner of Correction. Correction Officer. Civil Service, Collective bargaining. Arbitration, Collective bargaining, Judicial review. Practice, Civil, Standing. Paul Brouillette appeals from an order by a judge of the Superior Court vacating an arbitration award and reinstating a decision by the Commissioner of Correction (commissioner) that discharged Brouillette from his position as a correctional officer. We dismiss the appeal for lack of standing. Pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement (agreement) between the Department of Correction (department) and the Massachusetts Correction Officers Federated Union (union), an employee who is a union member may elect to pursue a grievance through arbitration or, alternatively, through the Civil Service Commission. If, as occurred here, arbitration is elected, the employee is required to execute a written “waiver of any and all rights to appeal the disciplinary action to any other forum including the Civil Service Commission.” Such a waiver was duly executed by Brouillette and delivered to the department. The department, not Brouillette (whose interests had prevailed at arbitration), appealed the arbitrator’s award to the Superior Court. Notwithstanding Brouillette’s waiver, the terms of the agreement, or G. L. c. 150C, § 11, the department named not only the union, but also Brouillette as a party defendant in its complaint to the Superior Court. This was improper and, we conclude, a nullity. Brouillette was not a party to the agreement and had no standing to enforce it or defend his interpretation in court. See Miller v. Board of Regents of Higher Educ., 405 Mass. 475, 480 (1989); Kessler v. Cambridge Health Alliance, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 589, 593-594 (2004). Thereafter, a judge of the Superior Court vacated the arbitration award on public policy grounds and reinstated the order of the commissioner terminating Brouillette’s employment with the department. While this result has clear and adverse consequences for Brouillette, it does not alter the fact that he elected to pursue arbitration and waive his rights to further participation in the disciplinary process. The union did not appeal from the judge’s order. Consequently, there is no valid appeal before us. Appeal dismissed. Philip N. Beauregard (Adrienne Catherine H. Beauregard-Rheaume with him) for Paul Brouillette. Judith Allonby for […]
Categories: News Tags: 1110413, Correction, department, Federated, Lawyers, massachusetts, Officer's, Union, Weekly
McGuinness, et al. v. Department of Correction, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-117-13)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC‑11261 BENJAMIN McGUINESS & another[1] vs. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION & another.[2] Suffolk. March 5, 2013. ‑ July 1, 2013. Present: Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ. Civil Service, Decision of Civil Service Commission, Judicial review, Termination of employment. Administrative Law, Decision, Proceedings before agency. Commissioner of Correction. Correction Officer. Employment, Termination. Public Employment, Termination. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on July 10, 2008. The case was heard by Frances A. McIntyre, J., on motions for judgment on the pleadings. The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. Stephen C. Pfaff for the plaintiffs. Carol A. Colby for Department of Correction. Robert L. Quinan, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Civil Service Commission, was present but did not argue. SPINA, J. This case concerns the effect of a tie vote on the Civil Service Commission (commission) in an appeal from a decision of the Department of Correction (department) to terminate two employees. On this record, we conclude that the effect of the tie vote was that the initial decision of the hearing officer affirming the department’s termination order became the final decision of the commission, which, in turn, is subject to judicial review. 1. Background. The plaintiffs, Benjamin McGuiness and Richard Mullen, were employees of the department, assigned to the Massachusetts Alcohol and Substance Abuse Center. In 2005, the department terminated the plaintiffs’ employment because of allegations that they used excessive force against an inmate in violation of the internal rules of the department and 103 Code Mass. Regs. § 505 (2009). See G. L. c. 31, § 41 (just cause). The termination arose out of an incident in which Mullen was alleged to have punched and to have twisted an inmate’s wrists, and McGuiness was alleged to have walked on the inmate’s legs, after the inmate had been placed in wrist restraints following a fight with a fellow inmate. The plaintiffs appealed the termination order to the commission, where a hearing was held before a single commissioner. See G. L. c. 31, § 43. Following the recommendation of the single commissioner, the commission voted three-to-two in favor of the plaintiffs and ordered that they be reinstated. The department sought judicial review under G. L. c. 31, § 44. A judge in the Superior […]
Categories: News Tags: 1011713, Correction, department, Lawyers, McGuinness, Weekly
McCabe v. Commissioner of Correction (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-070-13)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC‑11365 JOHN McCABE vs. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION. April 29, 2013. Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts, Appeal from order of single justice. Practice, Civil, Transfer of action to Superior Court. In 1986, John McCabe was committed to the Massachusetts Treatment Center (treatment center) as a sexually dangerous person. Several years later, a Superior Court judge ordered that he be remanded to the custody of the Commissioner of Correction, subject to the terms of McCabe’s unexpired criminal sentences. More than twenty years later, McCabe filed an application in the county court seeking a declaration, pursuant to G. L. c. 231A, § 5, that he must be returned to the treatment center. The single justice ordered the matter transferred to the Superior Court, pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 4A, and ordered that it be consolidated with another case that McCabe had commenced there that raised essentially the same issue. McCabe appeals from the order transferring his case to the Superior Court. We affirm. The decision to transfer a matter pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 4A, between this court and another is a matter commended to the single justice’s discretion. See Stow v. Commonwealth, 423 Mass. 1002, 1002 (1996); Callahan v. Board of Bar Overseers, 417 Mass. 516, 519-520 (1994). McCabe fails to demonstrate any error or abuse of that discretion, and there is no occasion to disturb the single justice’s order transferring the case. McCabe’s rights are fully protected by his ability to litigate his claim in the Superior Court. We express no opinion on the merits of the claim. Judgment affirmed. The case was submitted on briefs. John McCabe, pro se. Michael H. Cohen for Commissioner of Correction. Full-text Opinions
Categories: News Tags: 1007013, Commissioner, Correction, Lawyers, McCabe, Weekly