Cournoyer v. Department of State Police, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-037-18)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 17-P-579 Appeals Court ARTHUR COURNOYER vs. DEPARTMENT OF STATE POLICE & another.[1] No. 17-P-579. Middlesex. January 8, 2018. – April 2, 2018. Present: Blake, Neyman, & Ditkoff, JJ. State Police. Retirement. Police, Retirement, Training program, Authority of police chief. Public Employment, Police, Retirement, Reinstatement of personnel. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on March 14, 2016. A motion to dismiss was heard by Bruce R. Henry, J. Scott W. Lang (Jennifer Davis also present) for the plaintiff. Samuel M. Furgang, Assistant Attorney General, for the defendants. DITKOFF, J. The plaintiff, Arthur Cournoyer, appeals from a Superior Court judgment dismissing his claims for declaratory judgment and specific performance against the defendants. The plaintiff argues that the Department of State Police (department) is required by G. L. c. 22C, § 24A, to develop individualized training programs for former State police troopers seeking reinstatement, rather than require them to complete recruit training at the State police academy (academy). Concluding that the statute is unambiguous and that the department may require former troopers separated for more than three years to complete recruit training, we affirm, ordering that the judgment be modified to declare the rights of the parties. Standard of review. We review a ruling on a motion to dismiss de novo, Rodriguez v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Authy., 92 Mass. App. Ct. 26, 28 (2017), taking the complaint’s allegations as true, as well all reasonable inferences drawn in the plaintiff’s favor, Saliba v. Worcester, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 408, 412 (2017). To survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must present factual allegations that rise above the level of speculation, Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636 (2008), and plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief, Flagg v. AliMed, Inc., 466 Mass. 23, 26 (2013). Background. The plaintiff was a State police trooper from 1992 until 2000.[2] While so employed, the plaintiff received positive performance evaluations, and he completed all required in-service training in addition to numerous programs, certifications, and service in specialized areas of law enforcement. In 1998, however, the plaintiff suffered a severe injury while on duty, requiring medical leave and ultimately causing his involuntary retirement in 2000. Following several operations and physical rehabilitation, the plaintiff was able to obtain employment, working for the Worcester County sheriff’s department […]