Commonwealth v, Davis (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-072-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 15-P-1088 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. NASAHN DAVIS. No. 15-P-1088. Suffolk. September 12, 2016. – June 2, 2017. Present: Agnes, Neyman, & Henry, JJ. Practice, Criminal, Speedy trial, Dismissal. Complaint received and sworn to in the Roxbury Division of the Boston Municipal Court Department on March 16, 2012. After transfer to the Central Division of the Boston Municipal Court Department, a motion to dismiss was heard by Robert J. McKenna, J. Matthew T. Sears, Assistant District Attorney (Lindsey E. Weinstein, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the Commonwealth. Patrick Levin, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for the defendant. HENRY, J. Seven hundred and forty-two days after Nasahn Davis was arraigned in the Boston Municipal Court on charges of carrying a firearm without a license in violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10(a), he filed a motion to dismiss under Mass.R.Crim.P. 36(b), 378 Mass. 909 (1979). That rule provides that a criminal defendant who is not brought to trial within twelve months of the “return day,” here the arraignment, “is presumptively entitled to dismissal of the charges unless the Commonwealth justifies the delay.” Commonwealth v. Spaulding, 411 Mass. 503, 504 (1992). “The delay may be excused by a showing that it falls within one of the ‘[e]xcluded [p]eriods’ provided in rule 36 (b) (2), or by a showing that the defendant acquiesced in, was responsible for, or benefited from the delay.” Ibid. Accord Barry v. Commonwealth, 390 Mass. 285, 292, 298 n.17 (1983). “A failure to object to a continuance or other delay constitutes acquiescence.” Commonwealth v. Tanner, 417 Mass. 1, 3 (1994). The defendant’s motion to dismiss was allowed; on appeal, the Commonwealth contends that only eighty-one of the 742 days since arraignment are includable in the rule 36 calculation, contending, among other things, that 268 days of delay attributable to court congestion when both sides were ready for trial must be excluded. We conclude that delays attributable to court congestion — if the defendant objects — are not excludable from the rule 36 calculation, unless the judge makes the necessary findings under rule 36(b)(2)(F). Because the Commonwealth cannot justify the delays in excess of the 365-day limit, we affirm the order allowing the defendant’s motion to dismiss. Discussion. The parties agree that the number of days that elapsed […]
Commonwealth v. Davis (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-123-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 13-P-953 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. CLOVICEL DAVIS. No. 13-P-953. Essex. January 13, 2015. – August 28, 2015. Present: Trainor, Vuono, & Hanlon, JJ. Constitutional Law, Double jeopardy. Practice, Criminal, Double jeopardy, Duplicative convictions, Instructions to jury, Argument by prosecutor. Robbery. Identification. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on October 7, 2009. The cases were tried before Timothy Q. Feeley, J. Cathryn A. Neaves for the defendant. David F. O’Sullivan, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. VUONO, J. Following a joint trial in the Superior Court, a jury convicted the defendant, Clovicel Davis, and his brother, Curtis Davis, of two counts of unarmed robbery, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 19(b).[1] Clovicel has appealed, claiming that his convictions are duplicative and, as such, violate the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.[2] He also asserts error in the judge’s jury instruction on identification and the prosecutor’s closing argument. For the reasons that follow, we conclude there was no error at trial, but we agree with the defendant that the convictions are duplicative and that one of the indictments must be dismissed, and the case remanded to the Superior Court for resentencing on the remaining conviction. Background. On September 10, 2009, at about 4:00 A.M., Bruno Correa was working the night shift as a clerk at the Plaza Motel located on Route 1 in Peabody when he was robbed by two men whom he later identified as the defendants. Upon entering the motel lobby, Curtis feigned interest in renting a room and approached the counter. Once he was close to Correa he demanded money. Correa opened the cash drawer from which Curtis took an envelope containing $ 396. Curtis then attempted to hustle Correa out of the lobby, while Clovicel, who had remained near the door, snatched a gold chain from Correa’s neck and told Correa to give him his watch. As Correa began to remove the watch, he seized an opportunity to escape and ran to a nearby truck stop from which the police were called. Meanwhile, Curtis and Clovicel had driven away in a light colored sedan. A short time later, Curtis and Clovicel were stopped by the police in connection with an unrelated investigation. Because they matched the description of the robbers […]
Ed Davis: I ‘Personally Believe’ Bombers had More Targets
Police Commissioner Ed David told “Face The Nation” host Bob Schieffer he believes the marathon bombers had more targets planned. “We have reason to believe, based upon the evidence that was found at that scene … the explosive ordinance that was unexploded and the firepower that they had, that they were going to attack other individuals. That’s my belief at this time,” said Davis. “The scene was littered with unexploded improvised explosive devices that, actually, we had to point out to the arriving officers,” said Davis, who said more devices were found in the suspects’ getaway car. “This was as dangerous as it gets in urban policing.” Davis described the explosives as “homemade.” Aside from the pressure cooker bombs, and smaller bombs that were also loaded with shrapnel. Surviving suspect Dzhokhar Tsaraev remains in serious but stable condition, according to Davis. The younger brother was shot—and possible shot himself—during one of the firefights with police. “He is in serious but stable condition and we have not been able to interrogate him at this point in time,” said Davis. Davis said federal agents were coming to help with the questioning. “There is special FBI interview team that is coming out to talk to him, but at this time, we have not done that,” he said. South End Patch
Commonwealth v. Davis (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-050-13)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 11‑P‑1746 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. JOHN DAVIS. No. 11‑P‑1746. Suffolk. October 9, 2012. ‑ April 11, 2013. Present: Berry, Kafker, & Green, JJ. Controlled Substances. “School Zone” Statute. Constitutional Law, Confrontation of witnesses, Harmless error, Double jeopardy, Indictment. Error, Harmless. Evidence, Certificate of drug analysis, Wiretap. Electronic Surveillance. Search and Seizure, Electronic surveillance, Warrant, Affidavit. Practice, Criminal, Confrontation of witnesses, Harmless error, Warrant, Affidavit, Double jeopardy, Indictment, Trial of indictments together. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on February 27, 2006. Pretrial motions to suppress evidence were heard by Janet L. Sanders, J.; a pretrial motion for a hearing on alleged misrepresentations in a search warrants was heard by Christine M. McEvoy, J.; the cases were tried before Linda E. Giles, J.; and a motion for a new trial, filed on November 8, 2010, was heard by her. James E. Methe for the defendant. Zachary Hillman, Assistant District Attorney (Dean A. Mazzone, Assistant Attorney General, with him) for the Commonwealth. BERRY, J. A Superior Court jury convicted the defendant of trafficking in 200 grams or more of cocaine, G. L. c. 94C, § 32E(b)(4), and doing so in a school zone, G. L. c. 94C, § 32J. On the defendant’s consolidated appeal from his convictions and from the denial of his motion for a new trial, the Commonwealth concedes that the admission of certificates of drug analysis (drug certificates) violated the defendant’s constitutional confrontation rights under Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 310-311 (2009) (Melendez-Diaz). We reject the Commonwealth’s argument that the Melendez-Diaz error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we reverse the defendant’s convictions. Notwithstanding the reversal, we address certain issues that remain live and will affect any further proceedings. Specifically, we address three points involving the denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress recorded oral communications between a confidential informant (CI), the defendant, and a codefendant, Victor Alvarado. First, the defendant argues that the averments in State Trooper Steven M. Racki’s affidavit in support of a warrant for the one-party consensual recording of conversations under Commonwealth v. Blood, 400 Mass. 61 (1987) (Blood warrant), failed to demonstrate the required nexus with organized crime. Second, the defendant contends that the Blood warrant was overbroad in scope. Third, the defendant argues that because the affidavit in support of […]