Posts tagged "Escobar"

Commonwealth v. Escobar (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-063-18)

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us   SJC-12430   COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JUSTINO ESCOBAR.     April 18, 2018.     Controlled Substances.  Constitutional Law, Plea, Conduct of government agents.  Due Process of Law, Plea, Disclosure of evidence.  Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts.  Practice, Criminal, Plea, Conduct of government agents, Disclosure of evidence, New trial.  Evidence, Certificate of drug analysis, Disclosure of evidence.     The defendant, Justino Escobar, pleaded guilty to cocaine trafficking in 2009 and was sentenced to a term of from eight to twelve years in State prison.  In July, 2015, he filed a motion for a new trial and a related motion to conduct postconviction discovery, seeking to have his conviction vacated pursuant to Commonwealth v. Ware, 471 Mass. 85 (2015), and Commonwealth v. Scott, 467 Mass. 336 (2014).  In his motions, Escobar argued that the Commonwealth had not fully investigated misconduct at the William A. Hinton State Laboratory Institute (Hinton drug lab).[1]  In his view, the Inspector General’s investigation of the Hinton lab was incomplete because it did not inquire into whether any chemist other than Annie Dookhan had acted improperly.[2]   Escobar subsequently filed a motion to vacate his conviction and for the dismissal of the underlying charge as well as a motion for a so-called “Cotto order” pursuant to this court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Cotto, 471 Mass. 97 (2015).  After a hearing, in July, 2017, a judge in the Superior Court denied without prejudice the motions to vacate and for a Cotto order; allowed in part the motion for postconviction discovery, ordering limited discovery; and declined to rule on the motion for a new trial pending completion of that limited discovery.[3]  Escobar appealed.  We allowed his application for direct appellate review, and affirm.   On the basis of the record that was before her, the judge’s rulings were correct.  As she noted, Escobar’s core argument is that the chemist who analyzed the samples in his case, Della Saunders, had “testing productivity numbers” comparable to those of Dookhan.  In Escobar’s view, this raises the question whether Saunders, like Dookhan, also engaged in misconduct.  In light of his arguments, the judge determined that some limited postconviction discovery was warranted, and she thus allowed, in part, Escobar’s motion on this point.[4]  She also concluded, reasonably, that she could not fairly rule on Escobar’s motion for a new trial until that limited discovery […]

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Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - April 19, 2018 at 3:00 am

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Commonwealth v. Escobar (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-048-18)

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us   SJC-12371   COMMONWEALTH  vs.  EMILIA ESCOBAR.       Suffolk.     January 10, 2018. – March 29, 2018.   Present:  Gants, C.J., Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ.     False Impersonation & Identity Fraud.  Fraud.  Practice, Criminal, Plea.  Words, “Anything of value.”       Complaint received and sworn to in the Roxbury Division of the Boston Municipal Court Department on October 2, 2003.   A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty, filed on November 18, 2016, was heard by Kenneth J. Fiandaca, J.   The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review.     Edward Crane for the defendant. Dara Z. Kesselheim, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.          BUDD, J.  The defendant, Emilia Escobar, pleaded guilty to identity fraud pursuant to G. L. c. 266, § 37E (b), in connection with providing a false name to a police officer during a traffic stop.  Here, she appeals from the denial of a motion to withdraw the guilty plea, claiming that there were insufficient facts to establish that she attempted to receive, or received, “anything of value” within the meaning of § 37E (b).  Because we conclude that the phrase “anything of value,” as it appears in the statute, does not include avoiding criminal prosecution, we reverse. Background.  The facts are uncontested.  In October, 2002, a State police trooper stopped the defendant for driving an automobile with an excessively loud exhaust.  The defendant told the trooper falsely that her name was Ana Escobar, gave a false date of birth, and said that she did not have her license with her.  Upon conducting a check with the registry of motor vehicles, the trooper learned that Ana Escobar’s license was suspended and issued a citation in Ana Escobar’s name. Almost one year later, an investigation revealed that the defendant had been untruthful at the time of the stop.  A complaint was issued charging the defendant with multiple infractions in addition to identity fraud:  operating a motor vehicle with a suspended license;[1] improper operation of a motor vehicle; failing to possess a license while operating a motor vehicle; and providing a false name to a police officer. In March, 2004, pursuant to a plea agreement, the defendant admitted to sufficient facts on all charges except the charge of providing a false name to a police officer, which was dismissed.  Charges […]

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Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - March 29, 2018 at 4:50 pm

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Recinos v. Escobar (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-029-16)

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us   SJC-11986   LILIANA MARIBEL RIVERA RECINOS  vs.  MARIA ISABEL RECINOS ESCOBAR.       Middlesex.     November 5, 2015. – March 4, 2016.   Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ.     Probate Court, Jurisdiction, General equity power.  Jurisdiction, Probate Court.       Complaint in equity filed in the Middlesex Division of the Probate and Family Court Department on April 14, 2014.   The case was heard by Patricia A. Gorman, J.   The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court.     Elizabeth Badger for the plaintiff. Mary K. Ryan, Cynthia M. Guizzetti, & Mara O’Malley, for American Immigration Lawyers Association & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief.          SPINA, J.  In this case, we are asked to determine whether the Probate and Family Court Department has jurisdiction over youth between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one to make special findings that are necessary to apply for special immigrant juvenile (SIJ) status under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (2012).  Congress created the SIJ classification to permit immigrant children who have been abused, neglected, or abandoned by one or both of their parents to apply for lawful permanent residence while remaining in the United States.  See id.; 8 C.F.R. § 204.11 (2009).  “[C]hild” under the Federal statute is defined as an unmarried person under the age of twenty-one.  8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1).  Before an immigrant child can apply for SIJ status, she must receive the following predicate findings from a “juvenile court”:[1]  (1) she is dependent on the juvenile court; (2) her reunification with one or both parents is not viable due to abuse, neglect, or abandonment; and (3) it is not in her best interests to return to her country of origin.  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i).  Once these special findings are made, an application and supporting documents may be submitted to the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) agency.[2]  An application for SIJ status must be submitted before the immigrant’s twenty-first birthday.  8 C.F.R. § 204.11. Liliana Recinos, the plaintiff, was a twenty year old,[3] unmarried immigrant attempting to apply for SIJ status.  She filed a complaint in equity in April, 2014, in the Middlesex County Division of the Probate and Family Court Department.  The plaintiff requested equitable and declaratory relief in the form of a decree […]

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Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - March 4, 2016 at 6:59 pm

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Recinos v. Escobar (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-181-15)

SUFFOLK, ss. COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT LILIANA MARIBEL RIVERA RECINOS vs. MARIA ISABEL RECINOS ESCOBAR SJC-11986 ORDER The judgment of the Probate and Family Court dated March 13, 2015, dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint is reversed. The Probate and Family Court has jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiff’s case, and the plaintiff is dependent on the court for these purposes. The court shall conduct proceedings forthwith on the plaintiff’s complaint and shall act on her requests for relief expeditiously, such that, if the requested findings are made, she will have time to apply to the rederal authorities for special immigrant juvenile status before her twenty-first birthday on December 5, 2015. This order serve as the rescript of this court for purposes of Mass. R. A. P. 1 (c), and shall issue to the trial court immediately. Opinion or opinions to follow. By the Court, Full-text Opinions

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Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - November 10, 2015 at 8:35 pm

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