» Institution

Posts tagged "Institution"

Institution for Savings in Newburyport v. Langis, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-023-18)

NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 17-P-4 Appeals Court INSTITUTION FOR SAVINGS IN NEWBURYPORT AND ITS VICINITY vs. MATTHEW LANGIS & another.[1] No. 17-P-4. Essex. November 6, 2017. – February 27, 2018. Present: Kinder, Desmond, & Sacks, JJ. Judgment, Default, Relief from judgment. Practice, Civil, Default, Relief from judgment. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on December 19, 2014. A motion for relief from judgment, filed on February 26, 2016, was heard by Elizabeth M. Fahey. Eric P. Magnuson (Joseph T. Toomey also present) for the plaintiff. Kevin J. O’Connor for Infinex Investments, Inc. SACKS, J. This appeal raises a question regarding the procedure to be followed when a plaintiff files a properly supported application for default judgment for failure to serve interrogatory answers under Mass.R.Civ.P. 33(a)(4), as appearing in 436 Mass. 1401 (2002), but no final judgment can enter because damages have not yet been determined. The question is whether a defendant seeking relief from the initial action on such an application must satisfy the “excusable neglect” standard under Mass.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1), 365 Mass. 828 (1974), requiring “unique or extraordinary” circumstances, Feltch v. General Rental Co., 383 Mass. 603, 614 (1981) (quotation omitted), or merely the less demanding “good cause” standard for removal of a default under Mass.R.Civ.P. 55(c), 365 Mass. 822 (1974), i.e., “a good reason for failing to . . . defend in a timely manner and . . . meritorious defenses.” Johnny’s Oil Co. v. Eldayha, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 705, 708 (2012). Our prior decisions strongly suggest, and we now determine, that rule 55(c)’s good cause standard governs. Background. The case arises out of a complaint filed in the Superior Court involving a commercial dispute. On December 18, 2015, after the defendant Infinex Investments, Inc. (Infinex), missed a previously extended deadline for serving interrogatory answers on the plaintiff, Institution for Savings in Newburyport and its Vicinity (IFS), IFS served a final request for answers pursuant to rule 33(a)(3). On January 28, 2016 — the day after Infinex’s final rule 33(a)(4) deadline for serving such answers expired — IFS filed a properly supported “application for default judgment,” pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 33(a)(6), as appearing in 454 Mass. 1404 (2009), which included a request for a hearing on damages, pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 55(b)(2), as amended, 463 Mass. 1401 (2012). IFS’s application and accompanying […]

Dexter v. Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Concord (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-142-15)

NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 13-P-1844 Appeals Court MICHAEL DEXTER vs. SUPERINTENDENT, MASSACHUSETTS CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION, CONCORD. No. 13-P-1844. Middlesex. March 9, 2015. – September 11, 2015. Present: Green, Trainor, & Carhart, JJ. Imprisonment, Enforcement of discipline. Administrative Law, Regulations. Regulation. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on September 10, 2012. The case was heard by Peter B. Krupp, J., on motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, and a motion to reconsider or, in the alternative, to alter or amend the judgment was considered by him. Joan T. Kennedy for the defendant. TRAINOR, J. The plaintiff, Michael Dexter, was a pretrial detainee in custody at the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Concord (MCI-Concord) for at least part of 2012.[1] The plaintiff filed a complaint seeking a declaration concerning the property that pretrial detainees are allowed to possess at MCI-Concord. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss and the plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment. A Superior Court judge denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss and granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, entering a declaratory judgment stating: “103 C.M.R. 403, et seq., shall apply to inmates awaiting trial at MCI-Concord and no such inmate awaiting trial shall be considered a ‘transient inmate’ within the definition of that phrase in 103 C.M.R. 403.06.” The defendant filed a motion to reconsider, or in the alternative, to alter or amend the judgment, which was denied. This appeal followed. On appeal we are asked to determine the proper interpretation and application of the inmate property regulation as it applies to pretrial detainees.[2] Prison administrators are permitted “considerable discretion in the adoption and implementation of prison policies.” Royce v. Commissioner of Correction, 390 Mass. 425, 427 (1983). “However, the limits of such discretion are established by the rules and regulations promulgated by the Department of Correction. Once an agency has seen fit to promulgate regulations, it must comply with those regulations. [A]gency regulations have the force of law.” Ibid. (citations omitted). Here, the Department of Correction is bound by its “inmate property” regulation, as promulgated in 103 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 403.00 (2001) (the regulation). The “Applicability” section of the regulation states that it is applicable to “all inmates, whether sentenced or awaiting trial, incarcerated at state correctional institutions.” 103 Code Mass. Regs. § 403.04 (2001) (emphasis supplied). Section 403.04 makes it clear that […]