Commonwealth v. Newton N., a juvenile (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-019-18)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12354 COMMONWEALTH vs. NEWTON N., a juvenile. Berkshire. November 7, 2017. – February 5, 2018. Present: Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. Delinquent Child. Probable Cause. Insanity. Mental Impairment. Juvenile Court, Delinquent child. Practice, Criminal, Juvenile delinquency proceeding, Complaint, Arraignment, Dismissal. Complaint received and sworn to in the Berkshire County Division of the Juvenile Court Department on June 2, 2016. A motion to dismiss was heard by Judith A. Locke, J. The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. Kyle G. Christensen, Assistant District Attorney (Joseph A. Pieropan, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the Commonwealth. Laura Chrismer Edmonds for the juvenile. The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: Miriam H. Ruttenberg, Jennifer Honig, & Phillip Kassel for Mental Health Legal Advisors Committee & others. Ryan M. Schiff, Committee for Public Counsel Services, & Joseph N. Schneiderman for Youth Advocacy Division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services. Daniel F. Conley, District Attorney for the Suffolk District, & John P. Zanini, Assistant District Attorney, for District Attorney for the Suffolk District. GANTS, C.J. This case presents two important issues relevant to a Juvenile Court judge’s consideration of a prearraignment motion to dismiss a delinquency complaint. First, we hold that a judge, in weighing whether the information contained within the “four corners” of the complaint application and related exhibits constitutes probable cause, may not consider whether a juvenile was criminally responsible for the charged offenses or whether the juvenile’s mental impairment rendered the juvenile incapable of having the requisite criminal intent. Second, we hold that, where a prosecutor exercises his or her discretion to proceed to arraignment on a delinquency complaint supported by probable cause, the judge may not dismiss the complaint before arraignment on the grounds that dismissal of the complaint is in the best interests of the child and in the interests of justice. Because the judge in this case dismissed the delinquency complaint before arraignment where the complaint was supported by probable cause and where the prosecutor wished to proceed to arraignment, we vacate the dismissal and remand the case to the Juvenile Court.[1] Background. On May 25, 2016, a police officer applied for and obtained a delinquency complaint from a clerk-magistrate, charging the […]
Commonwealth v. Orbin O., a juvenile (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-020-18)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12314 COMMONWEALTH vs. ORBIN O., a juvenile. Berkshire. November 7, 2017. – February 5, 2018. Present: Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. Delinquent Child. Probable Cause. Juvenile Court, Delinquent child. Practice, Criminal, Juvenile delinquency proceeding, Complaint, Show cause hearing, Dismissal. Complaint received and sworn to in the Berkshire County Division of the Juvenile Court Department on April 14, 2016. A motion to dismiss was heard by Judith A. Locke, J. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. Kyle G. Christensen, Assistant District Attorney (Joseph A. Pieropan, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the Commonwealth. Afton M. Templin for the juvenile. The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: Miriam H. Ruttenberg, Jennifer Honig, & Phillip Kassel for Mental Health Legal Advisors Committee & others. Ryan M. Schiff, Committee for Public Counsel Services, & Joseph N. Schneiderman for Youth Advocacy Division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services. Daniel F. Conley, District Attorney for the Suffolk District, & John P. Zanini, Assistant District Attorney, for District Attorney for the Suffolk District. GANTS, C.J. In Commonwealth v. Newton N., 478 Mass. , (2018), also decided today, in which a police officer applied for and obtained a delinquency complaint, we held that, “where a prosecutor exercises his or her discretion to proceed to arraignment on a delinquency complaint supported by probable cause, the judge may not dismiss the complaint before arraignment on the grounds that dismissal of the complaint is in the best interests of the child and in the interests of justice.” We consider here whether that same limitation on judicial authority in deciding a motion to dismiss applies to a delinquency complaint brought by a private party under G. L. c. 218, § 35A, where a clerk-magistrate issued the complaint after finding probable cause. We conclude that this same limitation applies only where the prosecutor has affirmatively adopted the private party’s complaint by moving for arraignment. In cases where the prosecutor has not so moved, a judge considering a juvenile’s motion to dismiss prior to arraignment may consider whether the clerk-magistrate abused his or her discretion in issuing the complaint and, in doing so, may consider whether dismissal is in the best interests of the child and in the interests of justice.[1] Background. On […]
Josh J., a juvenile v. Commonwealth (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-017-18)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12286 JOSH J., a juvenile vs. COMMONWEALTH. Suffolk. October 5, 2017. – January 31, 2018. Present: Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. Bail. Delinquent Child. Due Process of Law, Pretrial detainees. Moot Question. Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk on January 11, 2017. The case was reported by Lowy, J. Eliza Lockhart-Jenks, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for the juvenile. Marina Moriarty, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. LOWY, J. This case, here on a reservation and report by a single justice of the county court in response to the juvenile’s petition under G. L. c. 211, § 3, requires us to consider the proper application of G. L. c. 276, § 58, and G. L. c. 276, § 58B, specifically with regard to the number of days an individual may be held without bail after a bail revocation hearing. We conclude that where an individual has been released on bail pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 58, and there is probable cause to believe the individual committed a crime while released on bail, the Commonwealth may seek to revoke bail under either § 58 or § 58B. The judge must then determine whether the Commonwealth satisfied the requirements of the particular statute, either § 58 or § 58B, under which it sought to revoke bail. Background and prior proceedings. On May 6, 2016, a delinquency complaint issued charging the juvenile with breaking and entering in the daytime with intent to commit a felony and larceny over $ 250. A judge in the Juvenile Court set the juvenile’s bail at $ 1,000. The judge also advised the juvenile, pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 58, that the juvenile’s bail could be revoked if he committed a new crime while on release. The juvenile posted bail and was released. In August, 2016, two delinquency complaints issued against the juvenile for several new crimes he allegedly committed while on release on the pending charges, including two counts of assault and battery on a pregnant victim and one count of malicious destruction of property valued over $ 250. In November, 2016, based on the new charges, the Commonwealth sought to revoke the juvenile’s bail pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 58. A Juvenile Court judge allowed the Commonwealth’s motion, revoked the juvenile’s bail, and set a date for a […]
Commonwealth v. Cole C., a juvenile (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-008-18)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 16-P-1645 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. COLE C., a juvenile.[1] No. 16-P-1645. Suffolk. November 8, 2017. – January 19, 2018. Present: Milkey, Blake, & Singh, JJ. Juvenile Court, Jurisdiction. Jurisdiction, Juvenile Court. Youthful Offender Act. Practice, Criminal, Indictment, Transfer hearing. Statute, Construction. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on July 5, 2016. After transfer to the Suffolk County Division of the Juvenile Court Department, a motion to dismiss was heard by Peter M. Coyne, J. Colby M. Tilley, Assistant District Attorney (Michael V. Glennon, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the Commonwealth. Melissa Allen Celli for the defendant. MILKEY, J. A grand jury indicted the defendant as a youthful offender after he had turned eighteen years old. Relying on Commonwealth v. Mogelinski, 466 Mass. 627 (2013) (Mogelinski I), a Juvenile Court judge dismissed the indictments for want of jurisdiction. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and order that the indictments be reinstated. Background. The relevant facts are undisputed. On April 20, 2016, Boston police arrested the defendant on a variety of charges related to an armed home invasion that occurred that day. He was seventeen years old at that time. After his arrest, the police took him to a Department of Youth Services (DYS) facility. The following day, a twelve-count delinquency complaint was issued, and a second delinquency complaint that included two additional charges was issued a day later. The defendant was arraigned on April 25, 2016, and two days after that (one week after the alleged incident), he turned eighteen. On July 5, 2016, a grand jury indicted the defendant as a youthful offender on five charges: armed home invasion, armed robbery, assault with a dangerous weapon, unlawful possession of a firearm, and intimidation of a witness. The indictments were filed with the Juvenile Court on July 11, 2016, and the case was continued to July 26, 2016, for arraignment. However, a Juvenile Court judge refused to arraign the defendant on the youthful offender indictments on the grounds that — because the defendant had turned eighteen prior to the issuance of the indictments — the court lacked jurisdiction over them. The judge also denied alternative relief that the Commonwealth requested, the holding of a transfer hearing pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 72A, in […]
Commonwealth v. J.A., a juvenile (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-187-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12277 COMMONWEALTH vs. J.A., a juvenile. Suffolk. September 7, 2017. – November 20, 2017. Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. Dog. Youthful Offender Act. Statute, Construction. Words, “Serious bodily harm.” Indictments found and returned in the Suffolk County Division of the Juvenile Court Department on November 19, 2015. A motion to dismiss was heard by Peter M. Coyne, J. The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. Elianna J. Nuzum, Special Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. Benjamin L. Falkner for the juvenile. The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: Michael W. Morrissey, District Attorney for the Norfolk District, & Tracey A. Cusick & Stephanie Martin Glennon, Assistant District Attorneys, for District Attorney for the Norfolk District. Jeffrey J. Pokorak, Kimberly Cariani, & Jaclyn Collier for Juvenile Law Center of Suffolk University Law School & another. Virginia F. Coleman for Animal Legal Defense Fund. BUDD, J. The juvenile is alleged to have brutally attacked his friend’s dog. The Commonwealth elected to proceed against the juvenile pursuant to the youthful offender statute, G. L. c. 119, § 54, on the ground that he caused serious bodily harm to the dog.[1] The juvenile argues that the youthful offender indictments are not supported by probable cause because the phrase “serious bodily harm” in the statute contemplates harm to human beings, not animals.[2] We agree and therefore affirm the dismissal below. We note, however, that the Commonwealth still may take action against the juvenile by seeking a complaint for delinquency against him.[3] Background. The following facts are taken from the testimony presented to the grand jury. In August, 2015, when the juvenile was fourteen years old, he tortured a friend’s dog by shoving a soap dispenser pump into the dog’s vagina, resulting in serious internal injuries to the dog.[4] A grand jury returned two youthful offender indictments against the juvenile, charging him with cruelty to animals and bestiality. See G. L. c. 272, §§ 34, 77. A Juvenile Court judge allowed the juvenile’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the phrase “serious bodily harm” in the youthful offender statute refers only to human victims. The Commonwealth appealed, and we transferred the case to this court on our own motion. Discussion. A juvenile may be tried […]
Benjamin B., a juvenile v. Commonwealth (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-181-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12341 Benjamin B., a juvenile vs. COMMONWEALTH. November 9, 2017. Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts, Appeal from order of single justice. Juvenile Court, Delinquent child. Practice, Criminal, Juvenile delinquency proceeding, Complaint, Dismissal. The juvenile appeals from a judgment of the county court denying, without a hearing, his petition for relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3. The juvenile has been charged by a delinquency complaint with making a bomb threat.[1] A judge in the Juvenile Court, apparently believing that she lacked authority to dismiss the complaint prior to arraignment, arraigned the juvenile.[2] But see Commonwealth v. Humberto H., 466 Mass. 562, 575-576 (2013) (Juvenile Court judge has discretion to dismiss complaint prior to arraignment where complaint is not supported by probable cause). See also Commonwealth v. Mogelinski, 473 Mass. 164, 166-167 (2015) (authority to dismiss before arraignment where judge determines that Juvenile Court lacks jurisdiction). The following day, the judge reconsidered that decision, determined she did have authority to consider a motion to dismiss before arraignment, and entered an order vacating the arraignment of the juvenile and directing the probation department to expunge the juvenile’s court activity record information (CARI). The probation department moved for reconsideration, arguing that it was obligated to maintain CARI records and could not expunge them. After further briefing and argument, the judge again reversed herself, reinstating the juvenile’s arraignment and vacating the expungement order. The juvenile’s G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition sought relief from this interlocutory ruling. We affirm the judgment. The case is before us on the juvenile’s memorandum and appendix pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:21, as amended, 434 Mass. 1301 (2001), which requires a party challenging an interlocutory ruling of the trial court to “set forth the reasons why review of the trial court decision cannot adequately be obtained on appeal from any final adverse judgment in the trial court or by other available means.” The juvenile has not met his burden under the rule. He argues that review in the ordinary appellate process would not be adequate because he would irrevocably lose the opportunity to have the complaint dismissed without creating a CARI record. We have recently rejected similar arguments in determining that there was no absolute right to immediate interlocutory review, pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, of the denial of a motion to dismiss. See […]
N.M., a juvenile v. Commonwealth (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-159-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557- 1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12152 N.M., a juvenile vs. COMMONWEALTH. Suffolk. March 7, 2017. – October 10, 2017. Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ.[1] Youthful Offender Act. Practice, Criminal, Indictment, Interlocutory appeal. Rape. Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk on June 15, 2016. The case was considered by Botsford, J. Harry C. Mezer (Joseph J. Machera also present) for the juvenile. Ronald E. DeRosa, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. Robert E. McDonnell, Vanessa M. Brown, & Joshua Silverstein, for Youth Advocacy Division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. BUDD, J. Here we consider whether a juvenile, who has been indicted as a youthful offender, is entitled as of right to interlocutory review of a denial of a motion to dismiss that indictment. We also consider whether the youthful offender indictment in this case was sufficiently supported by probable cause. We conclude that a juvenile is not entitled to G. L. c. 211, § 3, interlocutory review as a matter of right in these circumstances. Nevertheless, we exercise our discretion to reach the merits of the petition and conclude that the youthful offender portion of the indictment was not sufficiently supported by probable cause because the charged conduct did not involve the infliction or threat of serious bodily harm.[2] Background. The following facts are taken from the testimony and exhibits presented to the grand jury. In December, 2014, or January, 2015, the complainant disclosed to her mother that her female cousin, the juvenile, had been sexually touching her for the last few years, starting when the complainant was age five or six and the juvenile was age fourteen or fifteen. The girls attended weekly dance classes together and afterward would spend time in the juvenile’s bedroom napping or watching movies, away from adult supervision. The complainant told her mother that in this setting the juvenile had “kissed” her on her breasts, “touched” and “inserted [a] finger” in her vagina, and “instructed” her to touch the juvenile’s vagina. The complainant’s mother reported the sexual activity to police in May, 2015. Investigators conducted a sexual abuse intervention network interview,[3] during which time the complainant shared similar descriptions of the activities.[4] The complainant reported that the juvenile […]
Commonwealth v. Shane S., a juvenile (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-126-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 15-P-1746 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. SHANE S., a juvenile. No. 15-P-1746. Suffolk. February 14, 2017. – September 27, 2017. Present: Green, Meade, & Agnes, JJ. Firearms. Practice, Criminal, Motion to suppress. Constitutional Law, Search and seizure, Reasonable suspicion. Search and Seizure, Pursuit, Reasonable suspicion. Complaint received and sworn to in the Suffolk County Division of the Juvenile Court Department on January 7, 2015. Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court Department on March 12, 2015. Following joinder of the delinquency complaint and youthful offender indictment, a pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard in the Juvenile Court by Peter M. Coyne, J., and the case was heard by him. Rebecca L. Rose for the juvenile. Teresa K. Anderson, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. AGNES, J. This appeal follows a jury-waived trial which resulted in a determination that the juvenile was a youthful offender by unlawfully possessing a firearm in violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10(a), and delinquent by reason of carrying a loaded firearm without a firearm identification card in violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10(n). The juvenile was committed to the custody of the Department of Youth Services until age twenty-one. The sole question on appeal is whether the motion judge, who also was the trial judge, erred in denying the juvenile’s pretrial motion to suppress evidence. More particularly, the juvenile contends that he was unlawfully seized by the police without reasonable suspicion or probable cause, and that the firearm and ammunition offered in evidence at his trial should have been suppressed as the fruits of that claimed unlawful seizure. We affirm. Background. Two Boston police officers testified at the hearing on the juvenile’s motion to suppress. The following account is based on the judge’s findings of fact and other testimony by the officers, which the judge implicitly credited. See Commonwealth v. Jones-Pannell, 472 Mass. 429, 431 (2015). On January 6, 2015, Officer Eric Merner responded to a radio broadcast that a person on conditional release from a pending criminal charge, Dion Ruiz, was in a global positioning system (GPS) exclusion zone in the area of Washington and Ruggles Streets in Boston.[1] Officer Merner received a picture of Ruiz on his cellular telephone (cell phone), and proceeded to the area to search […]
Commonwealth v. Ormond O., a juvenile (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-120-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 16-P-840 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. ORMOND O., a juvenile. No. 16-P-840. Norfolk. February 7, 2017. – September 18, 2017. Present: Green, Meade, & Agnes, JJ. Delinquent Child. Controlled Substances. Joint Enterprise. Evidence, Constructive possession. Search and Seizure, Motor vehicle, Plain view. Practice, Criminal, Juvenile delinquency proceeding, Presumptions and burden of proof. Complaint received and sworn to in the Norfolk County Division of the Juvenile Court Department on April 6, 2015. The case was tried before Mary M. McCallum, J. Frank H. Spillane for the juvenile. Varsha Kukafka, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. MEADE, J. After a jury trial in the Juvenile Court, the juvenile was found delinquent by reason of possession of cocaine, in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 34.[1] The judge imposed a sentence of six months of probation. On appeal, the juvenile claims there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. We affirm. Background.[2] On April 4, 2015, Quincy police Detective Dennis Keenan was patrolling the “South Quincy/Penn Hill” area of Quincy in plain clothes and in an unmarked cruiser. Detective Keenan, a seven-year drug control unit veteran who had been involved in more than one thousand drug cases, had made arrests in that area. Around 5:45 P.M., Keenan witnessed Tyler Mauritson exit a blue Infiniti motor vehicle, registered to a Brockton woman, that was parked in front of 35 Nicholl Street, which is Mauritson’s home. Keenan, who was familiar with Mauritson, watched as Mauritson entered his residence. The Infiniti drove away and turned left onto Franklin Street, traveling into Braintree. The detective followed the car as it went left onto Hayward Street and then right onto Quincy Avenue, traveling south. While Keenan followed the Infiniti, he contacted Detective Michael Duran and requested that he speak to Mauritson and provide Keenan with an update. The Infiniti turned onto the Arborway, which is a residential way that ends at the Fore River with side streets that lead back to Quincy Avenue. Once the vehicle was on the Arborway, it began to slow down before it turned into a driveway located ten to fifteen houses down the street. The car then backed up, turned around, and traveled back on the same route it had just driven. While this was occurring, Keenan “tucked” his unmarked cruiser onto […]
Commonwealth v. Marcus M., a juvenile (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-097-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 16-P-1200 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. MARCUS M., a juvenile. No. 16-P-1200. Suffolk. June 6, 2017. – July 27, 2017. Present: Green, Hanlon, & Kinder, JJ. Practice, Criminal, Revocation of probation. Juvenile Court, Probation. Complaints received and sworn to in the Suffolk County Division of the Juvenile Court Department on December 19, 2014. A proceeding for revocation of probation was had before Peter M. Coyne, J. Alison R. Bancroft for the juvenile. Julianne Campbell, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. HANLON, J. After a probation violation hearing, a judge in the Juvenile Court found that the juvenile had violated the terms of his probation because he was charged three times with subsequent offenses allegedly committed while he was on probation. The judge committed the juvenile to the Department of Youth Services (DYS) until his eighteenth birthday. The juvenile now appeals, arguing that the only evidence offered on two of the three offenses was his court activity record information (CARI) record indicating that new complaints had issued. While we agree with the judge that the evidence supported a finding of violation regarding one offense on one complaint, for which there was other evidence, judicial notice of the CARI records, without more, was insufficient to support finding the other two violations. Background. The juvenile was placed on probation and his case continued without a finding, on May 8, 2015, after he admitted to facts sufficient to support findings of delinquency on charges of malicious destruction of property and vandalizing property. Ten days later, a probation officer issued a notice of probation violation after the juvenile was arrested for possession of a firearm, possession of ammunition, carrying a rifle or shotgun on a public way, and assault by means of a dangerous weapon. The probation case was continued a number of times and, on February 10, 2016, a second notice of probation violation was served on the juvenile as a result of other new charges, this time, affray and disturbing of public assembly. On March 11, 2016, a third notice of probation violation issued, alleging a “violation of the criminal law, namely, larceny.” At the probation violation hearing in June, 2016, a Boston police sergeant testified that he had responded to a call regarding a dispute among neighbors on Blue […]