Commonwealth v. Samuel S., a juvenile (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-033-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12135 COMMONWEALTH vs. SAMUEL S., a juvenile. Hampden. November 9, 2016. – February 17, 2017. Present: Gants, C.J., Botsford, Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ. Sex Offender. Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act. Youthful Offender Act. Delinquent Child. Global Positioning System Device. Juvenile Court, Delinquent child, Probation. Practice, Criminal, Juvenile delinquency proceeding, Probation. Complaint received and sworn to in the Hampden County Division of the Juvenile Court Department on August 21, 2014. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on October 3, 2014. Motions for relief from conditions of probation were heard by Judith J. Phillips, J., and a motion for reconsideration was considered by her. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. Laura Chrismer Edmonds for the juvenile. Cynthia Cullen Payne, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. Ryan M. Schiff & Caroline Alpert, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for Youth Advocacy Division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. BOTSFORD, J. The juvenile was adjudicated both a youthful offender and a delinquent juvenile as the result of a single sexual assault. A Juvenile Court judge ordered the juvenile to register as a sex offender and to submit to global positioning system (GPS) monitoring, concluding that both consequences, under the relevant statutes, were mandatory. The juvenile argues that this conclusion was error. He argues first that the pertinent section of the sex offender registration statute, G. L. c. 6, § 178E (f), required the judge to make an individualized determination whether the juvenile must register as a sex offender because he was not “sentenced to immediate confinement” within the meaning of the statute. He also argues that the GPS monitoring statute, G. L. c. 265, § 47, as interpreted by this court in Commonwealth v. Hanson H., 464 Mass. 807 (2013), does not require youthful offenders to submit to GPS monitoring. We agree with the juvenile on both points. Accordingly, we vacate the judge’s decision.[1] Background. 1. Facts.[2] This case stems from a sexual assault that occurred in June, 2014. The juvenile, who was seventeen years old at the time, was at home with the victim, his five-year-old half-sister. The victim’s father returned home and entered the living room. There, he saw the victim […]
Commonwealth v. Ilya I., a juvenile (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-022-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11637 COMMONWEALTH vs. ILYA I., a juvenile. Suffolk. October 6, 2014. – February 13, 2015. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Controlled Substances. Probable Cause. Juvenile Court, Delinquent child. Practice, Criminal, Juvenile delinquency proceeding, Complaint, Dismissal. Complaint received and sworn to in the Suffolk County Division of the Juvenile Court Department on June 4, 2012. A motion to dismiss was heard by Leslie E. Harris, J. After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. Gail S. Strassfeld for the juvenile. Cailin M. Campbell, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. HINES, J. After a street encounter in the Dorchester section of Boston, a police officer arrested the juvenile and charged him with possession of a class D substance with the intent to distribute in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32C (a). A clerk-magistrate issued a delinquency complaint formally charging the juvenile with the offense. A judge in the Juvenile Court allowed the juvenile’s motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of probable cause. The Commonwealth sought review in the Appeals Court, which reversed the dismissal in an unpublished decision. See Commonwealth v. Ilya I., 84 Mass. App. Ct. 1128 (2014). We granted the juvenile’s petition for further appellate review and now affirm the dismissal of the complaint. Background. Our review of the judge’s order of dismissal is confined to the four corners of the application for complaint, which in this case is essentially the police incident report detailing the facts underlying the juvenile’s arrest.[1] Following is a summary of the police incident report.[2] On June 1, 2012, members of the youth violence strike force, a unit within the Boston police department, were conducting surveillance in Codman Square in Dorchester. The police officers were familiar with that area as being one where drug and gang activity took place. Shortly before 5 P.M., the officers observed four black teenagers in the vicinity of Washington Street and Talbot Avenue. A male and a female approached the teenagers and engaged them in a “brief conversation.” Two of the teenagers walked up Washington Street toward Southern Avenue with the couple. The other two teenagers remained in the location where the first encounter with the couple occurred and appeared to look up […]
Commonwealth v. Foster F., a juvenile (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-159-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 13-P-1427 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. FOSTER F., a juvenile. No. 13-P-1427. Barnstable. October 9, 2014. – December 10, 2014. Present: Berry, Hanlon, & Carhart, JJ. Indecent Assault and Battery. Practice, Criminal, Juvenile delinquency proceeding, Argument by prosecutor. Evidence, Juvenile delinquency, Authentication of document, Verbal completeness. Witness, Victim. Internet. Complaint received and sworn to in the Barnstable County/ Town of Plymouth Division of the Juvenile Court Department on March 20, 2012. The case was tried before Mary O’Sullivan Smith. Rebecca Rose for the juvenile. Suzanne D. McDonough, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. CARHART, J. The juvenile appeals from an adjudication of delinquency by reason of indecent assault and battery, arguing that the judge erroneously allowed in evidence Facebook[1] communications and the entire transcript of the victim’s Sexual Abuse Intervention Network (SAIN) interview. The juvenile also argues that the prosecutor’s improper closing argument warrants reversal. We reverse. Background. The jury heard the following testimony. On January 28, 2012, the juvenile met the victim and her friends Gwen and Nancy[2] at a park in downtown Plymouth. They met to play a “dating game,” wherein the juvenile would spend some time with each of the three girls and then decide which girl he wanted to date. While each of the girls had been communicating with the juvenile through Facebook, they had not met him in person until they all went ice skating some two weeks earlier. The victim’s and the juvenile’s Facebook communications included explicit sexual exchanges. On January 28, the juvenile spent time alone talking with Gwen and, later, Nancy. The victim testified that, when it was her turn to be alone with the juvenile, she and the juvenile went behind a monument and began kissing on a bench. At some point, the victim started to walk away, but the juvenile convinced her not to leave. She returned, they sat on a different bench, and the juvenile began “dry humping” her. The victim tried to push him away, and started walking away again. As the two were walking toward the monument, the juvenile pushed the victim against the monument and started sucking on her ear. He then sat the victim down and pinned her legs. Despite the victim’s orders to stop, the juvenile placed his hand inside her pants and inserted several […]
L.L., a juvenile v. Commonwealth (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-191-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11721 L.L., a juvenile vs. COMMONWEALTH. Suffolk. September 3, 2014. – December 5, 2014. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Botsford, Cordy, & Hines, JJ. Sex Offender. Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act. Delinquent Child. Evidence, Juvenile delinquency, Sex offender. Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk on July 7, 2014. The case was reported by Spina, J. Beth L. Eisenberg, Committee for Public Counsel Services (Susan Oker, Committee for Public Counsel Services, with her) for the juvenile. Catherine Langevin Semel, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. Eric Tennen, for Children’s Law Center of Massachusetts & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief. BOTSFORD, J. After admitting to sufficient facts before a Juvenile Court judge with respect to two counts of indecent assault and battery on a person fourteen or older, the juvenile filed a motion seeking relief from the obligation to register as a sex offender pursuant to G. L. c. 6, § 178E (f) (§ 178E [f]). After ahearing, the judge denied the motion, thereby requiring the juvenile to register with the Sex Offender Registry Board (board). We consider here the juvenile’s petition for relief pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3. The principal issue he raises concerns the standard by which a Juvenile Court judge determines the risk of reoffense on the part of a juvenile under § 178E (f), an issue that this court considered in Commonwealth v. Ronald R., 450 Mass. 262, 267-268 (2007). We seek to provide additional guidance concerning that standard in this opinion. We affirm the order denying the juvenile’s motion for relief from registration. Background.[1] On the afternoon of May 9, 2013, the juvenile, who was then sixteen years old, approached an adult woman from behind as she was walking her dog in Lynn and pulled down the sweatpants she was wearing to her thighs. The juvenile then made a vulgar comment about the victim’s private parts, grabbed his own genitals, and ran away. The woman described her assailant to the Lynn police. Eight days later, on the afternoon of May 17, 2013, a different woman was walking four children home from school in Lynn when she felt the juvenile touch her buttocks and pull her […]
Commonwealth v. Muniur M., a juvenile (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-051-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC‑11552 COMMONWEALTH vs. MUNIUR M., a juvenile. March 18, 2014. Delinquent Child. District Court, Delinquent child. Practice, Criminal, Juvenile delinquency proceeding, Admission to sufficient facts to warrant finding, Plea, New trial. Evidence, Juvenile delinquency, Guilty plea. A District Court judge allowed the juvenile’s motion to vacate his admission to sufficient facts and for a new trial on the ground that the admission was coerced. The Commonwealth appealed, and the Appeals Court reversed. Commonwealth v. Muniur M., 83 Mass. App. Ct. 1132 (2013). We granted the juvenile’s application for further appellate review. Commonwealth v. Muniur M., 466 Mass. 1106 (2013). We now vacate the judge’s order and remand for further proceedings. Background. In 1992, the juvenile, who was fourteen years old, was charged in the juvenile session of the District Court with delinquency by reason of rape of a child with force under G. L. c. 265, § 22A. It was alleged that he digitally raped a female, who was thirteen years old, with whom he attended middle school. The juvenile later admitted to sufficient facts to warrant an adjudication of delinquency on the charge of statutory rape. When he made this admission, his father was pursuing several State and Federal lawsuits against the city of Pittsfield alleging racial discrimination resulting in his termination as a police officer from the Pittsfield police department. A District Court judge ordered that the juvenile submit to a presentence evaluation pursuant to G. L. c. 123, § 15 (e). The evaluator met with the juvenile’s parents separately, with the juvenile alone, and with all three together. The evaluator observed that the juvenile was “very withdrawn, staring out the window and answering questions in barely audible, short responses” when he was in his father’s presence, but “far more animate[d] and responsive” when he was alone. She opined that there was “some underlying depression,” which was probably caused by the strain on his father and family as a result of the pending lawsuits. The father appeared to be so preoccupied with his own legal situation that it was difficult to keep him focused on his son. The mother complained that the father was similarly preoccupied at home. The evaluator recognized that both parents were “appropriately concerned” about the juvenile. They acknowledged that he had engaged in some wrongdoing and indicated that they […]
A Juvenile v. Commonwealth (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-201-13)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC‑11585 A JUVENILE vs. COMMONWEALTH. December 23, 2013. Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts, Appeal from order of single justice. Juvenile Court, Delinquent child. Practice, Criminal, Juvenile delinquency proceeding, Transfer hearing. Delinquent Child. A juvenile against whom a delinquency complaint has issued in the Juvenile Court, charging him with certain offenses, appeals from a judgment of a single justice of this court denying, without a hearing, his petition for relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3. We affirm. The alleged offenses occurred when the juvenile was sixteen years old. The Commonwealth has moved for a transfer hearing pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 72A, which applies to juvenile offenders who are apprehended after their eighteenth birthdays. Under the statute, a Juvenile Court judge, after making a probable cause determination, has discretion either to order that the juvenile be discharged or to “dismiss the delinquency complaint and cause a criminal complaint to be issued.”[1] The juvenile moved to dismiss the charges on the ground that there had been prejudicial delay in apprehending him. The motion was denied. The juvenile’s G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition sought relief from that denial. The case is before us pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:21, as amended, 434 Mass. 1301 (2001), which requires an appellant in these circumstances to “set forth the reasons why review of the trial court decision cannot adequately be obtained on appeal from any final adverse judgment in the trial court or by other available means.”[2] The juvenile has not carried his burden under the rule. It is well established that “[t]he denial of a motion to dismiss in a criminal case is not appealable until after trial, and we have indicated many times that G. L. c. 211, § 3, may not be used to circumvent that rule. Unless a single justice decides the matter on the merits or reserves and reports it to the full court, neither of which occurred here, a defendant cannot receive review under G. L. c. 211, § 3, from the denial of his motion to dismiss.” Limbaugh v. Commonwealth, 465 Mass. 1018, 1019 (2013), quoting Bateman v. Commonwealth, 449 Mass. 1024, 1024-1025 (2007). We see no reason why the same should not be true of the denial of a motion to dismiss in a juvenile delinquency case. The juvenile […]
Commonwealth v. Humberto H., a juvenile (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-193-13)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC‑11297 COMMONWEALTH vs. HUMBERTO H., a juvenile. Suffolk. September 9, 2013. ‑ November 26, 2013. Present: Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Gants, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ. Controlled Substances. Probable Cause. Juvenile Court, Delinquent child. Supreme Judicial Court, Jurisdiction. Evidence, Juvenile delinquency, Intent. Intent. Practice, Criminal, Juvenile delinquency proceeding, Complaint, Dismissal, Arraignment, Judicial discretion. Complaint received and sworn to in the Suffolk County Division of the Juvenile Court Department on January 24, 2011. A motion to dismiss was heard by Leslie E. Harris, J. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. Donna Jalbert Patalano, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. Emily A. Cardy, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for the juvenile. Robert E. McDonnell, Deana K. El-Mallawany, & Nathaniel P. Bruhn, for American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief. GANTS, J. A Juvenile Court judge allowed the juvenile’s motion to dismiss a delinquency complaint charging one count of possession of a class D substance (marijuana) with intent to distribute after concluding that the complaint was not supported by probable cause that the juvenile intended to distribute the marijuana in his possession. The judge declared that, where a complaint is to be dismissed, he believed it “offensive to arraign a child . . . just to put it on the child’s record,” but concluded that he was obliged to arraign the juvenile before dismissing the complaint. The Commonwealth appealed the dismissal of the complaint. We affirm the judge’s dismissal of the delinquency complaint, concluding that the information in the complaint application fell short of probable cause to believe that the juvenile intended to distribute the marijuana in his possession. We also declare that a Juvenile Court judge, in his or her discretion, may allow a motion to dismiss before the arraignment of a juvenile where the judge concludes that prearraignment dismissal is in both the best interests of the child and the interests of justice., Background. We describe the facts as set forth in the police incident report filed in support of the application for the complaint. On January 24, 2011, a Boston school police officer and the dean of discipline (dean) of a Boston high school were posted at the back door of the high school’s cafeteria, monitoring students who […]
Commonwealth v. Quint Q., a juvenile (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-135-13)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 12‑P‑1154 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. QUINT Q., a juvenile. No. 12‑P‑1154. Suffolk. May 8, 2013. ‑ November 12, 2013. Present: Cypher, Vuono, & Meade, JJ. Constitutional Law, Admissions and confessions, Parent and child, Voluntariness of statement, Waiver of constitutional right by juvenile. Practice, Criminal, Motion to suppress, Waiver, Voluntariness of statement. Waiver. Words, “Interested adult.” Complaint received and sworn to in the Suffolk County Division of the Juvenile Court Department on March 29, 2011. A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Peter M. Coyne, J. An application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory appeal was allowed by Robert J. Cordy, J., in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk; and the appeal was reported by him to the Appeals Court. Sarah H. Montgomery, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. Michael A. Contant for the juvenile. CYPHER, J. A complaint issued in the Suffolk County Division of the Juvenile Court Department charging the juvenile with breaking and entering in the daytime with the intent to commit a felony therein, G. L. c. 266, § 18. The juvenile filed a motion to suppress statements he made at the police station during an interrogation. During the interrogation, the juvenile, age fifteen years and eight months at that time, made oral admissions that earlier that day, he had taken a tool from his high school and, in the company of two friends, used it to pry open the door to a house located at 35 Darling Street in the Mission Hill area of Boston, which the three then entered. Later in the fifty-minute interview, the juvenile admitted to breaking into five other homes on earlier dates. The statement was electronically recorded with his consent, and that audio recording was admitted in evidence at the suppression hearing. In the juvenile’s motion papers, he argued that he was not afforded an opportunity to consult with an interested adult, i.e., his mother, and that the police use of an interrogation technique known as “minimization,” combined with implied promises of leniency, rendered his statement involuntary. After a review of the exhibits and an evidentiary hearing, a judge allowed the motion, concluding that the juvenile’s statement was not voluntary because he had been coerced by the “domineering” conduct of his mother throughout the interview, […]
Juvenile Accused of Throwing Bleach in MBTA Bus Incident
A 15-year-old is being held on $ 100,000 bail after being accused of throwing bleach in the face of a passenger riding the 28 bus last week. The juvenile, a female from Roxbury, is facing charges of unarmed robbery, willful and malicious destruction of property under $ 250, mayhem and indecent assault and battery along with co-defendant Lai Lawnnie Douglas, 22, according to Jake Wark, spokesman for the Suffolk County District Attorney’s office. Roxbury District Court Judge David Poole imposed $ 20,000 bail for Douglas. Douglas was also held on a probation detainer for violating the terms of her probation on a 2008 case out of Roxbury District Court in which she was charged with larceny from a person, witness intimidation, carrying a dangerous weapon, and assault and battery, according to Wark. Boston Juvenile Court Judge Paul Lewis revoked the juvenile defendant’s bail in an open case out of Brookline charging her with assault and battery and shoplifting. Her name is not being released because she is a juvenile. According to prosecutors, Douglas, the juvenile and a third female boarded an MBTA bus at Dudley Station at approximately 1:50 a.m. on Sunday, June 9 and sat in the rear of the bus directly across from the male victim, according to Wark. Both defendants were allegedly captured on surveillance camera slapping the victim, and prosecutors say Douglas can be seen reaching into the man’s pocket and taking cash, a credit card and personal papers that she ripped and threw at the victim, prosecutors said. The juvenile held an open bottle of liquid, later determined to be bleach, near the victim’s nose and lips and tossed the bleach at the victim’s face and chest as the defendants exited the bus at Grove Hall, prosecutors said. MBTA Transit Police last week released surveillance images of the defendants and received information from several individuals identifying Douglas and the juvenile defendant. One anonymous caller told investigators that Douglas commented on Facebook that she was “going on the run” as a result of the incident, which prosecutors said was confirmed by police. The victim is continuing to receive treatment for impaired vision caused by the bleach thrown in his eye. The juvenile will be back in court July 1, Douglas will return to court July 19. SOUTH END PATCH: Facebook | Twitter | E-mail Updates South End Patch
Commonwealth v. Hanson H., a juvenile (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-065-13)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC‑11121 COMMONWEALTH vs. HANSON H., a juvenile. Hampden. December 6, 2012. ‑ April 11, 2013. Present: Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ. Juvenile Court, Delinquent child, Probation. Sex Offender. Global Positioning System Device. Statute, Construction. Complaint received and sworn to in the Hampden County Division of the Juvenile Court Department on March 1, 2010. A motion for relief from a condition of probation was heard by Judith J. Phillips, J. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. Ryan M. Schiff, Committee for Public Counsel Services (Stephanie Stolk Ormsby, Committee for Public Counsel Services, with him) for the juvenile. Katherine A. Robertson, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. GANTS, J. The issue presented in this case is whether a Juvenile Court judge is required under G. L. c. 265, § 47, to order a juvenile to wear a global positioning system device that will monitor his whereabouts (GPS monitoring) as a condition of probation where a juvenile is adjudicated delinquent and placed on probation for committing a “sex offense,” a “sex offense involving a child,” or a “sexually violent offense,” as defined in G. L. c. 6, § 178C. We conclude that, when § 47 is read in its entirety, it is not apparent that the Legislature intended to apply mandatory GPS monitoring to juveniles placed on probation as a result of having been adjudicated delinquent and thereby eliminate the discretion granted to Juvenile Court judges to render individualized dispositions consistent with the best interests of the child. We also conclude that, where the Legislature has established the statutory principle that, “as far as practicable, [juveniles] shall be treated, not as criminals, but as children in need of aid, encouragement and guidance,” G. L. c. 119, § 53, we will not interpret a statute affecting the delinquency adjudications of juveniles to conflict with this principle in the absence of clear legislative intent. Here, where such clear legislative intent is absent, we conclude that a Juvenile Court judge retains the discretion, based on the totality of the circumstances, to determine whether GPS monitoring should be imposed as a condition of probation for a juvenile who is adjudicated delinquent after committing a sex offense.[1] Background. The juvenile, a fifteen year old boy, was accused of rubbing his fingers […]