In the Matter of: Dwyer-Jones, Suzanne T. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-018-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11516 IN THE MATTER OF SUZANNE T. DWYER-JONES. Suffolk. October 6, 2014. – February 5, 2015. Present: Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Attorney at Law, Reciprocal discipline, Suspension, Disability, Inactive status. Information filed in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk on May 16, 2012. A petition to transfer to disability inactive status was heard by Gants, J. Thomas R. Kiley for the respondent. John W. Marshall, Assistant Bar Counsel. SPINA, J. We consider in this case whether an attorney who has been suspended from the practice of law in another jurisdiction based on mental health conditions or substance abuse is subject to reciprocal transfer to disability inactive status in Massachusetts without a separate hearing in Massachusetts to determine her incapacity. See S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 13 (1), as amended, 435 Mass. 1302 (2002). We conclude that she is. 1. Background. The respondent, Suzanne T. Dwyer-Jones, has been admitted to practice in both Maine and Massachusetts. On March 25, 2013, a final hearing was held before a single justice of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court on a petition filed by the Maine board of overseers of the bar for suspension of the respondent pursuant to Me. Bar R. 7.3(e)(2)(B). That rule permits the board to file a petition directly with the court where it is alleged that “the continued practice of [an] attorney poses a substantial threat of irreparable harm to the public,” id., because the attorney is “incapacitated from continuing practice by reason of mental infirmity or addiction to drugs or intoxicants.” Me. Bar R. 7.3(e)(2)(A). After the hearing, at which the respondent was both present and represented by counsel, the Maine single justice found that the respondent “is afflicted with a substantial proclivity for substance abuse and a very serious mental health condition.” He stated: “[T]he combined effects of these conditions clearly produced a substantial incapacity that adversely impacted [the respondent’s] ability to practice law and resulted in a substantial threat of irreparable harm to the public. Indeed, . . . she was essentially unable to manage her own affairs, let alone the complex matters involved in the representation of others. The court finds that the incapacitating symptoms of these conditions remain essentially as florid today as they were during […]
In the Matter of: Dwyer-Jones, Suzanne T. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-018-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11516 IN THE MATTER OF SUZANNE T. DWYER-JONES. Suffolk. October 6, 2014. – February 5, 2015. Present: Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Attorney at Law, Reciprocal discipline, Suspension, Disability, Inactive status. Information filed in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk on May 16, 2012. A petition to transfer to disability inactive status was heard by Gants, J. Thomas R. Kiley for the respondent. John W. Marshall, Assistant Bar Counsel. SPINA, J. We consider in this case whether an attorney who has been suspended from the practice of law in another jurisdiction based on mental health conditions or substance abuse is subject to reciprocal transfer to disability inactive status in Massachusetts without a separate hearing in Massachusetts to determine her incapacity. See S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 13 (1), as amended, 435 Mass. 1302 (2002). We conclude that she is. 1. Background. The respondent, Suzanne T. Dwyer-Jones, has been admitted to practice in both Maine and Massachusetts. On March 25, 2013, a final hearing was held before a single justice of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court on a petition filed by the Maine board of overseers of the bar for suspension of the respondent pursuant to Me. Bar R. 7.3(e)(2)(B). That rule permits the board to file a petition directly with the court where it is alleged that “the continued practice of [an] attorney poses a substantial threat of irreparable harm to the public,” id., because the attorney is “incapacitated from continuing practice by reason of mental infirmity or addiction to drugs or intoxicants.” Me. Bar R. 7.3(e)(2)(A). After the hearing, at which the respondent was both present and represented by counsel, the Maine single justice found that the respondent “is afflicted with a substantial proclivity for substance abuse and a very serious mental health condition.” He stated: “[T]he combined effects of these conditions clearly produced a substantial incapacity that adversely impacted [the respondent’s] ability to practice law and resulted in a substantial threat of irreparable harm to the public. Indeed, . . . she was essentially unable to manage her own affairs, let alone the complex matters involved in the representation of others. The court finds that the incapacitating symptoms of these conditions remain essentially as florid today as they were during […]
In the Matter of a Grand Jury Investigation (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-004-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11697 IN THE MATTER OF A GRAND JURY INVESTIGATION. Suffolk. September 4, 2014. – January 12, 2015. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Grand Jury. Subpoena. Cellular Telephone. Constitutional Law, Grand jury, Subpoena, Self-incrimination. Practice, Criminal, Grand jury proceedings, Subpoena duces tecum, Warrant. Evidence, Grand jury proceedings. Attorney at Law, Attorney-client relationship. Search and Seizure, Warrant, Probable cause. Probable Cause. Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk on April 7, 2014. The case was reserved and reported by Botsford, J. Aaron M. Katz (Patrick Welsh with him) for the petitioner. James L. Sultan (Charles W. Rankin with him) for the amicus curiae. Teresa K. Anderson, Assistant District Attorney (Patrick M. Haggan, Assistant District Attorney, with her) for the Commonwealth. LENK, J. This appeal arises from a petition brought under G. L. c. 211, § 3, challenging a Superior Court judge’s order approving the issuance of a grand jury subpoena duces tecum that compels a law firm to produce a cellular telephone. The single justice reserved and reported the matter to this court, and our analysis is confined to the limited record before us. The Commonwealth contends that the telephone belonged to John Doe,[1] the target of a grand jury investigation; that it was transferred from Doe to the law firm to obtain legal advice; and that it contains in the information stored on its memory, particularly in its record of text messages, evidence of a crime under investigation by the grand jury. The Superior Court judge determined that, while a subpoena served on Doe would violate his right against self-incrimination, and a subpoena served on the law firm would violate the attorney-client privilege, a subpoena compelling the law firm to produce the telephone could be served upon an ex parte showing by the Commonwealth of probable cause sufficient for the issuance of a search warrant. We conclude that, on the record before us, the attorney-client privilege protects Doe against compelled production of the telephone by the law firm, and that the protection afforded by the attorney-client privilege may not be set aside based on a showing of probable cause. We therefore reverse the Superior Court judge’s order. 1. Background. The law firm began representing Doe in April, 2013. According to the Commonwealth, in June, 2013, Doe transferred the telephone to the law firm in connection with its provision of legal services to him.[2] In March, 2014, the Commonwealth moved […]
In the Matter of the Estate of Rosen (and a companion case) (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-165-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 13-P-221 Appeals Court IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF FRED S. ROSEN (and a companion case[1]). No. 13-P-221. Suffolk. December 10, 2013. – December 30, 2014. Present: Berry, Meade, & Agnes, JJ. Will, Testamentary capacity, Power of appointment, Construction. Devise and Legacy, Power of appointment. Probate Court, Attorney’s fees. Practice, Civil, Attorney’s fees, Summary judgment. Power of Appointment. Petition for probate of a will filed in the Suffolk Division of the Probate and Family Court Department on June 8, 2005. Complaint in equity filed in the Suffolk Division of the Probate and Family Court Department on October 14, 2005. After consolidation, the cases were heard by Elaine J. Moriarty, J., on motions for summary judgment; the cases were heard by her; and a motion for attorney’s fees was considered by her. Susan E. Stenger for William P. Girard. Michael H. Riley for Rachelle A. Rosenbaum & others. BERRY, J. William P. Girard,[2] will contestant and plaintiff in an equity action consolidated in the Probate and Family Court, appeals from (1) a decree allowing the will of Fred S. Rosen (decedent or testator), (2) a judgment dismissing Girard’s complaint in equity against Mayya Geha, Mirna Geha Andrews, and Tanya Geha (Geha sisters), which challenged the decedent’s beneficiary designation for his Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of America – College Retirement Equities Fund (TIAA-CREF) account, (3) a judgment on a counterclaim brought in the equity action by the Geha sisters that held the TIAA-CREF beneficiary designation valid. Girard first argues that the testator lacked testamentary capacity when, on May 12, 2005, the testator executed his will and changed the beneficiary designation on his TIAA-CREF account. He also argues that regardless of the allowance of the will, article II (tangibles remainder provision) is invalid for lack of sufficiently identifiable beneficiaries. He further contends that the award of attorney’s fees should be vacated because it is excessive and was entered before he was allowed an opportunity to respond to the petition. We affirm. Background. The testator, who had been a physician, never married, he had no children or siblings, and his parents were both deceased. However, during his seventy-four years he formed many close friendships with various colleagues and their families,[3] as well as Girard and his brother (John Girard), long-time patients he had […]
In the Matter of: Haese, Glenn H. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-084-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC‑11510 IN THE MATTER OF GLENN H. HAESE. May 16, 2014. Attorney at Law, Disciplinary proceeding, Disbarment, Misuse of client funds. Board of Bar Overseers. Due Process of Law, Continuance. Administrative Law, Substantial evidence. Evidence, Administrative proceeding. The respondent, Glenn H. Haese, appeals from a judgment of a single justice of this court disbarring him from the practice of law for multiple violations of the Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct.[1] We affirm. 1. Procedural background. Bar counsel filed a petition for discipline with the Board of Bar Overseers (board) on March 4, 2011. After requesting and receiving at least three extensions of time to answer while he sought counsel, the respondent filed an answer, pro se, on May 20, 2011. On May 26, 2011, the board notified the parties of a prehearing conference on June 28, 2011, and hearing dates in September, 2011. On June 24, 2011, the respondent filed his first request for a continuance of the hearing. At the prehearing conference, the hearing was continued to October, 2011, and the respondent was given until July 28, 2011, to obtain counsel and file an amended answer conforming to the board’s rules. In early August, the respondent, represented by counsel, moved for an extension of time to file an amended answer, and filed his second motion to continue the hearing dates, this time requesting that the hearing be continued to January, 2012. A second prehearing conference was held on August 23, 2011. The hearing committee postponed the hearing, but only until December, 2011. The respondent, through counsel, filed an amended answer on September 13, 2011. On October 26, 2011, the respondent moved to amend the hearing schedule to accommodate his and his counsel’s schedule, and an accommodation was made. Then, seven business days before the hearing was scheduled to begin, on November 22, 2011, the respondent filed his third motion to continue the hearing, accompanied by the appearance of successor counsel. Prior counsel’s notice of withdrawal followed. The respondent requested that the hearing be continued until late January or February, 2012, so that successor counsel could prepare for the hearing, and to accommodate successor counsel’s planned vacation. The hearing committee denied the motion but, on reconsideration, permitted the parties, at their option, to elect to try […]
In the Matter of Burnbaum, Michael W. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-188-13)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC‑11352 IN THE MATTER OF MICHAEL W. BURNBAUM. November 14, 2013. Attorney at Law, Reciprocal discipline, Disbarment. Following his Federal felony drug conviction, the Supreme Court of Florida granted the petition of the respondent, Michael W. Burnbaum, for disciplinary resignation from the Florida bar. Approximately twelve years later, bar counsel petitioned, pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 16, as appearing in 425 Mass. 1319 (1997), for reciprocal discipline in Massachusetts. After a hearing, a single justice of this court ordered that the respondent be suspended for three years from the practice of law in Massachusetts. Bar counsel appeals. We conclude that the respondent should be disbarred. Background. The respondent was admitted to the bar in Massachusetts on June 7, 1977, and in Florida on November 27, 1984. In 1995, he was indicted in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida on charges of conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. He eventually pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), admitting that he had met with an incarcerated client and received from the client a map to a warehouse where 145 kilograms of cocaine were located. The respondent sent that map to another client by facsimile transmission. In June, 1999, the respondent was sentenced to a 105-month term of incarceration, with four years of supervised release to follow. The respondent did not report the conviction to bar counsel in Massachusetts. S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 12 (8), as appearing in 425 Mass. 1313 (1997). On November 12, 1999, the Supreme Court of Florida allowed the respondent’s petition for disciplinary resignation, and granted him leave to seek readmission after five years.[1] The respondent did not report the discipline to the Board of Bar Overseers (board) or to bar counsel, as he was required to do by S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 16 (6). After learning of the conviction and discipline in Florida, on November 23, 2011, bar counsel filed a notice of conviction and petition for reciprocal discipline in the county court. A single justice of this court suspended the respondent from the practice of law for three years, declining to apply the suspension retroactively to the date of his […]
In the Matter of: Fletcher, Patricia Jean (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-185-13)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC‑11441 IN THE MATTER OF PATRICIA JEAN FLETCHER.[1] October 31, 2013. Attorney at Law, Reinstatement, Disbarment. Board of Bar Overseers. The petitioner, Patricia Jean Fletcher, appeals from an order of a single justice of this court denying her petition for reinstatement to the bar. We affirm. In 1992, the petitioner was temporarily suspended from the practice of law in Massachusetts following her conviction in the State of New York of “serious crimes” within the meaning of S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 12 (3) (b), as appearing in 425 Mass. 1313 (1997).[2] Bar counsel thereafter filed a petition for discipline alleging, in addition to the convictions, that the petitioner violated the terms of her New York probation, failed to report the convictions to bar counsel and to cooperate in bar counsel’s investigation, and engaged in other misconduct involving deceit and misrepresentation. See S.J.C. Rule 3:07, Canon 1, DR 1‑102 (A) (4), (5), & (6), as appearing in 382 Mass. 769 (1981); S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 3(1), as amended through 382 Mass. 820 (1981).[3] She was disbarred in 2000. Matter of Wallenstein, 16 Mass. Att’y Discipline Rep. 409 (2000). In 2011, she filed a petition for reinstatement. A hearing panel of the Board of Bar Overseers (board), after a hearing, recommended that the petition be denied. The petitioner appealed to the board, which accepted the hearing panel’s findings and recommendation and voted to recommend that the petition be denied. The matter proceeded in the county court. The single justice after hearing accepted the board’s recommendation and denied the petition for reinstatement. Discussion. We do not review in this proceeding the underlying criminal convictions on which the orders of temporary suspension and disbarment were based.[4] “Basic respect for the integrity and finality of a prior unreversed criminal judgment demands that it be conclusive on the issue of guilt and that an attorney not be permitted to retry the result at a much later date in [her] reinstatement proceedings.” Matter of Hiss, 368 Mass. 447, 450 (1975). Instead, what is at issue on a petition for reinstatement is whether the petitioner has demonstrated that she has “the moral qualifications, competency and learning in law required for admission to practice law in this Commonwealth, and that . . . her resumption of the practice of law will […]
In the Matter of: Patch, Thomas F. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-183-13)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC‑11144 IN THE MATTER OF THOMAS F. PATCH. October 21, 2013. Attorney at Law, Disciplinary proceeding, Suspension, Disbarment. Board of Bar Overseers. Bar counsel appeals from an order of a single justice of this court indefinitely suspending the respondent, Thomas F. Patch, from the practice of law. Bar counsel argues that the single justice abused his discretion by not accepting the recommendation of the Board of Bar Overseers (board) that the respondent be disbarred, and by instead ordering an indefinite suspension based on his personal observations of the respondent in the court room and his conclusion that the respondent’s misconduct was mitigated by “unresolved emotional issues.” Because we agree with bar counsel, we vacate the order of indefinite suspension and direct that a judgment enter disbarring the respondent. Background. The respondent was admitted to the practice of law in 1987. He was suspended in 2004 for a term of three months following multiple adjudications of contempt in the Probate and Family Court stemming from his own divorce litigation, in which he represented himself. Matter of Patch, 20 Mass. Att’y Discipline Rep. 445 (2004). During this earlier disciplinary proceeding, he presented evidence in mitigation indicating that clinical depression had contributed to his misconduct. Id. at 446. After serving the three-month suspension, he was reinstated. In March, 2006, the respondent was convicted in the District Court of one count of criminal harassment (G. L. c. 265, § 43A [a]), for which he was sentenced to two and one-half years in the house of correction, suspended for five years; and of two counts of violating a protective order (G. L. c. 209A, § 7), for which he was sentenced to concurrent terms of five years’ probation. As one of the terms of his probation, he was ordered to submit to a psychological evaluation, and he was later ordered to submit to mental health treatment. In January, 2007, he was found to be in violation of the terms of his probation. He was ordered to serve two and one-half years in the house of correction, with five years’ probation following his release. In November, 2007, he was convicted in the District Court of one count of witness intimidation (G. L. c. 268, § 13B). The victim of that offense was one of the mental health professionals who had conducted the respondent’s […]
In the Matter of the Estate of Sharis (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-086-13)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 12‑P‑693 Appeals Court IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF ALICE R. SHARIS. No. 12‑P‑693. Suffolk. March 20, 2013. ‑ June 28, 2013. Present: Vuono, Rubin, & Sullivan, JJ. Will, Testamentary capacity, Undue influence. Undue Influence. Petition for probate of a will filed in the Suffolk Division of the Probate and Family Court Department on April 14, 2010. The case was heard by John M. Smoot, J. Jonathan D. Plaut for Richard Spinelli. Andrew G. Bunnell for Florence Cavallaro. SULLIVAN, J. Richard Spinelli appeals from a decision of a judge of the Probate and Family Court disallowing the will of his grandmother, Alice R. Sharis (Alice),[1] on the grounds of lack of testamentary capacity and Spinelli’s undue influence. We discern no error in the judge’s conclusions that Spinelli was a fiduciary, and that the will was the product of undue influence. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.[2] 1. Background. Born in 1916, Alice came to the United States from Turkey when she was twelve years old, and completed the seventh grade. She had three daughters, Virginia, Louise, and Florence, with her first husband, whom she divorced in 1959. She had sixteen surviving grandchildren and several great-grandchildren. The decedent married her second husband, Peter, in 1961. Peter, who predeceased Alice by thirteen months, suffered from Alzheimer’s disease in the last years of his life and lived in a nursing home during the last six months of his life. Spinelli is one of Alice’s grandchildren. After separating from his wife in November, 2003, he asked Alice and Peter if he could move into their home. He remained there through Peter’s illness and death and the death of Alice on February 13, 2010. He made no monetary contributions to the upkeep or running of the home, but he did drive Alice to medical appointments and other destinations. The judge found that Spinelli gained nearly complete control of Alice and Peter’s checking account between 2006 and 2008. Spinelli signed Peter’s name to 119 checks between March 4, 2006, and February 4, 2008. Alice complained to one of her daughters and a granddaughter that she did not know where her money or checks were. On June 30, 2007, Alice signed a durable power of attorney, prepared by Spinelli, that took effect immediately and […]
In the Matter of Clerk-Magistrate Robert E. Powers (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-076-13)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC‑11292 IN THE MATTER OF CLERK-MAGISTRATE ROBERT E. POWERS. Suffolk. January 8, 2013. ‑ May 10, 2013. Present: Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ. Clerk of Court. District Court, Clerk‑Magistrate. Supreme Judicial Court, Removal of clerk of court. Practice, Civil, Proceeding for removal of clerk of court. Due Process of Law. Formal charges filed in the Supreme Judicial Court on December 19, 2011. Peter J. Haley for the respondent. Thomas O. Bean (Robert W. Langlois with him) for Committee on Professional Responsibility for Clerks of the Court. Harry Spence, court administrator for the Trial Court, amicus curiae, submitted a letter. GANTS, J. The Committee on Professional Responsibility for Clerks of the Courts (committee) has filed formal charges against the respondent, Robert E. Powers (Powers), clerk-magistrate of the Barnstable Division of the District Court Department (Barnstable District Court), alleging three counts. In the first count, the committee alleges that Powers “typically arrived one to two hours late, and thus did not contribute to the work of the Clerk’s office or the leadership of his staff during the busiest hour of the office day,” in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility for Clerks of the Courts (code), S.J.C. Rule 3:12, Canon 3, first par., as appearing in 407 Mass. 1301 (1990).[1] The second count alleges that “Powers has willfully, grossly, and continuously failed to maintain order and decorum in proceedings he presided over and to be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, lawyers, staff, judges and others in his official dealings,” thus creating “the perception in the community that the Barnstable District Court is not a place to go to be treated fairly and to receive orderly administration of justice,” in violation of Canons 3 (A) (2) and (A) (3).[2] The third count alleges that Powers was “grossly delinquent in performing administrative duties” and “has willfully, grossly, and continuously failed to promptly issue decisions for matters that are heard by him,” in violation of Canons 3 (A) (5) and (B).[3] After a six-day hearing, a hearing officer found by clear and convincing evidence that Powers had committed the alleged violations of these canons of the code, and concluded that “the public good justifies his removal from office under G. L. c. 211, § 4.” The committee adopted the findings […]