Commonwealth v. Molina (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-023-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12022 COMMONWEALTH vs. JOSUE MOLINA. Suffolk. October 6, 2016. – February 7, 2017. Present: Gants, C.J., Botsford, Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ. Obscenity, Child pornography, Dissemination of matter harmful to minor. Constitutional Law, Search and seizure, Confrontation of witnesses. Search and Seizure, Warrant, Computer. Evidence, Information stored on computer, Intent. Subpoena. Intent. Practice, Criminal, Subpoena, Restitution, Confrontation of witnesses. Restitution. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on August 27, 2012. A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Mitchell H. Kaplan, J.; the cases were heard by Brian A. Davis, J., and a motion for restitution was considered by him. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. Ethan C. Stiles for the defendant. Ryan E. Ferch, Assistant Attorney General (Nancy Ruthstein, Assistant Attorney General, also present) for the Commonwealth. BOTSFORD, J. The defendant, Josue Molina, appeals from his child pornography convictions under G. L. c. 272, §§ 29B and 29C, on three grounds. First, he argues that the search warrant for the apartment in which he was living was overbroad as to places and things to be searched. We disagree, concluding that the search warrant was appropriately particularized. Second, the defendant challenges the validity of the administrative subpoena that issued under G. L. c. 271, § 17B, for Internet service records; he argues that the subpoena, to be constitutional, could only be issued based on a showing of probable cause. We similarly reject this argument. Finally, the defendant argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove that he had the lascivious intent necessary to support a conviction under G. L. c. 272, § 29B (§ 29B). Although we agree with the defendant that lascivious intent is required to be proved with respect to every type of conduct proscribed by § 29B, we conclude that this requirement was met in this case. We affirm the defendant’s convictions. The Commonwealth cross-appeals, arguing that it is entitled to a restitution hearing in this case, and that the victim for whom the Commonwealth seeks restitution is not required as a matter of law to appear and testify in order to protect the defendant’s constitutional right of confrontation. We agree, and remand for the requested restitution hearing. Background.[1] a. File-sharing. The dissemination […]
Molina v. State Garden, Inc. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-126-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 14-P-676 Appeals Court ANTONIO PEREZ MOLINA vs. STATE GARDEN, INC. No. 14-P-676. Suffolk. December 10, 2014. – September 3, 2015. Present: Katzmann, Hanlon, & Maldonado, JJ. Practice, Civil, Summary judgment. Workers’ Compensation Act, Action against third person, Identity of employer, Exclusivity provision. Waiver. Insurance, Waiver. Release. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on October 17, 2011. The case was heard by Robert B. Gordon, J., on a motion for summary judgment. Mark S. Horrigan for the plaintiff. Martha J. Zackin for the defendant. John Pagliaro & Martin J. Newhouse, for New England Legal Foundation & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief. KATZMANN, J. This appeal presents the question whether the “alternate employer endorsement” to a staffing company’s workers’ compensation insurance policy satisfies the requirements of G. L. c. 152, §§ 15 and 18, such that an injured employee’s employer, a customer of the staffing company and named in the endorsement, is immune from tort liability under the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act). We answer that question in the affirmative. The plaintiff, Antonio Perez Molina (Molina or employee), was injured while providing services on assignment from American Resource Staffing Network, Inc. (ARS), to State Garden, Inc. (State Garden or defendant), and brought suit against State Garden for negligence. While his case was pending in the trial court, he was awarded workers’ compensation benefits on ARS’s policy, which named the defendant as an additional insured. A Superior Court judge allowed State Garden’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed Molina’s complaint on the ground that his claim was barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Act, G. L. c. 152, §§ 23-24.[1] Molina appeals. We affirm.[2] Background. ARS is a staffing company that provides temporary staffing to clients such as State Garden, a produce business. State Garden uses ARS employees to supplement its workforce. Molina was assigned to State Garden as a temporary worker at its processing facility in Chelsea, Massachusetts. On or about December 22, 2010, Molina sustained a low back injury in the course of his work for State Garden.[3] Molina’s injury was covered by the Act. He applied for and received benefits from A.I.M. Mutual Insurance Company, ARS’s workers’ compensation insurer. State Garden and ARS both acted as Molina’s employer, controlling different aspects of his employment. ARS was the “general employer,” to whom Molina applied for […]
Commonwealth v. Molina (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-016-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC‑11329 COMMONWEALTH vs. ALEXANDER MOLINA. Bristol. October 7, 2013. ‑ January 29, 2014. Present: Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, & Duffly, JJ. Constitutional Law, Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness of statement. Evidence, Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness of statement. Practice, Criminal, Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness of statement. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on July 21, 2005. A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by David A. McLaughlin, J., and the cases were tried before Richard T. Moses, J. After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. David Keighley for the defendant. David J. Gold, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. BOTSFORD, J. Following a jury trial in the Superior Court, the defendant, Alexander Molina, was convicted of murder in the second degree, unlawful possession of a firearm while not at work or at home, and discharge of a firearm within five hundred feet of a building. The defendant appealed, and the Appeals Court affirmed the convictions. See Commonwealth v. Molina, 81 Mass. App. Ct. 855 (2012). We granted the defendant’s application for further appellate review, limited to issues concerning the admissibility of statements that the defendant made to the police during an interview conducted at the New Bedford police station on March 30, 2005. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. 1. Background. The facts of the case are summarized in the Appeals Court’s decision, see Molina, 81 Mass. App. Ct. at 856-857; we describe them briefly here. The victim, James Gauoette, was shot to death at around 5 P.M. on March 30, 2005, near the intersection of Ruth and Salisbury Streets in New Bedford. Three eyewitnesses, who were present near that intersection, testified at trial and provided details about their observations of the shooter. Two of the three testified that the shooter wore a mustard-colored or yellow shirt, and two of the three also stated that soon after the shooting, they observed the shooter in a brown jogging suit or brown sweatshirt. At trial, two of the three witnesses identified the defendant as the shooter. At approximately 10 P.M. on the same day, the police prepared to tow a bluish-green Mazda Protegé automobile that was within the environs of the crime scene. The […]