Cournoyer v. Department of State Police, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-037-18)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 17-P-579 Appeals Court ARTHUR COURNOYER vs. DEPARTMENT OF STATE POLICE & another.[1] No. 17-P-579. Middlesex. January 8, 2018. – April 2, 2018. Present: Blake, Neyman, & Ditkoff, JJ. State Police. Retirement. Police, Retirement, Training program, Authority of police chief. Public Employment, Police, Retirement, Reinstatement of personnel. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on March 14, 2016. A motion to dismiss was heard by Bruce R. Henry, J. Scott W. Lang (Jennifer Davis also present) for the plaintiff. Samuel M. Furgang, Assistant Attorney General, for the defendants. DITKOFF, J. The plaintiff, Arthur Cournoyer, appeals from a Superior Court judgment dismissing his claims for declaratory judgment and specific performance against the defendants. The plaintiff argues that the Department of State Police (department) is required by G. L. c. 22C, § 24A, to develop individualized training programs for former State police troopers seeking reinstatement, rather than require them to complete recruit training at the State police academy (academy). Concluding that the statute is unambiguous and that the department may require former troopers separated for more than three years to complete recruit training, we affirm, ordering that the judgment be modified to declare the rights of the parties. Standard of review. We review a ruling on a motion to dismiss de novo, Rodriguez v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Authy., 92 Mass. App. Ct. 26, 28 (2017), taking the complaint’s allegations as true, as well all reasonable inferences drawn in the plaintiff’s favor, Saliba v. Worcester, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 408, 412 (2017). To survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must present factual allegations that rise above the level of speculation, Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636 (2008), and plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief, Flagg v. AliMed, Inc., 466 Mass. 23, 26 (2013). Background. The plaintiff was a State police trooper from 1992 until 2000.[2] While so employed, the plaintiff received positive performance evaluations, and he completed all required in-service training in addition to numerous programs, certifications, and service in specialized areas of law enforcement. In 1998, however, the plaintiff suffered a severe injury while on duty, requiring medical leave and ultimately causing his involuntary retirement in 2000. Following several operations and physical rehabilitation, the plaintiff was able to obtain employment, working for the Worcester County sheriff’s department […]
Malden Police Patrolman’s Association v. City of Malden (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-103-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 16-P-494 Appeals Court MALDEN POLICE PATROLMAN’S ASSOCIATION vs. CITY OF MALDEN. No. 16-P-494. Middlesex. February 7, 2017. – August 11, 2017. Present: Trainor, Blake, & Shin, JJ. Practice, Civil, Motion to dismiss, Summary judgment. Superior Court. Rules of the Superior Court. Administrative Law, Primary jurisdiction, Exhaustion of remedies. Unjust Enrichment. Contract, Collective bargaining contract, Unjust enrichment, Promissory estoppel. Public Employment, Collective bargaining. Police, Collective bargaining. Massachusetts Wage Act. Civil Service, Collective bargaining, Municipal finance. Municipal Corporations, Collective bargaining, Municipal finance. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on January 21, 2015. The case was heard by Bruce R. Henry, J., on motions to dismiss and for summary judgment. Christopher G. Fallon for the plaintiff. Albert R. Mason for the defendant. BLAKE, J. The plaintiff, Malden Police Patrolman’s Association (union), is a labor organization comprised of approximately seventy-nine police officers employed by the defendant, the city of Malden (city). The union and the city were parties to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) covering three fiscal years from July 1, 2010, through June 30, 2013. The CBA set forth the provisions governing, among other matters, paid detail work performed by the officers.[1] During the summer of 2014, the union notified the city that it was in arrears on the payment of compensation to officers for detail work, requested a written explanation for the nonpayment, and demanded the outstanding detail pay. The city took the position that, because the officers earned the detail pay for work performed for third parties, the city was exempt from the provisions of the Massachusetts wage and hour laws, requiring timely payment of earned wages. On January 21, 2015, the union filed a complaint in the Superior Court against the city,[2] alleging that the city owed the officers approximately $ 410,000 in compensation for the performance of past detail work.[3] The complaint requested relief under theories of breach of contract (count I), breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (count II), promissory estoppel (count III), unjust enrichment (count IV), and violation of the Massachusetts Wage Act, G. L. c. 149, § 148 (Wage Act) (count V). The union then filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 56, 365 Mass. 824 (1974). The city moved to dismiss the union’s complaint or, in […]
Categories: News Tags: 1110317, Association, City, Lawyers, Malden, Patrolman’s, Police, Weekly
City of Boston v. Boston Police Patrolmen’s Association (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-118-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12077 CITY OF BOSTON vs. BOSTON POLICE PATROLMEN’S ASSOCIATION. Suffolk. December 5, 2016. – July 12, 2017. Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ. Arbitration, Confirmation of award, Authority of arbitrator. Municipal Corporations, Police. Police, Discharge. Public Employment, Police, Termination. Public Policy. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on July 22, 2013. The case was heard by Dennis J. Curran, J. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. Kay H. Hodge (Geoffrey R. Bok also present) for the plaintiff. Alan H. Shapiro (John M. Becker also present) for the defendant. HINES, J. This is an appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court confirming an arbitrator’s award reinstating a Boston police officer terminated for using a choke hold in arresting an unarmed suspect for disorderly conduct and making false statements in the ensuing departmental investigation. The arbitrator found that the officer, David Williams, had applied a choke hold, but that the choke hold had not actually choked the citizen, that the force was reasonable in the circumstances, and that the officer’s subsequent characterization of events was thus truthful. Accordingly, the arbitrator ruled that the city of Boston (city) lacked just cause to terminate Williams, and ordered his reinstatement with back pay. In July, 2013, the city filed a complaint in the Superior Court to vacate the arbitrator’s award. The court dismissed the complaint in June, 2015, and the city appealed. We granted the city’s application for direct appellate review. Because the award neither exceeds the arbitrator’s authority nor violates public policy, and because we are not free to vacate it where no underlying misconduct was found, we affirm. Background. a. Facts. On January 18, 2012, the city discharged Williams based on specifications arising from a disorderly conduct arrest on March 16, 2009. The specifications were use of excessive force, in violation of Boston police department rule 304 on use of nonlethal force, and untruthfulness in the subsequent investigation, in violation of rule 102, § 23, on truthfulness. Chosen by mutual agreement of the city and the Boston Police Patrolmen’s Association (union) pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), an arbitrator held three days of hearings, concluded that the city had proved neither charge, and ordered Williams’s reinstatement […]
Categories: News Tags: 1011817, Association, boston, City, Lawyers, Patrolmen’s, Police, Weekly
Dudley v. Massachusetts State Police (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-071-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 16-P-2 Appeals Court RICHARD DUDLEY, JR. vs. MASSACHUSETTS STATE POLICE. No. 16-P-2. Bristol. December 1, 2016. – June 1, 2017. Present: Cypher, Maldonado, & Blake, JJ.[1] Massachusetts Tort Claims Act. Governmental Immunity. Dog. Police, Negligence. Negligence, Governmental immunity, Police. Practice, Civil, Summary judgment. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on February 1, 2013. The case was heard by William F. Sullivan, J., on a motion for summary judgment. Jason R. Markle for the plaintiff. Andrew W. Koster, Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant. MALDONADO, J. The plaintiff, Richard Dudley, Jr., commenced this negligence action, pursuant to the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act (Act), G. L. c. 258, seeking damages from the defendant, Massachusetts State Police (State police), for injuries he suffered as a result of being attacked, in a public parking lot, by a trained police dog. Moments before the attack occurred, State Trooper Edward T. Blackwell, an experienced police canine handler, had been in pursuit of a criminal suspect who fled, on foot, taking a circuitous route through that parking lot. Dudley sued the State police, a public employer and agent of the Commonwealth,[2] alleging that Trooper Blackwell’s conduct, in releasing the police dog to apprehend a suspect in a public space, where the presence of others would be expected, created a foreseeable and substantial risk of harm to an innocent bystander. The State police answered the complaint, engaged in discovery, and then filed a motion for summary judgment, based on the ground of sovereign immunity under G. L. c. 258. Following a hearing, a judge of the Superior Court allowed the State police’s motion, ruling that Dudley’s negligence claim was barred by the immunity provisions of the Act, §§ 10(b) and (j). Dudley appeals from the separate and final judgment. See Mass.R.Civ.P.54(b), 365 Mass. 820 (1974). We reverse. Background. The chase. In the early afternoon of May 6, 2011, William P. Monopoli led several State police troopers on a high-speed motor vehicle chase, which began in Boston and ended in West Bridgewater. While speeding down the highway, Monopoli abruptly pulled his truck off the road onto an exit ramp. At the top of the ramp, Monopoli lost control of his truck, crossed the roadway’s double yellow lines, and crashed into a guardrail or curb. He then exited his […]
Alves v. Massachusetts State Police, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-001-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 15-P-1531 Appeals Court DAVID A. ALVES vs. MASSACHUSETTS STATE POLICE & others.[1] No. 15-P-1531. Bristol. November 3, 2016. – January 4, 2017. Present: Agnes, Blake, & Desmond, JJ. Res Judicata. Collateral Estoppel. Judgment, Preclusive effect. Negligence, Police. Practice, Civil, Summary judgment. State Police. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on June 29, 2012. The case was heard by Richard T. Moses, J., on a motion for summary judgment. Sonja L. Deyoe for the plaintiff. Adam R. LaGrassa, Assistant Attorney General, for Massachusetts State Police. BLAKE, J. Following the execution of an anticipatory search warrant, Massachusetts State police officers arrested the plaintiff, David A. Alves, on various charges stemming from the seizure of a package containing approximately twenty-five pounds of marijuana. The charges were subsequently dismissed, whereupon Alves filed a civil suit in the Superior Court asserting Federal civil rights violations against two State police officers, Paul Baker and William Donnelly, and negligence claims against the State police. The officers removed the Federal claims to the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts (Federal District Court), where a magistrate judge allowed Baker’s motion for summary judgment.[2] The State police then filed a motion for summary judgment in the Superior Court, where the State-based claims remained. Relying on the findings of fact made by the magistrate judge in his resolution of the Federal claims, a judge of the Superior Court allowed the motion. Alves now appeals. We agree that the matter is governed by principles of issue preclusion and accordingly affirm. Background. After intercepting a suspicious package addressed to a recipient in Massachusetts, a postal inspector at the processing and distribution center of the United States Postal Service in Providence, Rhode Island obtained a Federal search warrant to search the package.[3] The inspector found approximately twenty-five pounds of marijuana in the package, with an approximate street value of $ 35,000. The inspector contacted Baker, a Massachusetts State police trooper, who obtained an anticipatory search warrant from the Taunton District Court, to be triggered by the acceptance or acquisition of the package, which bore a distinctive tracking number, and was addressed to “John Couture 443 Weir Street, Taunton, MA.” The search warrant authorized the retrieval of the package from “44 [sic] Weir Street . . . [a] […]
Frawley v. Police Commissioner of Cambridge (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-028-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11903 JOSEPH F. FRAWLEY, JR. vs. POLICE COMMISSIONER OF CAMBRIDGE. Middlesex. November 5, 2015. – March 4, 2016. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Firearms. Police, Firearms, Retirement. Public Employment, Police. Declaratory Relief. Practice, Civil, Summary judgment, Injunctive relief, Relief in the nature of certiorari. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on November 13, 2012. The case was heard by Douglas H. Wilkins, J., on motions for summary judgment. The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. Samuel A. Aylesworth, Assistant City Solicitor, for the defendant. James F. Lamond (Dennis M. Coyne with him) for the plaintiff. SPINA, J. When Joseph F. Frawley, Jr., retired on March 4, 2004, from his position as a sergeant with the Cambridge police department (department), the police commissioner for the city of Cambridge (city) issued him a “retired officer identification card” (ID card) that had no expiration date. On December 22, 2011, Frawley applied for the issuance of a replacement ID card because the one in his possession had broken. The successor police commissioner (commissioner) denied the application, stating that Frawley “ha[d] not met the standard set by the Department.” On November 28, 2012, Frawley filed an amended complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief in the Superior Court. He sought a declaration that the commissioner had breached his duty under 501 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 13.00 (2008) (regulations), which set forth the standards for identification cards for retired law enforcement officers, by refusing to issue Frawley a replacement ID card. The ID card, together with a so-called “Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act Training and Certification Card” (training certification card), allows the holder to carry a concealed firearm in accordance with the provisions of the Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act of 2004 (LEOSA), Pub. L. No. 108-277, 118 Stat. 865 (2004), codified insofar as relevant here at 18 U.S.C. § 926C (2012). See 501 Code Mass. Regs. § 13.04(2)(a). After determining that Frawley had standing to seek declaratory relief, a judge allowed Frawley’s motion for summary judgment, declaring that he was entitled to receive a replacement ID card because he had retired “in good standing.” Id. at §§ 13.02, 13.03. The commissioner appealed, and we transferred the case to […]
Pugsley v. Police Department of Boston, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-133-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11740 SEAN PUGSLEY vs. POLICE DEPARTMENT OF BOSTON & others.[1] Suffolk. January 6, 2015. – July 31, 2015. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Boston. Municipal Corporations, Police. Police, Hiring. Anti-Discrimination Law, Sex, Bona fide occupational qualification. Employment, Discrimination. Practice, Civil, Standing. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on June 2, 2011. The case was heard by Carol S. Ball, J., on motions for summary judgment, and entry of final judgment was ordered by Frances A. McIntyre, J. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. Joseph L. Sulman (David Isaac Brody with him) for the plaintiff. Nicole I. Taub for police department of Boston. Nicholas A. Ogden, Assistant Attorney General (Ronald F. Kehoe, Assistant Attorney General, with him) for Human Resources Division & another. The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: Jamie Ann Sabino & Leah Kaine for The Women’s Bar Association of Massachusetts. Ralph C. Martin & Lisa A. Sinclair for Northeastern University. Simone R. Liebman & Constance M. McGrane for Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination. CORDY, J. The plaintiff, Sean Pugsley, brought a claim of sex discrimination against defendants Boston police department (department) and the Commonwealth’s Human Resources Division (division) alleging a violation of G. L. c. 151B and of the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, G. L. c. 12, § 11I. The plaintiff’s claim arises from the department’s preferential treatment of females in hiring candidates for the December, 2010, police academy class. Summary judgment was entered for the defendants on the discrimination claim, G. L. c. 151B.[2] For the reasons stated herein, we vacate the judgment of the Superior Court and remand the case for entry of a judgment of dismissal for lack of standing. 1. Background. Under G. L. c. 31 and the division’s personnel administration rules (rules), the department appoints entry-level police officers from a “main certification” list generated by the division at the department’s request. The division creates this list by ranking candidates on an eligibility list according to their scores on the most recent civil service examination (examination). The eligibility list is then augmented by candidates for “reemployment,”[3] and candidates who possess statutory preferences, including veterans’ preferences. The candidates for reemployment are required to be placed first on the main certification list, followed by those with statutory preferences,[4] […]
Chief of Police of the City of Worcester v. Holden (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-041-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11682 CHIEF OF POLICE OF THE CITY OF WORCESTER vs. RAYMOND J. HOLDEN, JR. Worcester. November 6, 2014. – March 11, 2015. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Firearms. License. Constitutional Law, Right to bear arms, Vagueness of statute. Due Process of Law, Revocation of license, Vagueness of statute. Words, “Suitable person.” Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on December 6, 2011. The case was heard by James R. Lemire, J., on motions for judgment on the pleadings. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. Mel L. Greenberg for the defendant. Kevin M. Gould, Assistant City Solicitor (David M. Moore, City Solicitor, with him) for the plaintiff. Julia Kobick, Assistant Attorney General, for the Commonwealth, amicus curiae. The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: Jonathan E. Lowy, Kelly Sampson, Elizabeth Burke, Jonathan L. Diesenhaus, James W. Clayton, & Anna M. Kelly, of the District of Columbia, & Kathy B. Weinman for Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence. Ben T. Clements & Lila E. Slovak for Massachusetts Chiefs of Police Association, Inc., & others. Edward F. George, Jr., & Susan Chu for Gun Owners’ Action League, Inc. Karen L. MacNutt for Commonwealth Second Amendment, Inc. SPINA, J. This case mounts a challenge under the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution[1] to the constitutionality of the “suitable person” standard in G. L. c. 140, § 131 (d) and (f), as amended through St. 1998, c. 180, § 41, by which licenses to carry firearms were issued, suspended, or revoked between 2005 and 2010.[2] The chief of police of the city of Worcester (chief) determined, based on the history of domestic violence of Raymond J. Holden, Jr., against his wife, that Holden was not a suitable person to have such a license. Holden sought judicial review of three separate adverse decisions of the chief: suspension of his license, then revocation of his license, and finally denial of his application for a new license to carry. After a complex history of District Court litigation that was consolidated and resolved largely in favor of Holden, the chief sought certiorari review in the Superior Court. On cross motions for judgment on the pleadings, a judge in the Superior Court ruled in favor of the […]
Plourde v. Police Department of Lawrence (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-037-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 13‑P‑650 Appeals Court RONALD PLOURDE vs. POLICE DEPARTMENT OF LAWRENCE. No. 13‑P‑650. Essex. January 7, 2014. ‑ April 9, 2014. Present: Katzmann, Fecteau, & Milkey, JJ. Massachusetts Wage Act. Governmental Immunity. Public Employment, Collective bargaining, Compensatory time. Employment. Contract, Employment, Collective bargaining contract. Labor, Collective bargaining, Failure to pay wages. Police, Collective bargaining, Compensation, Municipality’s liability. Municipal Corporations, Police, Governmental immunity, Special act. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on September 26, 2011. The case was heard by Robert A. Cornetta, J., on motions for summary judgment, and a motion for reconsideration was considered by him. Corinne Hood Greene for the plaintiff. Charles D. Boddy, Jr., City Attorney, for the defendant. Harold Lichten, for Professional Firefighters of Massachusetts, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. FECTEAU, J. The plaintiff, Ronald Plourde, a former captain of the Lawrence police department (department or defendant), appeals from the denial of his motion for summary judgment and the allowance of the department’s motion for summary judgment, by a judge in the Superior Court. The plaintiff had sued the city of Lawrence for the value of compensatory time that he had earned and accrued prior to being injured on duty in 2006. He retired due to his disability in 2010 without ever having returned to active duty. In granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the motion judge dismissed the plaintiff’s claims for breach of contract, breach of good faith and fair dealing, and a claim under G. L. c. 149, § 148, and G. L. c. 151 (collectively, Wage Act). Following the allowance of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration, which the judge denied, confirming his previous ruling that the plaintiff’s Wage Act claim was barred by sovereign immunity and the provisions of St. 1990, c. 41 (Lawrence Act), which established financial conditions for Lawrence. Because sovereign immunity is inapplicable to this case and because the Lawrence Act cannot be read to negate the defendant’s obligations under the Wage Act, we reverse. 1. Background. The summary judgment records contain the following undisputed facts. The plaintiff was employed by the defendant as a police officer from 1985 through 2010. The plaintiff was promoted to captain in 2002 and remained in that position until he retired in […]