Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 326573 v. Sex Offender Registry Board (and a consolidated case) (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-109-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12182 JOHN DOE, SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD NO. 326573 vs. SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD (and a consolidated case[1]). Suffolk. February 7, 2017. – June 23, 2017. Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ. Sex Offender. Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act. Internet. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on November 21, 2014. A motion for preliminary injunction was heard by Gregg J. Pasquale, J., and the case was reported by him to the Appeals Court. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on June 22, 2015. A motion for a preliminary injunction was heard by Heidi E. Brieger, J. A proceeding for interlocutory review was allowed in the Appeals Court by Judd J. Carhart, J. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. Andrew S. Crouch for John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 326573, & another. John P. Bossé for the defendant. Dana Goldblatt, for Committee for Public Counsel Services, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. GANTS, C.J. In Moe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 467 Mass. 598, 616 (2014), we permanently enjoined the Sex Offender Registry Board (SORB) “from publishing on the Internet the registry information of any individual who was finally classified as a level two sex offender on or before July 12, 2013, unless the individual is subsequently reclassified a level two or level three sex offender.” SORB contends in these two cases that, when it unsuccessfully seeks after July 12, 2013, to reclassify a level two sex offender as a level three sex offender, the individual is reclassified a level two sex offender for purposes of Moe, and SORB may therefore publish the individual’s registry information on the Internet. We disagree. We conclude that, under Moe, a sex offender is “reclassified” only where a hearing officer allows SORB’s motion to increase his or her classification based on new information indicating an increased risk of sexual recidivism, not, as here, where the hearing officer denied SORB’s motion for reclassification and retained the earlier level two classification. We therefore remand these cases to the Superior Court for the issuance of a permanent injunction barring publication of each plaintiff’s registry […]
Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 376575 v. Sex Offender Registry Board (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-179-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 14-P-926 Appeals Court JOHN DOE, SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD NO. 376575 vs. SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD. No. 14-P-926. Suffolk. October 20, 2016. – December 22, 2016. Present: Hanlon, Sullivan, & Blake, JJ. Sex Offender. Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act. Jurisdiction, Sex offender. Evidence, Sex offender. Obscenity, Child pornography. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on December 18, 2012. The case was heard by Paul D. Wilson, J., on a motion for judgment on the pleadings; a motion for reconsideration was considered by him; and a motion for postjudgment relief, filed on April 30, 2015, was heard by him. Christopher M. Bova for the defendant. Jay G. Hook for the plaintiff. BLAKE, J. While he was in the United States Army, John Doe No. 376575 (Doe or plaintiff) was convicted by general court martial of possession of child pornography in violation of art. 134, 10 U.S.C. § 934 (2012), the “general” provision of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (code). Following his release from military confinement, the sex offender registry board (board) classified Doe as a level two sex offender. Doe sought review in the Superior Court, where the judge concluded that the board lacked jurisdiction over Doe because his conviction under art. 134 was not a “like violation” sex offense requiring registration. See G. L. c. 6, §§ 178C-178P (sex offender registration statute). The board now appeals. We conclude that, under the circumstances here, where Doe had notice of and subsequently pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (2012), the art. 134 conviction was a “like violation” such that it constitutes a sex offense under G. L. c. 6, § 178C. We vacate the judgment.[1] Background. We summarize the facts found by the hearing examiner, supplemented by undisputed facts from the record. After a soldier stationed with the plaintiff observed what he believed to be child pornography on the plaintiff’s computer, he notified his commander, who initiated an investigation. A “U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command” final investigation report (investigation report), dated January 6, 2012, states that probable cause had been established to believe that the plaintiff had “committed the offense of Possession of Child Pornography when his personal computer was forensically examined, and multiple images of child pornography were discovered.” The investigation report further notes […]
Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 203108 v. Sex Offender Registry Board
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 13-P-848 Appeals Court JOHN DOE, SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD NO. 203108 vs. SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD. No. 13-P-848. January 29, 2016. Sex Offender. Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act. Constitutional Law, Sex offender. Due Process of Law, Sex offender, Hearing, Standard of proof. Practice, Civil, Sex offender, Standard of proof. Administrative Law, Hearing, Standard of proof. Internet. In our decision dated May 5, 2015, we affirmed a judgment of the Superior Court issued under G. L. c. 30A, § 14, affirming the administrative decision of the Sex Offender Registry Board (board) designating Doe No. 203108 (Doe) as a level three sex offender. See Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 203108 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 87 Mass. App. Ct. 313 (2015) (Doe No. 203108). Doe timely filed a petition for further appellate review (FAR) on May 18, 2015. On December 22, 2015, the Supreme Judicial Court denied Doe’s FAR application without prejudice and remanded the case to this court for further consideration in light of two recent decisions, Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 7083 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 472 Mass. 475 (2015) (Doe No. 7083), and Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 3839 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 472 Mass. 492 (2015) (Doe No. 3839). 473 Mass. 1106 (2015). Although we conclude that neither of those decisions requires us to alter our decision in Doe No. 203108, Doe is nonetheless entitled to a new classification hearing in light of Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 380316 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 473 Mass. 297 (2015) (Doe No. 380316). In this case, Doe’s classification hearing was held twenty months before his eventual release date, but just seven months before his earliest possible release date. (He had recently been denied parole, but the parole board offered him an opportunity to request reconsideration ninety days after the denial). Unlike the plaintiff in Doe No. 7083, at the time of his classification hearing Doe was not also civilly committed as a sexually dangerous person (SDP), making release on parole unlikely because of the need to obtain a Superior Court order of discharge. See Doe No. 7083, supra at 487 & n.11. Moreover, unlike the plaintiff in Doe No. 7083, Doe did not request a further continuance of his classification hearing date or ask the board to keep his classification proceeding open […]
Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 380316 v. Sex Offender Registry Board (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-198-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11823 JOHN DOE, SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD NO. 380316 vs. SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD. Middlesex. September 9, 2015. – December 11, 2015. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Sex Offender. Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act. Constitutional Law, Sex offender, Burden of proof. Due Process of Law, Sex offender, Hearing, Standard of proof. Practice, Civil, Sex offender, Standard of proof. Internet. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on November 21, 2013. The case was heard by Dennis J. Curran, J., on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. Brandon L. Campbell for the plaintiff. David L. Chenail (Elisha W. Willis with him) for the defendant. Beth L. Eisenberg & Larni S. Levy, Committee for Public Counsel Services, & Eric B. Tennen, for Committee for Public Counsel Services & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief. Andrew S. Crouch, for Youth Advocacy Division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief. LENK, J. We are asked in this case to consider anew the standard of proof that the Sex Offender Registry Board (SORB) must satisfy in order to classify a convicted sex offender under the provisions of the sex offender registry law, G. L. c. 6, §§ 178C-178Q. The plaintiff, John Doe No. 380316 (Doe), is a convicted sex offender who was classified by a preponderance of the evidence as having a moderate risk of reoffense. In Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 972 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 428 Mass. 90, 91 (1998) (Doe No. 972), we held that SORB need only prove the appropriateness of a sex offender’s risk classification by a preponderance of the evidence. In light of amendments to the sex offender registry law and other developments since our decision in that case, however, Doe contends that the preponderance standard no longer adequately protects his due process rights. We agree. For the reasons stated below, we hold that SORB is constitutionally required to prove the appropriateness of an offender’s risk classification by clear and convincing evidence.[1] 1. Background. When Doe was thirty-five years old, he reportedly “twisted” the penis of his six year old nephew through the child’s underwear while both were in the bathroom. […]
Doe No. 3839 v. Sex Offender Registry Board (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-144-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11604 JOHN DOE, SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD NO. 3839 vs. SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD. Plymouth. September 3, 2014. – August 21, 2015. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ. Sex Offender. Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act. Delinquent Child. Constitutional Law, Sex offender. Due Process of Law, Sex offender, Retroactive application of statute. Statute, Retroactive application. Practice, Civil, Sex offender. Administrative Law, Findings. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on February 18, 2011. The case was heard by Christopher J. Muse, J., on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, and a motion for relief from judgment and for reconsideration was also heard by him. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. Matthew J. Koes for the plaintiff. William H. Burke for the defendant. DUFFLY, J. In 1990 and 1991, the plaintiff, John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 3839 (Doe), was adjudicated a delinquent juvenile by reason of sex offenses he committed in 1989 and 1990, when he was fourteen and fifteen years old. Following his adjudications, Doe was committed to the Department of Youth Services (DYS), where he remained for over nine years, pursuant to orders extending his commitment beyond his eighteenth birthday. In April, 2000, Doe was committed temporarily to the Massachusetts Treatment Center (treatment center) for evaluation on the Commonwealth’s petition that Doe be civilly committed as a sexually dangerous person (SDP); thereafter, he was found to be sexually dangerous and was civilly committed to the treatment center for a period of from one day to life. In January, 2011, twenty years after Doe committed the offenses, the defendant Sex Offender Registry Board (SORB) classified him as a level three sex offender. In September, 2013, Doe was determined to be no longer sexually dangerous, and was discharged from the treatment center. Doe contends that the sex offender registration statute, G. L. c. 6, §§ 178C-178Q (registration statute), as applied to him, constitutes an ex post facto punishment, and violates his rights to due process and protection against double jeopardy, because the requirement that he register as a sex offender was triggered by juvenile adjudications that preceded the statute’s enactment. See St. 1996, c. 239, § 1. He maintains also that, even if the registration statute […]
Doe No. 7083 v. Sex Offender Registry Board (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-143-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11806 JOHN DOE, SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD NO. 7083 vs. SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD. Plymouth. March 5, 2015. – August 21, 2015. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Sex Offender. Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act. Constitutional Law, Sex offender. Due Process of Law, Sex offender. Practice, Civil, Sex offender. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on April 2, 2012. The case was heard by Paul E. Troy, J., on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. Ethan C. Stiles for the plaintiff. David L. Chenail for the defendant. Matthew J. Koes for John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 3839, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. DUFFLY, J. The plaintiff, John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 7083 (Doe), was serving a criminal sentence at the Massachusetts Treatment Center (treatment center), and also had been civilly committed to the treatment center as a sexually dangerous person (SDP), when the defendant Sex Offender Registry Board (SORB) notified him in September, 2009, of its recommendation that he be classified as a level three sex offender, pursuant to the sex offender registration statute, G. L. c. 6, §§ 178C-178Q.[1] Doe requested a hearing to challenge SORB’s recommendation. When that classification hearing took place, in February, 2012, Doe’s earliest parole eligibility date was ten months away, and a trial on Doe’s petition for discharge, pursuant to G. L. c. 123A, § 9, had been scheduled for a date eighteen months away.[2] Because each date was not only distant in time, but also only a potential date on which he might have become eligible for release, rather than a known release date, Doe requested that the classification hearing be continued to a date after, or shortly before, trial on his petition for discharge. In the alternative, Doe sought to have the classification proceeding left open after the hearing, so that his classification would not become final, and current evidence of his risk of reoffense would be available for the hearing officer to consider when his discharge was imminent. The hearing examiner denied the requests and classified Doe as a level three sex offender. Doe sought review in the Superior Court pursuant […]
Doe No. 356011 v. Sex Offender Registry Board (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-117-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 13-P-1842 Appeals Court JOHN DOE, SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD NO. 356011 vs. SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD. No. 13-P-1842. Suffolk. January 7, 2015. – August 18, 2015. Present: Kafker, Meade, & Maldonado, JJ. Sex Offender. Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act. Constitutional Law, Sex offender. Due Process of Law, Sex offender. Administrative Law, Hearing. Evidence, Expert opinion, Sex offender, Police report. Witness, Expert. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on February 1, 2013. The case was heard by Jeffrey A. Locke, J., on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Eric Tennen for the plaintiff. David L. Chenail for the defendant. MALDONADO, J. Following Doe’s 2011 conviction for indecent assault and battery on a person fourteen years of age or older,[1] the Sex Offender Registry Board (SORB) notified Doe that he would be required to register as a level three sex offender. Doe obtained de novo administrative review pursuant to G. L. c. 6, § 178L. Neither party called any witnesses, and the de novo hearing proceeded on the basis of documentary evidence, which included, among other things, classification records containing a summary of Doe’s disciplinary reports and a police report that described sexual assault allegations of which Doe was acquitted. The hearing examiner (examiner) found this hearsay evidence probative of Doe’s repetitive and compulsive sexual history, and he classified Doe as a level three sex offender. Doe appeals from a Superior Court judgment affirming this classification. He asserts the examiner erred by considering both the disciplinary history set forth in his classification records and the police report of acquitted conduct. Doe also challenges the denial of his request for expert funds relative to his age as a mitigating factor. We affirm. Background. The examiner based Doe’s level three classification on multiple statutory factors, see G. L. c. 6, § 178K(1), including his sexual history and compulsive sexual behavior (803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.40[2] [2002]), his criminal history[2] — particularly as it related to a history of nonsexual violent offenses — (803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.40[9][b], [c][6] [2002]), his poor incarceration behavior (803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.40[19] [2002]),[3] and his noncompliance with conditions of probation (803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.40[20] [2002]).[4] The examiner also explicitly rejected Doe’s claim that his age of forty-nine years was a mitigating factor. In assessing Doe’s […]
Doe No. 203108 v. Sex Offender Registry Board (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-043-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 13-P-848 Appeals Court JOHN DOE, SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD NO. 203108 vs. SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD. No. 13-P-848. Suffolk. November 5, 2014. – May 5, 2015. Present: Cypher, Fecteau, & Massing, JJ. Sex Offender. Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act. Administrative Law, Hearing, Substantial evidence. Practice, Civil, Waiver. Waiver. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on July 24, 2009. The case was heard by Heidi E. Brieger, J., on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Inna Landsman for the plaintiff. Patrick M. Grogan for the defendant. CYPHER, J. In Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 6904 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 82 Mass. App. Ct. 67, 75 (2012) (Doe No. 6904), we held that for the Sex Offender Registry Board (board) to carry out its statutory duty to classify incarcerated sex offenders according to their “current risk to reoffend,” the board must conduct its classification proceedings “at a reasonable time prior to release from incarceration.” In this appeal, Doe No. 203108 (Doe) claims that his classification hearing, held some seven months before his earliest possible release date (if parole were granted, December, 2009) and approximately twenty months before his ultimate release (in January, 2011) was unreasonably premature. In these circumstances — and because Doe did not raise this issue before the board but rather raised the claim for the first time during judicial review under G. L. c. 30A, § 14, of the final agency determination, eight months after his release — we conclude that the board did not act unreasonably. Accordingly, we affirm the Superior Court’s judgment affirming the board’s designation of Doe as a level three sex offender. Background. Doe’s obligation to register as a sex offender arises from two convictions of statutory rape, G. L. c. 265, § 23, involving a first victim, and from one conviction of assault with intent to commit rape, G. L. c. 265, § 24, involving a second victim. The statutory rape convictions are based on two separate incidents with a thirteen year old girl when Doe was eighteen. The assault with intent to rape conviction arises out of an incident with a twenty-one year old woman when Doe was nineteen. He pleaded guilty to all of the above charges on January 18, 2008.[1] Doe received concurrent State prison sentences of four to six years with respect to […]
Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Board (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-030-15)
JOHN DOE, SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD NO. 291554 vs. SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD. No. 13-P-1703. APPEALS COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS November 13, 2014, Argued March 27, 2015, Decided PRIOR-HISTORY: Suffolk. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on April 13, 2011. The case was heard by Frances A. McIntyre , J., on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. HEADNOTES-1 Sex Offender. Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act. Evidence, Sex offender, Expert opinion. Witness, Expert. COUNSEL: Xiomara M. Hernández for the plaintiff. Thomas M. Doyle for the defendant. JUDGES: Present: Green, Wolohojian, & Blake, JJ. WOLOHOJIAN, J., dissenting. OPINION BY: BLAKE OPINION Blake, J. The plaintiff, John Doe, challenges his final classification by the Sex Offender Registry Board (board) as a level three sex offender. He claims that the board’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence, primarily because the governing offense involved no physical contact or sexual component and, apart from that offense, Doe had no prior criminal record. We affirm. Background. We summarize the facts found by the hearing examiner,1 supplemented by additional undisputed facts from the record. In October of 2009, Doe responded to a post on a social networking Web site from the twelve year old female victim seeking assistance running away from home. He initiated a series of online communications with her over a period of thirty or so days. In his electronic mail messages (e-mails) to the victim, Doe misrepresented his age as being twenty-five, rather than his actual age of thirty-two. Eventually, Doe arranged to travel from his home State of Virginia to Massachusetts, on a date certain, to pick up the victim, intending to return to Virginia with her by train, subway, and bus. To that end, he purchased one bus ticket in his name and one in that of the victim. He also instructed the victim to bring some money and her Social Security card. FOOTNOTES 1 An evidentiary hearing was held on February 7, 2011. On the morning of the planned meeting, the victim’s mother noticed that the victim was acting suspiciously. The mother’s boyfriend then searched the victim’s computer and discovered her communications with Doe. The police were notified, and after interviewing the victim, they arrested Doe at the train station, shortly before the prearranged meeting. Upon questioning, Doe told the police that he knew the victim was twelve years old; that he planned “to kiss her, lick her, and suck on” her when they returned to Virginia; that he would take photographs of her and post them on a Web site; that he intended to get her to love him; and that he would marry her and have babies with her. Doe was charged and found guilty of enticement of a child under the age of sixteen (enticement) and attempted kidnapping of a child. He was sentenced to two […]
Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 34186 v. Sex Offender Registry Board (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-015-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11607 JOHN DOE, SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD NO. 34186 vs. SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD. Worcester. November 3, 2014. – February 2, 2015. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Sex Offender. Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act. Jurisdiction, Sex offender. Evidence, Sex offender. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on September 13, 2010. The case was heard by John S. McCann, J., on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, and a motion for reconsideration was considered by him. The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. Jennifer K. Zalnasky for the plaintiff. John R. Puricelli for the defendant. HINES, J. After the Sex Offender Registry Board (board) classified the plaintiff as a sex offender, a judge in the Superior Court concluded that the board lacked jurisdiction over the plaintiff because his conviction under art. 134, 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1994), the “general” provision of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (code), was not a “like violation” sex offense requiring registration. See G. L. c. 6, §§ 178C-178P. The board appealed, and we transferred the case from the Appeals Court to this court. We conclude that art. 134, although general in scope, assimilates the elements of underlying offenses and that under the circumstances here, where the plaintiff was convicted on specifications detailing “like violation” offenses, the art. 134 conviction is a sex offense under G. L. c. 6, § 178C. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment and reinstate the board’s classification of the plaintiff as a level two sex offender. 1. Factual background and procedural history. We summarize the facts found by hearing examiners after evidentiary hearings, supplemented by undisputed facts from the record. The plaintiff was convicted by general court martial of the following three specifications in violation of art. 134: (1) ”Did . . . knowingly transport or ship in interstate commerce visual depictions of one or more minors, under the age of [eighteen] years, engaging in sexually explicit conduct, in violation of [18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1)]“; (2) ”Did . . . knowingly receive visual depictions of one or more minors, under the age of [eighteen] years, engaged in sexually explicit conduct, which depictions had been shipped or transported in interstate commerce, in violation of [18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2)]“; and (3) “Did . . . […]