Reichenbach, et al. v. Haydock, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-157-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 16-P-1427 Appeals Court MARGARET J. REICHENBACH & another[1] vs. TIMOTHY G. HAYDOCK & another.[2] No. 16-P-1427. Bristol. September 6, 2017. – December 21, 2017. Present: Wolohojian, Agnes, & Wendlandt, JJ. “Anti-SLAPP” Statute. Constitutional Law, Right to petition government. Practice, Civil, Motion to dismiss. Massachusetts Civil Rights Act. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on October 1, 2015. A special motion to dismiss was considered by Robert J. Kane, J., and a motion for reconsideration was considered by him. Daniel C. Perry for the defendants. Robert B. Feingold (Heidi A. Nadel also present) for the plaintiffs. WOLOHOJIAN, J. In 2008, the plaintiffs bought an oceanfront property with the plan to demolish the existing house and build a new residence. Two of the neighbors (the defendants, Timothy Haydock and Barbara Moss) vigorously objected and are alleged to have for years employed a variety of means — some petitioning activity within the meaning of the “anti-SLAPP” statute, G. L. c. 231, § 59H, some not — designed to block the project. This suit arises out of that campaign, which the plaintiffs allege deprived them of their constitutional right to enjoy their property in violation of the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, G. L. c. 12, §§ 11H and 11I (the MCRA).[3] We are not here concerned with the merits of that claim. Instead, we deal in this interlocutory appeal[4] only with the denial of the defendants’ special motion to dismiss pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute. That motion was decided before Blanchard v. Steward Carney Hosp., Inc., 477 Mass. 141 (2017), which was not handed down until after this appeal was already pending. Despite the timing, Blanchard applies,[5] and applying its approach to the first prong of the Duracraft framework, see Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Prods. Corp., 427 Mass. 156, 167-168 (1998), we affirm. Background.[6] All of the real estate involved in this case was once owned by Clara Frothingham in the Nonquitt area of South Dartmouth, located on the shores of Buzzards Bay. In 1979, the Frothingham land was subdivided into eight lots, which were conveyed to members of Frothingham’s family. Defendant Timothy Haydock (whom we are given to understand is part of the Frothingham family) acquired one of those lots in 1991 (the Haydock lot); he also has a one-sixth interest in another family […]