Touher, et al. v. Town of Essex (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-099-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 14-P-796 Appeals Court BRIAN M. TOUHER[1] & others[2] vs. Town of Essex. No. 14-P-796. Essex. March 24, 2015. – August 10, 2015. Present: Kantrowitz, Blake, & Massing, JJ. Real Property, Lease. Contract, Lease of real estate, Unjust enrichment. Personal Property, Ownership. Landlord and Tenant, Fixture. Unjust Enrichment. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on May 11, 2012. The case was heard by Richard E. Welch, III, J., and motions to alter or amend the judgment and for a new trial or to amend the judgment were considered by him. Christopher Weld, Jr. (Suzanne Elovecky with him) for the plaintiffs. Gregg J. Corbo for the defendant. MASSING, J. This appeal arises from a series of disputes between the seasonal residents of Conomo Point and the town of Essex (town), which owns and rents them the land on which they reside. Four sets of plaintiff residents filed a complaint seeking a declaration that they owned the buildings they had erected on the town’s land. After a jury-waived trial, a Superior Court judge entered a declaration that two sets of plaintiffs owned their cottages as personal property, but that the more substantial homes that the two other sets of plaintiffs had built were fixtures that belonged to the town. The latter ‑- the decedent Paul Touher (Touher), and Sarah Wendell and David R. Wendell, Jr., as trustees of the David R. Wendell 1993 Revocable Trust (the Wendell Trust) (collectively, plaintiffs) — appeal from that judgment, as well as the judge’s posttrial decision that they had no equitable claim against the town to recover the value of the houses.[3] Largely for the reasons that the trial judge set forth in his detailed memorandum and order, we affirm. Background. 1. Historical perspective. For more than one century, the town has been leasing desirable plots of waterfront or near-waterfront property on Conomo Point — once the location of the town’s “poor farm” — to seasonal residents. The lessees, at their own expense, built seasonal cottages on these properties. In addition to the rent they paid to lease the land, the residents were assessed and paid real estate taxes on the cottages. At various times the town[4] has sought to alter its economic relationship with the Conomo Point residents. In 1987, the town took steps […]
Murray v. Town of Hudson, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-135-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11816 JOHN W. MURRAY vs. TOWN OF HUDSON & others.[1] Worcester. April 9, 2015. – August 3, 2015. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Municipal Corporations, Liability for tort, Parks, Notice to municipality, Governmental immunity. Negligence, Municipality, One owning or controlling real estate, Athletics. Massachusetts Tort Claims Act. Parks and Parkways. Governmental Immunity. Notice, Claim under Massachusetts Tort Claims Act. Practice, Civil, Presentment of claim under Massachusetts Tort Claims Act. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on April 24, 2013. The case was heard by John S. McCann, J., on a motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. Brian W. Murray for the plaintiff. John J. Davis for town of Hudson. Charlotte E. Glinka, Thomas R. Murphy, Elizabeth S. Dillon, & John A. Finbury, for Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. GANTS, C.J. During a varsity baseball game between two high school teams at a public park in the town of Hudson (town), the plaintiff, a ballplayer with the visiting team, seriously injured his knee while warming up in the bullpen. The plaintiff filed suit in the Superior Court against the town under the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, G. L. c. 258 (act), alleging that his injury was caused by the town’s negligence and its wanton and reckless conduct in allowing the visiting team to use a dangerous bullpen. The judge allowed the town’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the evidence did not support a finding of wanton or reckless conduct, and that the plaintiff’s negligence claim was barred by the recreational use statute, G. L. c. 21, § 17C, where the injury occurred on a baseball field owned by the town that it allowed the public to use without a fee, and where the town had no “special relationship” with the plaintiff because he was a student from a visiting high school rather than the town’s own high school. We conclude that the town could be found liable for negligence despite the recreational use statute because, where a town’s school invites another town’s school to play an athletic match on a town field, the town owes the visiting student-athletes the same duty to provide a […]
Showtime Entertainment, LLC v. Town of Mendon, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-113-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11770 SHOWTIME ENTERTAINMENT, LLC vs. TOWN OF MENDON & others.[1] Suffolk. March 5, 2015. – July 8, 2015. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Alcoholic Liquors, Entertainment. Constitutional Law, Alcoholic beverages, Public entertainment, Freedom of speech and press. Municipal Corporations, By-laws and ordinances. Zoning, Validity of by-law or ordinance. Certification of questions of law to the Supreme Judicial Court by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. Thomas Lesser (Michael Aleo with him) for the plaintiff. Robert S. Mangiaratti (Brandon H. Moss with him) for the defendants. SPINA, J. We consider in the present case a challenge brought against a bylaw adopted by the town of Mendon (town) prohibiting the sale or presence of alcohol at adult entertainment establishments. Showtime Entertainment, LLC (Showtime), seeks to operate such an establishment within the town and to serve alcohol on the premises. It brought suit in Federal court seeking to invalidate the bylaw. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has certified the following questions to this court, pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 1:03, as appearing in 382 Mass. 700 (1981)[2]: “1. Do the pre-enactment studies and other evidence considered by [the town] demonstrate a ‘countervailing State interest,’ Cabaret Enters., Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm’n, 393 Mass. 13, 17 . . . (1984) sufficient to justify [the town’s] ban on alcohol service at adult-entertainment businesses? “2. If the ban is so justified, is it adequately tailored?” See Showtime Entertainment, LLC v. Mendon, 769 F.3d 61, 82-83 (2014) (Showtime). The certified questions presented to us by the Court of Appeals focus on two parts of the test employed to determine the constitutionality of “content-neutral” restrictions on expressive behavior as first outlined in United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). See Commonwealth v. Ora, 451 Mass. 125, 129 (2008). The four factors of the test are: (1) the regulation must be within the power of the government to enact; (2) the regulation must further an important or substantial governmental interest; (3) the government interest must be unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and (4) the restriction must be no greater than is essential to the furtherance of the government interest. O’Brien, supra. We answer the first […]
Galenski v. Town of Erving, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-067-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11772 CHARLENE GALENSKI vs. TOWN OF ERVING & others.[1] Franklin. January 6, 2015. – April 17, 2015. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, Hines, JJ. Public Employment, Retirement benefits. School and School Committee, Retirement benefits, Group insurance. Municipal Corporations, Group insurance, Allocation of insurance premiums. Insurance, Group, Premiums. Retirement. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on November 21, 2012. The case was heard by John A. Agostini, J., on motions for summary judgment. The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. Patricia M. Rapinchuk for the defendants. Eric Lucentini (Sandra Lucentini with him) for the plaintiff. DUFFLY, J. Charlene Galenski retired in 2012 after six years of service as a school principal in the town of Erving (town); she previously had been a long-time public school teacher in other municipalities in the Commonwealth. Galenski then sought continued health insurance coverage and contribution by the town to the cost of her group health insurance premiums. In 2001, the town had voted to adopt G. L. c. 32B, § 9E, which required it to contribute over fifty per cent of the health insurance premiums of all of its retirees. Before employing Galenski, however, the town had enacted a policy stating that it would contribute only to the group health insurance premiums of retired employees who had retired after a minimum of ten years of employment with the town. Although Galenski was permitted to remain a member of the town’s group health insurance plan after she retired, the town determined she was not eligible for any contribution by the town to her health insurance premiums. Galenski filed a complaint in the Superior Court contending that the town had violated her right to payment by the town of a portion of her group medical insurance premiums, as required under G. L. c. 32B, § 9E; she sought declaratory and injunctive relief, and also raised a claim of estoppel based on detrimental reliance. A judge of the Superior Court allowed Galenski’s motion for summary judgment on the first two claims, denied the town’s cross motion for summary judgment, and issued a permanent injunction prohibiting the town from enforcing its policy.[2] The town appealed, and we transferred the case to this court on our own motion. […]
Celco Construction Corp. v. Town of Avon (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-019-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 13-P-1880 Appeals Court CELCO CONSTRUCTION CORP. vs. TOWN OF AVON. No. 13-P-1880. Norfolk. October 8, 2014. – March 2, 2015. Present: Green, Rubin, & Agnes, JJ. Contract, Public works, Bidding for contract, Municipality, Modification, Promissory estoppel. Public Works, Bidding procedure, Extra work. Municipal Corporations, Contracts, Estoppel. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on October 22, 2010. The case was heard by Patrick F. Brady, J., on a motion for summary judgment. Raymond S. Ewer for the plaintiff. Doris R. MacKenzie Ehrens for the defendant. GREEN, J. In its successful bid to perform work for the defendant town of Avon (town) on a water main extension project, the plaintiff, Celco Construction Corp. (Celco), assigned a unit price of $ 0.01 as its charge to excavate each cubic yard of rock from the project site. That price was substantially lower than Celco’s actual cost to remove each cubic yard of rock; Celco constructed its bid based on its belief that the amount of rock actually on site would be considerably less than the unverified estimate indicated in the contract bid documents, so that its low unit price would give it a competitive advantage when compared to other bidders who assigned a unit price to rock removal that more closely approximated the actual cost.[1] When the amount of rock turned out to exceed the estimate by more than 1,500 cubic yards, Celco sought an “equitable adjustment” in the contract price to recover its increased costs for rock removal. See G. L. c. 30, § 39N. The town refused Celco’s request, Celco filed a complaint in the Superior Court, and a judge of that court allowed the town’s motion for summary judgment. Celco appealed, and we now affirm the judgment. Background. We summarize the undisputed facts appearing in the summary judgment record relevant to Celco’s claim of entitlement to an equitable adjustment in the contract price.[2] In 2008, the town solicited bids to perform work on a project for the installation of water mains and associated reconstruction of roadways disturbed during such installation. Celco submitted a bid and was awarded the contract. Celco’s bid included unit prices for various elements of the work including, as relevant to its claim for equitable adjustment, a specified unit price of $ 0.01 per cubic yard for excavation and disposal of […]
Drummey, et al. v. Town of Falmouth, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-017-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 13-P-1498 Appeals Court TODD DRUMMEY & others[1] vs. TOWN OF FALMOUTH & others.[2] No. 13-P-1498. Barnstable. September 5, 2014. – February 26, 2015. Present: Cypher, Grasso, & Fecteau, JJ.[3] Zoning, By-law, Special permit, Governmental use, Permitted use. Municipal Corporations, By-laws and ordinances. Civil actions commenced in the Superior Court Department on March 21, 2011. After consolidation, the cases were heard by Robert C. Rufo, J. Christopher G. Senie for the plaintiffs. Frank K. Duffy, Jr., Town Counsel, for the defendants. CYPHER, J. We are asked to decide in this case whether the town of Falmouth (town) was required to obtain a special permit from the zoning board of appeals of Falmouth (ZBA) for the installation of a wind turbine on town land. We conclude that, under the town’s zoning by-law (by-law), a special permit was required. Background. The plaintiffs are Falmouth residents who live between 1,300 and 3,200 feet from a wind turbine known as “Wind 1,”[4] installed in 2009 on town land at its wastewater treatment facility (WWTF). Alleging significant distress from sound pressures and noise from the operation of Wind 1, Neil Andersen and Elizabeth Andersen (collectively, the Andersen plaintiffs), on August 25, 2010, sought an enforcement action by the town’s building commissioner asserting that the town was in violation of the by-law by operating Wind 1 without a special permit. The building commissioner denied their request in a letter dated September 24, 2010, and the Andersen plaintiffs appealed to the ZBA, which affirmed the building commissioner in a decision dated March 3, 2011. Separate actions for relief under G. L. c. 40A, § 17, were filed in the Superior Court by the Andersen plaintiffs and by the remaining plaintiffs. After consolidation of the cases below, and a bench trial, a judge on June 18, 2013, ordered that judgments enter affirming the decision of the ZBA.[5] Discussion. At trial, the plaintiffs argued that the building commissioner and the ZBA incorrectly interpreted the by-law to allow the issuance of a building permit for Wind 1 without a special permit, citing § 240-166 of the by-law which provides that a petitioner may apply for a special permit to allow construction of a windmill.[6] The judge, however, deferred to the opinion of the building commissioner, affirmed by the ZBA, that the by-law “does not apply in […]
Bay Colony Railroad Corporation v. Town of Yarmouth, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-011-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11608 BAY COLONY RAILROAD CORPORATION vs. TOWN OF YARMOUTH & another.[1] Norfolk. October 7, 2014. – January 29, 2015. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Railroad. Solid Waste Management. Municipal Corporations, Contracts. Contract, Municipality, Performance and breach, Implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Federal Preemption. Statute, Federal preemption. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on January 14, 2008. Motions for summary judgment were heard by John P. Connor, Jr., J.; the remaining issues were tried before him; and a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was considered by him. The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. Joseph L. Tehan, Jr. (Jackie Cowin with him) for the defendant. Joel G. Beckman (Dana A. Zakarian with him) for the plaintiff. GANTS, C.J. On June 30, 1989, the town of Yarmouth (town) entered into a transportation contract (contract) with the Bay Colony Railroad Corporation (Bay Colony) whereby Bay Colony was to transport solid waste from the town’s waste transfer station to a waste-to-energy facility in Rochester (facility) operated by the SEMASS Partnership (SEMASS). At that time, Bay Colony operated several rail lines in southeastern Massachusetts, including rail lines between the town and Rochester, pursuant to a lease agreement with the Commonwealth. However, in the fall of 2007, the Commonwealth notified Bay Colony that, effective December 31, 2007, it would terminate Bay Colony’s lease of the Cape Cod rail lines, which meant that Bay Colony would no longer be able to transport the town’s waste to the facility by rail. Section 9 of the contract provided that, in the event the Commonwealth terminated Bay Colony’s lease of the rail line, the town agreed to permit Bay Colony either to assign the contract to the railroad company that was awarded the lease of the rail line or to continue to transport the waste “pursuant to the terms of the [contract] either under an arrangement with a successor operator or by other modes of transportation.” Bay Colony notified the town by letter that, in accordance with the provisions of section 9, it intended to continue to transport waste under the contract “by other modes of transportation,” specifically, by truck rather than rail. The town, however, replied by […]
Kitras, et al. v. Town of Aquinnah, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-006-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 12-P-260 Appeals Court MARIA A. KITRAS, trustee,[1] & others[2] vs. TOWN OF AQUINNAH & others.[3] No. 12-P-260. Suffolk. January 18, 2013. – January 14, 2015. Present: Kantrowitz, Berry, & Agnes, JJ. Easement. Necessity. Real Property, Easement. Civil action commenced in the Land Court Department on May 20, 1997. After review by this court, 64 Mass. App. Ct. 285 (2005), the case was heard by Charles W. Trombly, Jr., J. Wendy H. Sibbison for Maria A. Kitras & another. Leslie-Ann Morse for Mark D. Harding & others. Diane C. Tillotson for Martha’s Vineyard Land Bank & others. John Donnelly, Assistant Attorney General, for the Commonwealth. Jennifer S.D. Roberts for Vineyard Conservation Society, Inc. BERRY, J. From the earliest time, the members of the Wampanoag Tribe of Gay Head (now known as Aquinnah) in Martha’s Vineyard (Gay Head Tribe or Tribe), had a custom and practice of common access across the lands that are the subject of this appeal. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the ancient origins of that common access — dating back before the late eighteenth century — establish the equivalent of a chain of title, with access rights that would not yield landlocked parcels. The late nineteenth century State statutory conveyance of large tracts of public common land in Aquinnah, including the subject lands, by the Legislature as grantor to the newly enfranchised Gay Head Tribe members as grantees, and the subsequent judicial partitioning of these governmentally conveyed lands did not, we determine, break these preexisting access rights. More specifically, the subsequent grantees of land tracts in the links of this chain of conveyances from the Gay Head Tribe members to the present plaintiffs were not divested of these long-held access rights flowing from the longstanding tribal custom and practice so as to leave the plaintiffs’ lots landlocked and bereft of easements. It is so that a plumb line — with perfectly fit easements in the precise transverse of paths walked by and through the lands by the Gay Head Tribe members, in their custom and practice — would, in this present time, be most difficult to reconstruct by metes and bounds since property boundaries were not set in that manner in the statutory governmental conveyances and subsequent judicial partition that deeded the lots to the Gay Head […]
Town of Athol v. Professional Firefighters of Athol, Local 1751, I.A.F.F. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-174-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11640 TOWN OF ATHOL vs. PROFESSIONAL FIREFIGHTERS OF ATHOL, LOCAL 1751, I.A.F.F. October 23, 2014 Fire Fighter, Municipality’s liability. Labor, Fire fighters, Health benefit plan, Arbitration, Collective bargaining. Municipal Corporations, Fire department, Insurance, Collective bargaining. Public Employment, Collective bargaining. Contract, Collective bargaining contract. This appeal arises from an action in the Superior Court challenging an arbitrator’s determination that the town of Athol (town) violated its collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the Professional Firefighters of Athol, Local 1751, I.A.F.F. (union) by unilaterally increasing copayment amounts that union members pay for medical services under their health insurance plans. The judge confirmed the portion of the arbitration award compelling the parties to bargain collectively over changes to copayment rates, but vacated two remedial aspects of the award. The Appeals Court affirmed.[1] We granted the union’s application for further appellate review to address the question whether the Superior Court judge erred in vacating any portion of the award. We reverse in part and remand for the entry of a judgment confirming the award in its entirety. Background. After the town unilaterally increased copayment amounts for medical services, the union filed a grievance under the parties’ CBA. It alleged that health insurance benefits are mandatory subjects of collective bargaining, and that any changes must be brought to successor contract bargaining. An arbitrator concluded that such changes are a mandatory subject of collective bargaining and that the town violated the CBA by making the changes unilaterally. As a remedy, the arbitration award required the town, among other things, to restore the cost and structure of copayments to the status quo ante and to make union members whole for economic losses resulting from the change in copayment rates. The town filed a complaint in the Superior Court seeking to vacate the award and for other relief. Discussion. Except in the narrow circumstances described in G. L. c. 150C, § 11, a judge may not vacate an arbitrator’s award. Bureau of Special Investigations v. Coalition of Pub. Safety, 430 […]
Twomey, et al. v. Town of Middleborough, et al. (and a companion case) (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-092-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC‑11435 GAIL E. TWOMEY & others[1] vs. TOWN OF MIDDLEBOROUGH & others[2] (and a consolidated case[3]). Plymouth. February 6, 2014. ‑ June 2, 2014. Present: Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ. Municipal Corporations, Home rule, Group insurance, Selectmen, Town meeting. Insurance, Group. Retirement. Middleborough. Civil actions commenced in the Superior Court Department on October 30, 2009, and June 1, 2010. After consolidation, the case was heard by Jeffrey A. Locke, J., on motions for summary judgment. The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. Sandra C. Quinn for Gail E. Twomey & others. Thomas J. Burns, III, for Charles Armanetti & others. Leo J. Peloquin for the defendants. SPINA, J. In this case, we consider which municipal entity, the board of selectmen or the town meeting, has the authority to establish the percentage of the total monthly premium for insurance coverage by a health maintenance organization (HMO) that is to be paid by a town’s retired employees. We conclude that, pursuant to G. L. c. 32B, § 16, the board of selectmen has such authority. 1. Statutory framework. Under the Home Rule Amendment, art. 89, § 6, of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution, municipalities of the Commonwealth may choose to provide health insurance coverage to their employees. See Cioch v. Treasurer of Ludlow, 449 Mass. 690, 695 (2007). General Laws c. 32B is a so-called “local option” statute that governs the provision of group insurance (medical and certain other coverages) once a municipality has voted to accept the terms of the statute. See Connors v. Boston, 430 Mass. 31, 37 (1999); Yeretsky v. Attleboro, 424 Mass. 315, 316-317 (1997). Recognizing that various municipalities may have different priorities, we have said that “a municipality is permitted to adopt ‘only those provisions of the statute that best accommodate its needs and budget.’” Cioch, supra at 697, quoting Yeretsky, supra at 317. Where the municipality at issue is a town, acceptance of many, but not all, of the provisions of G. L. c. 32B is “by vote of the inhabitants at a town meeting.” Yeretsky, supra at 317 n.5. See G. L. c. 32B, § 10. When it was enacted, G. L. c. 32B, inserted by St. 1956, c. 730, § 1, authorized municipalities to offer certain employees and […]