Commonwealth v. Vincent (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-169-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11177 COMMONWEALTH vs. DAVID W. VINCENT, THIRD. Berkshire. April 11, 2014. – October 14, 2014. Present: Ireland, C.J., Spina, Gants, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ.[1] Homicide. Practice, Criminal, Motion to suppress, Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness of statement, Assistance of counsel, Arraignment, Delay in commencement of prosecution, Waiver, Capital case. Evidence, Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness of statement. Constitutional Law, Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness of statement, Assistance of counsel, Waiver of constitutional rights, Delay in commencement of prosecution. Due Process of Law, Assistance of counsel, Delay in commencement of prosecution. Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court Department on July 24, 2009. A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by John A. Agostini, J.; the case was tried before him; and a motion for a new trial was considered by him. Greg T. Schubert for the defendant. John P. Bossé, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. DUFFLY, J. On the morning of June 3, 2009, police received reports from staff at a regional medical center in Pittsfield that a woman had been admitted with life-threatening injuries that might have resulted from a domestic dispute. The woman, Rebecca Moulton, was the girl friend of the defendant. Early that afternoon, the defendant went to the Pittsfield police station; after an initial interview with police, which was not recorded at his request, he was arrested for aggravated assault and battery. In a subsequent interview that he requested after booking, again not recorded at his request, the defendant made additional incriminating statements. Moulton died the following day, and the defendant thereafter was arraigned on charges of murder in the first degree. At trial, the defendant conceded that he had beaten Moulton, but asserted that he had not intended to cause her grievous injury or death. The theory of defense was that, as a result of his addiction to, and consumption of, large amounts of alcohol, cocaine, and marijuana on the night in question, the defendant lacked the requisite intent to support a conviction of murder in the first degree. A Superior Court jury found the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree on a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty.[2] The defendant’s appeal from his conviction was consolidated with his appeal from the denial of his motion for a new trial. […]