Loring Towers Associates v. Furtick v. Boston Housing Authority (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-033-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 13‑P‑799 Appeals Court LORING TOWERS ASSOCIATES[1] vs. MELVIN FURTICK; BOSTON HOUSING AUTHORITY, third-party defendant. No. 13‑P‑799. Essex. December 3, 2013. ‑ March 27, 2014. Present: Grainger, Brown, & Carhart, JJ. Summary Process. Practice, Civil, Summary process, Complaint, Parties. Boston Housing Authority. Due Process of Law, Housing. Summary process. Complaint filed in the Salem Division of the District Court Department on April 23, 2012. Following transfer to the Northeast Division of the Housing Court Department, a motion to dismiss a third‑party complaint was heard by David D. Kerman, J. Michael J. Louis & Angela Marcolina for Boston Housing Authority. Laura Gallant (James Breslauer with her) for Melvin Furtick. BROWN, J. Melvin Furtick, a physically disabled and mentally ill senior citizen, has been a participant in the Federal Housing Choice Voucher Program, better known as “section 8,” for over thirty years.[2] The Boston Housing Authority (BHA) terminated Furtick’s housing assistance benefits, a protected property interest, in violation of his due process rights. Such a result cannot be countenanced by any court of law. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Housing Court in this summary process litigation restoring Furtick’s housing benefits retroactively to the date of the unlawful termination. Facts. Except where noted, the following facts are undisputed. On January 17, 2012, the leased housing division of the BHA sent a letter addressed to Furtick at his subsidized apartment in Salem, notifying him of the proposed termination of his housing assistance benefits based upon his failure to attend two section 8 voucher recertification meetings scheduled for November 28, 2011, and December 22, 2011. See § 13.6.2 of the BHA Administrative Plan for Section 8 Programs (revised December 6, 2011) (BHA administrative plan). The BHA letter informed Furtick that he had the right to an informal hearing regarding the proposed termination before the BHA’s department of grievances and appeals as long as he requested a hearing within twenty days. See id. at § 13.6.3. When Furtick failed to respond within the twenty-day appeal period, the BHA, by letter dated February 7, 2012, and mailed to his apartment, terminated Furtick’s subsidy effective March 31, 2012. As Furtick was in jail during that time, he had no actual knowledge of any of this.[3] Upon his release, Furtick returned to his apartment and discovered that […]
Moe, et al. v. Sex Offender Registry Board (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-058-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC‑11520 MICHAEL MOE & others[1] vs. SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD. Suffolk. December 5, 2013. ‑ March 26, 2014. Present: Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ. Sex Offender. Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act. Constitutional Law, Sex offender. Due Process of Law, Sex offender, Retroactive application of statute, Class action. Practice, Civil, Sex offender, Class action, Injunctive relief. Statute, Retroactive application. Injunction. Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk on July 5, 2013. The case was reported by Gants, J. Ryan M. Schiff, Committee for Public Counsel Services (Dana Golblatt, Committee for Public Counsel Services, with him) for the plaintiffs. John M. Stephan, Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant. Eric Tennen, for Massachusetts Association for Treatment of Sexual Abusers, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. GANTS, J. On July 12, 2013, the Governor signed into law various amendments to G. L. c. 6, §§ 178C-178Q, the sex offender registry law (SORL), including amendments that would require the Sex Offender Registry Board (SORB) to publish on the Internet information contained in the sex offender registry (registry information) regarding all individuals given a level two or level three classification by SORB. See St. 2013, c. 38, §§ 7, 9. Before these amendments were enacted, § 178D required SORB to publish on the Internet the registry information of sex offenders given a level three classification, but expressly prohibited SORB from publishing on the Internet the registry information of level two offenders. The issues presented are whether the amendments are retroactive in effect “for the purposes of further constitutional inquiry,” as applied to those who were classified as level two offenders on or before the date of the amendments’ enactment, see Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 8725 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 450 Mass. 780, 787 (2008) (Doe No. 8725); whether the Legislature intended that they apply retroactively; and, if so, whether their retroactive application would violate due process under the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. We conclude that the amendments are retroactive in effect as applied to level two offenders who were classified on or before the date of the amendments’ enactment and that the Legislature intended such retroactive application, but that such retroactive application would violate State constitutional due process.[2] History of the case. On […]
Commonwealth v. Whitehead (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-032-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 12‑P‑1970 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. JASON P. WHITEHEAD. No. 12‑P‑1970. Barnstable. October 11, 2013. ‑ March 25, 2014. Present: Cypher, Katzmann, & Maldonado, JJ. Firearms. Constitutional Law, Search and seizure, Reasonable suspicion. Search and Seizure, Threshold police inquiry, Protective frisk, Reasonable suspicion. Threshold Police Inquiry. Evidence, Firearm. Practice, Criminal, Motion to suppress. Complaint received and sworn to in the Barnstable Division of the District Court Department on March 20, 2012. A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Joan E. Lynch, J., and the cases were heard by W. James O’Neill, J. Nicholas Grefe for the defendant. Elizabeth Anne Sweeney, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. KATZMANN, J. Following a jury-waived trial, a District Court judge found the defendant guilty of carrying a firearm without a license, G. L. c. 269, § 10(a), and carrying a firearm on school grounds, G. L. c. 269, § 10(j). The defendant now appeals from the denial of his motion to suppress a firearm, together with all the evidence that was obtained as a result of a police officer’s patfrisk and search of the backpack the defendant had strapped to his back. The issue before us is whether the motion judge correctly found that the police officer’s patfrisk and search of the backpack were permissible, where the officer observed several types of ammunition inside the defendant’s vehicle, which was parked on a college campus and which bore threatening decals, and where the defendant was wearing camouflage attire. We affirm. Background. On March 19, 2012, at 10:00 A.M., police were dispatched to Cape Cod Community College based on a report that security officers had observed ammunition in plain view inside a locked Jeep in a college parking lot. Officer Kevin Donovan of the Barnstable police department responded and met two security officers at the lot. The security officers identified the vehicle, which had decals attached to it, including “Kill ‘Em All Let God Sort It Out” and “Sniper No Need to Run — You’ll Only Die Tired.” Additionally, there was a sign hanging from the vehicle’s rearview mirror that said “Funeral.” Officer Donovan looked through the closed window of the vehicle and observed in the console area three rounds of ammunition for a semiautomatic weapon– a nine millimeter round, a .38 caliber round, and an empty […]
Town of Hanover v. New England Regional Council of Carpenters (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-057-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC‑11396 TOWN OF HANOVER vs. NEW ENGLAND REGIONAL COUNCIL OF CARPENTERS. Plymouth. December 2, 2013. ‑ March 25, 2014. Present: Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ. “Anti‑SLAPP” Statute. Constitutional Law, Right to petition government. Abuse of Process. Labor. Practice, Civil, Motion to dismiss, Standing. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on October 6, 2011. A special motion to dismiss was heard by Robert C. Cosgrove, J. The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. Christopher N. Souris for the defendant. James A. Toomey for the plaintiff. Richard J. Yurko, Noemi A. Kawamoto, Sarah R. Wunsch, Audrey R. Richardson, & Susan Reid, for American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief. IRELAND, C.J. This case presents an issue of first impression: whether an association that has provided support for litigation, without being a named party in that litigation, has engaged in protected petitioning activities for the purposes of G. L. c. 231, § 59H. The defendant, the New England Regional Council of Carpenters, appeals from a Superior Court judge’s denial of its special motion to dismiss a suit by the town of Hanover (town) claiming that the defendant engaged in abuse of process in prior legal proceedings.[1] Because we conclude that support of litigation constitutes protected petitioning activity within the meaning of G. L. c. 231, § 59H, and that here, the town did not demonstrate that the defendant’s right to petition was “devoid of any reasonable factual support or any arguable basis in law,” Office One, Inc. v. Lopez, 437 Mass. 113, 123 (2002), we allow the defendant’s special motion to dismiss. 1. Prior litigation. We begin by briefly discussing certain events relevant to the defendant’s special motion to dismiss. In May, 2009, the town engaged in an open bidding process for the construction of the town’s new high school. Fordyce v. Hanover, 457 Mass. 248, 251-252 (2010) (Fordyce). The town awarded the contract to the contractor with the lowest formal bid, following which a subcontractor who was not involved in the winning contract filed a bid protest with the Attorney General. Id. at 252. After an investigation of the town’s bidding process and award of the contract, the Attorney General found that the contractor who […]
Commonwealth v. Wallace (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-031-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 12‑P‑1798 Appeals Court 12‑P‑1557 COMMONWEALTH vs. NICKOYAN WALLACE (and a companion case[1]). Nos. 12‑P‑1798 & 12‑P‑1557. Suffolk. November 13, 2013. ‑ March 21, 2014. Present: Kantrowitz, Graham, & Meade, JJ. Constitutional Law, Speedy trial, Delay in commencement of prosecution. Practice, Criminal, Speedy trial, Delay in commencement of prosecution, Capital case. Due Process of Law, Delay in commencement of prosecution. Homicide. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on May 22, 2002. Motions to dismiss, filed on June 18 and 28, 2010, were heard by Charles J. Hely, J. An application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory appeal in the companion case was allowed by Ralph D. Gants, J., in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk, and the appeals were consolidated and reported by him to the Appeals Court. Norman S. Zalkind for Timi Wallace. Sarah H. Montgomery, Assistant District Attorney (Ursula Knight, Assistant District Attorney, with her) for the Commonwealth. Matthew A. Kamholtz for Nickoyan Wallace. GRAHAM, J. In June, 2010, the defendants, Nickoyan Wallace and Timi Wallace, indicted in May, 2002, for murder in the first degree, filed motions to dismiss the indictments based on violations of their speedy trial rights under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, art. 11 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, and Mass.R.Crim.P. 36(d)(3), 378 Mass. 913 (1979). A judge in the Superior Court conducted a three-day evidentiary hearing on the motions during which he heard testimony from two law enforcement officers and five assistant district attorneys. In addition, by agreement, the judge received in evidence several documentary exhibits. Following the hearing, the judge issued a lengthy and comprehensive memorandum of decision and order dated December 6, 2011. After weighing the relevant speedy trial factors, the judge concluded that the Commonwealth’s seven-year delay in filing a detainer against Nickoyan was egregious, giving rise to presumptive prejudice that required dismissal of the indictment against him. In contrast, the judge denied Timi’s motion to dismiss on the basis that Timi was more responsible for the delay and could not benefit from any prejudice resulting therefrom. The Commonwealth filed a timely appeal from the dismissal of the indictment against Nickoyan. A single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County allowed Timi’s motion for interlocutory review of the […]
Commonwealth v. Walker (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-056-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC‑11445 COMMONWEALTH vs. HENRY WALKER. March 21, 2014. Sex Offender. Constitutional Law, Sex offender. Due Process of Law, Sex offender. Evidence, Sex offender, Expert opinion. Practice, Civil, Sex offender, Findings by judge. Words, “Menace.” Following a jury-waived trial, a judge in the Superior Court determined that the defendant is a sexually dangerous person and committed him to the Massachusetts Treatment Center pursuant to G. L. c. 123A, § 14 (d).[1] The defendant’s past sexual offenses include exhibitionism, a noncontact offense, and, in at least two instances, exhibitionism accompanied by a contact offense, e.g., indecent assault and battery. The judge found that the defendant has a mental abnormality, specifically crediting the testimony of one of the experts who testified at trial that the defendant “will likely engage in future noncontact offenses, but that there is certainly a significant possibility of future contact offenses.” He also found that the defendant’s mental abnormality “is one that predisposes him to sexual acts to a degree that makes him a menace to the health and safety of other persons.” The Appeals Court affirmed, see Commonwealth v. Walker, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 901 (2013), and we granted the defendant’s application for further appellate review. In Commonwealth v. Suave, 460 Mass. 582, 585-586 (2011) (Suave), we considered, for the first time, “whether G. L. c. 123A, properly construed, permits a finding of sexual dangerousness based on an individual’s history of committing noncontact sexual offenses and his likelihood of committing only noncontact offenses in the future.” We concluded that a finding that a defendant is likely to commit noncontact sexual offenses could support a determination that the defendant is a “menace” only where the Commonwealth has shown that “the defendant’s predicted sexual offenses will instill in his victims a reasonable apprehension of being subjected to a contact sex crime. A generalized fear or some other unspecified psychological harm such as shock or alarm will not suffice.” Id. at 588. Because we had not yet decided the Suave case at the time of the defendant’s trial, the judge did not have the benefit of, and did not make his findings regarding noncontact offenses pursuant to, that decision. He did not, in other words, make any finding that the defendant is a “menace” because his predicted future noncontact offenses would be likely to instill in […]
Commonwealth v. Almeida (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-055-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC‑11486 COMMONWEALTH vs. DANIEL D. ALMEIDA. March 21, 2014. Sex Offender. Constitutional Law, Sex offender. Due Process of Law, Sex offender, Substantive rights. Evidence, Sex offender. Practice, Civil, Sex offender, Findings by judge. Words, “Menace.” Following a jury-waived trial, a judge in the Superior Court determined that the defendant is a sexually dangerous person and committed him to the Massachusetts Treatment Center pursuant to G. L. c. 123A, § 14 (d).[1] The judge concluded that the defendant suffers from a mental abnormality that manifests itself in behavior including voyeurism and exhibitionism, and that the defendant is reasonably likely to reoffend by engaging in those same types of behaviors in the future.[2] As the judge noted, the defendant’s sexual offenses are noncontact offenses. He nonetheless concluded that the defendant is likely to engage in sexual offenses in the future “to a degree that makes him a menace to the health and safety of other persons” if he is not confined to a secure facility. The judge also concluded that civil commitment on this basis did not violate the defendant’s substantive due process rights. The Appeals Court affirmed, see Commonwealth v. Almeida, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 451 (2013), and we granted the defendant’s application for further appellate review. At the time of the defendant’s trial, this court had not yet decided Commonwealth v. Suave, 460 Mass. 582 (2011) (Suave), in which we considered, for the first time, “whether G. L. c. 123A, properly construed, permits a finding of sexual dangerousness based on an individual’s history of committing noncontact sexual offenses and his likelihood of committing only noncontact offenses in the future.” Id. at 585-586. We concluded that it could, and, on the issue whether a defendant is a “menace,” stated that “the Commonwealth must show the defendant’s predicted sexual offenses will instill in his victims a reasonable apprehension of being subjected to a contact sex crime. A generalized fear or some other unspecified psychological harm such as shock or alarm will not suffice.” Id. at 588. We ultimately held in the Suave case that the defendant’s past and predicted future sexual behavior did not support a finding that he was a menace. Id. at 589. The Suave case thus does not itself provide an example of a defendant who was found to be sexually dangerous on the basis […]
Doherty v. Planning Board of Scituate (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-053-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC‑11401 MARYANN DOHERTY vs. PLANNING BOARD OF SCITUATE. Suffolk. December 3, 2013. ‑ March 21, 2014. Present: Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ. Zoning, Flood plain, Littoral property, By‑law. Planning Board. Municipal Corporations, Planning board, By‑laws and ordinances. Words, “Subject to flooding.” Civil action commenced in the Land Court Department on August 5, 2008. The case was heard by Harry M. Grossman, J. After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. Brandon H. Moss for the defendant. Leonard M. Singer (Michael D. Bliss with him) for the plaintiff. IRELAND, C.J. The plaintiff, MaryAnn Doherty, owner of two adjacent unimproved lots on a barrier beach peninsula in the town of Scituate (town),[1] applied for special permits from the town’s planning board (board) to construct new residential dwellings on the lots, which are located in a flood plain and watershed protection district (FPWP district). The board denied the applications, concluding that Doherty had not demonstrated that her lots were “not subject to flooding” within the meaning of § 470.9 of the zoning bylaw. Doherty sought review pursuant to G. L. c. 40A, § 17, where after a bench trial, a Land Court judge entered a judgment affirming the board’s decision and dismissing Doherty’s complaint. In an unpublished order and memorandum pursuant to its rule 1:28, the Appeals Court reversed, concluding that the phrase “subject to flooding” has a specific meaning derived from a map setting forth the FPWP district and based only on elevation from sea level. We granted the board’s application for further appellate review. Because we conclude that the Appeals Court adopted an incorrect definition of the phrase “subject to flooding,” and we agree with the meaning adopted by the Land Court judge, we affirm the judgment entered by him. 1. Background. The judge found the following facts, which we occasionally supplement with undisputed facts in the record. See Wendy’s Old Fashioned Hamburgers of N.Y., Inc. v. Board of Appeal of Billerica, 454 Mass. 374, 383 (2009) (Wendy’s) (on appellate review, judge’s factual findings will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous or where there is no evidence to support them). The unimproved lots in question are located at 114 and 118 Edward Foster Road, in the […]
Commonwealth v. Fay (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-054-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC‑11534 COMMONWEALTH vs. HAROLD FAY. Hampden. December 5, 2013. ‑ March 21, 2014. Present: Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ. Sex Offender. Open and Gross Lewdness and Lascivious Behavior. Evidence, Sex offender. Due Process of Law, Sex offender, Substantive rights. Constitutional Law, Sex offender. Words, “Menace,” “Mental abnormality.” Petition for civil commitment filed in the Superior Court Department on March 24, 2011. The case was heard by Mary‑Lou Rup, J. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. John Fennel, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for the defendant. Katherine A. Robertson, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. CORDY, J. On October 15, 2012, at the conclusion of a jury-waived trial, the defendant was found to be a sexually dangerous person and committed to the Massachusetts Treatment Center pursuant to G. L. c. 123A, § 14 (d). In support of her decision, the trial judge found that the defendant suffered from pedophilia and exhibitionism and that he was likely to reoffend against children. She further found that, although the defendant was only likely to commit noncontact sexual offenses, such as open and gross lewdness, in the future, these offenses would “instill in his child victims a reasonable apprehension of being subjected to a contact sex offense,” particularly where the defendant’s actions in the past exhibited luring, approaching, and confining behavior. Thus, she held that the defendant was a “menace” as defined by this court in Commonwealth v. Suave, 460 Mass. 582, 588 (2011), and ordered him civilly committed. On appeal, the defendant first argues that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that he is a “menace” to the health and safety of others. He contends that the judge improperly considered evidence that he exhibited “confining” behavior based on a criminal charge of which he was acquitted, and that if his “confining” behavior had not been considered, evidence that he lured or approached the children he targeted would have been insufficient. He further argues that, as a matter of law, he cannot be categorized as a sexually dangerous person within the meaning of G. L. c. 123A, where he is not likely to commit contact sex offenses in the future. Finally, he argues that, if his actions do fall within the statute, his commitment violates his […]
Categories: News Tags: 1005414, Commonwealth, Lawyers, Weekly
Commonwealth v. Mason (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-030-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 11‑P‑1662 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. TREVON MASON. No. 11‑P‑1662. Suffolk. October 4, 2013. ‑ March 20, 2014. Present: Cypher, Katzmann, & Maldonado, JJ. Practice, Criminal, Challenge to jurors, Jury and jurors. Jury and Jurors. Resisting Arrest. Complaint received and sworn to in the Dorchester Division of the Boston Municipal Court Department on September 9, 2008. A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Lawrence E. McCormick, J., and the case was tried before Robert E. Baylor, J. Patricia A. DeJuneas for the defendant. Paul B. Linn, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. CYPHER, J. The defendant, Trevon Mason, was charged with armed robbery, possession of a firearm without a firearm identification card, assault by means of a dangerous weapon, two counts of assault and battery on a police officer, and resisting arrest. Before trial, the Commonwealth entered a nolle prosequi of the charge of armed robbery, and a judge dismissed the charge of possession of a firearm without an identification card. The Commonwealth elected not to go forward on the charge of assault by means of a dangerous weapon on the day trial began. At the close of the Commonwealth’s case, the judge allowed the defendant’s motion for a required finding of not guilty on one of the two charges of assault and battery on a police officer. The jury acquitted the defendant of the other count of assault and battery on a police officer. The defendant was convicted of resisting arrest. The defendant appeals, claiming error in (1) the Commonwealth’s exercise of peremptory challenges of prospective jurors who belong to a discrete racial group; (2) the denial of his pretrial motion to suppress evidence; and (3) the admission at trial of evidence of irrelevant and prejudicial prearrest conduct of the defendant. It is not necessary to provide a detailed recitation of the facts of the underlying charges. We affirm. The jury empanelment. During voir dire, juror no. 8 informed the court that he felt that he had been mistreated during an arrest, but that he could be fair and impartial. He also indicated that he had graduated from the Maine police academy in June, 2010. Juror no. 22 informed the court during voir dire that she had a son who was currently incarcerated on a fifteen-year […]