1148 Davol Street LLC v. Mechanic’s Mill One LLC
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 13-P-1985 Appeals Court 1148 DAVOL STREET LLC. vs. MECHANIC’S MILL ONE LLC. No. 13-P-1985. Bristol. September 4, 2014. – December 12, 2014. Present: Cohen, Meade, & Milkey, JJ. Adverse Possession and Prescription. Municipal Corporations, Adverse possession. Real Property, Adverse possession. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on April 8, 2008. The case was heard by Renée P. Dupuis, J. Arthur D. Frank, Jr., for the defendant. John M. Sahady for the plaintiff. MILKEY, J. At issue in this appeal is the ownership of a strip of land in Fall River. The defendant was the record owner of the disputed property, which the plaintiff claimed based on adverse possession. The parties agree that the nature and length of the plaintiff’s use of the land generally was sufficient to establish title by adverse possession. The only contested issue is one of law: whether the plaintiff may count the time during which title to the land was held by one of the defendant’s predecessors-in-title, the city of Fall River (city), toward the requisite twenty-year period of continuous adverse use. Relying on G. L. c. 260, § 31, the defendant argues that the plaintiff’s adverse possession claim did not begin to run until the city transferred the property to a private party. In a thoughtful decision issued after a trial on stipulated facts, a Superior Court judge rejected this argument as a matter of law. She ruled that a private record owner of once-public land opposing an adverse possession claim cannot invoke G. L. c. 260, § 31, as a defense. We agree and therefore affirm. 1. Background. By 1975, the city of Fall River had acquired a parcel of land located at 1082 Davol Street in Fall River (Mechanic’s Mill parcel).[1] The property included “a large building [that] had been used for manufacturing purposes.” The record does not reveal what actual use the city itself made of the parcel, but the parties stipulated that the city “held” the property “for a public purpose as defined in Chapter 260, Section 31 of the General Laws.” In 1989, the city sold the Mechanic’s Mill parcel to a private corporation. Since then, the property has continued in private ownership, and it is now owned by defendant Mechanic’s Mill One LLC (record owner). In 1975, Paul and Albert […]
1148 Davol Street LLC v. Mechanic’s Mill One LLC
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 13-P-1985 Appeals Court 1148 DAVOL STREET LLC. vs. MECHANIC’S MILL ONE LLC. No. 13-P-1985. Bristol. September 4, 2014. – December 12, 2014. Present: Cohen, Meade, & Milkey, JJ. Adverse Possession and Prescription. Municipal Corporations, Adverse possession. Real Property, Adverse possession. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on April 8, 2008. The case was heard by Renée P. Dupuis, J. Arthur D. Frank, Jr., for the defendant. John M. Sahady for the plaintiff. MILKEY, J. At issue in this appeal is the ownership of a strip of land in Fall River. The defendant was the record owner of the disputed property, which the plaintiff claimed based on adverse possession. The parties agree that the nature and length of the plaintiff’s use of the land generally was sufficient to establish title by adverse possession. The only contested issue is one of law: whether the plaintiff may count the time during which title to the land was held by one of the defendant’s predecessors-in-title, the city of Fall River (city), toward the requisite twenty-year period of continuous adverse use. Relying on G. L. c. 260, § 31, the defendant argues that the plaintiff’s adverse possession claim did not begin to run until the city transferred the property to a private party. In a thoughtful decision issued after a trial on stipulated facts, a Superior Court judge rejected this argument as a matter of law. She ruled that a private record owner of once-public land opposing an adverse possession claim cannot invoke G. L. c. 260, § 31, as a defense. We agree and therefore affirm. 1. Background. By 1975, the city of Fall River had acquired a parcel of land located at 1082 Davol Street in Fall River (Mechanic’s Mill parcel).[1] The property included “a large building [that] had been used for manufacturing purposes.” The record does not reveal what actual use the city itself made of the parcel, but the parties stipulated that the city “held” the property “for a public purpose as defined in Chapter 260, Section 31 of the General Laws.” In 1989, the city sold the Mechanic’s Mill parcel to a private corporation. Since then, the property has continued in private ownership, and it is now owned by defendant Mechanic’s Mill One LLC (record owner). In 1975, Paul and Albert […]
Categories: News Tags:
Mendonca v. Civil Service Commission, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-162-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 13-P-1979 Appeals Court Paul Mendonca vs. Civil Service Commission & another.[1] No. 13-P-1979. Suffolk. September 15, 2014. – December 12, 2014. Present: Berry, Kafker, & Carhart, JJ. Veteran. Handicapped Persons. Public Employment, Provisional employee, Termination, Reinstatement of personnel. Civil Service, Termination of employment, Reinstatement of personnel. Employment, Termination. Administrative Law, Substantial evidence. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on January 13, 2012. The case was heard by Garry V. Inge, J., on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Richard L. Neumeier (Galen Gilbert with him) for the plaintiff. Iraida J. Alvarez, Assistant Attorney General, for the defendants. Carhart, J. Paul Mendonca appeals from the entry of judgment in favor of the defendants following a Superior Court judge’s denial of his motion for judgment on the pleadings. Mendonca had sought review pursuant to G. L. c. 31, § 44, of a decision by the Civil Service Commission (commission) upholding his layoff by the Executive Office of Labor and Workforce Development (EOLWD). Mendonca alleged that the layoff violated his rights as a disabled veteran. We agree and reverse. Background. Mendonca is a disabled Vietnam War veteran. He holds a bachelor of science degree in business management from Suffolk University, and a master’s degree in business administration from the University of Massachusetts. Mendonca’s extensive work history includes management, training, and marketing in the human resources field. He has negotiated and managed labor agreements to ensure labor law compliance; he has established and implemented human resources systems for various companies; he has recruited and trained staff; and he has secured competitive State abandoned property audit contracts for private companies. On May 3, 1999, the Commonwealth hired Mendonca as a provisional Administrator III. A Management Questionnaire (MQ) describing Mendonca’s position shows that Mendonca was responsible for administering the Commonwealth’s federally funded Job Search/Job Readiness Program (JS/JR). Mendonca worked closely with several State agencies, including the Departments of Transitional Assistance (DTA), Unemployment Assistance (DUA), and Career Services (DCS), and ensured that JS/JR “[wa]s operated according to Federal, State and contractual requirements.” Mendonca’s duties included negotiating and drafting interdepartmental service agreements; specifically, he “[r]ecommend[ed] amounts and conditions for reimbursement, scope of services, program requirements, key performance objectives, budget provisions and staffing configurations to ensure contractual goals are achievable.” On March 29, 2007, the human […]
Passatempo, et al. v. McMenimen, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-160-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 13-P-1678 Appeals Court RONALD P. PASSATEMPO, trustee,[1] & others[2] vs. FREDERICK V. McMENIMEN, THIRD, & others.[3] No. 13-P-1678. Suffolk. September 16, 2014. – December 11, 2014. Present: Kantrowitz, Grainger, & Hanlon, JJ. Insurance, Agent, Life insurance, Fraud and concealment, Misrepresentation. Fraud. Consumer Protection Act, Insurance, Unfair or deceptive act, Attorney’s fees. Practice, Civil, Attorney’s fees, Judgment notwithstanding verdict, New trial. Damages, Attorney’s fees. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on July 1, 2004. Following review by the Supreme Judicial Court, 461 Mass. 279 (2012), the case was tried before Thomas P. Billings, J.; a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, alternatively, for a new trial was heard by him; and a motion for attorney’s fees and costs was heard by him. Douglas Hallward-Driemeier for Nationwide Life Insurance Company of America & others. Charles M. Waters for the plaintiffs. GRAINGER, J. This case, boasting a lineage of more than a decade in numerous courts,[4] is now before us on appeal from a judgment holding the Nationwide defendants (collectively, Nationwide) liable to the plaintiffs on their G. L. c. 93A (c. 93A) claim. Nationwide argues error in the denial of its posttrial motion seeking to set aside the verdict or obtain a new trial and in the judge’s award of attorney’s fees and costs to the plaintiffs. G. L. c. 93A, § 9(4).[5] Background. The underlying dispute involves misrepresentations and fraud by which Frederick V. McMenimen, III, induced Samuel Pietropaolo, Sr. (Pietropaolo), to relinquish certain life insurance policies and purchase others, and is recounted in detail in Passatempo v. McMenimen, 461 Mass. 279, 281-285 (2012) (Passatempo I). At the beginning of the narrative, McMenimen was employed by the insurance brokerage firm New England Advisory Group, LLC, a business owned and managed by Barry G. Armstrong. McMenimen thereafter worked as an in-house broker for Provident Mutual Life Insurance Company (Provident) and, after losing that position, became self-employed. Provident was acquired by Nationwide after McMenimen was discharged from his Provident in-house position. Past trials and appellate decisions have resolved claims of liability on the part of McMenimen, New England Advisory Group, LLC, and Armstrong. We are now asked to consider an appeal from the judgment finding Nationwide liable to the plaintiffs. We refer to additional undisputed factual history insofar as it bears on Nationwide’s liability under theories of […]
Commonwealth v. Foster F., a juvenile (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-159-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 13-P-1427 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. FOSTER F., a juvenile. No. 13-P-1427. Barnstable. October 9, 2014. – December 10, 2014. Present: Berry, Hanlon, & Carhart, JJ. Indecent Assault and Battery. Practice, Criminal, Juvenile delinquency proceeding, Argument by prosecutor. Evidence, Juvenile delinquency, Authentication of document, Verbal completeness. Witness, Victim. Internet. Complaint received and sworn to in the Barnstable County/ Town of Plymouth Division of the Juvenile Court Department on March 20, 2012. The case was tried before Mary O’Sullivan Smith. Rebecca Rose for the juvenile. Suzanne D. McDonough, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. CARHART, J. The juvenile appeals from an adjudication of delinquency by reason of indecent assault and battery, arguing that the judge erroneously allowed in evidence Facebook[1] communications and the entire transcript of the victim’s Sexual Abuse Intervention Network (SAIN) interview. The juvenile also argues that the prosecutor’s improper closing argument warrants reversal. We reverse. Background. The jury heard the following testimony. On January 28, 2012, the juvenile met the victim and her friends Gwen and Nancy[2] at a park in downtown Plymouth. They met to play a “dating game,” wherein the juvenile would spend some time with each of the three girls and then decide which girl he wanted to date. While each of the girls had been communicating with the juvenile through Facebook, they had not met him in person until they all went ice skating some two weeks earlier. The victim’s and the juvenile’s Facebook communications included explicit sexual exchanges. On January 28, the juvenile spent time alone talking with Gwen and, later, Nancy. The victim testified that, when it was her turn to be alone with the juvenile, she and the juvenile went behind a monument and began kissing on a bench. At some point, the victim started to walk away, but the juvenile convinced her not to leave. She returned, they sat on a different bench, and the juvenile began “dry humping” her. The victim tried to push him away, and started walking away again. As the two were walking toward the monument, the juvenile pushed the victim against the monument and started sucking on her ear. He then sat the victim down and pinned her legs. Despite the victim’s orders to stop, the juvenile placed his hand inside her pants and inserted several […]
Commonwealth v. Velez (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-158-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 13-P-1334 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. WILLIAM VELEZ. No. 13-P-1334. Suffolk. November 3, 2014. – December 9, 2014. Present: Grainger, Rubin, & Hanlon, JJ. Imprisonment, Credit for time served. Practice, Criminal, Sentence, Probation. Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court Department on September 3, 2009. A motion for pretrial confinement credit, filed on April 17, 2013, was considered by Frances A. McIntyre, J. Rebecca A. Jacobstein for the defendant. Helle Sachse, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. HANLON, J. The defendant appeals from the partial denial of his motion for pretrial confinement credits on the sentence imposed on his probation revocation, claiming that he is entitled to an additional fifty-six days of credit for time he spent in jail awaiting trial on what he describes as unrelated charges. We affirm in part and reverse in part. Background. “As with most sentencing disputes, a specific chronology is useful to clarify the issues.” Commonwealth v. Holmes, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 737, 737 (2013), S.C., 469 Mass. 1010 (2014). At various times during the period at issue, the defendant had three unrelated, open criminal charges — an assault and battery charge, an unarmed robbery charge that was reduced to larceny from the person, and a charge of failure to register as a sex offender. It is the failure to register charge that is primarily at issue in this case; it arose in the Waltham District Court, which issued a criminal complaint for that offense on May 8, 2009. The defendant was arraigned on July 22, 2009, and was held at the Nashua Street jail on $ 5,000 bail from the July 22, arraignment date until at least August 24, 2009.[1] The docket sheet in the record does not indicate that bail ever was posted or reduced; however, the parties appeared to agree that the defendant was not held on that charge after August 24, 2009, apparently in reliance on the letter from the keeper of the records at the Nashua Street jail. See note 1, supra. However, the District Court docket sheet also shows that, on August 24, 2009, the failure to register case was continued to September 29, 2009, with the notation “Habe to Nashua St. Jail same bail $ 5/0′.” From this, we conclude that, although the defendant was held in […]
Commonwealth v. Valentin (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-192-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11581 COMMONWEALTH vs. PEDRO VALENTIN. Suffolk. October 6, 2014. – December 8, 2014. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Constitutional Law, Assistance of counsel. Due Process of Law, Assistance of counsel. Homicide. Practice, Criminal, Assistance of counsel, Capital case, New trial. Witness, Impeachment. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on October 23, 1991. Following review by this court, 420 Mass. 263 (1995), a motion for a new trial, filed on January 6, 2012, was considered by Patrick F. Brady, J. A request for leave to appeal was allowed by Gants, J., in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk. Dennis Shedd for the defendant. Paul B. Linn, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. CORDY, J. The defendant’s conviction of murder in the first degree was affirmed by this court in 1995. See Commonwealth v. Valentin, 420 Mass. 263 (1995). In 2012, he filed a motion for a new trial which was denied. The case is now before us pursuant to an order of a single justice of the county court allowing, in part, the defendant’ s application for leave to appeal from that denial under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. We conclude that trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance in failing to impeach a witness as to one of his statements, where counsel’s decision was not manifestly unreasonable and, in any event, did not so impact the outcome of the trial as to create a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. We also conclude that the substitution of trial counsel’s partner to stand in for her during jury deliberations was not one of structural error warranting a new trial absent a showing of prejudice. Further, considering the claim as one of ineffective assistance of counsel, we conclude that the defendant did not receive constitutionally deficient assistance or suffer any appreciable prejudice as a result of the substitution. Accordingly, the defendant’s motion for new trial was properly denied. Background. In October, 1991, the defendant was indicted on charges of murder in the first degree, G. L. c. 265, § 1, for the killing of Timothy Bond in July, 1991, and for assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, G. L. c. 265, § 15A (b). 1. Evidence at trial. The facts of this […]
Commonwealth v. Chamberlin (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-157-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 12-P-1292 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. PETER CHAMBERLIN. No. 12-P-1292. Bristol. September 9, 2014. – December 5, 2014. Present: Kantrowitz, Grainger, & Hanlon, JJ. Cellular Telephone. Subpoena. Practice, Criminal, Motion to suppress, Subpoena, Warrant. Grand Jury. Search and Seizure, Warrant, Plain view. Due Process of Law. Evidence, Voice identification. Identification. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on November 21, 2007. Pretrial motions to suppress evidence were heard by D. Lloyd Macdonald, J., and the cases were tried before Robert J. Kane, J. Merritt Schnipper for the defendant. Tara L. Blackman, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. GRAINGER, J. A jury of the Superior Court found the defendant guilty of armed robbery while masked, G. L. 265, § 17, kidnapping for purposes of extortion, G. L. c. 265, § 26, and armed assault with intent to murder, G. L. c. 265, § 18(b). The convictions were based on the armed invasion of a real estate agency following telephone conversations between the defendant and the agency’s owner during which the defendant made an evening appointment for the ostensible purpose of discussing one or more properties of interest to him. The defendant appeals, asserting numerous procedural and evidentiary errors that we consider in turn, referring to the undisputed factual background as necessary to inform our discussion. 1. Production of telephone records. The victim told the police that although the defendant was masked, his voice was recognizable as belonging to an individual who identified himself as “Marco” during several telephone calls that culminated in an evening appointment at the victim’s office for the time of the robbery. The victim reported that the defendant spoke repeatedly during the robbery, making threats to the victim and referring to the victim’s wife. In the course of investigating the robbery, Fall River police Detective Lawrence Ferreira examined the victim’s phone, retrieving a voicemail message from “Marco.” After obtaining call records from the victim’s cellular telephone carrier, Detective Ferreira linked the defendant to the only number on the call list that the victim did not recognize. Ferreira then contacted the carrier, T-Mobile, and requested call records associated with that number. Ferreira informed the T-Mobile law enforcement relations officer, Ronald Witt, that the defendant’s phone was being used to contact the victim’s family and that the “suspect has threatened the victim’s family with bodily harm.”[1] […]
Categories: News Tags: 1115714, Chamberlin, Commonwealth, Lawyers, Weekly
L.L., a juvenile v. Commonwealth (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-191-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11721 L.L., a juvenile vs. COMMONWEALTH. Suffolk. September 3, 2014. – December 5, 2014. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Botsford, Cordy, & Hines, JJ. Sex Offender. Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act. Delinquent Child. Evidence, Juvenile delinquency, Sex offender. Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk on July 7, 2014. The case was reported by Spina, J. Beth L. Eisenberg, Committee for Public Counsel Services (Susan Oker, Committee for Public Counsel Services, with her) for the juvenile. Catherine Langevin Semel, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. Eric Tennen, for Children’s Law Center of Massachusetts & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief. BOTSFORD, J. After admitting to sufficient facts before a Juvenile Court judge with respect to two counts of indecent assault and battery on a person fourteen or older, the juvenile filed a motion seeking relief from the obligation to register as a sex offender pursuant to G. L. c. 6, § 178E (f) (§ 178E [f]). After ahearing, the judge denied the motion, thereby requiring the juvenile to register with the Sex Offender Registry Board (board). We consider here the juvenile’s petition for relief pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3. The principal issue he raises concerns the standard by which a Juvenile Court judge determines the risk of reoffense on the part of a juvenile under § 178E (f), an issue that this court considered in Commonwealth v. Ronald R., 450 Mass. 262, 267-268 (2007). We seek to provide additional guidance concerning that standard in this opinion. We affirm the order denying the juvenile’s motion for relief from registration. Background.[1] On the afternoon of May 9, 2013, the juvenile, who was then sixteen years old, approached an adult woman from behind as she was walking her dog in Lynn and pulled down the sweatpants she was wearing to her thighs. The juvenile then made a vulgar comment about the victim’s private parts, grabbed his own genitals, and ran away. The woman described her assailant to the Lynn police. Eight days later, on the afternoon of May 17, 2013, a different woman was walking four children home from school in Lynn when she felt the juvenile touch her buttocks and pull her […]
Karaa, et al. v. Yim, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-156-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 14-P-17 Appeals Court SHOREH KARAA & another[1] vs. KUK YIM & others.[2] No. 14-P-17. Middlesex. October 8, 2014. – December 5, 2014. Present: Kafker, Trainor, & Milkey, JJ. Real Property, Lease. Contract, Performance and breach. Landlord and Tenant, Termination of lessee’s obligation, Rent, Security deposit, Consumer protection. Damages, Mitigation, Attorney’s fees. Consumer Protection Act, Landlord and tenant, Trade or commerce. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on September 30, 2011. The case was heard by Kathe M. Tuttman, J. Edward A. Broderick for the plaintiffs. Wei Jia, for the defendants, submitted a brief. KAFKER, J. The primary issue presented in this landlord-tenant case is the proper application of the security deposit provisions in G. L. c. 186, § 15B. The residential property was owned by Shoreh Karaa and Fadi Karaa (collectively, the Karaas), and rented by China Real Estate Development Investment & Trust Fund Corporation (CREDIT), Kuk Yim, and Chiung Fong (collectively, the tenants). After a bench trial, the Superior Court judge found that the tenants had breached their lease with the Karaas, and that the tenants’ obligations under the lease were not excused under the doctrine of frustration of purpose. The judge also found that the Karaas were not liable for alleged violations of G. L. c. 186, § 15B, stemming from their mishandling of the tenants’ security deposit. The judge further determined that the Karaas had not committed fraud or breached the covenant of quiet enjoyment, that they properly had mitigated their damages, and that they were not liable for alleged violations of G. L. c. 93A. The trial judge did find, however, that the Karaas were liable under G. L. c. 186, § 15B(2)(a), for their failure to pay interest on the tenants’ last month’s rent. On appeal, the tenants take issue with the trial judge’s holdings in favor of the Karaas. We affirm. Background. In March, 2010, the Karaas placed their home located at 83 Spring Valley Road in Belmont (property) up for rent at $ 4,500 per month through listings on the Internet site “Craigslist” and with a real estate agent. On May 10, 2010, the tenants and the Karaas entered into a written lease agreement for the property at a reduced rent of $ 4,300 per month, with a starting date of June 16, 2010. The lease was for one year and fifteen days. The lessees […]