Ventrice v. Ventrice (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-026-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 13-P-1992 Appeals Court DIANE LYNN VENTRICE vs. MICHAEL CHARLES VENTRICE. No. 13-P-1992. Hampden. December 2, 2014. – March 19, 2015. Present: Rapoza, C.J., Vuono, & Meade, JJ. Constitutional Law, Access to court proceedings. Divorce and Separation, Child custody. Minor, Custody. Parent and Child, Custody, Custody. Complaint for divorce filed in the Hampden Division of the Probate and Family Court Department on December 28, 2010. The case was heard by Anne M. Geoffrion, J. William M. Driscoll for the husband. Bradford B. Moir for the wife. MEADE, J. After a trial and subsequent hearing in the Probate and Family Court, the defendant, Michael Charles Ventrice, appeals from certain provisions of an amended divorce judgment nisi. In particular, Michael appeals the provision ordering that he and the plaintiff, his former spouse Diane Lynn Ventrice, shall engage in and pay for court-directed mediation before either may file any subsequent action in the Probate and Family Court.[1] Michael also contends that the judge abused her discretion by awarding Diane sole legal and physical custody of three of the couple’s four children.[2] For the reasons that follow, we vacate the amended divorce judgment and remand to the Probate and Family Court for additional proceedings.[3] Background. We recite facts found by the judge, and accept as true other essential uncontroverted facts from the record. Miller v. Miller, 448 Mass. 320, 321 (2007). Michael and Diane Ventrice were married in June, 2001. They had four children, who, as of the time of trial in May, 2012, were between the ages of twelve and five: Linda, the oldest, followed by Susan, Agatha, and Matthew, who was youngest.[4],[5] During their marriage, Michael and Diane owned and operated a business known as Big Adventures, a children’s play center, in Westfield. The couple alternated working at Big Adventures and staying home with the children. Michael was the primary caretaker for about four years, while Diane worked extended hours at the business.[6] At all other times, Diane was the primary caregiver for the children. Michael performed construction and snow-plowing jobs on the side for extra money, while Diane was working as a security assistant. Diane filed for divorce in December, 2010. It was clear from the record and undisputed that the marriage was irretrievably broken. During the pendency of the divorce, Diane began […]
Souza, petitioner (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-024-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 13-P-1052 Appeals Court GEORGE SOUZA, petitioner. No. 13-P-1052. Suffolk. June 3, 2014. – March 18, 2015. Present: Kantrowitz, Milkey, & Hanlon, JJ. Sex Offender. Practice, Civil, Sex offender, Directed verdict, Instructions to jury. Evidence, Sex offender, Expert opinion. Petition filed in the Superior Court Department on February 2, 2009. The case was tried before Diane M. Kottmyer, J. Mary P. Murray for the Commonwealth. Michael A. Nam-Krane for the petitioner. HANLON, J. George Souza filed a petition in Superior Court seeking release from his civil confinement as a “sexually dangerous person” (SDP). See G. L. c. 123A, § 9. At trial, the jury was unable to reach a verdict and, thereafter, the trial judge allowed Souza’s motion for a directed verdict of not guilty. The Commonwealth appeals, arguing there was sufficient evidence to permit a retrial. We agree and reverse. Background. We recite the evidence heard by the jury in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. Commonwealth v. Cowen, 452 Mass. 757, 763 (2008). Souza has a significant adult criminal record, extending over a period from 1963 until his last conviction in 2000.[1] In 1971, he pled guilty in New York to “rape in the second degree” for having “engaged in sexual intercourse with . . . [a] female less than . . . fourteen years of age.”[2] Souza has maintained that the victim was working as a “prostitute” at the time, that she looked eighteen to him, and that she agreed to engage in sex with him. Nevertheless, in one interview, he also stated, “[A] little girl came . . . it was my fault . . . this little child . . . I should never [have] went with this child.” When asked how old the girl had been, he said, “I have no idea . . . I don’t even want to guess.” He was then twenty-seven years old. On another occasion, in 2011, Souza asserted that the police entered the room where he was with the victim “before any sexual activity took place.” More recently, in a group therapy session in 2012, Souza, discussing the New York offense, told the group that he had “engag[ed] in sexual intercourse with a 15-year-old prostitute . . . [and] that she did not look 15 because they […]
Murray v. Super (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-022-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 14-P-518 Appeals Court DAWN MICHELLE MURRAY vs. JONATHAN S. SUPER. No. 14-P-518. Worcester. December 2, 2014. – March 16, 2015. Present: Cypher, Wolohojian, & Blake, JJ. Divorce and Separation, Child custody, Child support, Modification of judgment. Minor, Custody. Parent and Child, Custody, Child support. Complaint for divorce filed in the Worcester Division of the Probate and Family Court Department on January 30, 2009. After consolidation, complaints for modification, filed on July 10, 2012, and October 2, 2013, were heard by Lucille A. DiLeo, J. Nicholas J. Plante for the mother. Christine D. Anthony for the father. BLAKE, J. The mother, Dawn Michelle Murray, appeals from a judgment of the Probate and Family Court dismissing her complaint for modification, which sought to remove the minor children of the marriage to the State of California. Where the parent seeking to move has primary physical custody of the children, the standard governing removal of the minor children from the Commonwealth requires a determination of whether there is a real advantage to the custodial parent and consideration of the best interests of the children and the interests of both parents. See Yannas v. Frondistou-Yannas, 395 Mass. 704, 710-711 (1985) (Yannas). Where the real advantage to the custodial parent is at odds with the best interests of the children, the children’s interests are paramount. Concluding that the judge below did not err in placing the interests of the children first, we affirm that part of the judgment denying the mother’s request to remove the children to California. The mother also appeals from that portion of the judgment reducing the child support obligation of the father, Jonathan S. Super.[1] We vacate the portion of the judgment related to child support and remand the matter for additional findings on that issue. Background. We summarize the proceedings, setting forth relevant background facts as determined by the judge, supplemented by the record where necessary, and reserving other facts for our later discussion of the issues. The parties were divorced by judgment of divorce nisi on October 24, 2011, after a contested trial. The divorce judgment provided, in pertinent part, that the parties would share legal custody of their three minor children,[2] with the mother having “primary physical custody” and the father having parenting time. When the children are not in […]
Flaherty v. Sheriff of Suffolk County, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-023-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 14-P-778 Appeals Court GEORGE H. FLAHERTY vs. SHERIFF OF SUFFOLK COUNTY & another.[1] No. 14-P-778. Suffolk. December 9, 2014. – March 16, 2015. Present: Cohen, Fecteau, & Massing, JJ. Sheriff. Correction Officer. Public Employment, Assault pay benefits, Worker’s compensation, Retirement. Workers’ Compensation Act, Public employee. Limitations, Statute of. Commonwealth, Claim against. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on November 15, 2010. The case was heard by Linda E. Giles, J., on motions for summary judgment. Christopher G. Perillo for the defendants. Arinda R. Brooks for the plaintiff. MASSING, J. The defendants, the sheriff of Suffolk County and the Suffolk County sheriff’s department (collectively referred to as the Commonwealth[2]), appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court finding the Commonwealth liable for assault pay owed to the plaintiff, George H. Flaherty, under G. L. c. 126, § 18A (sometimes referred to as the statute). The Commonwealth contends (1) that Flaherty’s entitlement to assault pay terminated when he reached the mandatory age of retirement for correction officers and became entitled to superannuation retirement benefits and (2) that his action is barred by the statute of limitations. The Superior Court judge rejected both contentions. We agree with the judge’s conclusion that Flaherty was entitled to assault pay as long as he was receiving workers’ compensation benefits, and that his action is not time barred, but we agree with the Commonwealth that the applicable statute of limitations is G. L. c. 260, § 3A, precluding Flaherty from recovering payments that became due more than three years before he filed his complaint. Background. While working as a Suffolk County correction officer in January, 2006, Flaherty was injured as a result of prisoner violence. An administrative judge of the Department of Industrial Accidents found that he was partially disabled and awarded him workers’ compensation benefits beginning January 4, 2006. He continued to receive workers’ compensation benefits until September 1, 2010, the effective date of a lump sum settlement agreement that ended his entitlement to those benefits. On November 15, 2010, Flaherty filed an action in the Superior Court claiming that the Commonwealth was required by G. L. c. 126, § 18A, to compensate him with assault pay during the period he received workers’ compensation benefits. The Commonwealth did not dispute that Flaherty was entitled to assault pay but argued that his superannuation […]
Commonwealth v. Dagraca-Teixeira (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-045-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11754 COMMONWEALTH vs. JASON DAGRACA-TEIXEIRA (and a companion case[1]). March 16, 2015 Firearms. Controlled Substances. Evidence, Firearm, Constructive possession, Inference. Search and Seizure, Warrant. The defendants, Jason Dagraca-Teixeira (Jason) and Adilson Teixeira (Adilson), were convicted of possession of heroin, G. L. c. 94C, § 34;[2] unlawful possession of a firearm, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (h); and unlawful possession of ammunition, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (h) (1). On appeal, the defendants argued, among other things, that the evidence supporting their convictions was insufficient. A panel of the Appeals Court affirmed the convictions. Commonwealth v. Dagraca-Teixeira, 85 Mass. App. Ct. 1126 (2014). We granted the defendants’ applications for further appellate review, limited to the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence. See Commonwealth v. Dagraca-Teixeira, 469 Mass. 1110 (2014). We hold that there was sufficient evidence supporting the convictions of possession of heroin, but that the Commonwealth did not present sufficient evidence to establish possession of the firearms and ammunition beyond a reasonable doubt. We therefore affirm in part and reverse in part. We review the essential evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. At approximately 11 P.M. on an evening in November, 2011, six Taunton police officers executed a search warrant for a second-floor apartment on Wales Street in Taunton. They entered through an open door and found eight to ten people inside, including Adilson. The officers secured the apartment and its occupants. One of the officers searched Adilson and found $ 340 in cash in his pocket. While the officers were present, Jason arrived with an unidentified woman. An officer searched him and found $ 375 in cash and a key. The search of the apartment included three bedrooms located off a short interior hallway. Jason’s key fit the lock of one of the bedrooms. In that bedroom, an officer found a small bag containing a substance believed to be heroin, along with Jason’s baptismal certificate, a cellular telephone, and scales. During the search of a second bedroom, another officer found two small bags of what appeared to be the same substance found in the first bedroom, along with twenty-nine dollars in cash, on a table with Adilson’s birth certificate and other documents. A woman’s jacket was hanging on the door to the bedroom closet. Inside a zippered pocket, in the jacket, officers found […]
Categories: News Tags: 1004515, Commonwealth, DagracaTeixeira, Lawyers, Weekly
Fitzgerald v. District Court Department of the Trial Court (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-044-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11648 STEVEN FITZGERALD vs. DISTRICT COURT DEPARTMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT.[1] March 13, 2015 Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. Practice, Criminal, Plea. Steven Fitzgerald appeals from a judgment of a single justice of this court denying his petition for relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3. Because we agree with the single justice that Fitzgerald is not entitled to extraordinary relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, we affirm. Fitzgerald pleaded guilty to certain criminal offenses in the District Court in 2013. In his petition before the single justice, he argued that he was forcibly medicated when he tendered his pleas. He also complained that he has not been able to obtain a copy of the court file of the earlier, related proceedings conducted under G. L. c. 123, §§ 8B and 16 (b), which resulted in orders that he be involuntarily committed and treated with antipsychotic medications. On appeal, Fitzgerald primarily presses his claim that he was improperly ordered to take antipsychotic medications before he pleaded guilty.[2] It appears that at some point before the plea hearing, a District Court judge had granted a petition of the medical director of Bridgewater State Hospital to involuntarily commit Fitzgerald pursuant to G. L. c. 123, § 16 (b), and also granted the medical director’s separate petition seeking authority to treat him with antipsychotic medications pursuant to G. L. c. 123, § 8B. Then, in March, 2013, a second judge held the plea hearing at which Fitzgerald was represented by counsel. After finding him competent to stand trial,[3] and conducting a plea colloquy, the judge accepted his guilty pleas and sentenced him. To the extent that Fitzgerald now seeks through his G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition to have his pleas vacated, on the ground that he was improperly forced to take antipsychotic medications, and was under the influence of those medications when he tendered his guilty pleas, his request is misplaced. Such a request should be made in a motion for a new trial pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30, as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001), which, if denied, is subject to review in the normal appellate process. A motion for a new trial filed in the trial court, and not a petition for general superintendence relief in this court, is the appropriate remedy. See Commonwealth v. Colon, 439 Mass. 519, 524 (2003), quoting Commonwealth v. Huot, […]
Categories: News Tags: 1004415, court, department, District, Fitzgerald, Lawyers, Trial, Weekly
Commonwealth v. Didas (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-043-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11712 COMMONWEALTH vs. DAMIEN DIDAS. Middlesex. December 4, 2014. – March 13, 2015. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Controlled Substances. Practice, Criminal, Sentence. Statute, Construction, Retroactive application, Amendment. Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court Department on October 20, 2011. A pretrial motion to apply to the defendant’s case amendments made to G. L. c. 94C was heard by Garry V. Inge, J. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. Bethany Stevens, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. Arnold A. Blank, Jr., Committee for Public Counsel Services, for the defendant. Barbara J. Dougan, for Families Against Mandatory Minimums, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. BOTSFORD, J. In this case we return to St. 2012, c. 192, “An Act relative to sentencing and improving law enforcement tools” (Crime Bill). More specifically, we revisit the question whether certain provisions of the Crime Bill apply to drug crimes with which the defendant was charged before the statute’s effective date, but for which the defendant was not convicted until after the effective date. See Commonwealth v. Galvin, 466 Mass. 286 (2013). See also Commonwealth v. Bradley, 466 Mass. 551 (2013). The Crime Bill had an emergency preamble and was effective on passage, which occurred on August 2, 2012. Among other things, it made a number of changes to provisions of the Commonwealth’s controlled substances law, G. L. c. 94C.[1] The Crime Bill also included a section specifying that certain provisions of the legislation were to apply retroactively to individuals who previously had been convicted of certain drug crimes with mandatory minimum sentences and were still serving those sentences. See St. 2012, c. 192, § 48 (§ 48). In Galvin, 466 Mass. at 286-287, 290-291, based on our review of the Crime Bill’s language and purpose, we interpreted § 48′s retroactivity provisions to mean that certain of its mandatory minimum sentence reductions should be applied retroactively to a defendant who had been charged with committing a drug offense before the Crime Bill’s effective date, but who was not tried, convicted, or sentenced until after that date. Thereafter, in Bradley, 466 Mass. at 561, we held that the school zone radius reduction included in § 30 of the Crime Bill should be applied retroactively to an […]
Commonwealth v. Augustine (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-042-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11482 COMMONWEALTH vs. SHABAZZ AUGUSTINE. Suffolk. October 10, 2013. – March 11, 2015. Present: Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ. Practice, Criminal, Appeal, Interlocutory appeal, Attorney’s fees, Request for fees and costs. Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court Department on July 29, 2011. Following review reported in 467 Mass. 230 (2014), a motion to award appellate attorney’s fees was filed in this court on February 28, 2014. The case was submitted on briefs. Matthew R. Segal & Jessie J. Rossman for the defendant. Cailin M. Campbell, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. Jane Larmon White, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for Committee for Public Counsel Services, amicus curiae. BOTSFORD, J. Following our decision in Commonwealth v. Augustine, 467 Mass. 230 (2014), the defendant filed a request for attorney’s fees pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 15 (d), as appearing in 422 Mass. 1501 (1996). He seeks fees for counsel he engaged to replace his court-appointed counsel for the defense of the Commonwealth’s interlocutory appeal in the case. It is undisputed that the defendant is indigent and that his new counsel agreed not to charge him any fees for their services. For reasons explained below, we hold that the defendant is not entitled to the payment of fees under rule 15 (d) in these circumstances. Procedural background. The defendant was indicted in 2011 for the murder of Julaine Jules. In November, 2012, he moved to suppress “cell site location information” that the Commonwealth had obtained, without a warrant, from his cellular telephone service provider. Augustine, 467 Mass. at 234. A judge of the Superior Court allowed his motion and suppressed the challenged evidence. Id. The Commonwealth thereafter applied for leave to appeal from the adverse ruling in accordance with Mass. R. Crim. P. 15 (a) (2), as appearing in 422 Mass. 1501 (1996).[1] Id. A single justice of the county court granted the application and directed the appeal to proceed in this court. Id. We held that, under art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his cell site location information, and therefore that a warrant was required for the Commonwealth to obtain the information. Id. at 255. We remanded the case to the Superior Court to give […]
Categories: News Tags: Augustine, Commonwealth, Lawyers, Weekly
Commonwealth v. Augustine (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-042-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11482 COMMONWEALTH vs. SHABAZZ AUGUSTINE. Suffolk. October 10, 2013. – March 11, 2015. Present: Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ. Practice, Criminal, Appeal, Interlocutory appeal, Attorney’s fees, Request for fees and costs. Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court Department on July 29, 2011. Following review reported in 467 Mass. 230 (2014), a motion to award appellate attorney’s fees was filed in this court on February 28, 2014. The case was submitted on briefs. Matthew R. Segal & Jessie J. Rossman for the defendant. Cailin M. Campbell, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. Jane Larmon White, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for Committee for Public Counsel Services, amicus curiae. BOTSFORD, J. Following our decision in Commonwealth v. Augustine, 467 Mass. 230 (2014), the defendant filed a request for attorney’s fees pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 15 (d), as appearing in 422 Mass. 1501 (1996). He seeks fees for counsel he engaged to replace his court-appointed counsel for the defense of the Commonwealth’s interlocutory appeal in the case. It is undisputed that the defendant is indigent and that his new counsel agreed not to charge him any fees for their services. For reasons explained below, we hold that the defendant is not entitled to the payment of fees under rule 15 (d) in these circumstances. Procedural background. The defendant was indicted in 2011 for the murder of Julaine Jules. In November, 2012, he moved to suppress “cell site location information” that the Commonwealth had obtained, without a warrant, from his cellular telephone service provider. Augustine, 467 Mass. at 234. A judge of the Superior Court allowed his motion and suppressed the challenged evidence. Id. The Commonwealth thereafter applied for leave to appeal from the adverse ruling in accordance with Mass. R. Crim. P. 15 (a) (2), as appearing in 422 Mass. 1501 (1996).[1] Id. A single justice of the county court granted the application and directed the appeal to proceed in this court. Id. We held that, under art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his cell site location information, and therefore that a warrant was required for the Commonwealth to obtain the information. Id. at 255. We remanded the case to the Superior Court to give […]
Chief of Police of the City of Worcester v. Holden (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-041-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11682 CHIEF OF POLICE OF THE CITY OF WORCESTER vs. RAYMOND J. HOLDEN, JR. Worcester. November 6, 2014. – March 11, 2015. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Firearms. License. Constitutional Law, Right to bear arms, Vagueness of statute. Due Process of Law, Revocation of license, Vagueness of statute. Words, “Suitable person.” Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on December 6, 2011. The case was heard by James R. Lemire, J., on motions for judgment on the pleadings. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. Mel L. Greenberg for the defendant. Kevin M. Gould, Assistant City Solicitor (David M. Moore, City Solicitor, with him) for the plaintiff. Julia Kobick, Assistant Attorney General, for the Commonwealth, amicus curiae. The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: Jonathan E. Lowy, Kelly Sampson, Elizabeth Burke, Jonathan L. Diesenhaus, James W. Clayton, & Anna M. Kelly, of the District of Columbia, & Kathy B. Weinman for Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence. Ben T. Clements & Lila E. Slovak for Massachusetts Chiefs of Police Association, Inc., & others. Edward F. George, Jr., & Susan Chu for Gun Owners’ Action League, Inc. Karen L. MacNutt for Commonwealth Second Amendment, Inc. SPINA, J. This case mounts a challenge under the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution[1] to the constitutionality of the “suitable person” standard in G. L. c. 140, § 131 (d) and (f), as amended through St. 1998, c. 180, § 41, by which licenses to carry firearms were issued, suspended, or revoked between 2005 and 2010.[2] The chief of police of the city of Worcester (chief) determined, based on the history of domestic violence of Raymond J. Holden, Jr., against his wife, that Holden was not a suitable person to have such a license. Holden sought judicial review of three separate adverse decisions of the chief: suspension of his license, then revocation of his license, and finally denial of his application for a new license to carry. After a complex history of District Court litigation that was consolidated and resolved largely in favor of Holden, the chief sought certiorari review in the Superior Court. On cross motions for judgment on the pleadings, a judge in the Superior Court ruled in favor of the […]