A defendant petitioned the Supreme Judicial Court under General Laws chapter 211, section 3, seeking relief from a Boston Municipal Court judge’s denial of his motion to dismiss a criminal complaint. The defendant argued he was not brought to trial within the twelve-month period required by Massachusetts Rule of Criminal Procedure 36(b).
The SJC affirmed the single justice’s denial of the petition. The court held that a defendant cannot appeal the denial of a motion to dismiss prior to trial, and that chapter 211, section 3, may not be used to circumvent this rule. The defendant’s argument that collateral consequences from the pending case made ordinary appellate review inadequate for speedy trial claims failed. The court had previously rejected similar arguments, finding that collateral effects such as anxiety, community suspicion, and economic disabilities do not necessarily render the regular appellate process inadequate for speedy trial violations.
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SJC-11783
JAMES ROSENCRANZ vs. COMMONWEALTH.
July 31, 2015.
Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. Practice, Criminal, Speedy trial, Complaint, Dismissal, Interlocutory appeal.
James Rosencranz appeals from a judgment of a single justice of this court denying his petition pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3. That petition sought relief from the order of a Boston Municipal Court judge denying Rosencranz’s motion to dismiss a criminal complaint on the ground that he had not been brought to trial within the twelve-month period provided by Mass. R. Crim. P. 36 (b), as amended, 422 Mass. 1503 (1996). The appeal is now before us pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:21, as amended, 434 Mass. 1301 (2001). We affirm the judgment of the single justice.
It is established that a defendant in a criminal case is not entitled to appeal from the denial of a motion to dismiss prior to trial. See Jackson v. Commonwealth, 437 Mass. 1008, 1009 (2002). It is also settled that G. L. c. 211, § 3, may not be used to circumvent that rule. Id. “Unless a single justice decides the matter on the merits or reserves and reports it to the full court, neither of which occurred here, a defendant cannot receive review under G. L. c. 211, § 3, from the denial of his motion to dismiss.” Id.
Rosencranz argues that the alleged violation of his right to a speedy trial cannot effectively be remedied through the ordinary appellate process because the pendency of the criminal proceedings in the meantime has ongoing collateral consequences for him; specifically, he contends that the pending case adversely affects his ability to practice law or to secure other employment.[1] We have previously considered and rejected arguments like this. The collateral consequences attendant to the pendency of criminal proceedings — such as “continued anxiety, community suspicion and other social and economic disabilities” — do not necessarily render the regular appellate process inadequate for speedy trial claims. Esteves v. Commonwealth, 434 Mass. 1003, 1003-1004 (2001) (distinguishing speedy trial claims from double jeopardy claims). See Owens v. Commonwealth, 465 Mass. 1010 (2013) (rejecting interlocutory review under G. L. c. 211, § 3, of denial of motion to dismiss based on claim of speedy trial violation); Cousin v. Commonwealth, 442 Mass. 1046 (2004) (same).[2]
Judgment affirmed.
The case was submitted on the papers filed, accompanied by a memorandum of law.
Francis J. DiMento, Jr., for the petitioner.
[1] In a bar discipline proceeding arising out of unrelated events, Rosencranz was suspended from the practice of law in the Commonwealth, effective February 1, 2012, for a period of six months. To date, he has not sought reinstatement.
[2] We do not address other issues and arguments raised by Rosencranz on appeal that were not raised before the single justice.