SJC Blocks Catholic Saint Statues on Quincy Public Safety Building: Fitzmaurice v. City of Quincy (SJC-13877, August 20, 2026)

Mayor of Quincy commissioned two ten-foot bronze statues of Catholic saints for the façade of the city’s new $175 million public safety building. Fifteen Quincy residents sued to stop the installation, arguing the expenditure of public funds and the display violate article 3 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, which bars subordination of one religious sect over another. A Superior Court judge granted a preliminary injunction. The city appealed, claiming the residents lacked standing and that the statues honor first responders, not religion. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the injunction on August 20, 2026.

The Statues and Their Significance

One statue depicts Saint Michael, an archangel with wings stepping on the head and neck of a demon. The other shows Saint Florian, a Roman soldier pouring water from a vessel onto a burning building. Both are canonized saints in the Catholic Church. The contract commissioning the statues described them as representing Saint Michael, the patron saint of law enforcement, and Saint Florian, protector of firefighters.

The city argued the statues carry secular meaning. Saint Michael appears on police awards and is a common tattoo among officers. The Florian Cross adorns fire department badges across Massachusetts, including Quincy’s. Florian Hall in Boston is a union hall for firefighters. International Firefighters’ Day falls on May 4, Saint Florian’s feast day. Two Quincy first responders submitted affidavits stating the statues represent bravery and honor they aspire to emulate.

Plaintiffs’ expert testified that patron saints are particular to Catholicism. The depictions in these statues are consistent with Catholic iconography and are not intelligible without reference to Catholic tradition. Saint Michael is venerated as the leader of God’s heavenly army who cast Satan from heaven. Saint Florian was martyred for his faith and is honored for saving a town from fire through divine intervention.

Public Opposition and Secrecy

The mayor commissioned the statues in July 2023 without notifying the city council or the public. By January 2025, the city had spent at least $761,378.75 in public funds on the project, with total costs anticipated to reach $850,000. A local newspaper broke the story in February 2025. Over two hundred residents attended the next city council meeting, a sharp increase from the usual five to ten. One councillor who had been told of the plan stated he believes the statues will bless first responders and that he hopes they might say a little prayer before going on duty.

Hundreds of residents publicly opposed the statues. An online petition gathered over 1,600 signatures. Nineteen faith leaders from the Quincy Interfaith Network, representing multiple religions, issued a statement expressing grave concerns. They warned that erecting the statues sends a message about insiders and outsiders, noting that while saints play an important role for many Roman Catholic neighbors, Quincy is composed of many people of faith and those who identify with no religious tradition.

Standing Under the Ten-Taxpayer Statute

The city argued the plaintiffs lacked standing. The SJC disagreed. General Laws chapter 40, section 53, the ten-taxpayer statute, allows at least ten taxable inhabitants to petition a court to restrain a city from spending money for any purpose or in any manner other than that for which the city has the legal and constitutional right to spend. Twelve of the plaintiffs pay property taxes in Quincy. They alleged the city spent public money on statues that violate article 3.

The city contended the statute applies only to violations of specific spending statutes, not constitutional claims. The court rejected that argument. The statute’s text refers to spending for any purpose or in any manner except where the municipality has the legal and constitutional right to do so. The word any is comprehensive. The court had previously recognized taxpayer standing in a similar constitutional challenge to legislative chaplain salaries.

The city also argued plaintiffs failed to show their tax burden would increase. The court noted the city had already spent more than $761,000 and would incur additional costs to transport the statues from storage and install them on the building. Public funds were spent secretly years before the mayor’s plans became public. The court emphasized that no surreptitious attempt to outwit the statute can be tolerated.

The Constitutional Framework

Article 3, adopted in 1780, originally required towns to provide public support for Protestant teachers of religion. Congregationalists were the overwhelming majority, so article 3 functioned as a general assessment favoring the Congregational Church. After decades of lawsuits and persecution, article 3 was amended in 1833. The revised text provides that all religious sects and denominations shall be equally under the protection of the law, and no subordination of any one sect or denomination to another shall ever be established by law.

The SJC established its framework for article 3 claims in Colo v. Treasurer & Receiver General, a 1979 case challenging the use of public money to pay legislative chaplains. The court explained there are no simple tests or precise lines for determining constitutionality. Courts must view the purposes and history of the challenged practice in relation to the purposes and history of the constitutional amendments, informed by decisions from other state and federal courts.

Colo examined the long history of legislative chaplains, noting the practice existed at the time of the First Amendment’s passage and continued without objection as Massachusetts moved from public support of Christianity to equal protection of all sects. The court stated that long history cannot alone immunize a practice from constitutional invalidity, but it suggests courts should reflect carefully before striking it down.

The Colo court also considered factors from Lemon v. Kurtzman, a 1971 U.S. Supreme Court decision: whether the practice has a secular purpose, whether its primary effect advances or inhibits religion, and whether it creates excessive government entanglement with religion. The court added a fourth factor: divisive political potential. These were described as helpful guidelines, not mechanistic tests.

The city urged the SJC to abandon reliance on Lemon because the U.S. Supreme Court has since rejected that test in favor of analyzing historical practices and understandings. The SJC declined. The Colo framework is neither limited to nor dependent upon mechanical application of Lemon. It begins with careful examination of the text, purpose, and history of both the challenged practice and the constitutional amendments, recognizing that article 3 evolved to reflect societal changes. The factors from Lemon and case law provide additional guidance for identifying improper intermingling of state and religion. The court reaffirmed that Colo remains good law.

Likelihood of Success on the Merits

The SJC concluded the motion judge did not abuse his discretion in finding the plaintiffs likely to succeed. The case raises concerns at the core of article 3’s purpose: whether the city is singling out a particular religion for special treatment. The two statues are both of Catholic saints. Each is ten feet tall and will be prominently placed on the front of the public safety building facing busy streets. They are the only statues and the sole adornments on the front of the building.

Plaintiffs’ unrebutted expert attested that patron saints are particular to Catholicism. The depictions are consistent with Catholic iconography, displaying symbols central to each saint’s veneration that are not intelligible without reference to Catholic tradition. One statue depicts an archangel with wings; the other portrays a miracle for which the saint is venerated by the Catholic Church.

The likelihood these statues could be viewed as endorsement of Catholicism is enhanced because they are not part of a larger collection including nonreligious monuments or figures important to other religions. The court contrasted cases where religious symbols appeared alongside secular ones or as part of historical displays. A Ten Commandments monument among seventeen monuments commemorating Texas history was upheld. A menorah displayed with a Christmas tree and explanatory sign about winter festivals passed muster. A Christian cross in a September 11 museum, surrounded by secular artifacts with a panel explaining its historical significance, survived challenge.

The Quincy statues stand tall and alone, adorned with Catholic iconography. They are brand new, not long-standing historic monuments important to common history. They differ from a Nineteenth Century Plymouth statue honoring Mayflower passengers or cross-shaped grave markers of soldiers who died in World Wars. Such monuments have obvious religious origins but have taken on common, secular meaning over time. Removal of historic monuments presents different issues. Without secular meaning built through common history, these new statues have greater potential to be perceived as government endorsement of Catholicism and subordination of other religions.

The court acknowledged evidence of secular purpose. The Florian Cross appears on fire badges. Florian Hall is named for the saint. Some police awards bear Saint Michael’s name. Quincy first responders credibly attested to the secular significance of these symbols. The record also demonstrates, however, that the symbols have distinctly Catholic roots. The motion judge found the Saint Michael statue overtly religious, displaying large wings of an archangel and standing on a demon representative of Satan, as an objective observer would understand. Saint Florian’s message is difficult to discern without explanation of its historic and religious origins. On this record, the judge’s conclusion that the statues’ primary effect will be to advance a religious message does not constitute an abuse of discretion.

The motion judge rejected the mayor’s affidavit asserting only secular purpose, noting the mayor’s curious actions in commissioning the statues without public knowledge. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that when government professes a secular purpose for an arguably religious policy, the characterization is entitled to some deference, but courts must distinguish a sham secular purpose from a sincere one. Stated reasons generally get deference, but the secular purpose must be genuine, not merely secondary to a religious objective. The judge could reject the affidavit based on the abbreviated preliminary injunction record. If litigation continues, the mayor will be subject to cross-examination to determine whether he selected the statues for secular purposes or to impose his religious beliefs on the city.

Reasonable support exists for the judge’s determination that the statues have caused divisiveness. More than two hundred people attended the first city council meeting after the plan was revealed, compared to five to ten usual attendees. Hundreds of residents have publicly opposed the statues. A councillor described how contentious the issue is for constituents. An online petition gathered over 1,600 signatures. Faith leaders issued a statement of grave concerns.

The Public Interest and No Hostility to Religion

The public interest weighs strongly in favor of the preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs demonstrated a reasonable likelihood the city violated important constitutional rights and spent taxpayer dollars in violation of those rights in a manner not recoverable. If the statues were installed during litigation, plaintiffs and other residents would confront them regularly, experiencing feelings of subordination given their own beliefs or nonbeliefs.

Potential harm to the city is minimal. The building is open and functioning without the statues. The statues are safely in storage. This is not a case where an injunction interferes with government interests in any meaningful way.

The city argued without supporting analysis that prohibiting the statues would violate the U.S. Constitution by showing hostility to religion. The SJC disagreed. The city itself has no free exercise rights under state or federal constitutions. Those clauses protect private religious expression from government interference, not the government’s own expression. Hostility toward religion has no place in establishment clause traditions. On this record, however, the issue is not government hostility to religion but government preferential treatment of a particular religion.

Why It Matters

The decision reaffirms Massachusetts’s commitment to religious equality under its state constitution. Article 3 was amended nearly two centuries ago to abolish preferences for particular sects. The SJC’s Colo framework, rooted in constitutional text, history, and purpose, remains the proper standard for evaluating establishment claims under Massachusetts law, regardless of shifts in federal doctrine.

The ruling does not question the secular significance of Saint Michael and Saint Florian to first responders. It recognizes, however, that when government selects two large statues of Catholic saints as the sole adornments on a prominent new building, using hundreds of thousands of taxpayer dollars, without public input, the display risks conveying official endorsement of one religion over others. Context matters. Size matters. Transparency matters.

The case is now back in Superior Court for further proceedings. The statues remain in storage in Randolph.

Read the full opinion: Fitzmaurice v. City of Quincy (SJC-13877, August 20, 2026).