CourtSupreme Judicial Court
DocketSJC 13951
ReleasedSeptember 3, 2026
Full opinionRead the full text of the decision
The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed a lower court’s denial of a petition seeking extraordinary relief under G.L. c. 211, § 3, holding that a husband had adequate remedies through the ordinary appellate process and could not bypass them simply because he failed to file timely appeals.
The Procedural History
In December 2025, a District Court judge issued an ex parte abuse prevention order under G.L. c. 209A on the husband’s complaint against his wife. The wife moved to terminate that order, and the court allowed her motion. She then filed her own complaint for an abuse prevention order against the husband. After a hearing with both parties present, a District Court judge issued a six-month order in her favor.
The husband did not appeal either the termination of his order or the issuance of the order against him within the time allowed. Meanwhile, the wife had commenced divorce proceedings in the Probate and Family Court, and temporary orders issued in that case.
Instead of pursuing timely appeals, the husband filed a G.L. c. 211, § 3 petition arguing he lacked adequate notice and opportunity to present evidence in both proceedings and that the abuse prevention order against him did not meet statutory standards. He also sought to stay all orders in both courts. A single justice denied relief, finding the petition did not present the exceptional circumstances warranting extraordinary intervention.
The Legal Standard
General Laws chapter 211, section 3 grants the Supreme Judicial Court broad superintendence power over lower courts, but this power is reserved for exceptional cases. The court will not exercise it when a party has adequate remedies through ordinary appellate channels.
S.J.C. Rule 2:21(2) requires a party challenging an interlocutory ruling to explain why review cannot adequately be obtained on appeal from a final judgment or by other available means. The rule places the burden on the petitioner to demonstrate that extraordinary relief is necessary.
What the Court Held
The Supreme Judicial Court held that the single justice did not abuse her discretion in denying the petition. The husband had clear paths to appellate review that he simply failed to use.
An abuse prevention order issued after a two-party hearing is subject to appeal in the ordinary course. The court cited its 1996 decision in Zullo v. Goguen, which established this principle. The husband’s failure to file a timely appeal did not transform an adequate remedy into an inadequate one.
The court pointed to its 2021 decision in Bishay v. Superior Court, noting that general superintendence power is for situations where no adequate alternative remedy exists, not where a petitioner fails to pursue or unsuccessfully pursues an available remedy.
Additional Remedies Ignored
The court noted that even if the husband wanted to challenge interlocutory orders from the Probate and Family Court, he could raise those issues on appeal from a final judgment. He also failed to explain why he could not seek review under G.L. c. 231, § 118, which provides another avenue for interlocutory appeals.
Court records revealed that an Appeals Court single justice had since allowed the husband’s motion for leave to file late notices of appeal from both the termination of his order and the issuance of the order against him. The original abuse prevention order had also been extended by a District Court judge. The husband filed new requests for relief concerning the extended order and making further allegations about the wife’s counsel, but the Supreme Judicial Court did not consider these materials because they were not before the single justice who denied the original petition.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces a basic principle of Massachusetts appellate practice: litigants must use ordinary appellate channels when they are available. The court will not allow parties to circumvent procedural rules or revive missed deadlines through petitions for extraordinary relief.
The ruling has particular significance for family law practitioners. Abuse prevention orders under G.L. c. 209A are appealable, and parties must act promptly to preserve their rights. A party who misses an appeal deadline cannot simply petition for extraordinary relief as a second chance.
The decision also clarifies that multiple appellate paths may exist for challenging trial court orders. When a petitioner fails to explain why none of these ordinary remedies would suffice, the court will not grant extraordinary intervention. This preserves the superintendence power for truly exceptional cases where the normal appellate process cannot provide adequate relief.
Read the full opinion: Iverson I. v. France F (SJC-13951, September 3, 2026).