Judge William Sullivan announced at 11:35 Friday morning that he would declare a mistrial in the Lindsay Clancy case. Then he did something unusual: he held off, and gave Kevin Reddington one hour to get to the Supreme Judicial Court.
Reddington is filing an emergency petition with a single justice. Here is what he is asking for, what he is actually protecting, and why the jury’s last note is the hardest fact in his way.
What produced the ruling
The jury’s third note, its most emphatic:
“It is with a heavy heart that we report we are unable to come to a unanimous decision and will not be able to.”
Sullivan’s response:
“I don’t feel I have any choice but to declare a mistrial at this time.”
That is the language of compulsion, and it is deliberate. A judge declaring a mistrial over a defendant’s objection is building a record that the mistrial was necessary, because the consequences of getting that wrong are severe.
Reddington’s objection: the holdout juror “has made statements acknowledging doubt but refuses to apply it to the verdict as the law states,” creating what he called a “clear and present danger.”
The vehicle: a single justice petition
The filing goes to a single justice of the SJC under G.L. c. 211, § 3, the court’s general superintendence power:
“The supreme judicial court shall have general superintendence of all courts of inferior jurisdiction to correct and prevent errors and abuses therein if no other remedy is expressly provided; and it may issue all writs and processes to such courts… which may be necessary to the furtherance of justice and to the regular execution of the laws.”
This is the same mechanism the Committee for Public Counsel Services used in 2025 to force emergency action on unrepresented defendants. It is the standard route for relief that cannot wait for an ordinary appeal.
It is also extraordinary relief, and the words “if no other remedy is expressly provided” do most of the work. Single justices deny the overwhelming majority of these petitions, and interlocutory intervention in an ongoing criminal trial is among the hardest asks in Massachusetts practice.
What he is really protecting
The immediate request is to stop the mistrial. That is not the valuable part.
The valuable part is double jeopardy.
A mistrial declared over the defendant’s objection bars retrial unless it was supported by “manifest necessity.” If a court later finds Sullivan declared a mistrial without manifest necessity, the Commonwealth cannot try Lindsay Clancy again. Not on any of the three indictments.
That is the whole game. Reddington believes eleven jurors favor acquittal. He told the court this week that a single juror is preventing a not guilty verdict. From that position, a mistrial is the worst outcome available: it erases eleven votes he will have to win all over again, in front of a jury that may not break the same way.
So the petition serves two functions even if it fails. It seeks to stop the mistrial now, and it preserves the objection that makes a future double jeopardy challenge possible. A defendant who does not object to a mistrial generally cannot complain about it later.
Why the third note is the problem
Manifest necessity is the standard, and a hung jury is its textbook example. The SJC has called it “a traditional example” of manifest necessity, and the United States Supreme Court has held that “jeopardy does not terminate when the jury is discharged because it is unable to agree.”
The question is always whether the deadlock was genuine and whether the judge did enough before giving up. On this record, Sullivan did nearly everything the case law contemplates:
- First note, Tuesday: sent them back with no deadlock instruction.
- Second note, Wednesday: gave the Tuey-Rodriquez charge, the Massachusetts deadlock instruction.
- Reread the reasonable doubt instruction Thursday after the foreperson’s note.
- Reinstructed again Friday morning and sent them back once more.
- Third note: declared the mistrial.
Then compare the notes. In a February 2025 decision, the SJC upheld a mistrial where the second note said the jury was deadlocked and “will not change this decision,” holding that after a second and unequivocal statement of deadlock the judge properly declined to ask whether jurors would keep going.
Wednesday’s note here said the jury was “still unable” to agree, which is softer, and Sullivan responded by instructing rather than discharging.
Friday’s note says the jury is unable to agree “and will not be able to.”
That is a statement about the future, not the present. It is at least as unequivocal as the language the SJC has already held sufficient, and it is the single hardest fact in the petition’s way.
The juror argument, and the wall it hits
Reddington’s stronger theory is not that the deadlock was fake. It is that the deadlock was manufactured by one juror who lied during jury selection and refuses to apply the law, and that Sullivan should have removed that juror instead of discharging the jury.
The difficulty is that Massachusetts law points the other way, hard.
A deliberating juror may be discharged only for reasons personal to that juror, having nothing to do with the case or with the juror’s relationship to the other jurors. In Commonwealth v. Tiscione, 482 Mass. 485 (2019), the SJC put it bluntly: “our law does not allow for the removal of a dissenting juror to resolve an impasse in deliberations.” In that case, removal required reversal.
Commonwealth v. Connor, 392 Mass. 838 (1984), anticipated exactly this kind of note from a jury room, warning that such reports “may be mere euphemisms for the truth: that the juror was persistent in asserting a minority position during deliberations.”
Connor also answers the argument that a mistrial is too costly to accept:
“Although a mistrial may be expensive in both human and monetary costs, it is not to be avoided by intrusion into the jury’s domain. The possibility that an unreasonably stubborn or eccentric juror will be seated is an unavoidable risk of the jury system.”
The voir dire dishonesty theory is the one path around that bar, because lying at empanelment is personal to the juror and unrelated to the merits. But Connor requires that a juror’s inability appear “in the record as a demonstrable reality,” and a foreperson’s note about disagreement over reasonable doubt is not proof that anyone lied in July.
The precedent nobody in the defense wants to discuss
This has been litigated recently, at length, and the defendant lost.
In the Karen Read case, the first jury deadlocked after five days and three notes. The judge declared a mistrial. Jurors said afterward that they had actually agreed unanimously on acquittal on two of three charges and hung only on the third.
The defense argued a mistrial was not manifestly necessary, that the judge should have asked for partial verdicts, and that Read had effectively been acquitted on two counts. The SJC rejected all of it, holding that post-trial accounts of private deliberations, inconsistent with what the jury said in open court, cannot render a mistrial improper or constitute an acquittal where no verdict was announced or recorded.
She was retried.
That decision is the most recent, most detailed Massachusetts authority on precisely this question, and it runs against the petition.
The partial verdict question, and why it is closed
The one thing that could have salvaged something for the defense is a partial verdict, and the law forecloses it.
A judge is not required to accept a partial verdict before declaring a mistrial, and is prohibited from doing so on a single indictment containing lesser included offenses.
Each of Clancy’s three indictments charges first-degree murder with second-degree murder and manslaughter as lesser included offenses. So no partial verdict was available within any count. The jury could not report that it had ruled out first-degree murder and have that recorded.
Across the three counts, separate indictments, a partial verdict was theoretically possible, and a recorded acquittal on any one count could never be retried. There is no indication one was sought or taken.
What happens next
If the single justice denies the petition, which is the likely outcome, Sullivan declares the mistrial and the jury is discharged. The charges remain. District Attorney Timothy Cruz then decides whether to retry, dismiss, or negotiate.
Reddington has said he is ready: “Bring it. I’ve got witnesses lined up.” On a resolution short of trial: “We’ll see what Mr. Cruz wants to do.”
The double jeopardy claim survives the denial. A defendant who objected to a mistrial can raise the bar later, by motion to dismiss before any retrial, and appeal from its denial.
And if a retrial happens, the SJC has permitted a third trial after two hung juries, so a second deadlock would not end the case either.
Common questions
What is Reddington filing with the SJC?
An emergency petition to a single justice under G.L. c. 211 § 3, the court’s general superintendence power, seeking to stop the mistrial. It is extraordinary relief available only where no other remedy is expressly provided.
Why fight a mistrial? Doesn’t it help the defendant?
Not here. Defense counsel has said eleven jurors favor acquittal and one is preventing a not guilty verdict. A mistrial erases those votes and permits a retrial. The defense wants the verdict it believes is close, not another trial.
Could a mistrial prevent a retrial?
Only if it was declared without “manifest necessity” over the defendant’s objection. A genuine hung jury is the traditional example of manifest necessity, so the bar is high. Preserving the objection is what keeps a future double jeopardy claim alive.
Why couldn’t the judge just remove the juror?
Massachusetts law permits discharging a deliberating juror only for reasons personal to that juror, unrelated to the case. In Commonwealth v. Tiscione the SJC held that removing a dissenting juror to break an impasse required reversal of the conviction.
Can Lindsay Clancy be tried again?
Yes, unless a court finds the mistrial was not manifestly necessary. The charges remain and the district attorney decides whether to retry. The SJC has permitted a third trial after two hung juries.
Jury notes, courtroom quotations, and the timing of the mistrial ruling as reported by Boston.com, the Associated Press, Reuters, NPR, and NBC10 Boston on September 4, 2026. This is a developing matter and the single justice had not ruled as of publication. Statutory text quoted directly from G.L. c. 211 § 3. Legal standards from Commonwealth v. Connor, 392 Mass. 838 (1984); Commonwealth v. Tiscione, 482 Mass. 485 (2019); Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, 364 Mass. 87 (1973); Commonwealth v. Roth, 437 Mass. 777 (2002); Daniels v. Commonwealth, 441 Mass. 1017 (2004); and Read v. Commonwealth, SJC-13663 (2025). The charges against Lindsay Clancy are unproven and she is presumed innocent. General legal information, not legal advice.