Commonwealth v. Henderson (SJC-13482, September 4, 2026)

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SJC-13482

COMMONWEALTH vs. KAIDEN HENDERSON.

Essex. March 6, 2026. – September 4, 2026.

Present: Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Kafker, Georges, & Wolohojian, JJ.

Homicide. Felony-Murder Rule. Robbery. Evidence, Joint venturer, Intent, Consciousness of guilt. Joint Enterprise. Intent. Practice, Criminal, Instructions to jury, Lesser included offense, Capital case.

Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on February 8, 2021.

The cases were tried before Thomas Drechsler, J.

Dana Alan Curhan for the defendant. Marina Moriarty, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

BUDD, C.J. A jury convicted the defendant, Kaiden Henderson, of murder in the first degree of Jose Vasquez on the theory of felony-murder with armed robbery as the predicate offense. On appeal, the defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. He also claims that the judge erred by failing to instruct the jury on larceny. The defendant seeks dismissal of the charges, a new trial, or a reduction in the murder and armed robbery convictions. We affirm and decline to order any extraordinary relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E. Background. We summarize the facts the jury could have found, reserving certain details for discussion of the issues. 1. The murder. On the evening of November 21, 2020, the defendant, together with an associate, David Trongeau, and Trongeau's girlfriend, Aspasia Filiogiannis, were smoking marijuana and listening to music in a room at a hotel in Haverhill. They were later joined by Devaughn Johnson, who had planned to sell marijuana at the hotel. Although the defendant denied that he sold with Johnson, he testified that he sold marijuana to make money while unemployed. The defendant further explained that he would typically sell marijuana out of hotel rooms since he did not have a permanent address at the time. To obtain marijuana, they visited the victim, a marijuana dealer who was friendly with both the defendant and Johnson. The defendant, accompanied by Johnson and Trongeau, drove from the hotel to a nearby apartment building where the victim lived with his parents and younger sister. When they arrived, the defendant and Trongeau went into the building while Johnson remained in the back seat of the car. The victim's sister let the two men into the apartment, and they went into the victim's room. At some point, Trongeau came outside the room and went into the bathroom. Not long after Trongeau returned to the victim's room, there was a crashing sound, and the victim stumbled out of the room with blood coming from his neck and arms. He later died from multiple sharp force injuries to his neck, chest, ribs, and torso. The defendant and Trongeau left the victim's room and ran outside the apartment. The defendant carried two bags over his shoulders that he did not have when entering the apartment, and Trongeau had a knife in his hand. As the two men ran toward the car in which they had arrived, Johnson opened the doors, the defendant got into the driver's seat, Trongeau got into the seat behind him, and they sped away. When they arrived back at the hotel, Johnson entered through the front door and then proceeded down the hallway to open a side door for the defendant and Trongeau, both of whom had blood on their clothes. The three returned to the room with a black duffel bag and a multicolor backpack. The defendant changed his clothes, including his underwear, and put them in a trash can in the hotel hallway. At some point, two men who had contacted Johnson to purchase marijuana arrived at the hotel room and found the defendant, Johnson, and Trongeau "running around in a panic." The defendant and Johnson gave the two buyers marijuana in exchange for transportation from the hotel, and the four men left together. Johnson was dropped off at a location in Haverhill, and the defendant was taken to a fast food restaurant in New Hampshire, where a friend picked him up. Soon thereafter, Filiogiannis –- who had stayed in the hotel room the entire time — drove Trongeau to Taunton. Trongeau had with him the multicolor backpack and a bloodstained comforter from the hotel room. While in the car, Trongeau told Filiogiannis that he went to the victim's apartment to smoke, they "started arguing," and he "blacked out and stabbed [the victim] in the neck." Upon arriving at a friend's apartment, Trongeau put the backpack and the comforter in the Dumpster in the parking lot. 2. The investigation. Police were dispatched to the scene of the stabbing in response to a 911 call by the victim's sister. When they arrived, they observed blood in the stairwell of the building and in various places in the apartment. The victim was sitting in a pool of blood in the living room. Inside a locked safe on the floor of the victim's bedroom was $2,730 in cash wrapped in rubber bands and pieces of paper with "exotics," "edibles," and "biscotti" written on them, which an officer testified were street terminology for different types of marijuana. The victim's father told the police that between $15,000 and $30,000 in cash was missing from the room. The next day, after speaking to Filiogiannis, police went to the hotel. In the hotel room where the defendant, Johnson, and Trongeau were staying, there was blood on the sheets, door handle, and floor, and a comforter was missing from the room. The defendant's bloody clothes were found in a plastic bag in the hotel Dumpster; stains located on the defendant's jeans and underwear matched the victim's deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA). Investigators also went to the home of Trongeau's mother. While there, she permitted an officer to listen as she spoke to Trongeau on the telephone. During the call, Trongeau confessed to having stabbed the victim, stating that it was not self- defense and he "forced it." Trongeau sounded emotional and was crying on the call. Based on information provided by Filiogiannis, police found and arrested Trongeau at an apartment in Taunton. They retrieved the multicolor backpack in a garbage truck that had collected trash from the Dumpster at the Taunton apartment building. There was blood on the backpack, and inside were pre- rolled marijuana cigarettes and a digital scale.

The defendant was arrested in a hotel in Boston on December 1, approximately one and one-half weeks after the stabbing. He had with him $346 in cash, a blue Nike backpack with personal effects, identification cards in his own name and in the name of Jacob Alves, and a one-way bus ticket to South Carolina also in the name of Jacob Alves. No murder weapon was ever recovered. 3. Procedural history. The defendant and Trongeau were charged with murder and armed robbery. Johnson was charged with accessory after the fact to those crimes. Trongeau died before trial, and the Commonwealth entered a nolle prosequi of his indictments. The defendant and Johnson were tried together. Johnson was convicted of accessory after the fact to armed robbery, and the Appeals Court affirmed his conviction in an unpublished opinion. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 105 Mass. App. Ct. 1127 (2025). The defendant was convicted of armed robbery and murder in the first degree on a theory of felony- murder. He timely appealed. Discussion. The defendant argues that his murder conviction should be reversed because (1) the evidence presented was insufficient to support a conviction of felony-murder with armed robbery as the predicate offense, and (2) the judge erred by failing to instruct the jury on larceny as a lesser included offense of armed robbery. 1. Sufficiency of the evidence. In considering a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we assess the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676-677 (1979). "Proof of the essential elements of the crime may be based on reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence, . . . and the inferences a jury may draw need only be reasonable and possible and need not be necessary or inescapable." Commonwealth v. Kapaia, 490 Mass. 787, 791 (2022), quoting Commonwealth v. West, 487 Mass. 794, 800 (2021). As discussed infra, the evidence provided by the Commonwealth was sufficient to prove felony-murder, that is, that the defendant knowingly participated in an armed robbery during which a death occurred and that he had the intent either to kill, to cause grievous bodily harm, or to do an act which, in the circumstances known to the defendant, a reasonable person would have known created a plain and strong likelihood that death would result. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 477 Mass. 805, 832 (2017) (Gants, C.J., concurring), cert. denied, 586 U.S. 826 (2018). "[T]o establish that a defendant is guilty of armed robbery, the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant (or a coventurer) (1) was armed with a dangerous weapon; (2) either applied actual force or violence to the body of [a] person . . . , or by words or gestures put [that person] in fear; (3) took the money or the property of another; and (4) did so with the intent (or sharing the intent) to steal it" (quotation and citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Duke, 489 Mass. 649, 658 (2022). The Commonwealth was required to prove either that the defendant was armed or that he knew his coventurer to be armed. See Commonwealth v. Phap Buth, 480 Mass. 113, 116, cert. denied, 586 U.S. 1041 (2018). Here, the evidence was sufficient to prove that the defendant participated in an armed robbery. To begin, the jury could have found that the robbery was planned. There was evidence from which the jury could have found that Johnson and the defendant went to the victim's apartment in order to obtain marijuana to sell to customers, and that the victim had the exact type of high-grade marijuana that Johnson advertised and they later gave to the customers. Further, the defendant drove past the victim's home and parked around the corner, despite the fact that there was ample space to park in front of the victim's building. The defendant and Trongeau then walked to the victim's apartment, leaving Johnson in the car with the headlights and taillights on. Cf. Commonwealth v. Housen, 458 Mass. 702, 707 (2011) ("[J]ury could have inferred that the third man remained downstairs to serve as a lookout" when two men went up to victim's apartment while one stayed behind). Viewed holistically, these facts permitted the jury to infer that the defendant had a plan to rob the victim. Later, when the defendant and Trongeau left the victim's home, they ran quickly back to the car and the defendant was carrying two bags that did not belong to him, one of which contained marijuana. As they approached the car, Johnson immediately opened the car doors for them, and once they got in, the defendant sped away. Cf. Commonwealth v. Benitez, 464 Mass. 686, 688, 690 (2013) (defendant and coventurer left driver parked nearby, able to quickly drive all three away after armed robbery). There was also evidence the jury could have relied on to conclude that the defendant was armed. The victim sustained seventeen knife wounds during the attack. Based on testimony from the medical examiner, there were two different types of wounds on the victim: some with both a sharp and a blunt edge that could have been generated by a chef knife, and others with two sharp edges. The jury could have found that the wounds consisting of one sharp and one blunt edge were consistent with the steak knife that a witness saw Trongeau holding when he returned to the hotel, which could have led to the inference that the defendant was armed with and used a different knife that produced the wounds with two sharp edges. Moreover, video footage from a camera mounted at the doorway of the victim's building captured the defendant and Trongeau as they entered and left the building. The footage, although blurry, could have allowed the jury to find that the defendant had a knife clipped to his front pocket as he entered, and that he was holding a knife in his hand when he fled. In addition, the jury could have found that the defendant became aware of Trongeau's knife at least during the robbery, if not earlier. The defendant's continued participation in the armed robbery thus "implicat[ed] him in the joint venture," regardless of whether there was sufficient evidence that he was armed himself. Commonwealth v. Fisher, 492 Mass. 823, 858 (2023). Further, the evidence presented demonstrated that the defendant committed the armed robbery with the intent necessary for felony-murder, that is, the intent to kill or cause grievous bodily harm to the victim. See Brown, 477 Mass. at 832 (Gants, C.J., concurring). As discussed supra, the jury could have concluded that the defendant stabbed the victim with a knife. And blood containing the victim's DNA was found on the defendant's discarded clothing, including on the upper back portion of his underwear, which was consistent with the defendant having placed a knife in the back of his pants at some point after the attack. Finally, the jury heard evidence of the defendant's consciousness of guilt, including disposing of the bloody clothes and being in possession of a one-way bus ticket bound for South Carolina bought under a false identity. See Commonwealth v. Martin, 467 Mass. 291, 315 (2014), quoting Commonwealth v. Booker, 386 Mass. 466, 470 (1982) ("evidence of consciousness of guilt 'may be sufficient to amass a quantum of proof necessary to prove guilt' when 'coupled with other probable inferences'"). The defendant argues on appeal that by not convicting him under theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty, the jury rejected the theory that he participated in the stabbing. We disagree. It is not for the court to speculate about the jury's decision-making. See Commonwealth v. Rogers, 8 Mass. App. Ct. 646, 652 (1979). Moreover, even if the jury did not find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant wielded a knife himself, the defendant's participation in the robbery after the stabbing had begun demonstrated that he shared Trongeau's intent to either kill or cause grievous bodily harm to the victim. Cf. Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 494 Mass. 288, 299- 300 (2024) (victim's "extensive wounds" sustained during armed robbery did not support theory that coventurer was merely present "but was unaware of, and not complicit with" crime); Fisher, 492 Mass. at 858 (defendant "would have been aware" after participating in prior armed robbery where coventurer used gun that coventurer was armed and planned to use firearm against victim during armed robbery). Thus, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the jury heard sufficient evidence to find that the defendant participated in the armed robbery with the requisite intent for felony-murder.1 2. Instructions on larceny. The defendant also argues that the judge's failure to instruct the jury on larceny as a lesser included offense of armed robbery created a substantial likelihood of miscarriage of justice. We do not agree. "[W]hen the evidence permits a finding of a lesser included offense, a judge must, upon request, instruct the jury on the possibility of conviction of the lesser crime." Commonwealth v. Roberts, 407 Mass. 731, 737 (1990). Here, although the evidence could have supported a larceny conviction, the defendant did not request an instruction on that offense. Indeed, such an

1 The defendant testified to his own version of the events, stating that he was in a panic after seeing Trongeau stabbing the victim, and that as he was grabbing his own black Nike backpack (previously left at the victim's home), he also took the victim's backpack by mistake. He further testified that he ran quickly outside the apartment because he was scared of Trongeau, who was wielding the knife while running behind him. The jury as the fact finders, of course, were "free to reject the defendant's version of events in its entirety." Commonwealth v. Guy, 441 Mass. 96, 103 & n.7 (2004). The evidence presented at trial was sufficient "to support the jury's rejection of the defendant's" testimony. Commonwealth v. Deane, 458 Mass. 43, 52 (2010). instruction would have been inconsistent with the defendant's trial strategy. Larceny requires an intent to "deprive the possessor of the property permanently." Commonwealth v. Cartright, 478 Mass. 273, 283-284 (2017). See G. L. c. 266, § 25. Thus, to find the defendant guilty of larceny, the jury would have had to reject his theory that he was "at the wrong place at the wrong time," and that he accidentally "grabbed the wrong backpack" when "running for his life from a guy . . . who just stabbed his friend." Cf. Roberts, supra at 738-739 (no lesser included offense instructions required where defendant "wanted an acquittal, not a conviction of a lesser included crime," and instructions "might have undermined" defendant's tactical decision to seek acquittal on ground of self-defense). Trial counsel made a tactical decision not to pursue larceny as a lesser included offense, the decision was not manifestly unreasonable, and the trial judge was under no obligation to provide the instruction sua sponte. 3. G. L. c. 278, § 33E. After reviewing the entire record, we discern no extraordinary circumstances that would justify exercising our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the verdict of murder in the first degree or order a new trial. Conclusion. For the reasons stated, the judgments of the defendant's convictions of armed robbery and murder in the first degree on the theory of felony-murder are affirmed.

So ordered.