Appeals Court Reverses Alimony Sunset and Property Division

CourtMassachusetts Appeals Court

DocketAC 25-P-281

ReleasedSeptember 15, 2026

ArguedNovember 14, 2025

PanelRubin, Brennan, & Wood, JJ

Full opinionRead the full text of the decision

Question

Three questions. First, does the Alimony Reform Act of 2011, G. L. c. 208, § 49 (f), which presumptively terminates alimony at the payor’s full retirement age, apply to an antenuptial agreement executed in 2000 that creates an affirmative obligation to pay alimony without specifying an end date? Second, are interests in a family company acquired by the husband during the marriage through means not enumerated in the agreement’s definition of “Separate Property” subject to equitable division? Third, did the trial judge err in deducting the wife’s advance legal fees from her share of the net divisible assets rather than from her share of the gross divisible assets?

Rule

On antenuptial agreements. Contract principles apply to antenuptial agreements, and their interpretation is a question of law reviewed de novo. Rudnick v. Rudnick, 102 Mass. App. Ct. 467, 470 (2023). An agreement must be “construe[d] . . . based on a fair construction of the contract as a whole and not by special emphasis upon any one part,” Duval v. Duval, 101 Mass. App. Ct. 752, 757-758 (2022), “while also recognizing that every word is to be given force so far as practicable.” Once an antenuptial agreement is determined valid and enforceable, a judge is “obligated to enforce its terms as written” and cannot modify it. Korff v. Korff, 64 Mass. App. Ct. 94, 97-98 (2005).

On applicable law. As a general rule, the law existing at the time an agreement is made enters into and becomes part of the agreement. Feakes v. Bozyczko, 373 Mass. 633, 636 (1977). Laws enacted after execution are not considered part of the agreement unless its provisions clearly establish that the parties intended to incorporate subsequent enactments. Mayor of Salem v. Warner Amex Cable Communications Inc., 392 Mass. 663, 666-667 (1984). The Alimony Reform Act of 2011, G. L. c. 208, § 49 (f), creates a presumption that alimony shall automatically terminate when the payor attains full retirement age, which may be rebutted if the recipient demonstrates good cause to deviate beyond the presumptive termination date.

On property division. General Laws c. 208, § 34, governs equitable division of marital property. An equitable, rather than equal, division is the ultimate goal. Williams v. Massa, 431 Mass. 619, 626 (2000).

Holding

On alimony duration. The ARA does not apply. The parties executed their agreement in 2000, ten years before the ARA was enacted. The agreement contains no indication the parties intended future changes in the law to govern alimony. Under the general rule, the law in effect when an agreement is made becomes part of it, while subsequently enacted laws do not unless the parties clearly intended to incorporate them. Because the agreement contains no such intent, the law in effect in 2000 applies. The agreement creates an affirmative, enforceable obligation to pay alimony, not merely a reservation of rights. Section 5 provides that the parties “will in good faith negotiate . . . an amount of alimony to be paid by [the husband],” using mandatory language (“will” and “to be paid”) rather than permissive or conditional terms. The section specifies three parameters for calculating alimony: the amount must allow the wife to maintain a lifestyle similar to that maintained with the children before divorce, must account for her other income sources, and cannot reduce the husband’s lifestyle below the wife’s. The agreement contains no termination event; section 5’s language “from time to time” reflects an indefinite duration. The absence of a specified end date does not render the agreement incomplete; it reflects the parties’ agreement to an alimony obligation of indefinite duration. Applying the ARA’s retirement provision would impermissibly modify the parties’ valid and enforceable agreement.

On property division. The agreement creates two main categories of assets: “Separate Property” (defined in section 2) and non-separate property (property not meeting that definition). Under section 4.C, applicable to marriages over fourteen years, “Interests in [the company]” and “Trust Interests” held as separate property are excluded from equitable division. Whether a company interest is “Separate Property” is determined under section 2. An interest in the company acquired during the marriage qualifies as “Separate Property” only if acquired through one of the methods enumerated in section 2 (e.g., proceeds from sale of premarital property, trust distributions, gifts, inheritance). Section 4.B defines “Interests in [the company]” but does not provide that every asset within that definition is separate property. A company interest acquired during the marriage through a method not enumerated in section 2 is non-separate property subject to equitable division under section 7.A, which preserves the wife’s rights in the husband’s “property, other than Separate Property.” The judge erred by treating company shares purchased with company loans, interests in company investor entities received as dividends on those shares, and debentures purchased with cash as nondivisible. The record contains no indication these interests meet section 2’s definition of “Separate Property”; they were made available to the husband because of his senior employment, not family membership, and on the same terms as other senior employees. The husband’s contrary interpretation would allow him to convert divisible non-separate property (such as earned income or joint assets) into nondivisible company interests, stripping the wife of her marital interests and producing an absurd, unjust result.

On advance distributions. The parties’ stipulation stated that legal fees paid on behalf of each party “shall be . . . credited against . . . each party’s share of” the divisible assets. The judge erred by deducting only the wife’s legal fees from her share of the remaining divisible assets without a corresponding deduction of the husband’s fees from his share. The judge should have added total legal fees to the divisible estate, divided the resulting total pursuant to G. L. c. 208, § 34, and then deducted each party’s fees from that party’s respective share.

Result

So much of the divorce judgment as pertains to property division and alimony is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the judge shall amend the divorce judgment to make clear that the ARA’s durational limit does not apply to the husband’s alimony obligation. The judge shall include in the husband’s divisible assets the excluded company shares, interests in company investor entities received as dividends, and debentures acquired during the marriage, assign fifty-five percent to the wife subject to necessary adjustments, and correct the treatment of advance distributions. The alimony order remains in effect as a temporary order during the pendency of the remand. The divorce judgment is affirmed in all other respects.

Players

Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court, on direct appellate review
Opinion by: Wood, J.
Panel: Rubin, Brennan, and Wood, JJ.
Below: Frances M. Giordano, J., Suffolk Division of the Probate and Family Court Department; complaint filed November 7, 2019; trial May 2022; judgment December 2024
Wife (appellant): Liz L. (pseudonym)
Husband (appellee, cross-appellant): Ursel U. (pseudonym)
Counsel for wife: Thomas H. Sosnowski, of New York, and David E. Cherny
Counsel for husband: Corey Stoughton, of New York, and Joshua W. Bean, of New York

A prenuptial agreement signed ten days before a 2000 wedding has generated a significant appellate dispute over alimony and property division. The Appeals Court held that the Alimony Reform Act of 2011 does not apply to the agreement’s alimony provision, which created an indefinite obligation to pay, and that company interests the husband acquired during the marriage through his employment fell outside the agreement’s exemption for separate property. The court vacated the property and alimony provisions of the 2024 divorce judgment and remanded.

The Agreement

Liz L. (wife) and Ursel U. (husband) executed their antenuptial agreement in October 2000. Both parties came from substantial wealth, but the husband’s premarital assets dwarfed the wife’s. The agreement addressed alimony and property division in the event of divorce. It shielded much of the husband’s wealth from equitable division, including interests in family trusts and holdings in a family business (the company).

On alimony, the agreement provided that the wife did not waive her right to alimony if, at the time of divorce, the parties had children or had been married at least nine years. If they had children, the agreement stated that the parties “will in good faith negotiate . . . an amount of alimony to be paid by [the husband]” that would “allow her to maintain a lifestyle similar to the lifestyle the parties maintained with their children prior to the termination of the marriage.” The alimony calculation had to account for the wife’s other income sources and could not reduce the husband’s lifestyle below the wife’s. The agreement contained no termination date for alimony.

On property division, the agreement categorized assets as either “Separate Property” or non-separate property. “Separate Property” included property owned at marriage and listed on exhibits, plus property acquired during marriage through specific methods: proceeds from sale of separate property, new property purchased with those proceeds, property received by trust distribution or inheritance, appreciation on separate property, and income from separate property. The husband waived all rights in the wife’s property. The wife retained specified rights in the husband’s separate property that varied by length of marriage. After fourteen years of marriage, the wife would have equitable division rights in the husband’s separate property under G. L. c. 208, § 34, except for two excluded categories: “Interests in [the company]” and “Trust Interests.”

The agreement defined “Interests in [the company]” as “shares of stock of any class and debentures of or issued by [the company]” and “any interest in any partnership or corporation that was issued to the shareholders of the [company] as a dividend,” but excluded three subcategories: shares in registered investment companies managed by the company or affiliates, interests purchased within two years before a divorce filing, and interests acquired “with the intent of reducing that portion of his Separate Property that would otherwise be subject to equitable division.” The agreement also preserved the wife’s rights “in or to a property settlement from [the husband]’s property, other than Separate Property.”

The agreement stated it would not merge into a judgment but would “survive” and “be forever binding and conclusive on the parties.” It could not be “altered, amended or abrogated” except by a written instrument executed by both parties.

The Marriage and Divorce

The parties married in 2000 and had two children (born in 2003 and 2006). They lived an “extraordinary, upper-class lifestyle” with multiple multimillion-dollar residences staffed with employees, a fine art and antiques collection, and frequent private jet travel. Although the husband earned a generous salary working for the company, the lifestyle was largely funded by his family trusts, which owned several of the residences. The wife raised the children, managed household staff, decorated the homes, and handled the family’s philanthropic work.

The wife filed for divorce in November 2019 after nineteen years of marriage. Before trial, the parties stipulated that the agreement was valid and enforceable, and the judge incorporated that stipulation into the judgment. They disagreed sharply, however, on what the agreement meant.

The Trial Court’s Ruling

A ten-day trial was held in May 2022. The judge issued an eighty-nine-page decision in December 2024 containing 445 findings. She found that the agreement was “incomplete” as to alimony duration and applied the ARA’s retirement provision, which presumptively terminates alimony when the payor reaches full retirement age. She ordered the husband’s alimony obligation to terminate in 2031 when he turns sixty-seven. The judge calculated the wife’s annual lifestyle need at $5,808,322, subtracted her income from other sources (including investment income and child support), and set general term alimony at $4,015,215 per year ($334,602 per month).

On property division, the judge assigned the wife fifty-five percent of the divisible assets. She excluded from those assets the husband’s trust interests, all company interests acquired before marriage, and certain company interests acquired during the marriage. She found that company shares the husband purchased during the marriage with loans from the company, interests in company investor entities he received as dividends on those shares, and debentures he purchased with cash all qualified as nondivisible “Interests in [the company]” under the agreement. The judge deducted the legal fees the husband had paid on the wife’s behalf from the wife’s share of the remaining divisible assets, but did not make a corresponding deduction of the husband’s fees from his share.

The Wife’s Appeal

The wife challenged the alimony duration and several aspects of the property division. She argued that the agreement created an affirmative, indefinite obligation to pay alimony, not merely a reservation of rights, and that the ARA does not apply to a pre-ARA agreement with a surviving, nonmodifiable alimony provision. She contended that company interests the husband acquired during the marriage through methods not listed in the agreement’s definition of “Separate Property” should be divisible. She also argued the judge erred by deducting her legal fees from her net share rather than from her gross share of divisible assets.

The husband cross-appealed, asserting the judge made a mathematical error that inflated the value of his divisible assets.

The Appeals Court’s Analysis

Alimony and the ARA. The court began with contract principles. As a general rule, the law existing when an agreement is made becomes part of that agreement. Laws enacted afterward do not become part of the agreement unless the parties clearly intended to incorporate future enactments. The agreement here, executed in 2000, contains no indication the parties intended future alimony law to apply. The ARA was enacted in 2012. Under the general rule, the 2000 law governs.

The court rejected the judge’s conclusion that the agreement merely reserved the wife’s right to seek alimony and left duration to be determined under the law at divorce. Section 5 of the agreement uses mandatory language: the parties “will in good faith negotiate . . . an amount of alimony to be paid.” The words “will” and “to be paid” are “language of an unmistakably mandatory character,” not permissive terms like “may” or conditional phrases like “if.” The section specifies three concrete parameters for calculating the amount. It uses temporal language (“from time to time”) that reflects an indefinite duration. The absence of a termination date does not make the agreement incomplete; it reflects the parties’ intent that the obligation continue indefinitely.

The court noted that applying the ARA’s retirement provision would constitute an impermissible modification of the valid, enforceable agreement. Because the agreement survived the divorce judgment rather than merging with it, it retains independent significance as a contract and cannot be modified under the usual “material change in circumstances” standard. The judge erred in applying the ARA. On remand, she must amend the judgment to make clear that the durational limit does not apply.

Property Division and Company Interests. The court turned to the meaning of the agreement’s property provisions. It concluded that the agreement creates two main categories: “Separate Property” (defined in section 2) and non-separate property (everything else). Section 4 governs division of the husband’s separate property based on length of marriage. For marriages over fourteen years, section 4.C gives the wife equitable division rights in the husband’s separate property under G. L. c. 208, § 34, but excludes “Interests in [the company]” and “Trust Interests” from that divisible separate property. Section 7.A preserves the wife’s rights in the husband’s “property, other than Separate Property.”

The critical question: are company interests acquired during the marriage that do not meet the section 2 definition of “Separate Property” divisible? The court said yes. Whether an asset is “Separate Property” is determined by section 2. An interest in the company acquired during marriage qualifies as “Separate Property” only if acquired through one of the enumerated methods (sale proceeds, trust distributions, gifts, inheritance, appreciation, or income from separate property). Section 4.B defines which assets constitute “Interests in [the company],” but that definition does not make every such interest “Separate Property.” A company interest acquired during marriage by a method not in section 2 is non-separate property, and the agreement contains no restriction on dividing non-separate property.

The judge had excluded company shares the husband purchased with company loans, interests in investor entities he received as dividends on those shares, and debentures he purchased with cash. The record contains no indication these interests meet the section 2 definition of “Separate Property.” They were made available to the husband because of his senior employment at the company, not his family membership, and on the same terms as other senior employees. The judge erred by excluding them. The court was unpersuaded by the husband’s claim that debentures purchased with cash from a family trust qualify as separate property because they were acquired with “income from [separate property].” Even if that were true, an asset acquired with income from separate property does not meet the section 2 definition unless purchased with proceeds from the sale of premarital property listed on the exhibits. There is no indication the husband acquired the assets that way.

The court also rejected the husband’s contrary interpretation as producing an absurd result. Under his reading, he could convert earned income or joint marital assets into what he claims are nondivisible company interests, stripping the wife of her marital property rights. Such a construction is neither reasonable nor in accord with the probable intentions of the parties.

Advance Distributions. The parties had stipulated that legal fees paid on behalf of each party during the divorce proceedings would be treated as advance distributions credited against that party’s share of the divisible marital estate. The judge deducted only the wife’s fees from her share of the remaining assets, with no corresponding deduction for the husband. The court agreed with the wife that this was error. The stipulation said each party’s fees “shall be . . . credited against . . . each party’s share of” the divisible assets. To accomplish that, the judge should have added the total fees to the divisible estate, divided the total pursuant to § 34, and then deducted each party’s fees from that party’s share.

The Husband’s Cross-Appeal. The husband identified a discrepancy in the judge’s findings regarding the value of certain debentures. The judge’s findings and asset tables contain inconsistent values for both the debentures and the total divisible assets. The delta between the two stated values for divisible assets equals the discrepancy in the debenture total. The court agreed a discrepancy exists but left the factual resolution for the judge on remand.

The Remand

On remand, the judge must amend the alimony provision to clarify that the ARA’s durational limit does not apply. She must include in the husband’s divisible assets the excluded company shares, investor-entity interests, and debentures acquired during the marriage, and assign fifty-five percent to the wife subject to other necessary adjustments. She must correct the treatment of advance distributions by adding total legal fees to the divisible estate, dividing it, and then deducting each party’s fees from that party’s share. To the extent the redistribution of assets increases the wife’s income, the judge may, in her discretion, recalculate the alimony amount using the same criteria. She should also resolve the factual discrepancies regarding debenture values. The alimony order remains in effect as a temporary order during the remand.

Read the full opinion: Liz L. v. Ursel U (AC-25-P-281, September 15, 2026).