Trial Court Erred by Finding Sanitary Code Violation Didn’t Violate c. 93A: AIF Dartmouth, LLC v. Hanson (AC 24-P-961 & 25-P-341, Sept. 14, 2026)

A landlord who violates the state sanitary code by failing to make timely repairs commits a per se violation of the consumer protection law, even when the judge credits the landlord’s explanation for the delay. The Appeals Court so held in vacating a Housing Court judgment that found a landlord violated repair rules but awarded the tenant nothing under G. L. c. 93A.

Lisa Hanson rented an apartment from AIF Dartmouth, LLC beginning in August 2019. Within fifteen days, she reported multiple problems: damaged or missing window screens and a defective lock on her patio door. The landlord never fixed the issues promptly. Hanson followed up in September 2020; the repairs dragged on for years. Two screens were replaced in May 2020, but three windows remained without screens. The landlord replaced the patio door in October 2022 but did not provide a screen.

The landlord also failed to return a countersigned copy of a lease renewal rider for the 2022-2023 rental period, though Hanson signed and returned it and continued paying rent. In June 2023, the landlord notified Hanson it would not renew her lease. It served a notice to quit in September 2023 and filed a summary process action. After contentious pretrial hearings, the landlord voluntarily dismissed the case in January 2024, then refiled and added Hanson’s daughter as a codefendant.

The Trial

At trial in the subsequent action, the jury found in favor of Hanson on her counterclaims. It determined her tenancy was at will, not governed by a lease. The jury awarded her $7,068 for breach of the warranty of habitability and $4,950 for interference with quiet enjoyment. It found no liability on her claims for retaliation or violation of the security deposit statute.

After an evidentiary hearing, the trial judge found the landlord violated 940 Code Mass. Regs. § 3.17(3)(c) by failing to give Hanson an executed copy of the rental agreement. That was a c. 93A violation, and the judge awarded her $75 in damages and $4,000 in attorney’s fees. But on the claim related to the window screens and patio door, the judge found the landlord violated 940 Code Mass. Regs. § 3.17(1)(e) by failing to repair promptly, yet concluded material extenuating circumstances excused the delay. He credited the landlord’s testimony about difficulties sourcing materials and COVID-19 pandemic supply chain disruptions. The judge awarded no c. 93A damages on that claim.

Per Se Violations

The regulation is explicit. Title 940 Code Mass. Regs. § 3.17(1) provides that “[i]t shall be an unfair or deceptive act or practice for an owner to” violate subsection (e), which covers failure to make repairs within a reasonable time. The Appeals Court noted that Attorney General regulations designating conduct as unfair or deceptive have the force of law. When a regulation states that a violation “shall be” an unfair or deceptive practice, courts have held the violation is per se a c. 93A violation.

The trial judge’s finding that the landlord violated § 3.17(1)(e) left him no discretion to conclude the landlord did not violate c. 93A. The judge’s factual findings about COVID-19 and supply chain issues were not clearly erroneous, but the law is the law. The regulation’s mandatory language controlled.

The landlord argued that c. 93A damages would duplicate the jury’s habitability award. The court disagreed. While both claims arose from the same facts, c. 93A provides for damages beyond those the jury awarded. At minimum, even if there are no additional actual damages, c. 93A requires an award of attorney’s fees and costs.

Other Issues

Hanson raised several other arguments on appeal. The court rejected most of them.

Attorney’s fees from the initial action. Hanson sought attorney’s fees for defending the landlord’s first summary process action, which the landlord voluntarily dismissed. A judge denied her motion for fees in February 2024. Hanson did not file a notice of appeal until May 6, 2024, well past the statutory period. The court lacked jurisdiction over that appeal. She filed a second motion in March 2024 making the same argument; the judge denied it as duplicative. The court held the judge acted within her discretion and that Hanson’s appeal from the March motion did not revive arguments rejected in February.

Sanctions. The judge imposed sanctions on Hanson’s attorney for filing the duplicative March motion. The court found no abuse of discretion, noting the judge determined the motion was not asserted in good faith and the rule 11 violation was willful.

Jury instructions on retaliation. Hanson argued the trial judge erroneously failed to include on the special verdict form, as a protected activity, reporting a violation of G. L. c. 186, § 14 (utilities, services, and quiet enjoyment). The court found she waived the issue by failing to object to the verdict slip after the judge inserted her requested language into the jury instructions themselves. Even if preserved, the court saw no prejudice because Hanson received damages for her underlying quiet enjoyment claim, and the maximum damages for retaliation and quiet enjoyment are identical.

Security deposit. Hanson contended the judge erred in instructing the jury on the security deposit statute and that the landlord’s failure to pay annual interest was a per se c. 93A violation. The landlord paid all overdue interest ($0.43) in February 2023, seven months before the tenancy ended. The court concluded the judge adequately instructed the jury and that Hanson failed to prove any injury from the landlord’s return of all interest during the tenancy, so there was no separate compensable harm under c. 93A.

Emotional distress damages. Hanson argued the judge improperly required expert testimony to substantiate her emotional distress claim. The court found no error. At trial, Hanson testified multiple times about her subjective feelings. The judge sustained objections only when questions called for “health impacts” without medical documentation or expert testimony. At the c. 93A hearing, Hanson again testified at length about anxiety, chest pains, loss of appetite, panic attacks, and emergency room visits. The judge found the testimony insufficient to establish causation and noted the lack of medical documentation. The court deferred to the judge’s factual findings and saw no clear error.

Attorney’s fees under the lease. Hanson sought attorney’s fees under G. L. c. 186, § 20, which implies a reciprocal right to fees for a tenant who successfully defends a summary process action when the lease provides for landlord’s fees. The jury found her tenancy was not governed by a lease. Hanson took that position at trial. The judge applied judicial estoppel, holding Hanson could not claim the tenancy was not subject to a lease and then assert the lease’s attorney’s fee provision applied. The court found no error.

Calculation of fees. The trial judge awarded Hanson $8,800 in attorney’s fees for interference with quiet enjoyment and $4,000 for the c. 93A violation related to the unsigned lease, far less than the $84,209.44 she sought. The judge applied the lodestar method, made detailed findings about reasonable rates and hours, and estimated time spent on successful claims because Hanson’s counsel did not delineate hours by claim. The court deferred to the judge’s superior ability to calibrate fee awards and found no abuse of discretion.

Landlord’s cross-appeal. The landlord moved to overturn the jury’s findings or reduce the damages. The court applied a highly deferential standard and found no abuse of discretion in the judge’s denial. The landlord’s argument that the jury ignored evidence of COVID-19 delays misapprehended the standard of review. The fact that the jury could have weighed evidence differently from the judge was insufficient to overturn the verdict.

The Partial Dissent

Justice Henry dissented in part on four points. First, she would remand the emotional distress issue to clarify whether the judge denied damages solely because Hanson lacked medical records or expert testimony; such evidence is not required for emotional distress claims. Second, she found clear error in the judge’s crediting COVID-19 as an excuse for delays that occurred before the pandemic began in early 2020. Third, she would address the judge’s erroneous finding that Hanson misrepresented her daughter’s status; the lease listed the daughter as an approved tenant, and Hanson’s statement in her answer was accurate. Fourth, she would hold that the attorney’s fees provision in the lease applies regardless of the jury’s finding that the tenancy was at will, because lease terms carry over unless modified.

Why It Matters

The decision clarifies that when the Attorney General promulgates a regulation stating that certain conduct “shall be” an unfair or deceptive practice under c. 93A, a violation is per se a c. 93A violation. Trial judges have no discretion to find otherwise, even when they credit a landlord’s explanation for the conduct. Landlords who violate sanitary code repair requirements face not only habitability damages but also c. 93A liability, which carries mandatory attorney’s fees and the possibility of multiple damages if the violation is willful or knowing.

For tenants, the ruling means that proving a sanitary code violation establishes a c. 93A violation as a matter of law. The tenant need not separately prove the conduct was unfair or deceptive. The only remaining questions are damages, willfulness, and fees.

The court awarded appellate attorney’s fees to Hanson for her successful appeal on the c. 93A and quiet enjoyment claims, to be determined in accordance with the appellate rules. The landlord’s request for fees was denied because it was not the prevailing party and because the jury found no lease applied.

Read the full opinion: AIF Dartmouth, LLC v. Hanson (AC-24-P-961-&-25-P-341, September 14, 2026).