Appeals Court Unimpounds Briefs, Declines to Extend Mandatory Acquittal-Sealing Backward: Commonwealth v. Goulart (AC 25-P-396, September 18, 2026)

Deivisson Goulart raped his wife’s fifteen-year-old niece while the two worked construction jobs together in 2017. A jury convicted him of two counts of aggravated rape of a child and one count of forcible rape of a child. It acquitted him of a second count of forcible rape. The Appeals Court affirmed his convictions and declined to impound an acquittal that predated Commonwealth v. J.F. and remains public in Superior Court.

The decision turns on two issues: whether the judge abused his discretion in denying a mistrial after the victim blurted inadmissible testimony, and whether a 2022 acquittal must be impounded in the Appeals Court when it remains unsealed below.

The Facts

The victim came to the United States on a six-month visa when she was fifteen. She lived with her much older sister. The defendant, married to the victim’s niece, lived on the other side of a two-family home. The defendant was more than eleven years older than the victim. The victim began working with him, doing construction, yard work, and mechanic’s work.

The defendant began talking about sex with the victim, touching her, and licking her ears. He asked her “a few times” to fellate him. She refused. Then, while working on a house, the defendant “jump[ed] out of nowhere,” put his hand over her mouth, and said, “shh.” He pulled down her pants and underwear and penetrated her anus. When she tried to talk to him the next morning, he became angry, told her she would have “worse problems” if she told anyone, and instructed her, “Just don’t tell anyone.”

Afterward, the victim felt she “fell in love for him.” On another occasion at the same house, the defendant whispered in her ears, licked them, pulled her hair, and “put his entire dick inside [her] mouth.” After that, he had her fellate him “like every other day.” Years later, when she returned to the United States, she reported what had happened. During a police interview, the defendant spontaneously brought up the victim’s sexual orientation and stated that “[h]e expected that [the victim] would be in love with him, and expected that [the victim] would . . . claim rape.”

The Blurt and the Mistrial Motion

At trial, the victim testified that the defendant told sexual jokes to her. When asked to explain, she said, “he did it to anyone, any kid that it was around. It wasn’t just me, but like — put like pa — take the pants and put it down, like you know, . . . like this and stuff.” The defendant immediately moved for a mistrial. The judge denied the motion and instead struck the testimony, instructing the jury they could not consider it. He told them, “There are no contentions, no allegations of any sort involving any persons other than . . . this witness.”

The victim then interrupted: “There is. Yeah, there is.” The judge again struck the testimony and told the jury “there’s no evidence in that regard.” He excused the jury and instructed the prosecutor to talk to the victim “about not interrupting and what she’s allowed and not allowed to testify about.” The defendant renewed his motion for a mistrial. The judge again denied it.

When the jury returned, the judge instructed the victim to “listen to the question” and “[d]o your best to answer the question.” He struck the testimony a third time and told the jury, “you need to stay focused on what needs to be decided in this case. There [are] no charges, no accusations concerning anything other than what you’ll hear from about [the victim] and this defendant, and there’s no evidence in that regard either.” There were no further issues, though the victim remained a difficult witness, requiring redirection multiple times.

The jury convicted Goulart of two counts of aggravated rape of a child and one count of forcible rape of a child. It acquitted him of one count of forcible rape of a child. The jury had been instructed it had to agree unanimously on at least one particular oral rape. Inferably, it harbored a reasonable doubt whether those rapes were forcible.

No Abuse of Discretion

The Appeals Court held that the judge acted within his discretion in denying the mistrial. The judge “provided timely and forceful curative instructions to the jury,” repeatedly telling them the testimony was stricken. He specifically told the jury twice that there were no other allegations or evidence about other allegations. He reminded the jury during the final charge to disregard any testimony he had struck.

The improper statement was not highlighted or repeated. The prosecutor did not mention it. Defense counsel used the victim’s hostility to his advantage, arguing in closing, “What are we to make of a witness who comes into court and shows disrespect to the proceedings? . . . . Is that the kind of person who would have no qualms about making up a charge against someone against whom she has vendetta[?]” The victim’s vague statements were not so prejudicial that they could not be corrected by instructions. The jury’s partial acquittal is evidence they were able to follow the judge’s instructions and analyze the evidence dispassionately.

The Acquittal and Impoundment

Both parties filed impounded briefs in the Appeals Court, citing the acquittal. They explained they did so because the briefs mentioned the acquittal, which occurred before J.F. was decided. That 2023 decision held that G. L. c. 276, § 100C, requires mandatory impoundment of acquitted charges absent a defendant’s written request to keep them public.

The Appeals Court traced the history of the statute. The Legislature first enacted it in 1973, allowing defendants to request sealing of acquittals. In 1983, it amended the statute to require impoundment unless “the defendant makes a written request to the commissioner not to seal the records of the proceedings.” In 1984, it further amended the statute to require courts to impound acquittals without waiting for notification from the commissioner of probation.

In 1989, the First Circuit held the statute unconstitutional as a violation of the public’s First Amendment right of access to court documents. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Pokaski, 868 F.2d 497, 509 (1st Cir. 1989). The Supreme Judicial Court adopted procedures consistent with Pokaski, and “the statute generally had not been enforced.”

In J.F., decided May 5, 2023, the Supreme Judicial Court determined that Pokaski was wrongly decided and would no longer be followed. The Chief Justice of the Trial Court issued Transmittal No. 24-4 on February 8, 2024, directing automatic sealing of acquittals on or after May 5, 2023. For cases decided between May 5, 2023, and March 11, 2024, notices would be sent to each acquitted defendant of the right to request that the acquittal not be sealed. The Chief Justice determined that J.F. did not apply to cases decided before May 5, 2023.

No Good Cause Shown

Goulart’s acquittal occurred on May 4, 2022, just over a year before J.F. He made no affirmative request for impoundment. The acquittal remains publicly available in Superior Court to this day. Defense counsel confirmed at oral argument that Goulart has no intention of moving to impound it there.

The Appeals Court held that the parties failed to demonstrate good cause to impound the acquittal in the appellate court. The parties did not file proper motions to impound their briefs under the Uniform Rules on Impoundment Procedure. More to the point, they failed to show good cause. The acquittal remains publicly available in Superior Court, and “the defendant has made no showing how its availability in the Appeals Court would prejudice him.” Given Goulart’s convictions of two counts of aggravated rape of a child and one count of forcible rape of a child, “it is hard to imagine how the defendant . . . would be harmed by the public’s learning that he was also acquitted of one count of forcible rape of a child.”

The court noted that since J.F., the Supreme Judicial Court has consistently treated pre-J.F. acquittals as unimpounded and reported them in published opinions. It rejected the defendant’s suggestion that any description of the conduct underlying the acquittal should be impounded, noting that in this case the jury convicted the defendant of oral rape and acquitted only of the count charging it was forcible. “There is no way in this case to separate out the conduct underlying the acquittal from the conduct underlying the conviction.”

Why It Matters

The decision clarifies that the mandatory-sealing regime established in J.F. does not extend backward to acquittals that occurred before May 5, 2023, and remain public in the trial court. Parties cannot impound documents in the Appeals Court through self-help; they must file proper motions and demonstrate good cause. The decision also confirms that timely, forceful curative instructions can remedy inadmissible testimony about uncharged conduct, particularly when the statement is vague, not repeated, and not exploited by the prosecution.

Read the full opinion: Commonwealth v. Goulart (AC-25-P-396, September 18, 2026).