Divided Appeals Court Affirms Suppression of Gun Found in Inventory Search: Commonwealth v. Beechman (AC 25-P-1082, September 21, 2026)

On September 2, 2024, at about 1 A.M., Boston police officers pulled over an unregistered SUV in Dorchester. The driver, Lorenzo Beechman, was calm and compliant. He was not under arrest. Officers immediately searched the SUV without telling Beechman they planned to impound it, and they found a loaded firearm under the front passenger seat. A Superior Court judge suppressed the gun, concluding the impoundment violated the Fourth Amendment and article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. The Commonwealth appealed. After initial panel argument, all 25 justices of the Appeals Court heard the case. They split 11 to 11, with three justices taking no part. The tie affirmed the suppression order but set no precedent.

The Stop and Search

Officers saw from the SUV’s license plate sticker that the registration had expired. They confirmed through their mobile database that it was expired and non-renewable. They activated their lights, and Beechman pulled into a gas station. One officer testified he intended to tow the SUV the moment he pulled it over. He said his commanding officer had instructed him that in all situations involving an expired registration or revoked license, he must impound the vehicle, tow it, and perform an inventory search. At the suppression hearing, the officer acknowledged there is no such policy in any Boston police department document.

Beechman provided his driver’s license. He initially had trouble finding the registration, so he asked if he could step out to locate it. The officer agreed and patfrisked him; no weapons or contraband were found. Throughout, Beechman was polite and compliant. Officers told him to stand near the rear of the SUV. He was on the phone with his girlfriend, who owned the vehicle. Beechman asked if he had done anything wrong. One officer said he had not. The officers never told Beechman they were going to impound the SUV. They immediately began searching it. Beechman asked again if he had done anything wrong. He never consented to the impoundment. After the search revealed the firearm, police called for a tow.

What the Trial Judge Found

The motion judge found the impoundment was not reasonably necessary. The SUV was not obstructing traffic, was not in any public way, and could easily be parked to await a tow truck in numerous locations. The judge found the police violated their own inventory policy. The judge concluded the impoundment and the resulting inventory search were unconstitutional.

The Concurring Justices: No Legitimate Purpose, Not Reasonably Necessary

Eleven justices, led by Justice D’Angelo, concluded the Commonwealth failed to prove a legitimate, noninvestigative purpose for the impoundment. They examined the four recognized purposes. First, protecting the vehicle from theft or vandalism applies only when a vehicle will be left unattended. Here, Beechman was not under arrest and could have stayed with the SUV. Second, protecting the public from dangerous items requires evidence of a threat. The defendant was calm and cooperative, and the patfrisk found nothing. There was no evidence of recent shootings or that the area was high crime. Third, removal of a dangerous condition applies when a parked vehicle creates a hazard. The judge found the SUV was not obstructing traffic and was not in a public way. Fourth, sparing a property owner the burden of an abandoned vehicle applies when the driver has been arrested. Beechman was not under arrest. There was no evidence the gas station was closed or that parking was restricted.

The concurrence distinguished Commonwealth v. Daley, where the Supreme Judicial Court approved impoundment of an unregistered vehicle stopped on a busy main road. The safety risk of leaving a vehicle on a busy public road justified impoundment in that case. Here, the SUV posed no such risk. The concurrence also found the impoundment was not reasonably necessary. The officers never considered alternatives. One officer testified he decided to tow the SUV from the moment he pulled it over, based on a non-existent policy. The police never told Beechman they planned to impound the SUV. Even when he asked if he had done anything wrong, they said he had not, then immediately began the search. Beechman was on the phone with the owner of the car, but the officers gave him no opportunity to suggest an alternative such as arranging a private tow.

The concurrence noted that while police have no general duty to offer alternatives to impoundment, the facts here showed officers never considered whether any alternative existed. Under Goncalves-Mendez, police must offer a passenger the option to assume custody when they are aware a passenger lawfully could do so. The concurrence acknowledged that rule did not squarely apply because there was no passenger here. But the broader principle, that police must act reasonably and consider practical alternatives, did apply. The officers’ rush to search, before even informing Beechman of their plan, demonstrated unreasonableness.

The Dissenting Justices: Impoundment Was Proper

Eleven justices, led by Justice Meade, argued the impoundment was lawful. The dissent began with the proposition that police generally have authority to impound an unregistered vehicle. The stop was lawful because the registration had expired. General Laws c. 90, § 9, prohibits operation of an unregistered vehicle. In Daley and other cases, courts have approved impoundment of unregistered vehicles. The dissent emphasized that police have no affirmative duty to offer alternatives to impoundment. Ferrara held there is no general obligation on police to ask a defendant if he wishes to propose an alternative. While police must allow a reasonable alternative if the operator requests one, here Beechman never requested an alternative.

The dissent distinguished Goncalves-Mendez, which required police to offer a passenger the option to assume custody. That new obligation applies only where police are aware a passenger lawfully could assume custody. Here, Beechman was the sole occupant. No person present or not could lawfully operate the unregistered SUV. The girlfriend was on the phone but was not present to arrange a tow. At 1 A.M., it would not be reasonable to require police to wait for her. The dissent also argued that parking lots are often treated as public ways under G. L. c. 90. A public way is any way or any place to which the public has a right of access, or any place to which members of the public have access as invitees or licensees. The gas station parking lot, open and accessible to the public, fit that definition. Even if the lot were not a public way, G. L. c. 90, § 9, provides that an unregistered vehicle cannot be allowed to remain on any way.

The dissent addressed other noninvestigatory justifications for impoundment. Protecting the vehicle from theft or vandalism applied even though Beechman was not under arrest, because there was no evidence he intended to remain with the SUV at 1 A.M. The dissent cited federal cases upholding impoundment from private lots open to the public due to risk of vandalism or theft. The dissent also rejected the claim that impoundment decisions must be made pursuant to written guidelines. The Supreme Judicial Court has declined to impose that requirement. A footnote in Commonwealth v. Campbell suggested such a rule, but the dissent called it obiter dictum. The cases Campbell cited, Eddington and Ellerbe, held only that inventory searches, not impoundment decisions, require written procedures. Finally, the dissent argued the inventory search itself was proper. Boston police department special order 05-013 provided that all motor vehicles secured by the department shall be inventoried. Because the SUV was secured, the search was conducted in accord with written procedures.

Why the Split Matters

The 11-11 division leaves practitioners without guidance. The suppression order stands, but the case creates no precedent. Defense lawyers can cite the concurrence’s reasoning in future suppression motions involving unregistered vehicles, but prosecutors can cite the dissent with equal force. The split reveals a fundamental disagreement about how far Goncalves-Mendez extends and whether police must consider alternatives when a driver is not under arrest. It also exposes tension over whether impoundment of an unregistered vehicle parked in a lot accessible to the public is categorically reasonable, or whether courts must examine the totality of circumstances on a case-by-case basis.

The case also highlights the gap between officer training and written policy. The officer’s testimony that he believed he was required to impound any vehicle with an expired registration, despite the absence of any such written rule, troubled the concurring justices. The dissent brushed this aside, noting that subjective intent is irrelevant to Fourth Amendment analysis. But the concurrence saw it as evidence that officers failed to engage in the reasonableness inquiry the Constitution demands. The issue may return to the Supreme Judicial Court, either in this case (if the Commonwealth seeks further appellate review) or in a future case presenting similar facts. Until then, trial judges facing motions to suppress evidence from inventory searches of unregistered vehicles will have to navigate the conflicting analyses on their own.

Read the full opinion: Commonwealth v. Beechman (AC-25-P-1082, September 21, 2026).