Appeals Court Applies Mendes to Confrontation Claim: Commonwealth v. Khadgi (AC 25-P-1208, Sept. 24, 2026)

A Cambridge police officer saw Shyam Khadgi beating his girlfriend in Harvard Square and arrested him on the spot. At trial, the officer recounted not only what he saw but also what the victim told him minutes later while receiving medical care. Khadgi objected that her statements were testimonial hearsay barred by the Confrontation Clause. The Appeals Court assumed the statements were likely inadmissible but affirmed the conviction anyway: Khadgi himself testified that the woman was his girlfriend of seven years, supplying the very fact the Commonwealth needed to prove.

The decision reiterates the holding of Commonwealth v. Mendes, 463 Mass. 353 (2012), that harmless-error review looks at the entire record, not just the prosecution’s case.

The Facts

Shortly before 2 a.m., a Cambridge officer walking through Harvard Square saw Khadgi striking a woman in the face and arms ten to fifteen times, hard enough to lift his foot off the ground. The officer separated them, arrested Khadgi, and called an ambulance.

The victim was crying and could not speak at first. The officer saw bruises on her face. After three or four minutes, an ambulance arrived and she began receiving medical care. Still emotional, she told the officer she had been beaten for about eight minutes before he arrived, that she was kicked in the buttocks, and that she and Khadgi had been dating for seven years. Photographs authenticated by the officer showed large bruises on her face and scratches on her arm.

Khadgi testified in his own defense. He said the victim’s friend texted him that she was drunk, so he went to pick her up. They argued. He said the victim started hitting him inside a building and he was grabbing her arms to take her home, trying to defend himself. Although he denied punching her, he also said it was not like he punched her so hard, and he admitted he believed he caused her injuries. He described her as his girlfriend and testified that they stayed in the same house for seven years.

The Motions and the Trial

Before trial, both sides filed motions in limine about the victim’s statements. Khadgi specifically argued their admission would violate his confrontation rights. After a voir dire of the officer, Khadgi argued the statements were not excited utterances and would be inadmissible hearsay under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68-69 (2004). A District Court judge (not the trial judge) ruled them admissible. Khadgi objected again when the statements were introduced at trial before Judge Nestor.

The Commonwealth charged Khadgi with assault and battery on a family or household member under G. L. c. 265, § 13M. The statute requires proof that the parties “are or have been in a substantive dating or engagement relationship.” The only evidence in the Commonwealth’s case on that element came from the victim’s statements to the officer.

What the Court Held

The Appeals Court assumed without deciding that the victim’s statements were testimonial. By the time she spoke to the officer, Khadgi was in custody, she was receiving medical treatment, the officer had witnessed the attack personally, and no reason existed to believe anyone else was involved. Under Commonwealth v. Rand, 487 Mass. 811, 826 (2021), and Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 315, 326 (2016), Khadgi had a strong argument the statements were testimonial.

The court held that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The officer personally saw Khadgi strike the victim in the face and arms at least ten times with considerable force. Photographs showed large bruises on her face and scratches on her arms. The victim’s confirmation of the beating was duplicative of properly admitted evidence.

As to the relationship element, the court applied Mendes. In that drug-distribution case, the SJC held that harmless-error review looks at the totality of the record, including the defendant’s own testimony. The defendants in Mendes had testified they owned cocaine and marijuana to argue the drugs were for personal use, not distribution. The SJC held their testimony cured any error in admitting certificates of drug analysis, which had been declared testimonial hearsay after trial.

Here, Khadgi testified the victim was his girlfriend and they lived together for seven years. That testimony amply demonstrated the requisite relationship. Khadgi raised no challenge to the relationship element at trial or in closing argument. Under Mendes, the court considers the defendant’s testimony “along with the ‘totality of the record.'” 463 Mass. at 364.

The Reasoning

The court rejected any suggestion that a defendant’s testimony should be excluded from harmless-error review. In Mendes, the Appeals Court had held it was inappropriate to consider the defendants’ testimony because it would be virtually impossible to say whether or how they would have testified absent the error. The SJC reversed, stating flatly that “[o]ur review encompasses both the Commonwealth’s and the defendant’s case.” 463 Mass. at 361.

The SJC set out a narrow exception for cases involving unlawfully seized evidence that should have been suppressed. In that circumstance, where the defendant’s testimony was prompted by and offered in response to the content of the improperly admitted evidence, the testimony itself would be tainted by the unlawful search or seizure. Commonwealth v. Charros, 443 Mass. 752, 766 (2005). That exception did not apply here.

The trial judge also acquitted Khadgi of a felony charge, stating that charge was supported only by the victim’s statements. The Appeals Court noted the acquittal in a footnote, lifting the impoundment to the extent necessary to resolve the case.

Why It Matters

The decision is a straightforward application of Mendes to a confrontation claim. When a defendant takes the stand and testifies to the same facts as challenged hearsay, the error is harmless if the defendant’s testimony independently proves the element in question. The court will not speculate about what the defendant might have said in a different trial.

Practitioners should note the court’s framing of the confrontation analysis. The victim’s statements were likely testimonial because the emergency had passed, the defendant was in custody, and the officer had witnessed the crime. That framing aligns with recent SJC and Appeals Court cases tightening the definition of nontestimonial statements in domestic-violence cases.

The decision also confirms that harmless-error review sweeps broadly. Courts weigh properly admitted and improperly admitted evidence together, and they consider the Commonwealth’s closing argument to assess what role the tainted evidence played. Here, the Commonwealth relied primarily on the officer’s observations and the photographs, not the victim’s statements, to prove the beating occurred.

Read the full opinion: Commonwealth v. Khadgi (AC-25-P-1208, September 24, 2026).