SJC Bars Expungement of Juvenile Harassment Order Despite Later Vacatur: Piper P. v. Barron B. (SJC-13854, October 5, 2026)

On May 2, 2024, a Juvenile Court judge issued a harassment prevention order against a nine-year-old boy, effective through November 1, 2024. The judge credited testimony from the boy’s classmate, also in fourth grade, that the boy had kicked her in the head during gym class, stepped on her hand, and engaged in other bullying behavior. The plaintiff said she suffered a concussion and went to a hospital emergency room. At the hearing, the juvenile’s counsel told the judge that the school district was investigating the allegations and expected to issue a written report shortly. The judge said he would revisit the order once the school investigation was completed.

Several weeks later, the school district completed its investigation pursuant to the antibullying statute, G. L. c. 71, section 37O. The investigator’s report concluded that interviews with students and staff did not substantiate the allegations that the juvenile intentionally made physical contact with the plaintiff. The report stated that there was not a preponderance of evidence that the juvenile had repeatedly targeted the plaintiff with inappropriate, malicious or disparaging verbal statements, physical acts or gestures such as would be necessary to support a finding of bullying or cyberbullying.

The juvenile submitted the report to the Juvenile Court and moved for reconsideration. In July 2024, the judge terminated the harassment prevention order. In doing so, the judge wrote that after further hearing, there was no evidence, physical or anecdotal, of an intentional blow to the plaintiff’s face. Ten students and several staff were interviewed and provided little insight or evidence. There was no bruising, no outward signs of a kick to her face or head or stomping on her fingers, and no evidence of intentional injury.

The juvenile then moved to expunge all records associated with the harassment prevention order. The judge initially allowed the motion. The Massachusetts Probation Service intervened and moved for reconsideration, arguing that expungement was unavailable absent fraud on the court. The judge reconsidered the ruling and vacated the expungement order, finding in a margin endorsement that there was no clear and convincing evidence of fraud on the court. The juvenile appealed. The Supreme Judicial Court granted direct appellate review.

The Statutory Framework

The court began by examining the legislative source and limits of the Juvenile Court’s authority. The Juvenile Courts, like all the courts of the Commonwealth except the Supreme Judicial Court, are creatures of the Legislature and derive their powers, other than those powers that are inherent in all courts, from the Legislature. Any legislative grant of authority to the Juvenile Court must either be articulated expressly or be capable of being deduced by necessary and inevitable implication.

General Laws c. 258E does not expressly authorize a judge to order the expungement of records concerning harassment prevention orders. Section 9 requires that whenever the Juvenile Court issues a harassment prevention order, the clerk transmit information concerning the order to the Commissioner of Probation for inclusion in designated record-keeping systems, including the Statewide domestic violence record-keeping system (DVRS). The directive is mandatory. Nothing in the statute expressly authorizes the removal or expungement of those records from the DVRS when an order is later vacated because the evidence is ultimately deemed insufficient.

The statutory text draws no distinction, for purposes of retaining DVRS records, between orders that remain active and those later terminated or vacated. Section 9 does require a court to notify law enforcement in writing when a harassment prevention order is vacated, and to direct that agency to destroy all record of the vacated order. But the statute defines the relevant agency as the agency that received the order for service on the defendant, not the office of the Commissioner of Probation. For that reason, the record-destruction provision in section 9 does not apply to the DVRS records maintained by the office of the Commissioner of Probation.

No Implied Authority

The court’s decision in Vaccaro v. Vaccaro, 425 Mass. 153 (1997), controls. There, the court considered whether a judge had authority to expunge abuse prevention order records maintained in the DVRS. The court concluded that the Legislature had created a comprehensive statutory scheme requiring retention of those records and that no power to order expungement can be implied. The same reasoning applies here.

When the Legislature enacted G. L. c. 258E in 2010, it expressly directed that harassment prevention orders be incorporated into the DVRS, the same centralized record-keeping system that maintains abuse prevention orders issued under G. L. c. 209A. That decision reflects a deliberate legislative judgment that prior harassment prevention orders, like prior abuse prevention orders, should remain available to law enforcement officials and judges evaluating subsequent requests for protective relief. Prior filings, including inactive orders, may assist judges who are evaluating future requests for harassment prevention orders in assessing risk, credibility, escalation, and patterns of alleged conduct. Preserving those records advances the central purpose of G. L. c. 258E: protecting victims of harassment.

The juvenile argued that the government’s interest in retaining these records largely disappears once an order has been vacated for insufficient evidence. The court found that concern understandable. A vacated order does not carry the same weight as one that remains valid and enforceable. But even vacated orders can provide meaningful information, notwithstanding their inactive status and regardless of the reason for termination, at least where the order was not procured through fraud on the court.

Inherent Authority Limited to Fraud

The Appeals Court has recognized a narrow inherent judicial authority to expunge records of both abuse prevention orders and harassment prevention orders in one limited circumstance: where the order was procured through fraud on the court. That authority does not arise from generalized equitable concerns. Rather, it stems from the judiciary’s obligation to protect the integrity of the judicial process itself. Fraud on the court involves conduct that corrupts the adjudicative process; it is not established from the mere fact that evidence is later determined to be inaccurate, mistaken, or unsupported.

The standard is exacting and requires clear and convincing evidence. Here, as expressly noted in a margin endorsement, the judge did not find by clear and convincing evidence that the plaintiff had committed fraud on the court. Instead, the judge had concluded only that subsequently developed evidence failed to establish any intentional injury or willful and malicious conduct necessary to justify continued relief under G. L. c. 258E. Those are materially different conclusions.

A witness, particularly a child witness, may sincerely recount events later determined to be inaccurate or unsupported by corroborating evidence. A subsequent failure of proof does not itself establish intentional deception. Nor does a judge’s decision to terminate an order retroactively transform the original proceeding into a fraud on the court.

No Broader Equitable Power

The juvenile urged the court to expand the judiciary’s inherent authority beyond cases involving fraud on the court and to recognize a broader equitable power to expunge records whenever an order is later vacated for insufficient evidence. The court declined. The inherent powers of the courts are those whose exercise is essential to the function of the judicial department, to the maintenance of its authority, or to its capacity to decide cases. The judiciary’s inherent authority is implicated where the absence of statutory authority impairs the function of the court or threatens the maintenance of its authority.

No similar concern exists here. Maintaining an accurate record of the issuance of the harassment prevention order, as well as its subsequent termination, in the DVRS does not impair the court’s function or threaten its authority or ability to decide cases so as to require an exercise of any inherent power of expungement. To recognize such an inherent authority would effectively create a new expungement regime untethered to any threat or impairment to the integrity of the judiciary itself. Courts would be required to determine when later evidentiary developments justify erasing otherwise properly issued orders from legislatively mandated databases, even without any attendant threat to the integrity of the judicial system or impairment to the courts’ ability to adjudicate cases, and notwithstanding the Legislature’s evident intent that such records be retained.

That determination involves competing policy considerations regarding public safety, record retention and access, and the treatment of juveniles. The Legislature is institutionally better equipped to balance those interests and determine whether a broader expungement remedy should exist. Consistent with its constitutional role, and in the absence of a threat to the judiciary or its ability to carry out its adjudicatory functions, the court declined to use inherent authority to override the Legislature’s policy choice.

Juvenile Status Insufficient

The juvenile further argued that Juvenile Court judges possess broader equitable authority because proceedings involving children are guided by rehabilitative principles and concern the welfare of minors. The court did not disagree that juvenile proceedings differ in important respects, nor did it minimize the significance of placing a child’s name in databases accessible to law enforcement agencies indefinitely.

Even so, the court has declined to recognize the power of the Juvenile Court to expunge probation records where the Legislature enacted a statutory scheme governing confidentiality and retention that did not confer such power, notwithstanding the unique goals of the juvenile justice system. In addition to the limitation governing vacated orders, G. L. c. 258E, section 10, provides that records involving a juvenile shall be withheld from public inspection, with limited exceptions. Where the Legislature has specifically addressed confidentiality in this manner, a recognition of an expungement power would be particularly inappropriate.

The Legislature has struck its own balance between the juvenile’s interest in not being unfairly prejudiced by his record and the needs of courts and law enforcement agencies for information pertaining to juvenile proceedings. Where the Legislature has determined that a very few limited persons are entitled in certain circumstances to know that proceedings were brought against a particular juvenile, the juvenile’s contention that those limited persons should not have access to that information, that they do not need it, or that they will misuse it, is a contention that should be addressed to the Legislature, not to a Juvenile Court judge.

The Concurrence and Dissent

Justice Kafker, joined by Justice Wendlandt, wrote separately to question whether the Juvenile Court has jurisdiction over harassment prevention proceedings against children under twelve. The 2018 Criminal Justice Reform Act fundamentally changed the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court. The Legislature excluded from the definition of delinquent child children below the age of twelve accused of committing criminal offenses, and children who commit a civil infraction or a first offense of a misdemeanor. Justice Kafker reasoned that it stands to reason that the Legislature also intended at that time to exclude from the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court the issuance of harassment prevention orders against a child under twelve; after all, the issuance of such an order also necessitates involvement of such a young child in the juvenile justice system and the creation of a damaging record of such involvement.

The legislative history of the 2018 act indicates that the Legislature understood that children who enter the juvenile justice system have a higher risk of reoffending for the remainder of their lives, and that their risk of recidivism is greater the earlier they enter the system. The Legislature implicitly declared that the juvenile justice system is not the appropriate forum to address offenses committed by children under twelve. If such a child violates a harassment prevention order, no delinquency proceedings can be brought to enforce it, even though the principal remedy provided by c. 258E for violation of harassment prevention orders is criminal in nature. Justice Kafker wrote that he hoped the Legislature would address these evident problems and further consider whether the issuance of harassment orders against children under twelve is consistent with the fundamental principles underlying the criminal justice reform act.

Chief Justice Budd dissented, arguing that the court should recognize a tailored application of the existing standard when the parties are young children. The fraud standard is not well suited for the circumstances presented here, as it is entirely unclear whether young children even have the capacity to commit fraud. Requiring a defendant to present proof that a young child plaintiff had formed a specific and substantial intent to manipulate and defraud the court is ill suited to the circumstances. Chief Justice Budd argued that the use of the court’s inherent power to expunge a vacated harassment prevention order may be appropriately considered where the plaintiff is a child under twelve years of age, and a judge has determined that the allegations of harassment underlying the original order lack factual support or are otherwise untrue. Given the requisite findings had already been made, and the government’s minimal interest in retaining records of an erroneous order against a nine-year-old, Chief Justice Budd would have ordered expungement.

Practical Consequences

The decision leaves in place a system in which harassment prevention orders against juveniles remain in state databases indefinitely, even when later vacated for insufficient evidence, unless the movant can demonstrate fraud on the court by clear and convincing evidence. Records maintained in the DVRS are not public; they are available only to trial court judges through the court’s computer system and to law enforcement agencies through the criminal justice information system. However, these records can have significant consequences for juveniles, including potential barriers to employment in certain sectors such as childcare, teaching, coaching, or other activities involving minors, as well as fostering or adopting children.

The court acknowledged the force of the juvenile’s concerns but concluded that the issue is a matter for the Legislature, not the courts. The decision does not foreclose the possibility of legislative action to create a broader expungement remedy or to clarify the application of harassment prevention orders to very young children.

Read the full opinion: Piper P. v. Barron B (SJC-13854, October 5, 2026).