CourtSupreme Judicial Court
DocketSJC 13981
ReleasedOctober 20, 2026
Full opinionRead the full text of the decision
Question
When a litigant challenges a civil contempt judgment through a G.L. c. 211, § 3 petition to a single justice, must the petitioner demonstrate the absence of adequate alternative relief before obtaining extraordinary intervention?
Rule
General Laws chapter 211, section 3, authorizes the Supreme Judicial Court to grant extraordinary relief, but only when a petitioner demonstrates “the absence of adequate alternative relief.” Commonwealth v. Fontanez, 482 Mass. 22, 24-25 (2019). A judgment of civil contempt is “an appealable final judgment” that may be challenged “in the ordinary course of appeal.” Gaines v. Attorney Gen., 495 Mass. 1016, 1018 (2025), quoting Strahan v. Superior Court Dep’t of the Trial Court, 452 Mass. 1017, 1018 (2008).
Holding
The court held that Tarasuik was not entitled to extraordinary relief under G.L. c. 211, § 3, because he failed to demonstrate the absence of adequate alternative relief. The single justice correctly concluded that Tarasuik did not establish why he could not have appealed directly from the civil contempt judgment instead of seeking extraordinary intervention. Because a direct appeal was available, the petition did not present “the type of exceptional matter that requires the court’s extraordinary intervention.”
Result
The judgment of the single justice denying the G.L. c. 211, § 3 petition was affirmed.
Players
- Court: Supreme Judicial Court, on appeal from a single justice's denial of a G.L. c. 211, § 3 petition
- Below: Single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court; underlying proceeding in the Northeast Division of the Housing Court Department
- Petitioner-Appellant: Ryan Tarasuik (pro se)
- Respondents: 162 Washington LLC, Rock and Sons Property Management LLC, and Joseph Rock
- Nominal Party: Northeast Division of the Housing Court Department
Ryan Tarasuik found himself in civil contempt in Housing Court and tried to take the fight directly to the Supreme Judicial Court. The court said no, ruling that he should have used the ordinary appeal process instead of seeking extraordinary relief under G.L. c. 211, § 3.
The decision shows a fundamental principle: the extraordinary relief statute is a last resort, not a substitute for direct appeal.
The Procedural Path
Tarasuik was a litigant in the Northeast Division of the Housing Court. A judge there entered a judgment of civil contempt against him. Rather than appeal that judgment through normal channels, Tarasuik filed a petition for extraordinary relief with a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court under G.L. c. 211, § 3. He challenged both the validity of the contempt judgment and the Housing Court judge’s efforts to enforce it.
The single justice denied the petition. The reason: Tarasuik’s case did not present the kind of exceptional matter that warrants extraordinary intervention. Tarasuik moved for reconsideration. That motion was also denied. He then appealed the single justice’s decision to the full court.
The Central Issue
The question before the court was straightforward. When a litigant seeks extraordinary relief under G.L. c. 211, § 3, to challenge a civil contempt judgment, must he show that no other adequate remedy exists?
The answer, the court held, is yes. Section 3 relief is available only when ordinary legal remedies cannot do the job.
What the Law Requires
General Laws chapter 211, section 3, gives the Supreme Judicial Court broad power to issue writs and orders. Courts have interpreted this authority narrowly. A petitioner must demonstrate the absence of adequate alternative relief. The single justice in this case applied the standard from Commonwealth v. Fontanez, which requires a showing that the matter is exceptional and that no other remedy will work.
Civil contempt judgments, meanwhile, are appealable final judgments. The court has said so repeatedly, most recently in Gaines v. Attorney Gen. in 2025. That means a litigant can challenge such a judgment by filing a direct appeal.
Why Tarasuik Lost
Tarasuik did not explain why direct appeal would not suffice. He simply filed his section 3 petition and argued that the contempt judgment was invalid. The court noted that he failed to establish why he could not have challenged the judgment through a normal appeal.
Because direct appeal was available, Tarasuik could not meet the threshold requirement for extraordinary relief. The single justice did not abuse her discretion in denying the petition, and the full court found no error of law in that decision.
A Procedural Note
Tarasuik filed his papers under S.J.C. Rule 2:21, which governs certain interlocutory appeals. The court noted in a footnote that rule 2:21 did not apply here because civil contempt judgments are final, not interlocutory. The court reviewed the case anyway, but the analysis reinforced the same point: final judgments go through direct appeal, not petitions for extraordinary relief.
Practical Consequences
The decision serves as a reminder that G.L. c. 211, § 3, is not a second bite at the apple. Litigants who disagree with trial court judgments must use the appeals process that the law provides. Extraordinary relief is for situations where those ordinary processes cannot provide a remedy.
For Housing Court litigants in particular, the message is clear. Civil contempt judgments can be appealed. If you want to challenge one, file a notice of appeal and follow the rules that govern direct appeals. The Supreme Judicial Court will not entertain a section 3 petition unless you can show that a direct appeal is inadequate.
Pro se litigants like Tarasuik may be tempted to seek relief directly from the state’s highest court, especially when they believe a lower court has committed serious error. This case illustrates that the path matters. Courts enforce procedural rules strictly, and exhaustion of ordinary remedies is a prerequisite to extraordinary intervention.
Read the full opinion: Tarasuik v. 162 Washington LLC (SJC-13981, October 20, 2026).