SJC to Litigants: Use the Ordinary Appeal Process (Tarasuik

CourtSupreme Judicial Court

DocketSJC 13957

ReleasedOctober 20, 2026

Full opinionRead the full text of the decision

Question

When a litigant seeks extraordinary relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, to challenge interlocutory orders of the Housing Court, must the single justice grant relief if the petitioner has adequate alternative remedies available through direct appeal or interlocutory review under G. L. c. 231, § 118, first paragraph?

Rule

General Laws c. 211, § 3, authorizes the Supreme Judicial Court to exercise general superintendence over all courts of inferior jurisdiction. A single justice is not required to intervene “if the petitioner has an adequate alternative remedy or if the single justice determines, in his or her discretion, that the subject of the petition is not sufficiently important and extraordinary as to require general superintendence intervention.” Commonwealth v. Fontanez, 482 Mass. 22, 24-25 (2019).

Direct appeal from a final judgment is an adequate alternative remedy. Harihar v. Commonwealth, 497 Mass. 1013, 1014 (2026). Review pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 118, first paragraph, where available for interlocutory orders, is also an adequate alternative to c. 211, § 3 relief. Greco v. Plymouth Sav. Bank, 423 Mass. 1019, 1019-1020 (1996).

When a single justice exercises discretion not to reach the merits of a c. 211, § 3 petition, the full court asks “only whether the single justice abused his or her discretion in making that decision.” Boone v. Commonwealth, 494 Mass. 1011, 1012-1013 (2024).

Holding

The single justice did not abuse her discretion in denying the petition. Tarasuik failed to explain why review of the Housing Court orders could not have been obtained through ordinary appeal from a final judgment or, for interlocutory orders, through review under G. L. c. 231, § 118, first paragraph. The fact that Tarasuik later sought and received interlocutory review from the Appeals Court under § 118 on two of the challenged orders demonstrates that adequate alternative remedies existed. That he “did not receive the relief in that court that he desired . . . does not render the relief inadequate or entitle him to relief pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3.” Because Tarasuik had adequate alternative remedies, the single justice properly declined to exercise extraordinary superintendence power.

Result

The judgment of the single justice denying the petition for relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, was affirmed.

Players

Court: Supreme Judicial Court, on appeal from a single justice's denial of a petition for extraordinary relief
Opinion by: Per curiam
Below: Northeast Division of the Housing Court Department (orders dated February 3, April 28, and May 28, 2026); single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court (petition filed June 1, 2026)
Petitioner-Appellant: Ryan Tarasuik, tenant, appearing pro se
Respondents-Appellees: Christopher DeSimone, Sr.; 162 Washington LLC; Rock and Sons Property Management LLC (property owners)

A tenant who loses in Housing Court cannot leapfrog the normal appeal process by invoking the Supreme Judicial Court’s superintendence power. That is the message the SJC sent to Ryan Tarasuik, who tried to use G. L. c. 211, § 3, to reverse a series of Housing Court orders that went against him.

Tarasuik, appearing pro se, litigated two cases in the Northeast Housing Court against the owners of the property where he lived. Over the course of several months, the Housing Court issued three orders adverse to him: one in February 2026 denying his request to block the sale of the property and requiring him to allow inspections and repairs; another in April allowing the property owner to seek use and occupancy payments; and a third in May ordering him to make those payments. On June 1, 2026, Tarasuik filed a petition with a single justice of the SJC asking for extraordinary relief from all three orders. He also asked the single justice to stay the Housing Court proceedings.

The single justice denied the petition, concluding that it did not present the kind of exceptional matter requiring the court’s extraordinary intervention and that adequate alternative remedies were available. She also denied the stay request. Tarasuik moved for reconsideration; that motion was denied as well.

The Appeal and the Standard

Tarasuik appealed to the full SJC. The court reviewed only whether the single justice abused her discretion in refusing to reach the merits of the petition. The standard is deferential. A single justice need not intervene under c. 211, § 3, if the petitioner has an adequate alternative remedy or if the petition does not present a sufficiently important and extraordinary matter.

Tarasuik submitted his appeal under S.J.C. Rule 2:21, which governs appeals from a single justice’s denial of relief from an interlocutory trial court ruling. The court assumed without deciding that the appeal was not limited by Rule 2:21’s requirements, but concluded that even under a broader view, Tarasuik was not entitled to the relief he sought.

The Existence of Alternative Remedies

The SJC found that Tarasuik did not explain why he could not have obtained review of the disputed orders through the ordinary appellate process. He could have appealed from any final judgment in the Housing Court cases. For interlocutory orders, he could have sought review under G. L. c. 231, § 118, first paragraph, which provides a mechanism for discretionary appellate review of certain non-final orders.

The court noted that Tarasuik did, in fact, pursue § 118 review. He filed successive petitions with single justices of the Appeals Court seeking interlocutory review of the order denying his request to enjoin the sale and the order requiring use and occupancy payments. He received review in both instances. The Appeals Court denied him relief, but that did not make the remedy inadequate. As the court stated, quoting its recent decision in Harihar, the fact that a litigant “did not receive the relief in that court that he desired . . . does not render the relief inadequate or entitle him to relief pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3.”

The Lesson for Litigants

The decision reinforces a basic principle of appellate procedure: extraordinary relief under c. 211, § 3, is not a substitute for losing on the merits through the normal channels. The superintendence power exists to address truly exceptional situations where the ordinary appellate process cannot provide a remedy. When a litigant has access to direct appeal or interlocutory review, those remedies are presumed adequate.

Tarasuik’s effort to use the SJC’s superintendence power as a second bite at the apple after losing in the Appeals Court was unavailing. The full court saw no abuse of discretion in the single justice’s refusal to intervene. Because the petition for extraordinary relief failed, the court also found no error in the denial of the stay motion.

Why It Matters

This case will be cited by appellate courts (and opposing counsel) whenever a party attempts to invoke superintendence jurisdiction without first exhausting, or even attempting, the ordinary appellate routes. It confirms that c. 211, § 3, is a safety valve, not a parallel track. For Housing Court litigants in particular, the decision clarifies that interlocutory orders can be reviewed under § 118 and that dissatisfaction with the outcome of that review does not open the door to superintendence relief. Pro se litigants, who may be unfamiliar with the hierarchy of appellate remedies, are bound by the same rules as represented parties.

Read the full opinion: Tarasuik v. DeSimone (SJC-13957, October 20, 2026).