SJC Upholds Firearms Age Restriction, Drawing on Historical Militia Traditions: Commonwealth v. Thomson (SJC-13856, October 20, 2026)

The Conviction and the Challenge

In December 2021, a police officer stopped a car in Dorchester after it ran a red light. Mikai Thomson sat in the front passenger seat. A lit marijuana blunt was in the center console. A pound of marijuana sat on the back seat. None of the three occupants wore a seat belt. When the officer asked if anyone had a weapon, Thomson did not answer. The officer asked him to step out. Thomson shoved the officer and ran, discarding a loaded nine millimeter semiautomatic handgun along the way.

Thomson was charged with assault and battery on a police officer and carrying a firearm without a license under G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a). A jury convicted him on both counts. He appealed only the firearm conviction, arguing that the minimum age of twenty-one for obtaining a license to carry violates the Second Amendment. Thomson was twenty years old at the time of the offense and had never applied for a license.

The Supreme Judicial Court transferred the case from the Appeals Court on its own motion and now affirms. In an opinion by Justice Wolohojian, the court holds that the age restriction is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of regulating firearms for young people.

The Standing Hurdle

Thomson raised two challenges: a facial attack on the age restriction itself and an as-applied claim that the restriction violates the Constitution as to him specifically. The court found he has standing only for the facial challenge.

Massachusetts law has long required defendants to apply for and be denied a license before bringing an as-applied challenge to the licensing scheme. Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 496 Mass. 627, 640 (2025). The principle is not unique to firearms; it reflects the general rule that one cannot challenge a licensing scheme without first seeking a license. The rule applies even when the applicant is ineligible by age, because the applicant has not shown that age alone would have been the basis for denial. See Commonwealth v. Powell, 459 Mass. 572, 590 (2011).

Thomson argued that applying for a license would have been futile because the statute flatly barred him from eligibility. The court acknowledged that it has not foreclosed a futility exception in an appropriate case on an adequate record, but this is not that case. Thomson made no showing that age alone stood between him and a license. He may have been independently ineligible on other grounds, such as a prior violent crime conviction. Without such a showing, the futility doctrine does not apply.

A facial challenge, however, does not require a license application. “[I]n a prosecution for violation of a licensing statute which is unconstitutional on its face, the issue of its validity is presented even in the absence of an application for a license.” Commonwealth v. Gordon, 354 Mass. 722, 725 (1968). The court proceeded to consider Thomson’s facial challenge on the merits.

The Second Amendment Framework

The Supreme Court has developed a two-step framework for evaluating firearm regulations under the Second Amendment. First, does the Second Amendment’s plain text cover the individual’s conduct? If so, the government must then demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 17 (2022).

The court assumed without deciding that Thomson, despite being under twenty-one, qualifies as one of “the people” protected by the Second Amendment. There is no dispute that carrying a semiautomatic handgun falls within the text of the amendment. The question thus became whether the Commonwealth met its burden to show historical consistency.

The historical inquiry is not a search for a “dead ringer” or “historical twin.” Instead, courts must engage in “analogical reasoning” to determine whether a modern regulation is “relevantly similar” to historical ones. United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 692 (2024). The key metrics are “how and why” the regulation burdens the right to armed self-defense. Bruen, 597 U.S. at 29.

Massachusetts’s Graduated Licensing Scheme

Massachusetts has long employed a graduated system that gives progressively greater access to firearms as young people mature. At any age, a young person may hold, handle, and fire firearms under the supervision of a license holder. G. L. c. 140, § 129C (m). At age fifteen, a young person may obtain a firearm identification (FID) card, which permits possession of nonlarge capacity rifles and shotguns; until age eighteen, the application requires parental certification. G. L. c. 140, § 129B (1) (iv), (v).

At eighteen, a person may obtain an FID card without parental involvement. At twenty-one, unless otherwise disqualified, a person may apply for a license to carry, which permits the purchase, possession, and carrying of all firearms, including handguns and large capacity weapons. G. L. c. 140, § 131 (d) (iv).

The scheme reflects three considerations: age, supervision, and setting. Younger individuals may use firearms only in structured settings under adult supervision. As they mature, supervision requirements lessen and settings expand. The Legislature determined that twenty-one is the age of competence to carry a firearm without supervision.

The Historical Tradition

The court examined Massachusetts’s historical regulations concerning minors and firearms, beginning with the founding era. At that time, all able-bodied males from sixteen to fifty were obligated to enroll in the militia. Province Laws 1775-1776, c. 10, § 2. Those enrolled were required to have specified arms and equipment, but minors were not expected to supply these themselves. Instead, “parents, guardians, or masters” were obligated to “furnish and equip” minors with the required arms. Id. § 8. If the parent or guardian could not afford to do so, the town was required to provide the arms. Minors could not be punished for failing to supply their own arms; that responsibility fell to the parent, guardian, or master.

Arms supplied by the town were to be stored in a safe place and delivered to the enrolled person only when required for militia service, then returned when service ended. Enrolled minors could be fined for failing to appear for service, but they bore no independent obligation to equip themselves. By 1809, the minimum age for militia enrollment had risen to eighteen, in line with federal law. R.S. (1836), c. 12, § 5.

The infancy doctrine further constrained minors’ access to firearms. Minors could not be bound by contract except for the purchase of “necessaries” such as food, clothing, and education. Stone v. Dennison, 13 Pick. 1, 6 (1832). Firearms were not considered necessaries. Minors also could not control or retain their own earnings; wages earned by minors belonged to their fathers. Benson v. Remington, 2 Mass. 113, 115 (1806). These legal constraints meant that minors had little ability to obtain firearms independently of their parents.

The court also examined the broader historical landscape. The Legislature had authority to set the age of competence for various rights and obligations, including marriage, jury service, and contracting. These age restrictions served a common purpose: “to protect minors . . . from the consequences of their own immaturity.” The historical regulations regarding firearms reflected the same principle.

The Analogy

The court found the modern licensing age restriction “closely analogous” to the historical regulatory tradition. Both schemes share the same “why”: to protect young people from the consequences of their immaturity. Both employ the same “how”: temporary restrictions tied to age and supervision until the person reaches twenty-one.

Historically, minors could possess firearms for organized militia service under the supervision of commanders, with arms supplied by responsible adults. Outside of supervised militia service, minors had little ability to obtain firearms independently. The modern scheme similarly ties possession and use of firearms to age, setting, and supervision.

The court emphasized that no single historical regulation needed to match the modern statute in all respects. Instead, a combination of pertinent historical regulations satisfied the “how” and “why” test. This is not a case where historical law “targeted different kinds of people, did so for different reasons, and operated in different ways.” United States v. Hemani, 608 U.S. 772, 795 (2026). Both the modern and historical schemes temporarily restrict the same population (young persons) for similarly limited periods (before age twenty-one) for the same purpose (protection from immaturity).

The Dissent’s Proposed Remand

Justice Kafker, joined by Justice Wendlandt, dissented in part. The dissent agreed that Thomson has standing to bring a facial challenge but argued the case should be remanded for further briefing and expert historical analysis. The dissent pointed to the limited historical showing by the Commonwealth and argued that the court impermissibly performed its own historical research without giving Thomson an opportunity to respond.

The majority rejected the call for remand. The court noted that the question presented was precisely the one the parties briefed and argued on appeal. The principle of party presentation does not prevent a court from conducting its own legal research to resolve the legal question presented. The court distinguished this case from Commonwealth v. Mattis, 493 Mass. 216 (2024), which involved new brain science requiring expert testimony. Here, the court was tasked with resolving a legal question of historical analogy, which is within the court’s ordinary competence.

The majority also noted that neither party requested a remand. Thomson waived the constitutional issue in the trial court and could not now expect a “do-over” to develop a record. The standard of review for waived claims in noncapital cases is whether there is a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. The court found no such risk here.

Why This Case Matters

This decision is the first by the Supreme Judicial Court to apply the Bruen framework to a firearms age restriction. It establishes that historical militia regulations requiring parental supply of arms and supervised use by minors are sufficiently analogous to modern age-based licensing restrictions. The court’s holding aligns Massachusetts with the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in National Rifle Ass’n v. Bondi, 133 F.4th 1108 (11th Cir. 2025), and contrasts with decisions by the Fifth, Eighth, and Third Circuits that struck down age restrictions on the purchase or possession of firearms by eighteen to twenty year olds.

The decision leaves open several questions. The court assumed without deciding that a person under twenty-one is a member of “the people” protected by the Second Amendment. That question remains unresolved in Massachusetts. The court also did not foreclose the possibility of an as-applied challenge based on futility in an appropriate case on an adequate record, though it found this case did not present such circumstances.

For practitioners, the decision reaffirms the standing requirement for as-applied challenges to the licensing scheme: apply for a license and be denied. It also illustrates the court’s willingness to conduct its own historical research when the parties’ briefing is limited, though the dissent suggests that approach raises procedural concerns. The decision may not be the last word. The Circuit split on firearms age restrictions remains unresolved, and the Supreme Court has yet to address the question directly.

Read the full opinion: Commonwealth v. Thomson (SJC-13856, October 20, 2026).