SJC Voids Children’s Gym Liability Waiver Under Health Club Statute: Cross v. BeFree Enterprises (SJC-13933, November 10, 2026)

Ava Cross was five years old when she fell from a piece of equipment during a gymnastics class at The Little Gym of West Boylston and broke her arm. Her father had signed a liability waiver as part of her enrollment. The question the Supreme Judicial Court answered: does a 1985 consumer protection statute barring health clubs from including liability waivers in their contracts apply to a children’s gymnastics program?

The court said yes. The Little Gym is a health club under G. L. c. 93, § 80, and the waiver is void.

The Facts

The Little Gym describes itself as a child development and gymnastics center. It offers classes for children up to age twelve (some as young as four months, with parents present). The program has three dimensions: physical skills (motor and gymnastic skills), social and emotional development, and cognitive development. The facility is set up like a gymnastics studio, with padding and equipment.

In October 2020, Ava’s paternal grandmother enrolled her in a weekly class. The grandmother and Ava’s father completed enrollment paperwork together. On October 28, 2020, Ava’s father signed a document titled “Acknowledgement of Risk and Waiver of Liability.” It stated that he understood there “may be some risk of injury associated with participation” and agreed to “waive any and all claims of liability, release and hold harmless The Little Gym International, Inc. and its franchisees in the event that such injury . . . may occur to me or my child.” The next day, the grandmother paid for the classes online with a credit card.

In August 2021, the process repeated. The grandmother enrolled Ava again; the father signed an identically worded waiver. On October 10, 2021, during a class, Ava was at the beam station using a “red bar” she had used many times before. This time, she tried to sit on top of it, fell, and injured her arm. A coach was present.

Ava’s mother sued the Little Gym for negligence, alleging breach of a duty to supervise. The Little Gym moved for summary judgment, arguing the waiver barred the claim. A Superior Court judge agreed and granted summary judgment. Ava appealed.

The Statute

In 1985, the Legislature passed an emergency law regulating contracts between health clubs and their customers, declaring it “necessary for the immediate preservation of the public convenience.” The act, codified at G. L. c. 93, §§ 78 to 88, protects consumers from abusive industry practices. It prohibits long-term contracts, requires monthly (not more frequent) billing, mandates conspicuous cancellation language, allows cancellation upon death or disability, prohibits unfair and deceptive practices, and creates causes of action for violations.

Section 80 addresses liability waivers. It says “[n]o contract for health club services may contain any provisions whereby the buyer agrees not to assert against the seller or any assignee or transferee of the health club services contract any claim or defense arising out of the health club services contract or the buyer’s activities at the health club.” The phrase “or the buyer’s activities at the health club” was added in the final version of the bill.

Two definitions matter. A “contract for health club services” is one “which has the primary purpose of providing a person with the right to use the facilities of a health club or with instruction, training, or assistance by a health club in the preservation, maintenance, encouragement or development of physical fitness, conditioning or well-being.” A “health club” is a facility “in which any person, firm, corporation, partnership, unincorporated association, franchise or other business enterprise offers facilities for or instruction, training or assistance in the preservation, maintenance, encouragement or development of physical fitness, conditioning or well being.” Both definitions include nonexclusive lists of examples: health spas, gyms, weight control centers, martial arts schools, “or any other similar course of physical training.”

Any contract for health club services that does not comply with the act “shall be void and unenforceable as contrary to public policy.”

What the Court Held

Justice Wolohojian, writing for a unanimous court, held that the waiver is prohibited by section 80 and therefore void.

The waiver plainly falls within the statute’s text. It is a provision “whereby the buyer agrees not to assert against the seller . . . any claim . . . arising out of . . . the buyer’s activities at the health club.” The waiver said Ava’s father agreed to “waive any and all claims of liability” in the event injury “may occur to me or my child.” That covers Ava’s negligence claim arising from her activities at the Little Gym.

The harder question was whether the waiver was part of a “contract for health club services.” Standing alone, the waiver did not contain essential contract terms (it did not, for instance, identify what services the Little Gym would provide). But it was not alone. The waiver was part of a single transaction with the enrollment paperwork and the credit card payment. When several writings evidence a single contract, courts read them together. This is true even when the writings are signed at different times, as they were here. Taken together, the documents show the contract’s “primary purpose” was to let Ava use the Little Gym’s facilities and receive instruction in “encouragement or development of physical fitness” (specifically, motor and gymnastic skills).

That left the question whether the Little Gym is a “health club.” The court had no hesitation. The summary judgment record established that the Little Gym is a gymnastics center offering classes to children up to age twelve, with a facility containing gymnastics equipment. One of its three program dimensions is physical skills, including motor and gymnastic skills. It employs coaches. One was present when Ava fell. The Little Gym offers “facilities for, and instruction in, ‘encouragement or development of physical fitness, conditioning or well being.'”

The Little Gym’s Arguments

The Little Gym pointed to features that distinguish it from a traditional gym: scheduled classes rather than open access, extensive instructor supervision, programs for children. It called itself an “early education enrichment program.” The court acknowledged these differences but said they miss the point. The question is whether the Little Gym falls within the broad statutory definition of “health club,” and it does.

The nonexclusive list of examples in section 78 confirms this. The statute covers facilities offering traditional sports (tennis), health and well-being programs (health spas, weight control centers), and training in self-defense and martial arts. Like the Little Gym, martial arts and self-defense schools offer classes with instructors, often to children. The Little Gym “fits comfortably within that definition.”

The Little Gym raised two policy arguments. First, it contended the Legislature intended to bar waivers only for contract claims, not tort claims. The court said the plain language defeats this. Section 80 prohibits waivers not only for claims “arising out of” the contract but also for claims “arising out of” a “buyer’s activities at the health club.” The statute is “clear and unambiguous” and “conclusive as to legislative intent.”

Second, the Little Gym argued that reading section 80 to cover tort waivers produces an absurd result because “Massachusetts law favors the enforcement of releases.” The court disagreed. There is no inconsistency between a general policy favoring releases and a legislative decision to ban them in a particular context. “[I]t is not for us to inquire into the expediency or the wisdom of the legislative judgment.”

Why It Matters

The decision settles that children’s fitness and gymnastics programs fall within the health club statute if they offer instruction in physical fitness, conditioning, or well-being. Operators of such programs cannot use liability waivers to bar negligence claims arising from a child’s activities at the facility. The statute, passed as emergency legislation in 1985, reflects a legislative judgment that consumers of health club services need protection from certain contractual terms, including waivers of tort liability.

The court noted that other jurisdictions have reached similar conclusions, either by statute (Hawaii, Maryland, New York all ban liability waivers in analogous contexts) or by common law disfavoring waivers for children (Michigan, Pennsylvania, Washington). The remand leaves open all questions about the merits of Ava’s negligence claim.

Read the full opinion from the court: Cross v. BeFree Enterprises, LLC (SJC-13933, November 10, 2026) (PDF, mass.gov).