Patrick Clancy’s wrongful death lawsuit against the mental health providers who treated his former wife, Lindsay Clancy, will go forward. Norfolk Superior Court Judge Michael P. Doolin denied the providers’ motion to dismiss in a five-page decision dated Thursday, November 19, 2026. Los Angeles Magazine published the decision, and Globe magazine also reported the ruling.
The ruling turns on one contested claim: that Lindsay Clancy told her psychiatrist and nurse practitioner she was “both suicidal and homicidal as to her children.” The judge did not find that she said it. At this stage he had to assume the complaint’s allegations are true, and he held that, if true, they are enough to get past the one Massachusetts statute that would otherwise block the suit.
The providers deny the claims. Nothing in the suit has been proven. Lindsay Clancy has pleaded not guilty to murder in the children’s deaths, is presumed innocent, and faces a retrial in March 2027.
Who is being sued
Patrick Clancy sued in January 2026, individually and as personal representative of the estates of Cora, 5, Dawson, 3, and Callan, 8 months. The defendants are psychiatrist Dr. Jennifer A. Tufts, psychiatric nurse practitioner Rebecca H. Jollotta, Aster Mental Health, Inc., and South Shore Health System, Inc. The suit alleges they “provided negligent mental health care to Lindsay which resulted in her killing the three children,” as the decision summarizes it. The case is Norfolk Superior Court Civil Action No. 2682CV00071.
The judge heard arguments on October 28 and took the motion under advisement, as we reported in our coverage of that hearing.
The statute at the center: G.L. c. 123, § 36B
Massachusetts limits when a therapist or psychiatrist can be sued over harm a patient causes someone else. G.L. c. 123, § 36B says there is “no duty owed by a licensed mental health professional to take reasonable precautions to warn or in any other way protect a potential victim or victims of said professional’s patient,” and no lawsuit for failing to, unless one of two exceptions applies.
The parties agreed only the first exception matters here, the decision says. It applies when:
- “the patient has communicated to the licensed mental health professional an explicit threat to kill or inflict serious bodily injury upon a reasonably identified victim or victims,”
- “the patient has the apparent intent and ability to carry out the threat,” and
- the professional “fails to take reasonable precautions.”
If any piece is missing, Doolin wrote, “no duty to warn or protect a potential victim exists as a matter of law.”
Argument 1: no explicit threat was alleged. The judge disagreed.
The providers argued the amended complaint does not plausibly allege that Lindsay communicated an explicit threat against the children to any of them. Doolin pointed to three paragraphs of the complaint. Two allege that Patrick “has information and a good faith basis in fact to believe” Lindsay told Jollotta, and separately Tufts, “that she was both suicidal and homicidal as to her children.” A third alleges each defendant “was placed on notice by Lindsay that she was both suicidal and homicidal towards her kids.”
He also cited paragraphs alleging she reported “intrusive thoughts” of harming her children, and one alleging that Lindsay “will testify when deposed” that she reported homicidal ideation to the defendants. “Such allegations are sufficient to plausibly allege that Lindsay communicated to the Defendant licensed mental health professionals an explicit threat to kill or inflict serious bodily injury on the decedents,” he wrote.
Argument 2: the allegations are too thin. The judge disagreed.
The providers argued those allegations are speculative because the complaint never says what the “information and good faith basis” is, and because they are less detailed than the rest of the complaint. Doolin rejected both points, citing Polay v. McMahon, 468 Mass. 379 (2014): “for purposes of surviving a motion to dismiss, a party may allege facts based on information and belief,” and the court must assume they are true. “The allegations as written are sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss,” he wrote.
Argument 3: nobody could have foreseen it. The judge disagreed.
The providers also argued the children’s deaths were not reasonably foreseeable to them. Doolin cited Reid v. Boston, 95 Mass. App. Ct. 591 (2019), for the rule that “the intervening acts of a third party that are a reasonably foreseeable result of the original negligence will not break the chain of causation, even if those acts are criminal.” He added that it is enough “that the same general kind of harm was a foreseeable consequence,” quoting Jupin v. Kask, 447 Mass. 141 (2006).
He then summarized what the complaint alleges, which he had to accept as true for now: that Tufts prescribed medications but failed to monitor Lindsay’s reactions or address her worsening symptoms; that Lindsay told Jollotta she was overwhelmed, unable to sleep, and afraid something awful might happen; that Jollotta prescribed Seroquel, which the complaint says made her condition worse; that Lindsay reported “increasing intrusive thoughts about harming herself and her children”; and that Tufts noted her condition was deteriorating and her medication was not effective. Those allegations, he wrote, “plausibly suggest that the decedents’ deaths were a foreseeable result” of the alleged negligence.
The footnote that could matter later
Patrick’s lawyers had a backup argument: even without § 36B, the providers owed an ordinary common law duty to give Lindsay proper care. Doolin didn’t decide it, but footnote 5 signals trouble for that theory as to the individual clinicians.
Because § 36B says there is no duty to protect a patient’s potential victims outside its exceptions, “it is questionable whether a licensed mental health professional could have any common law duty of care to a third-party,” he wrote, citing Shea v. Caritas Carney Hosp., Inc., 79 Mass. App. Ct. 530 (2011). The institutions are different. Under Williams v. Steward Health Care Sys., LLC, 480 Mass. 286 (2018), § 36B addresses individual professionals and does not wipe out a hospital’s own common law duty, so “there is no question that the institution Defendants may still have a common law duty of care,” the footnote says.
The practical effect: against Tufts and Jollotta, the case may rise or fall on the explicit threat exception. Against Aster and South Shore Health, a second path may stay open.
The fight over what Lindsay said
The allegation the case now rests on is the one Lindsay Clancy’s own criminal lawyer has publicly denied. After the October hearing, Kevin Reddington said, “Lindsay Clancy never told any of her healthcare providers that she harbored homicidal ideation toward her children,” the Boston Globe and WBZ reported. He also said she never indicated she would testify in the civil case.
At her criminal trial, Tufts and Jollotta testified that Lindsay never told them she had thoughts of harming the children, the Globe and Court TV reported. Lindsay did not testify.
That sets up the next phase. Surviving a motion to dismiss only means the complaint is legally sufficient on paper. To win, Patrick will eventually need evidence that the explicit threat was made, and the most obvious witness is a woman facing a murder retrial who has a Fifth Amendment right not to testify while that case is pending.
What happens next
- Discovery. The case now moves into the exchange of records and depositions, unless the court orders otherwise.
- Timing against the criminal case. Lindsay’s retrial is set for March 29, 2027, and the full SJC will hear her double jeopardy challenge in January. Whether she can be deposed before the criminal case ends is an open question no outlet has reported on.
- Damages. The wrongful death statute, G.L. c. 229, § 2, allows recovery of a decedent’s “fair monetary value” to the family and punitive damages where death was caused by “gross negligence.”
Frequently asked questions
Is Patrick Clancy’s lawsuit against Lindsay’s doctors going forward?
Yes. Judge Michael P. Doolin denied the providers’ motion to dismiss on November 19, 2026. The ruling does not decide whether they were negligent.
Who is Patrick Clancy suing?
Psychiatrist Dr. Jennifer A. Tufts, psychiatric nurse practitioner Rebecca H. Jollotta, Aster Mental Health, Inc., and South Shore Health System, Inc.
What is the duty to warn law in Massachusetts?
G.L. c. 123, § 36B. A licensed mental health professional generally has no duty to protect a patient’s potential victims unless the patient communicated an explicit threat to kill or seriously injure a reasonably identified person and had the apparent intent and ability to carry it out, or the patient had a known history of violence that created a clear and present danger.
Did the judge find Lindsay Clancy told her doctors she wanted to harm her children?
No. On a motion to dismiss the court assumes the complaint’s allegations are true. The judge held the allegations were enough to proceed. Lindsay Clancy’s criminal lawyer has said she never told her providers that, and both providers testified at her trial that she did not.
Can a hospital be liable when a psychiatric patient harms someone?
Possibly. In Williams v. Steward Health Care Sys., LLC, 480 Mass. 286 (2018), the SJC held that § 36B limits individual professionals’ duty but does not eliminate a hospital’s own common law duty. Judge Doolin cited that case in this ruling.
Sources: Memorandum of Decision and Order on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Clancy v. Tufts, Norfolk Superior Court No. 2682CV00071 (November 19, 2026), as published by Los Angeles Magazine; Globe magazine, November 20, 2026; G.L. c. 123, § 36B as published by the Massachusetts Legislature; cited cases verified on CourtListener; earlier Boston Globe, WBZ and Court TV reporting as cited in our prior coverage. General information, not legal advice.
