SJC Orders New SORB Hearing After Expert-Fund Denial: Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Board (SJC-13847, Aug. 18, 2026)

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated a level-two sex-offender classification and ordered a new hearing after the Sex Offender Registry Board refused to fund an expert witness. The case turns on a question the court left open a year ago: whether empirical evidence supports using multiple offenses to predict not just risk of reoffense but degree of dangerousness.

John Doe, convicted in 2017 of two counts of indecent assault and battery on a child under fourteen, has been classified by SORB six times since then. Each classification landed him at level two. The saga involved recording malfunctions, legal errors, and shifting applications of regulatory factors as the law evolved.

The Expert Request

Before his sixth classification hearing in January 2023, Doe asked SORB to pay for a psychiatrist or psychologist. He wanted the expert to testify on two points: whether applying factor thirty-seven (a catch-all provision allowing SORB to consider any information useful in assessing dangerousness) to his multiple offenses was scientifically sound, and what current research says about repetitive sexual behavior and degree of dangerousness when there is no evidence of prior offenses or compulsive conduct.

The hearing examiner denied the motion, writing that expert testimony on factor thirty-seven’s application was not unique to Doe. A Superior Court judge upheld that decision, adding that the statute expressly requires SORB to consider the number of prior offenses when determining dangerousness.

The Shifting Landscape

Before 2019, SORB routinely applied factor two (repetitive and compulsive behavior) to multiple offenses as evidence of reoffense risk. A Superior Court judge later ruled that using factor two for repetitive behavior alone, without proof of compulsion, violated due process because no empirical evidence supported the link. SORB did not appeal. The agency conceded error in Doe’s fourth classification on that ground.

On remand, SORB pivoted. In Doe’s fifth classification decision, the board announced it would now consider his multiple offenses under factor thirty-seven to assess dangerousness, not reoffense risk. No empirical studies in the guidelines supported this application. SORB’s brief to the SJC conceded as much, stating that research linking repetitive offending to dangerousness does not exist.

What the Court Held

Justice Kafker, writing for a unanimous court, ruled that denying expert funds was an abuse of discretion. Doe’s motion was not a generic request for an expert to opine on dangerousness. He identified a specific, novel issue: whether applying factor thirty-seven to multiple offenses in the absence of compulsive behavior rests on any scientific foundation.

The court emphasized that SORB bears the burden to justify its application of regulatory factors and to ensure guidelines track available research. Allowing Doe to challenge that foundation with expert testimony serves that goal. The recent invalidation of factor two’s application to repetitive behavior made the request particularly apt.

The Reasoning

SORB regulations permit expert funds when an offender identifies a condition or circumstance special to him, explains its connection to risk or dangerousness, and specifies the type of expert needed. The hearing examiner faulted Doe on the first prong, saying his request was not unique to him.

The SJC rejected that interpretation. Special does not mean unique in the sense that testimony would apply to no one else. In prior cases, the court approved expert funding for testimony about women offenders generally and about the difference between compulsive and repetitive behavior. What matters is that the request is not generic. Doe’s motion targeted a specific gap: the empirical basis for applying factor thirty-seven to his repetitive conduct after factor two’s use for the same conduct was invalidated.

The statutory directive to consider the number of prior offenses does not foreclose the constitutional challenge. Expert testimony could be used to argue that the statute, as applied through factor thirty-seven without scientific support, violates due process. The agency should create a factual record so a reviewing court can assess the claim.

Why It Matters

The decision tees up the question the court sidestepped in Doe No. 527962 last year: whether due process permits SORB to use multiple offenses as a proxy for dangerousness when no empirical evidence links the two. A proper record with expert testimony will let the court answer that question on the merits.

The ruling also clarifies the standard for expert-fund requests. Offenders need not show that their circumstances are sui generis. They must show that the request is tailored to a specific scientific or legal issue, not a generalized plea for a second opinion on classification.

For Doe, the practical effect is a new hearing with expert assistance. Whether that leads to a different classification or a constitutional ruling on factor thirty-seven remains to be seen.

Read the full opinion: Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 526105 v. Sex Offender Registry Board (SJC-13847, August 18, 2026).